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L Á S Z L Ó KÖRINEK* 
Global and Hungarian Tendencies in Law Enforcement 
Abstract. The author explores current trends in law enforcement and criminal policy. The first 
part of the essay focuses on the methodological and theoretical difficulties with describing the 
state of global crime. Special attention is given to the peculiarities of post-9/11 developments 
in the field of crime prevention and anti-terrorist legal regimes, a situation in which the efforts 
to combat terrorism have crossed the traditional boundaries of criminal law enforcement and the 
policy and practice of pre-emptive strikes is difficult to fit even into the recognized conceptual 
framework of crime prevention. Following this, the author turns to the analysis of decentralizing 
and privatizing public security and law enforcement and the question of security partnerships. 
Prior to the assessment of the concept and paradigm of human security-which is at the 
heart of the inquiry-Professor Körinek provides an overview of the social effects of crime and 
security protection, the social perception of crime and law enforcement and the interrelation 
of politics and criminal law. The author calls for a complex and global approach when 
approaching the question of liberty and security, since the traditional distinctions between 
the military and the police as well as domestic and external security are fading. By using a 
comparative methodology (incorporating a wide range of international examples along with 
references to Hungarian criminal policy developments and constitutional jurisprudence) the 
author claims that the new element in the human security approach is that it places the 
perspective of individuals and their communities before the security interests of the national 
or even the whole international community, and thus is able to resolve the dichotomy that is 
generally presumed to exist between human rights and security. 
Keywords: criminology, statistics, law enforcement, data protection, terrorism, transition, 
community policing, crime prevention, privatisation, private security, criminal policy, human 
security 
I believe-and through my work would like to serve-the idea that criminology 
should be a science that contributes positively to the everyday practice of fighting 
crime, even on the local level. This does not however relieve the scholar of the 
responsibility for facing up to those more general consequences that he has 
contributed to through his work or through his professional neglects. 
Corresponding Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Professor, University 
of Pécs, H-7622 Pécs, 48-as tér 1. 
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2 LÁSZLÓ KÖRINEK 
Today it is not necessary anymore to argue in great detail that the whole 
world 's security has an increasingly direct impact on our own situation. This is 
the very practical consideration that induced me-beyond the natural evolution 
in scientific thinking which tends towards attempting to grasp global issues-to 
deal with the topic referred to in title of this article. Initially the title was to be 
"Where does the world progress?", but the verb "progress" has inevitable 
positive connotations, while in reality the dissipation of the concerns expressed 
in this article seems doubtful for now. 
1. The state of crime 
It should be noted in advance that statistical data concerning the "state of 
global crime" are even less informative than data collected from individual 
legal systems. Behind the general numbers there are different, sometimes even 
downright contradictory behaviours, which are condemnable in some contexts, 
laudable in other, or at least part of citizens' fundamental rights. As an example 
for the latter one could refer to the Second Amendment of the United States' 
constitution, which enshrines the right to bear arms as a fundamental right 
fo r citizens, while in other countries the private ownership of firearms is 
prohibited or very restricted. 
So I note with an emphasis on all these advance warning that a survey 
commissioned by the United Nations for the organisation's 11th congress in 
Bangkok on crime prevention and administration of criminal justice reported 
that the number of recorded crimes (based on data from 57 countries) increased 
by 12% between 1995 and 2002. The vast majority of countries investigated 
were European and American. The report itself emphasises that criminal 
statistics in the individual countries are different.1 comprehensive numbers for 
the period under investigation were only available from 12 countries, for the 
rest corrective statistical methods had to be applied. Survey on victimization 
provided data for the period from 1992-2002, and these indicate decreasing 
numbers in most categories, but a careful investigation (citizens' willingness 
to report crimes as well as problems of uncovering them lead to vast differences 
between popular perception of criminal activity and the number of criminal acts 
1
 See Kertész, I.: A bünügyi statisztika nemzetközi összehasonlításának lehetőségei 
[Options for a comparative crime statistics-analysis]. Statisztikai Szemle, 1996. 1. 16-34. 
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registered by the authorities) reveals that there is no irreconcilable contradiction 
between the statistical data concerning criminal acts that become known.2 
There is therefore reason for concern-but certainly not panic-on account of 
the reported data. There is even less cause for demanding exceptional powers 
or extraordinary licences for combating crime. As the example of dropping US 
criminal rates shows, crime growth can be stopped with the strengthening of 
procedural safeguards, the stability of legal unity and the mobilisation of social 
resources based on democratic co-operation. 
Nonetheless, something changed in the area of law enforcement. Barriers 
were broken, centuries-old constitutional walls were-torn down. The reason is 
not quantitative but qualitative. The exact time of the beginning of the new era 
in our thinking about security is: 11th September 2001. 
It is true that the date and the associated terror attack with its tragic 
outcome has only symbolic significance for many, as terrorism itself, as well 
as organised crime and especially drug crimes, which had triggered similar 
responses earlier, reach back a very long time. September l l ' h major effect in 
this regard was to convince a significant portion of Americans that they need 
to give up their aversion to the state, as only a strong public power, capable 
of defending the nation from domest ic and external threats alike, can be an 
effective protection from new threats. 
One could sense the new direction already in the US president's first speeches 
following the attack. In his statement to Congress on 20,h September 2001 he 
declared: 
We will direct every resource at our command-every means of diplomacy, 
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial 
influence, and every necessary weapon of war-to the disruption and to the 
defeat of the global terror network. 
In the same speech George W. Bush also responds to the question what 
Americans need to do. He asks them to live their lives, hug their children, 
uphold the American values, to continue to support the victims of the tragedy 
and to co-operate with the FBI agents investigating the attack. He asks them 
for patience with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter 
:
 State of Crime Report: The State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide-Report of 
the Secretary-General, A/Conf.203/3. UN, Bangkok, 2005. points 35-38. 12. 
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security and for continued participation and confidence in the American economy. 
Finally: pray.1 
It hardly needs complex proof: this is the message of the caring and protecting 
state. It does not require any individual initiative for fighting terrorism, and it 
wants activity only insofar as law enforcement officials request. 
2. Being protected, observed and exposed 
Experience shows that people gladly make sacrifices for the efficiency of law 
enforcement . If necessary, they contribute financially to combating crime 
and they are even willing to change their lifestyle. Citizens generally accept 
surveillance cameras recording events in their private lives. Those who can 
afford it hire bodyguards or employ difficult technical solutions for the super-
vision of their residence from a distance. The anxiety resulting f rom the 
threat of crime therefore leads to the situation in which being protected 
simultaneously means being observed. 
In a broader context the storage of personal information about us in various 
databases also ties into this phenomenon. This cannot all be unequivocally 
attributed to an overzealous state engaged in keeping an eye on its citizens at 
all times, since there are many known cases in which citizens-especially in an 
effor t to help uncover cases that elicited widespread public outrage, such as 
particularly grave and violent crimes-provided information voluntarily. A case 
in point was an investigation in the German province of Lower-Saxony, where 
persons within the presumed perpetrator 's age range provided DNA samples in 
massive numbers. These samples then ultimately led to the identification of the 
murderer of the child who had fallen victim to a violent sexual crime, and the 
perpetrator confessed another similar crime as well.1 
It is also true at the same time that data is not always provided voluntarily. 
Article 3 (2) (b) of our Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data 
and Public Access to Data of Public Interest, specifically mentioned-among 
other things-the interests of crime prevention and criminal investigations as 
circumstances in which the law could even prescribe the processing of special 
personal data. It is also a fact that today there are global systems established 
for the purposes of collecting data without publicly available information on 
1
 Bush, G. W.: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20. 
September 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
4
 See Hochgartz, P.: Zur Perseveranz bei Sexualmorden-Zugleich ein Bericht über 
die spektakuläre Ermittlung eines Mehrfachtäters. Kriminalistik, 54 (2000) 322-327. 
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the criteria chosen for their selection; here it is not only the aspect of volun-
tariness that takes a backseat to cr ime prevention and law enforcement 
interests, but in fact even the service of the latter is increasingly dubious. 
Rumours on plans for developing genera l -g lobal -wire tapping and sur-
veillance systems abounded already in the last decade of the previous 
century. According to the well-respected civil rights organisation Privacy 
International, the EU and the FBI planned to jointly establish such a sys tem/ 
There is no reliable information on whether it was realised, but it is safe to 
assert that given the current regulatory framework it could hardly operate 
legally. In 1998 a document was drafted to provide information to the 
European Parliament on this issue, and it stated that such plans exist, but they 
have not yet been presented to the strategic decision-makers or the relevant 
control forums. At the same time the report notes as fact that such a system 
practically exists already (ECHELON), but under the control of the United 
States/ It is hard to even argue with the notion that information gleaned from 
such a system could be used, for instance, in the context of economic 
competition as well.7 
In reality the issue reaches even further: the efforts to combat terrorism 
have crossed the traditional boundaries of criminal law enforcement" The 
policy and practice of pre-emptive strikes is difficult to fit even into the 
recognized conceptual framework of crime prevention. 
Crossing the boundaries of traditional criminal law has an immediate effect 
on the foundations of constitutionality and the rule of law. The Constitutional 
Court emphasised the mutual conditionality of criminal law and fundamental 
law in several decisions. In this vein: 
It follows from the constitutionality of the legal system that a fundamental 
requirement regarding the state's exercise of its penal powers is that it 
adheres to constitutional principles: the basis for exercising penal power can 
only and exclusively be constitutional criminal law. ...It is the position of 
the Constitutional Court that a constitutional state governed by the rule of 
5
 See: http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/tapping/statewatch_tap_297.htm] 
'' See European Parliament: An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control. 
PE 166.499/lnt.St./Exec.Sum./en, Luxembourg, 1998. 
See European Parliament: Report on the existence of a global system for the 
interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) 
(2001/2098(INI)). Final, A5-0264/2001. Strasbourg, 11. July 2001. 
h
 See Sofaer, A. D.: Playing Games with Terrorists. New England Law Review, 36 
(2002) 903-909. 
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law can only react to legal violations with adherence to the rule of law. 
The legal order of a state governed by the rule of law cannot deny anyone 
rule of law safeguards. The reason is that everyone is entitled to these as a 
fundamental right. Based on the rule of law even just claims cannot be 
enforced if rule of law safeguards are disregarded. Though justice and 
moral cause can ser\>e as motives for establishing culpability, the legal basis 
for punishability has to be constitutional. ... The Constitution's Article 8(1) 
and (2) serve as the guiding rule concerning the constitutional requirements 
on criminal law. According to these paragraphs the Republic of Hungary 
recognizes a human's inviolable and inalienable rights, the respect for and 
protection of these rights is the state's primary obligation. An important 
demand imposed by the Constitution is that 'the rules concerning 
fundamental rights and obligations are specified by law, which may not 
constrain the essential content of the fundamental rights, however'.9 
It can be stated as a fact that the constitutional safeguards serving to protect 
fundamental rights were developed precisely with a view to criminal law, 
starting simply from the generally accepted fact that this is the area where 
fundamental rights are or can be most severely restricted. Pointing beyond 
the concrete procedure and decision at hand, this is probably what motivated 
the Constitutional Court to s tate- in its decision 23/1990 (X. 31) on the 
unconstitutionality of the death penalty-that the right to life and dignity as an 
absolute right imposes a limitation on the state's penal powers. 
In spite of the broad array of public power efforts at protecting the essential 
preconditions of human life (for example environmental protection), it is safe 
to assert that this absolute value is considerably less protected than the areas 
falling under the purview of criminal law. If somebody intentionally kills 
someone else, then he can expect a harsh punishment, but the public power 
may not take his life, no matter what behaviour he displays in the course of the 
proceedings against him. The very same person can be legally killed (though 
not with outright intent) in the case of firearm use by the police, if he refuses 
arrest.10 The Israeli security forces ' "focused prevention" policy persons-
generally used following a rocket attack-in reality denotes the liquidation of 
persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities." Though one could debate 
9
 1 1/1992 (III. 5.) Decision of the Consti tutional Court . 
10
 9/2004 (III. 30.) Decision of the Constitutional Court. 
11
 See Kretzmer, D.: Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions 
or Legitimate Means of Defence? The European Journal of International Law, 16 (2005) 
171-212. 
GLOBAL AND H U N G A R I A N TENDENCIES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 7 
the necessity or constitutionality of such a policy, it can hardly be doubted that 
the frequent killing of bystanders (often children) in the process is absolutely 
unjustified in terms of criminal policy. 
Regrettably the other fundamental value, human dignity, is also increasingly 
subordinated to the goals of fighting terrorism. Article 54 of our Constitution 
logically links the protection of human life and dignity with the prohibition 
of torture, inhumane, cruel and degrading treatment or punishment. There are 
circumstances under which extinguishing human life is accepted by interna-
tional human rights conventions, but torture never is.13 Nevertheless-primarily 
with reference to the war on terrorism-today the real occurrence of interrogation 
practices that employ torture is increasingly openly acknowledged, even in 
the judicial practice of systems that call themselves constitutional.1 ' Moreover, 
there are even attempts to institutionalise it in constitutional forms.14 Domesti-
cally, too, some have called for placing the members of terrorist organisations 
and their supports beyond the scope of law in the framework of a new inter-
national consensus.15 
It is undeniable that terrorism is really an immense threat to people 's 
security. Consequently, the principle of necessity and proportionality used as a 
constitutional test could in some cases lead to a different conclusion f rom the 
ones we are accustomed to, in terms of the means used to combat this 
phenomenon. The question is, however-and this is where the issue ties into the 
subject of this s tudy-is in how far these exceptional authorisations will (or 
can) remain in the realm of fighting terrorism? The link between money 
laundering and the financial support for political violence16 as well as considera-
tions of pre-emption suggest that the special-data processing and o t h e r -
12
 See the UN Secretary General 's statement: Press Release, SG/SM/9373 OBV 428, 
17lh June 2004, New York. 
13
 See Crelinsten, R. D.: The World of Torture-A Constructed Reality. Theoretical 
Criminology, 7 (2003) 293-318. 
14
 See Filó, M.: Az inkvizítor védelmében - a kínzás jogállami apológiája? (Protecting 
the inquisitor-a rule of law justification for torture?] Fundamentum, 9 (2005) 89-97 as well 
as Dershowitz, A. M.: Why Terrorism Works. New Haven-London, 2002. 131-163. 
" Kiss Á. P.: A hadviselés szabályai és a nemzetközi terrorizmus [The law of armed 
conflicts and international terorrism|. Új Honvédségi Szemle, 59 (2005) 115. 
16
 See Gál I. L.: A pénzmosás és a terrorizmus finanszírozása [Money laundering and 
financing terrorism]. In: Körinek L.-Kőhalmi L.-Herke Cs. (ed.): Emlékkönyv Irk Albert 
egyetemi tanár szidetésének 120. évfordulójára. Studia Juridica Auctoritate Universitates 
Pécs Publicata, Pécs, 2005. 37-41, as well as Sorel, J.-M.: Some Questions about the 
Definition of Terrorism and the Fight against its Financing. European Journal of Inter-
national Law, 14 (2003) 365-378. 
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authorisations ought to be extended to apply to background financial/economic 
operations as well (see for instance Act LIX of 2002, enacted on the basis of 
the international convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in New York in its 54th session on 9lh December 1999, on the scaling backing 
of financing terrorism). You could expand the circle even further: it is 
undeniable the terrorism and organised crime-primarily but not exclusively in 
the realm of f inancing-display numerous common features and points of 
intersection.17 Thus it seems hardly just if ied to draw substantial distinctions 
regarding the tools that can be employed by the public power in approaching 
the two issues, and generally this distinction is indeed not made (see for 
instance the explanation issued in support of the amendment of Articles 1 - 4 
of Act LXXV of 1999 on the Provision of Combating Organised Crime and 
Certain Phenomena connected thereto). But it does not end here either. 
Research on the subject has shown that there are numerous criminal acts that, 
though they are committed in support of political violence or in connection 
with it, cannot in legal terms be categorised as being connected to terrorism or 
organised crime.18 
It needs to be emphasised that prevention is an especially key area in terms 
of the special tools used, and this is also an area in which in the majority of 
cases one cannot know in advance what will end up becoming really relevant 
in the course of the investigation or in terms of immediate pre-emption 
(impeding an act). Thus inevitably data will begin to pile up that is unnecessary 
in terms of realising the original goal but could be used to scale back other acts 
that pose a threat to society. This is especially so in the case of countries-such 
as Hungary, for instance-where the threat of terrorist acts is rather low, but the 
authorities responsible for security are constantly active. 
According to the consistent application of the principle of purpose limitation 
all information gathered with special authorisations and with special methods 
should be (and theoretically has to be) excluded from a criminal procedure, if 
originally their potential disclosure would not have allowed for the use of 
special authorisations. By contrast the professionals responsible for security 
reasonably assert that it cannot be in the interest of the legislator to render data 
17
 See Bibes. P.: Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism-Colombia, a Case 
Study. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 17 (2001) 243-258. 
IS
 See Hamm, M. S.: Cr imes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory. Research, 
and Prevention. Washington D. C., 2005. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/ 
211203.pdf 
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obtained with the most efficient tools and with a serious investment of resources 
inaccessible to law enforcement.1 '1 
It should be noted that while data collection and prevention in general, as 
well as criminal investigations, have experienced profound transformations, 
the study and practice of penalties has displayed a kind of return to classical, 
conservative principles. The penalty has to be proportional to the gravity of the 
deed.20 At the same time in many places, Hungary among them, we can observe 
tendencies that divert the practice of applying sanctions f rom strict propor-
tionality to promising more severe punishments, either out of utilitarian or 
political power considerations.21 Prison (deprivation of liberty) as a social/poli-
tical/legal response to criminal behaviour has regained its role and importance 
which it had somewhat lost in the prior decades of correction-focused trends.22 
Overall it can be stated that the individual 's and civil society communities ' 
exposure to the public power has grown to a very significant degree, all the 
while there have been no observable benefits of limiting fundamental rights in 
terms of improved public security (though there have been no signs of a marked 
deterioration either). 
3. Decentralisation, socialisation and privatisation in the defence of 
public security 
At the same time it is apparent that in certain respects the state's security 
monopoly-in contrast to the developments described above- i s loosening, and 
in some specific areas it is completely relinquished. The explanation is that the 
central power 's massively increased control possibilities do not simultaneously 
indicate an interest in fully exploiting all these resources. The individual's and 
the community 's exposure consists in the authorities' capability to observe who 
telephone what, when, why and whom. In reality the authorities responsible for 
security need to take account only of conversations that are important to t h e m -
such as those related to international organised crime and terrorism-but the 
14
 Hetesy Zs.: A büntetőeljárás szükségtelen eleme: a célhoz kötött bizonyíték elve 
[An unnecessary part of criminal procedure]. In: Körinek L. (ed.): Tanulmányok 
Finszter Géza 60. születésnapjára. PhD tanulmányok 4. [Essays on Geza Finszter 's 60 ,h 
birthday], Pécs, 2005. 74. 
Szabó A.: A büntetőjog reformja [Reforming Criminal Law]. Budapest, 1992. 255. 
21
 See Sichor, D.: Penal Policies at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. 
Criminal Justice Review, 25 (2000) 1-30. 
22
 Estrada, F.: The Transformation of the Politics of Crime in High Crime Societies. 
European Journal of Criminology, 1 (2004)419-443 . 
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caller does not know the criteria for selection or registration, and still less its 
concrete results. At the same time the interest of central (federal) authorities and 
bodies of political power is that there be an acceptable level of public security 
and stability in society. Sooner or later the recognition that the local factors and 
problems influencing security can-in some cases decisively-be better handled 
where they arise is going to dawn on the state leadership. Shifting interests will 
also transform the approach to security issues. The attendance and popularity 
(and thus profitability) of places that are by their nature public but are privately 
owned (shopping centres, entertainment facilities, etc.) are obviously improved 
by police protection. Under such conditions enlisting the owners and operators-or 
the person and property protection enterprises they employ for safeguarding 
their assets-hardly requires complex justification. 
Relinquishing the state's monopoly naturally only applies to the immediate 
security protection activities. Threat prevention and the administration of justice 
still belong to the state's realm of responsibilities. It no longer fulfils this task 
alone, however, but rather serves as a coordinating director in a stage play that 
features multiple roles. In the context of this new co-operation between the 
police, security companies, local governments and other bodies, civil organisa-
tions, as well as individual citizens a-and in some areas more than one—security 
partnership emerges. In the long term operation of this joint effort the state 
creates the legal framework with a view towards ensuring that no area with 
security relevance remains uncovered. The state plans and creates the conditions 
that stimulate the participants' activities. Thus it "governs remotely": it accepts 
that it cannot provide for everyone's security at the desired level. Nonetheless, 
there still remain areas of activity that cannot be privatised. 
The process can therefore most aptly be described as follows: a state with 
limited capabilities confers part of the protection tasks on enterprises and 
citizens, who by assuming these tasks enter into a risk community, security 
partnership relationship with the state. 
There can be few doubts as to the necessity of these security partnerships. 
The mode of realisation, however, requires immense circumspection and the 
very careful weighing of interests and constitutional values. This is necessary 
because within the framework of the new forms of close co-operation, the 
private security companies serving private interests-and of course the clients 
behind them-wil l inevitably gain some influence over the operations of the 
public power, while the state for its part will also undoubtedly extend its 
intervention and control possibilities to relations that constitutionally belong 
within the realm of the pr ivate sphere. If the framework of co-operation is 
not very clearly specified and realised with a close view to constitutional 
principles, then there is the danger of the emergence of a law enforcement 
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complex that is disquieting in terms of both, the state's legal functioning and 
the protection of fundamental rights. Hoogenboom refers as "grey policing" to 
the system in which the security organisations belonging to various different 
sectors are engaged in informal relationships in which the boundaries of responsi-
bility become blurred.21 Research has shown the validity of Hogenboom's 
conclusions and the dangers of inscrutable security co-operations.24 Cit izens ' 
voluntary engagement is not unproblematic either. On the one hand they depend 
on power interests, and on the other hand there is the problem that the civil 
guard and similar units are also subject to the control of persons or groups with 
their own respective interests and values, which in no way guarantees an 
operation that is compatible with constitutional principles.21 
All the above does not cast doubt on the raison d'être of security partner-
ships, since in spite of the differences the basic values (personal or property 
security) are common, and the protection f rom dangers is a necessary element 
of all human activity and behaviour. One of the advantages of harmonised 
public and private security co-operation is diversity, that is the ability to 
flexibly adapt to the given requirements. There are many different models of 
partnership and their study could significantly enrich our knowledge of threat 
and crime prevention, and even law enforcement.26 
The Hungarian national strategy for crime prevention [Annex to resolution 
115/2003 (X. 28.) of Parliament] has given a substantial impetus to local and 
regional planning and coordination. Both, the local government documents on 
the objectives, principles and methods for protecting public security, as well 
as the institutionalising security partnerships are important elements of this 
tendency. 
23
 See Hoogenboom, В.: Grey Policing: A Theoretical Framework. Policing and 
Society, 2 (1991) 17-30. 
~
4
 See Fairchild, P.: The Emerging Police Complex: Hoogenboom and Australian Inter 
Agency Cooperation. The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 27 
(1994) 2-59 . 
25
 See Funk, A.: Die Fragmentierung öffentlicher Sicherheit-Das Verhältnis von 
staatlicher und privater Sozialkontrolle in der politikwissenschaftlichen Diskussion. In: 
Sack, F.-Voß, M.-Frehsee, D.-Funk, A.-Reinke, H. (Hrsg.): Privatisierung staatlicher 
Kontrolle: Befunde, Konzepte, Tendenzen. Baden-Baden, 1995. 49-53, as well as Bolyai J.: 
Társadalmi részvétel a rendfenntartásban közösségi rendőrség [Social involvment in law 
enforcement-community policing). Kandidátusi értekezés, Budapest, 1994. 122-154. 
"''See Pitschas, R.-Stober, R.: Kriminalprävention durch Sicherheitspartnerschaften. 
Köln 2000, as well as Terpstra, J.: Models of Local Security Networks: On the Diversity of 
Local Security Networks in the Netherlands. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 7 
(2005) 37-46. 
12 LÁSZLÓ KÖRINEK 
4. The social effects of cr ime and security protection 
It is a commonplace that crime is a social mass phenomenon whose causes-
according to a significant portion of the scientific community-are rooted in 
coexistence, more specifically the disorders of coexistence. Another obvious 
fact: crime does not merely threaten the legal order and the specific objects 
of the criminal acts, but in its own way it also shapes the peop le ' s and 
communities ' behaviour and life. It is a lso evident that the access to tools of 
protection, having those at one 's disposal is an important factor of subjective 
and objective security, ultimately of life quality overall. 
The population of a society can be grouped in relation to two extreme 
poles. Around the one pole are those whose victimisation is rather unlikely, as 
their situations allows them to install supplementary security equipment and 
to buy security services.27 Nonetheless it must be noted that security cannot 
be listed among the easily maximised goods, as every institution, system, or 
equipment also produces new security hazards, whilst it increases protection 
against o ther threats. M a n y criminal acts are known in which it was the 
security personnel who provided the robbers with the necessary tip-off, in fact 
sometimes the robbers hailed from their ranks. Indira Gandhi was murdered by 
her own bodyguards. 
Still, the most exposed are those who are located near the second pole. 
Their lifestyle, their destitution significantly correlates with a high risk of 
victimisation. Supplementary security is unavailable or less available for them, 
and the cr iminals select potential victims whose vulnerability is greatest. By 
virtue of the "rights of the poor" this g roup must make do with the level of 
security that the state guarantees to all. 
This phenomenon is pernicious, because for one it marks the failure of the 
20,h century 's aspiration to achieve social (welfare) homogeneity, and also 
because it wreaks havoc on society's communi ty consciousness, its sense of 
self-identity. A fragmented society cannot feel, live and act according to 
common criteria of order. Disintegration is a negative process for the progress 
of society as a whole, and its effect on public security further widens and 
deepens the gap between the different strata of the population.28 
In reality this is about even more than that. Even with the best regulation 
and strictest control the abovementioned security partnerships cannot resolve 
*
7
 Salgó L.: Az új típusú biztonság [New Security], Budapest, 1994. 59. 
Ferge Zs.: Szegénység és bűnözés, azaz: van-e dezintegrációs és decivilizációs 
veszély? [Poverty and crime: is there a danger of disintegration and de-civilisation?] 
Belügyi Szemle, 37 (1999) 3 - 2 7 . 
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the differences between the various actors participating in protecting public 
safety in some form. This is complemented by the privatisation of communal 
spaces, which can in part be understood absolutely literally, while in another 
sense it means that significant manifestations of social life (for instance 
shopping, spending one 's leisure time) increasingly take place in private places. 
As a consequence the poor, as well as members of groups marginalised on the 
basis of social prejudices, are more exposed to harassment, occasionally even 
expulsion by security personnel. Nota bene, the public power itself uses 
solutions that restrict people's f reedom of movement (bans, house arrests, etc). 
Another consideration that ought not to be neglected is that today the 
number of private police exceeds the personnel of the official bodies entrusted 
with ensuring public security. 
According to official statistics there were 43 000 private investigator 
positions in the US in 2004-employees and entrepreneurs24-while the number 
of security guards somewhat exceeded one mil l ion/" At this time there were 
842 000 police positions,11 including investigators. 
In Hungary the numbers are vastly different. According to the Chamber 
of Bodyguards, Property Protection and Private Detectives there are 112 066 
persons with a licence that authorises them to conduct private security activities, 
and even those qualified as actively engaged are 69 951 as of 1st September 
2005,32 which is more than double the number of active police personnel. The 
total number of the latter, according to the January 1" 2005 statistic of the 
National Police Department (ORFK) was 29 449.33 
The situation wherein the burghers live securely in cities surrounded by 
walls, while those stuck outside endure in hazardous living conditions, is 
reminiscent of medieval conditions. Just as back then, today, too, many people 
aspire to become members of the exclusive club, which naturally implies the 
exclusion of many people. 
Poverty and exclusion do not merely impede access to security services; 
prejudices, as well as efforts resulting from misinterpreted and impatient notions 
of political efficacy result in deprivation itself being considered some sort of 
'' See http://www.bls.gOv/oco/ocosl57.htm#emply 
30
 See http://www.bls.gOv/oco/ocosl59.htm#emply 
31
 See http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl60.htm 
32
 See http://www.szvmszk.hu/node/6 
33
 See (http://www.orfk.hu/magyar_rendor.seg/tortenet/jelen_szamokban.html 
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deviance, even straight-out criminal behaviour.'4 Just as it was expressed by the 
outspoken monographer of the domestic police between the two world wars: 
...it is a psychologically known fact that the destitute, needy popular 
stratum, or just group, is extraordinarily dangerous to public security, 
wholly unreliable from a national standpoint, and thus not only useless for 
the national society, but rather a burden.35 
Today the public power 's turning on the poor and disadvantaged groups 
manifests itself most strikingly in framework of the still fashionable "zero 
tolerance" principle, which intensifies the policy of exclusion36 even if the state 
may achieve some measure of success in terms of liquidating or alleviating some 
(social) differences, or at least the most flagrant manifestations of marginali-
sation (for instance Roma settlements). It has an especially demoralising effect 
when the penal power is spectacularly lenient towards a suspect that hails from 
the "upper ten thousand" (the prime suspect of the criminal act that caused 
billions in damages was interrogated by the prosecutors in a markedly friendly 
atmosphere, and the popular folk singer sentenced to incarceration was often 
allowed to leave the prison for a few days, etc.) 
It also has to be said that the helplessness resulting from destitution and 
social exclusion can really veer those towards the world of crime who see not 
other possibility for improving their lot. Though of course the vast majority of 
them remain exploited and disgraced pariahs in that environment, too.'7 
5. Petty crime and major crime 
Opposition parties aspiring to a ruling role generally like to refer to the incum-
bent administration's suspected corruption or other shady deals, at the same time 
promising that if elected they will mercilessly expose all abuses regardless of 
w h o the perpetrators may be. As far as they are successful, however, the 
34
 See Crowther, Ch.: Thinking about the "Underclass"-Towards a Political 
Economy of Policing. Theoretical Criminology, 4 (2000) 149-167 as well as Gönczöl 
К.: Bűnös szegények [Guilty poor], Budapest. 1990. 1990. 
33
 Nagy J.: A község rendészete [Community law enforcement]. Szombathely, 1938. 
171. 
36
 See Ferge Zs.: A szétszakadó társadalom [Disintegrating society]. Belügyi Szemle, 
38 (2000) 14. 
37
 See Forrai J.: Szegénység és bűnözés különös fo rmája a budapesti utcákon: a férfi-
és női prostitúció [A special form of poverty and crime on the streets of Budapest: male 
and female prostitution]. Belügyi Szemle, 37 (1999) 91 -101 . 
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results are usually pretty slim, mostly straight-out disillusioning (witness for 
instance the activities of the short-lived State Secretariat for Public Funds). In 
the criminal proceedings concerning the astonishingly high commission paid 
from public coffers the successive court verdicts were diametrically opposed, 
and in terms of the key charges the case ended in the acquittal of the accused. 
The investigation concerning the oil affairs-that is their taking on the charac-
teristics of organised crime-began in 1996 but has failed to produce even a 
first instance ruling. 
In the last decade of the previous century there was such an underworld 
war in Hungary, in the course of which the attacks-typically bombing-o f the 
criminals against each other created an almost unbearable situation. The interior 
department and police leadership at the time employed methods reminiscent of 
efforts aimed at total control, such as comprehensive identity checks, and as a 
result they apprehended 1.574 persons, 153 of whom were caught as a result 
of arrest warrants. 252 persons, mainly of Ukrainian, Romanian and Asian 
nationality, were expelled from the country due to lacking residence permits, 
employment without permit and other miscellaneous violations. Charges were 
brought against 268 persons on the basis of strong suspicion of criminal acts. In 
a parliamentary session the minister of the interior reported all this as a success. 
He also added that even though these measures do not offer a solut ion to the 
problems, there are nonetheless encouraging signs in the investigations 
concerning the bombings as well. We must note at this point that a significant 
portion of the bombings and their perpetrators remains unexposed even today. 
The differing efficiency of law enforcement in fighting petty crime and 
major crime is a result of several factors. 
Above all there is a difference in visibility and the closely related willingness 
to report crimes. In the case of major crimes the perpetrators' education, 
technical skills and levels of information increase the chance of failing to 
uncover, and finding evidence is also difficult. In the case of minor crimes this 
is usually not the case. 
The other connection is that the administration of criminal just ice needs 
measurable results which-just as commercial companies-i t can best achieve 
with "mass production". It is a different matter that the possibilities open to the 
administration of justice (for instance the difference between misdemeanour and 
criminal proceedings) allow for fewer simplifications, and as a result the 
handling of petty offences does not reduce the strain on judicial administration 
of justice proportionally to their minor importance. Thus it can happen that 
courts become "clogged up" with cases that pose minor threats to society while 
as a result the capacities originally set aside for trials on major crimes are 
increasingly difficult to mobilise. This goes some way towards explaining 
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how in criminal l aw-and as a part of this phenomenon also in the context of 
court tr ials-fundamental requirements are formulated that seek to counter the 
difficulties in finding sufficient evidence by either renouncing or at least relaxing 
rule of law values (introduction of witnesses that the defence may not encounter, 
admitt ing into evidence materials from clandestine information gathering 
without revealing the sources or the methods for obtaining them, etc). 
Increasing eff iciency by abandoning rule of law principles is dubious to say 
the least. In my opinion we rather ought to start from the notion that minor 
crimes-though they affect a much larger group of victims-are altogether not as 
dangerous to society as terrorism, extremely well-funded organised crime 
structures that threaten the creation of alternative social structures, or environ-
mental pollution that threatens the health of millions. 
In the case of petty crimes it is more effective therefore to expand alternative 
sanctions that also contain civil rights elements. Simultaneously the capacity 
for combating ma jo r crimes ought to be improved and increased both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms. 
6. The social perception of crime and law enforcement 
It is hardly debatable that in democratic societies public perceptions, the citizens' 
opinions, sentiments and especially their fear of crime cannot be disregarded 
when it comes to the public power ' s approach to crime, nor in criminological 
research. 
Generally it can be asserted that two kinds of approaches exist in terms of 
social reaction to crime. The first suggests that the self-restraint of criminal 
law is appropriate, since the decriminalisation experiences tend to be rather 
good overall. If society does not wish to receive back savage evil-doers back 
from prison, then the humanisation of penal law is imperative. 
The other approach, referring to law and order, proclaims exactly the opposite. 
According to this thinking permissive criminal policy is a fiasco. Criminals do 
not deserve society's good faith or patience. Prisons are either completely 
incapable or extremely inefficient at conveying proper values to people, but it 
does not follow that one should try to humanise prisons, but that criminals 
ought to be locked up for as long as possible, for life if need be. 
People generally tend to hold the latter belief. They perceive severe punish-
ments as the best method for preventing criminal acts. Nonetheless, it is an 
indisputable fact that the punitive approach is not exclusive in reality bu t -
though sometimes in a somewhat contradictory manner-is mixed with more 
tolerant views. The majority of people calling for strict punishments simulta-
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neously accept the need for both, punishments and correctional-type measures.11 
We can also observe a subtle shift in the assessment of the role of retributive 
types of punishment, while there is an increased acceptance of complex 
state/public power responses to crime.39 Proper information on crime and the 
administration of justice plays a very important role in this process, in 
persuading people-for instance in the course of all proceedings that pertain to 
them in any form, or in the media- , furthermore in increasing social partici-
pation in prevention and the administration of criminal justice.4 
A special problem for societies that experienced regime transition is that 
dictatorships generally-including the former socialist systems as well-managed 
to keep crime rates at a low level, at least according to off ic ia l statistics. 
Undeniably the paternalistic state provided people with some sense of security.41 
In contrast, the countries in transition were hit by massive waves of crime 
that struck simultaneously with political démocratisation. It was easy for the 
perception to emerge-as it indeed did-that it was really the constitutional 
fundamental rights safeguards-suddenly taken more seriously-which lead to 
the "police's hands being tied" and thus caused increasing crime.42 Consequently, 
the solution can be nothing but the curtailment of individual liberties, renouncing 
some principles in exchange for increasing the efficiency of law enforcement.43 
It can really be observed that in the transitional states f ree-market based 
38
 Boers, K.: Kriminalitätsfurcht. Pfaffenweiler, 1991. 324 and 325, as well as 
Kerner, H.-J.: Kriminalitätseinschätzung und Innere Sicherheit. Eine Untersuchung über 
die Beurteilung der Sicherheitslage und über das Sicherheitsgefühl in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland, mit vergleichenden Betrachtungen zur Situation im Ausland. 
Wiesbaden, 1980. 225 and Körinek L.: Rejtett bűnözés [Latent crime], Budapest, 1988. 151. 
34
 Körinek L.: Félelem a bűnözéstől [Fear of Crime], Budapest, 1995. 116-117, and 
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governance is mixed with such police-state methods, indeed with such conceptual 
approaches.44 
7. Politics and Criminal Law 
Significant changes in criminal policy usually result from long, arduous 
processes in public thinking. The birth of a new policy is generally preceded 
by the exhaustion of reserves offered by old solutions, by the recognition that 
the previously used methods mark a dead-end. 
This is how it was already in the 17lh century, when as a result of continuously 
harsher penalties almost all legal violations resulted in the gallows, and in 
England, for instance, over two hundred offences were punishable by death. In 
spite of the increasing severity of punishments crime kept rising. The irony of 
the situation was that one of the best opportunities for committing crime was 
offered by public executions, which drew pickpockets and other criminals 
whose acts were also subject to the death penalty.43 
It was Cesare Beccaria who recognized the need for a new perspective by 
emphasising that it was not the severity of the punishment, nor its cruelty, but 
its inevitability that exerted the best deterrent effect.46 He also formulated other 
important, still valid considerations concerning police work and crime prevention. 
Regarding the former, for example, his opinion was that it should only be 
allowed to operate based on clear laws, lest it paves the way for tyranny, which 
always "lurks on the f r inges" of political liberty.4 Beccaria 's ideas on the 
connection between criminal law regulation and prevention are also instructive 
and relevant today: 
Just as nature's permanent and extremely simple laws cannot prevent 
turmoil in the movement of heavenly bodies, human laws, too, between the 
in finite and contradictory powers of attraction of pleasure and pain, cannot 
prevent all disruptions and disorder. Still, this is the illusion harboured by 
narrow-minded people once they attain power. If we forbid people to engage 
in various indifferent activities, then this will not unequivocally mean that 
44
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we pre-empt the crimes resulting from such activities, but rather that we 
create new crimes, that we arbitrarily specify the concepts of virtue and 
crime, which are proclaimed as eternal and immutable. Where would we end 
up if we banned everything that might induce us to commit crimes? One 
would even have to deprive humans of the use of their sensory organs!48 
The world has not changed much since, and neither has the temptations to 
solve its problems through criminal law regulations. It is time to recognise that 
criminal law alone is not capable of solving the problems it addresses. 
As pointed out before, it is beyond dispute that the prevention and the 
reconnaissance preceding criminal investigations, furthermore the war on terror, 
as well as its expansion to include other criminal categories, increasingly takes 
place beyond the f ramework imposed by criminal law, in fact partly beyond 
any legal f rameworks whatsoever. This raises fundamental human rights 
concerns. At the same time one also has to see that politics seeks to "channel 
back" the really great results into the administration of criminal justice-albeit 
with mixed success. International criminal courts are established one after the 
other, and failed dictators are brought to justice. It appears therefore that it is 
"only" the fundamental rights safeguard aspects of applying criminal law that 
are relegated to the background, the expectations f rom deterrent effects are still 
prominent. 
In developing the future role of criminal law we ought to keep in mind that 
it is aimed at individual, externally manifested acts and behaviour, and is thus 
incapable of liquidating or substantially influencing the causes of crime. The 
exception here is the regulation itself, as far as the cause and objective of 
criminalisation is not the protection of general social values, but the interest of 
helping the public power 's operation, in some instance the interest of furthering 
the enforcement of other legal statutes (mala prohibita). 
Article 218 of our criminal code, for instance, ordains a punishment for 
anyone who helps another person to cross the national border without permission 
or in an impermissible method. The state undoubtedly has a right to regulate 
the conditions and modes of border-crossing. Still, it needs to be kept in mind 
that in this case (I would like to emphasise that the current regulation does not 
require the motivation of financial benefits nor other circumstances necessary 
to fulfi l the criteria of a criminal act, that is a purely benignly motivated co-
operation in helping somebody get into the country this way could prove 
sufficient to bring somebody into prison) the subject of the criminal act is in 
essence the furthering of a generally recognised human value (free movement). 
48
 See: ibid. 134-135. 
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Moreover, the border crossing to leave the country, which is also subject to the 
prohibition, is the immediate assertion of an internationally recognised funda-
mental right, in as far as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights- implemented by Act 8 of 1976-, in its Article 12 (2) explicitly states 
that anybody may freely leave any country, including his own. It is true, of 
course, that the exercise of this right can be subject to legal limitations, but the 
restrictions do not change the hierarchy of values. We generally classify as 
mala prohibita those kinds of behaviour in the case of which the applicability 
of penalties depends on whether they were undertaken with authorisation or 
without. Here again I emphasise that the system of authorisations may have-
and indeed usually does have-a reasonable justification, but the fact is that the 
action without permission is subject to punishment even if it does not violate 
anyone ' s interests. In other words: the basis for official action is not the 
concrete social damage caused by the legal violation, or any threat thereof, but 
the public power ' s loss of prestige. 
The politicians who wish to use the seemingly simple tool of criminal law 
regulation for dealing with social problems fail to take into account- though 
as pointed out above Beccaria already called attention to this fact - that bad 
regulation and unjust application of the law not only fail to achieve a deterrent 
effect , but can outright lead to the opposite result: they can increase the number 
or severity of criminal acts.49 
While emphasising the dangers lurking over lawmaking we also need to 
state-precisely because of the clandestine operations that are based on a war-
like conception and are devoid of fundamental rights safeguards in their efforts 
to combat cr ime-that criminal law regulations are also repositories of social 
and constitutional values that need to be enforced in the future as well. 
Above all we need to emphasise the values and most important norms based 
on these values, which provide some kind of security both in an objective and a 
subjective sense as well. The key issue here is that criminal law clearly and 
predictably establishes the expectations whose violation will allow for the 
application of -a l so previously established-legal consequences (nullum crimen, 
nulla poena sine lege). Thereby the rules' moral reinforcement is also achieved.50 
The creation of long term regulations based on generally accepted values also 
44
 See Kury, H.-Ferdinand, Th. N.-Obergfell-Fuchs, J: Does Severe Punishment 
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presumes that ideological perceptions concerning crime and punishment are 
relegated to the background, both in jus t ice policy, as well as in research.81 
Beccaria was right. Prospective punishments have no deterrent effect.52 Of 
course it does not follow that all prisons should immediately be torn down. 
Deterrence is not the only function of punishments and criminal law. It can 
undoubtedly be necessary, for example, to temporarily-or according to the 
reigning official view today even permanently-seclude some perpetrators f rom 
society. Though the severity of the prospective punishment in itself does not 
deter from committing a crime, the enforcement, as well as the authorities' 
treatment of suspects in general does have an effect on the individual and his 
future action. The most important "message" that the administration of criminal 
justice and the public power in general can send the people is: fair treatment. It 
is not surprising that studies have verified: the authorities' fair behaviour and 
the accepted legitimacy of their intervention has a demonstrable impact on 
law-abiding behaviour.5 ' 
A special problem is that in tough political battles criminal law may become 
dysfunctional. When financial resources are scarce, legislators-in the thrall of 
impatient omnipotence-may wish to try to heal society's general ills with a 
criminal law that is not supposed serve this purpose. If a phenomenon that they 
believe deeply worries society (in reality their presumed voters) spreads, they 
immediately revert to using the tool of criminal law. A typical example is the 
law adopted by the Orbán government to impose more severe punishments on 
drug consumption. It appeared that they lashed out at drug consumers, while in 
reality they sought to demonstrate their deep commitment to their own voters. 
In light of such practices the criminal code begins to resemble a book of 
political messages rather than a codex created by moderate politicians. 
M
 Braswell, M. C.-Whitehead, J. T.: Seeking the Truth: An Alternative to Conservative 
and Liberal Thinking in Criminology. Criminal Justice Review, 24 (1999) 50-63. 
52
 See Gendreau, P.-Goggin, C.-Cullen, F. T.: The Effects of Prison. Sentences on 
Recidivism. Ottawa, 1999.; Kury, H.-Ferdinand, Th. N.-Obergfell-Fuchs, J.: Does Severe 
Punishment Mean Less Criminality? International Criminal Justice Review, 13 (2003) 
110-148. and Paternoster, R.-Iovanni, L.: The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity: A 
Reexamination. Social Forces, 64 (1986) 751-777. 
53
 Sherman, L. W.: Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal 
Sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30 (1993) 452. 
22 LÁSZLÓ KÖRINEK 
8. What is to be done? 
So far I have dealt wi th-not without critical remarks-cr iminal law and its 
social and legal environment: I described some tendencies that can be observed 
in security protection today. A representative of science cannot limit himself 
to explaining the world, as best as his powers and talent allow he must also 
contribute to changing and improving it.34 
Of course we already achieved something if we show politics and 
legislature the dead-ends, the paths they ought to avoid at all costs. Such is for 
example the removal of law enforcement from the rule of law, or the plan to 
scale back crime by increasing the severity of punishments. 
There is more we have to offer, though. There is a continuously evolving 
approach that provides a modern response to the majority of the problems 
raised in this article, at least on a theoretical level. Its further extrapolation and 
application could help to end, or at least reduce, in many areas the dilemmas 
and problems presented in this study. This approach is nothing else than 
human security. Let me note that the English term "human security" is usually 
translated as humane security,53 but the notion of "human security" is better in 
terms of expressing the close connection to human rights. 
The concept of human security and the associated criteria were developed 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The programme, in 
its 1994 Human Development Report, designates the freedom from fear and 
deprivation as a basic component of human security (Human Development 
Report, 1994). As regards to our topic the issue here is that the success of 
countering crime depends on the success of preventing social problems, resolving 
social tensions, and head off disintegration-in essence on pre-empting the need 
for criminal law intervention in the first place. 
To further develop the concept of human security and to create a plan for 
its realisation, at the U N ' s Millennium session in 2000 a decision was made to 
establish a Commission on Human Security. The best theoretical and professional 
experts were delegated to this commission, which was co-chaired by Sadako 
Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for refugees, and Amartya Sen, Nobel 
Prize winner in economics. Former Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek 
also participated in the Commission 's work. 
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security mission], Nato Tükör, (1999) 8. 
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The body f in ished its report by 2003 and noted that the internat ional 
community needs a new security paradigm. The state will continue to r emain 
an important factor in ensuring security, but of ten it can or does not want to 
live up to its security obligations, and somet imes it even becomes a source of 
threat to its cit izens itself. Thus instead of the s tate 's security one has to m a k e 
human security the centrepiece of attention.56 
The Commiss ion defines the concept of human security as follows: 
to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfilment.*1 
The protection of fundamenta l rights and liberties is absolutely inseparable 
f rom the concept of human security. But it also extends to the defence against 
severe wide-ranging threats and hazardous situations. 
The need for complex5" and global approaches5 9 in the thinking on securi ty 
was already recognised earl ier . It has also became apparent that p rev ious 
distinctions (military/police, domestic/external, etc.) are fading, or at least los ing 
their pertinence. The new element in the human security approach is that it 
places the perspective of individuals and their communit ies before the securi ty 
interests of the national or even the whole international communi ty . 
The assessment of migration exemplifies the difference in the traditional 
state or national security and the novel human security conception. The lat ter 
sees human migration as something positive, for it increases countries ' mutua l 
dependence and re inforces the acceptance of d i f ferences . It enhances the 
exchange of knowledge, as well as the spread and conveyance of skills. It he lps 
economic development and simultaneously the success of the people involved 
in migration. Admittedly, there are also dangers and adverse consequences, but 
the negative consequences of migration should also be primarily assessed wi th 
regards to their effect on the people who are immediately affected. 
The concept of human security resolves the dichotomy that is general ly 
presumed to exist between human rights and security. This approach holds that 
56
 See Commission: Human Security Now. Commission on Human Security, UN, 
New York, 2. 2003. 
'
7
 See Commission: Human Security Now. Commission on Human Security, UN, 
New York, 4. 2003. 
* See for example Rubin, H.: Security in Society: Protecting an Increasedly 
Connected World. Washington D. C„ 2003. 
54
 See for instance Steinbruner, J. D.: Principles of Global Security. Washington D. C., 
2000. 
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providing for the most extensive enjoyment of human rights possible is not 
obstacle, but rather an objective-and in a successful case an achievement-of 
security and defence policy.60 
If I need to sum up the desired strategy as succinctly as possible, I turn to a 
phrase by Javier Solana: "[Al world more fair is a world more secure".61 
' '"See Oberleitner, G.: Human Security and Human Rights. European Training 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. Occasional Papers, 2002. No. 8. 
61
 See Solana, J.: Beszéd az. Európai Nemzeti Fórumon [Speech on the European 
National Forum], S0005/4, Dublin. 2004. 
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Judicial Independence in Transition: 
Revisiting the Determinants of Judicial Activism in the 
Constitutional Courts of Post-Communist States 
Abstract. This study investigates the relationship between dimensions of judicial inde-
pendence and judicial review in constitutional courts Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union. In part a modified replication of prior works examining the issue, the 
study uses newly collected data from a panel of ten countries. It examines the relationship of 
judicial review with: (1) judicial independence (using both measures employed by the prior 
works, corrected versions of those measures, and measures original to this study); (2) political 
and social contextual factors; and (3) the receptiveness of post-communist countries to the 
importation of transplanted legal institutions. Improvements on the conceptualisation of 
judicial independence, inclusion of the dimensions of receptiveness, and a more appropriate 
panel of countries enable this study to present a more complete and accurate portrait of 
constitutional judicature in transition contexts. The results show that while corrections to prior 
measures of judicial independence improve the results at the margin, the entirely new measures 
of the concept represent a greater step forward. Several dimensions of judicial independence 
are positively related to judicial review, as are the measures of countries' receptiveness to legal 
transplants. Other key factors positively related to judicial review in transition include 
legislative fragmentation at the time of each court decision, the scope of rights guarantees in a 
bill of rights, and popular trust in courts. Presidential power is negatively related to judicial 
review. The findings further indicate that aside from judicial independence, the prior works do 
present correct portrayals of most of the contextual influences they investigate. 
Keywords: judicial independence; constitutional courts; post-communist states; transitional 
justice; comparative law 
1. Introduction 
The collapse of communist regimes in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) brought with it the dramatic transfor-
mation of entire systems of constitutional justice across Europe 's eastern 
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f ront ier . 1 M a n y states w h e r e the rule of l a w had exis ted in n a m e only f o r nea r ly 
half a c e n t u r y were s u d d e n l y f reed to d e s i g n and a t t e m p t t o build (or i m p o r t ) 
n e w ins t i tu t iona l f r a m e w o r k s fo r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of l a w and jus t ice . 2 O f the 
s t ruc tura l f e a t u r e s d e s i g n e d and built in t r ans i t ion ing s t a t e s , "by fa r t he m o s t 
i m p o r t a n t of the new i n s t i t u t i o n s " w e r e t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t s e a c h 
c o u n t r y a d o p t e d . ' 
T h e s e n e w t r ibuna l s s t a n d out f o r a t l eas t two r e a s o n s . First, w h i l e t he 
p roces s and products of t r ans i t ion d i f f e r ed in many w a y s a c r o s s the r e g i o n , the 
p r e s e n c e o f a cons t i t u t iona l c o u r t was o n e of a f ew i m p o r t a n t c o m m o n a l i t i e s . 
A l t h o u g h unt i l 1989 o n l y t w o c o u n t r i e s t h r o u g h o u t C E E p o s s e s s e d s o m e 
( n o m i n a l l y ) i n d e p e n d e n t cons t i t u t i ona l c o u r t , by the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s every s t a t e in 
the region h a d es tabl i shed o n e , most p a t t e r n e d af ter G e r m a n y ' s Federal C o n s t i -
tut ional C o u r t (FCC).4 T h i s y ie lded a na tu ra l exper imen t o f sor ts : the s a m e bas i c 
cour t m o d e l , t r ansp lan ted i n t o d i f fe ren t c o n t e x t s , p r o d u c e d not iceably d i f f e r e n t 
o u t c o m e s o n a wide r a n g e o f impor tan t i s s u e s . 5 
1
 Schwartz, H.: The struggle for constitutional justice in post-communist Europe. Chicago, 
2000.; Procházka, R.: Mission accomplished: on founding constitutional adjudication in 
Central Europe. Budapest, 2002.; Pribán, J.: Constitutional justice and retroactivity of laws 
in postcommunist Central Europe. In: Pribán. J.-Roberts, P . -Young , J. (eds.): Systems of 
justice in transition: Central European experiences since 1989. Aldershot, 2003. 29—49. 
Sadurski, W.: Postcommunist constitutional courts in search of political legitimacy. 
Florence, 2001. 8ff. 
1
 Dupré, С.: Importing the law in post-communist transitions: the Hungarian Consti-
tutional Court and the right to human dignity. Oxford, 2003. 26. 
4
 Sadurski: op. cit. 1; cf. Tanchev, G.: Constitutional safeguards of legality and 
legitimacy. In: Kelly. M. (ed.): Openness and transparency in governance: challenges and 
opportunities. Maastricht, 2000: Howard, A. E. D.: Judicial independence in post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe. In: Russell. P.-O'Brien. D. (eds.): Judicial independence in the 
age of democracy: critical perspectives from around the world. Charlottesville, VA 
2001. 89-1 10; Dupré: op. cit.; Schiemann, J.: Explaining Hungary's powerful constitutional 
court: a bargaining approach. European Journal of Sociology, 42 (2001) 357-390. Indeed, 
establishing a constitutional court became the distinguishing "trade mark" and the "proof of 
the democratic character" of post-communist states eager to demonstrate that a genuine trans-
formation to democracy was underway. Sólyom, L.: The role of constitutional courts in the 
transition to Democracy: with special reference to Hungary. International Sociology, 18 
(2003) 133, 134. Procházka insightfully emphasises the importance these states-especially 
the Visegrád Four (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Pol and (-attached to being 
perceived in Western Europe as genuinely committed to transformation from authoritarian 
socialism to democracy. Procházka: op. cit. 
This experiment has not gone unnoticed by students of courts as policy-shapers. 
Epstein, L.-Knight, J.-Shvetsova, O.: The role of constitutional courts in the establishment 
and maintenance of democratic systems of government. Law and Society Review, 35 (2001) 
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S e c o n d , these c o u r t s p layed a v e r y ac t ive part in s h a p i n g not j u s t t h e out-
c o m e , b u t t he even t h e process of d e m o c r a t i c t r ans i t ion , ' 1 and m a n y b e c a m e 
f o r m i d a b l e po l i cy p l a y e r s in a v e r y b r i e f span of t i m e . T h e H u n g a r i a n Cons -
t i tut ional Cour t , fo r i n s t a n c e , struck d o w n nearly o n e - t h i r d of all p r i m a r y legis-
lat ion ( 2 7 3 of 905 n a t i o n a l laws) b r o u g h t before it f o r cons t i t u t i ona l rev iew 
dur ing i ts f i rs t six y e a r s a lone. 7 T h e w e i g h t of the i s s u e s in w h i c h t h a t Cour t 
p layed a p ivota l role i s s tr iking: r e t r o a c t i v e criminal legis la t ion, 8 r e s t i t u t i on for 
exp rop r i a t i on by the c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e , 9 lustration l aws , 1 9 the I M F - d i r e c t e d 
e c o n o m i c aus te r i ty p r o g r a m m e , " a b o r t i o n , 1 2 the d e a t h pena l ty , 1 3 s a m e - s e x 
pa r tne r sh ip s , 1 4 and m a n y others . 1 3 M o r e recent ly , in J u l y 2005, on t h e bas i s of 
a pe t i t ion by thi r teen c i t i zens , the S l o v a k i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Cour t n u l l i f i e d the 
117-164; Boulanger, С.: Beyond significant relationships, tolerance intervals and triadic 
dispute resolution: constructing a comparative theory of judicial review in post-communist 
societies. Paper presented at the Law and Society 2003 Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, 5-8 
June 2003; Scheppele, K. L.: Constitutional negotiations: political contexts of judicial 
activism in post-Soviet Europe. International Sociology, 18 (2003), 219-238. 
6
 Dupré: op. cit. 26. 
Scheppele: op. cit. 224. This is particularly significant given the scope and range of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court's exercise of its review powers in its first decade of 
operation. Nearly all of Hungary's legislative framework was reviewed by the constitu-
tional court, largely as a consequence of the ease of access for petitioning review by the 
court. Sólyom, L.-Brunner, G.: Constitutional judiciary in a new democracy: the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000. 81. Specifically, via the actio popularis, any individual 
could petition for constitutional review of any law, regardless of whether she was in any 
way affected by the law itself; some 3,170 cases of this type were initiated between 1990 
and 1996, inclusive. Ibid. 
8
 See Decisions 11/1992 and 53/1993; available (in English) in Sólyom-Brunner: op. 
cit. For a fuller discussion of the retroactive punishment issue, see Nalepa, M.: Why post-
communists punish themselves: a model of transitional justice legislation. Paper presented 
to the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, IL, 27 April 2002; 
Nalepa, M.: Punish all perpetrators or protect the innocent?: a signaling model of truth 
revelation procedures. Paper presented to the American Political Science Association 
annual meeting, Philadelphia, PA, 28 August 2003. 
9
 Decisions 21/1990 and 16/1991. In: Sólyom-Brunner: op. cit. 
10
 Decision 60/1994. In: ibid. 
11
 Decision 43/1995. In: ibid. 
12
 Decision 64/1991. In: ibid. 
13
 Decision 23/1990. In: ibid. 
14
 See Decision 14/1995. In: ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
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legislature 's ratification the EU Constitution and (temporarily) barred the 
country 's president from signing it.16 
For students of judicial politics, the development of these new courts is 
significant not merely as an opportunity to apply existing models, but also 
because lessons f rom these unconventional contexts can improve and expand 
extant theories.17 The experiences, contexts, and compact histories of the new 
tribunals may prove pivotal in identifying gaps in existing theory; in particular, 
their study may bring to light forces which are invisible in 'conventional' 
contexts, but which ought to be incorporated into any general theory of consti-
tutional adjudication. 
Explorations of the courts and the lessons they have to teach have been 
underway for well over a decade, but one of the discoveries thus far is puzzling. 
After surveying the judicial decisions of seven C E E constitutional courts, two 
prominent American political scientists-Eric Flerron and Kirk Randazzo-
concluded that the degree of institutional judicial independence enjoyed by the 
courts did not affect the likelihood that those courts would annul a statute or 
other government act. This conclusion, along with several others reached by 
Herron and Randazzo and other scholars, runs counter to conventional 
wisdom, raising questions both about these new courts themselves and, more 
broadly, about broader theories of judicial independence. In short, if Herron 
and Randazzo are correct, then either (A) the new courts are sui generis, and 
have less in common with their Western templates, or (B) a basic tenet of 
political science-i.e., that institutional design affects behaviour-may not be 
true of constitutional courts. 
Both the implications of Herron and Randazzo's findings and problems with 
their and others' studies make it necessary to revisit this question empirically. 
This Article does just that, seeking to uncover a more complete picture of CEE 
courts themselves and of judicial independence more generally. Building on 
the prior studies' research design, the Article principally explores whether the 
degree of institutionally inscribed formal independence of the courts them-
selves affects the incidence of judicial review in C E E and the FSU. This study 
16
 Jurinová, M.: President ready to sign EU Constitution. The Slovak Spectator, 25 July 
2005. <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok.asp?cl=20421>. Forbes.com (2005): Slovak 
Constitutional Court blocks ratification of EU constitution. Forbes.com, 14 July 2005. 
<http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2005/07/14/afx2139424.html> 
17
 As Schcppele observes, the new courts "are good to study not because they are 
different in kind f rom what becomes normal politics, but precisely because they reveal 
in sharper relief the problems buried in what passes for normal in 'consolidated' democracies." 
Scheppele: op. cit. 220. 
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also examines other factors that may influence the level of judicial review-some 
studied in previous work, and some original to this study. The s tudy 's findings 
regarding the determinants of judicial review by constitutional courts in CEE 
and the FSU will contribute not only to an understanding of these courts, but 
they can also help to both test and reshape general theories of both constitu-
tional adjudication and the transplantation of legal institutions. 
To this end, the Article proceeds as fol lows: Part 2 reviews existing 
literature addressing constitutional judicial politics in transition, describing and 
critique two particular investigations-Herron and Randazzo's, and another by 
John Ishiyama and Shannon Ishiyama Smithey- that studied the relationship 
between judicial independence and judicial review in CEE and the FSU.'X 
Part 3 describes the data and methodology employed in this study, and Part 4 
analyses the results. Part 5 of fe rs conclusions regarding methodological 
improvements and substantive findings. 
At the outset, it is important to note several obstacles that hinder all studies 
of the new courts. At a theoretical level, despite myriad volumes on judicial 
politics produced over the last two decades, a general theory of judicial 
independence-even a common definit ion-is still lacking.14 A novel, though 
elementary, model is developed and used here, but it goes only a short way 
towards constructing a sound, comprehensive definition of judicial independence. 
Second, the methodologies developed for studying constitutional politics in 
stable democracies with long traditions of constitutional review may be 
inadequate to investigate states where the courts are brand new, that have no 
recent tradition or legacy to build upon, and where the rules of the game are 
constantly in flux.20 This problem-troublesome enough when studying conven-
tional, consolidated democracies2 ' - is heightened in transition contexts where 
the existence, content, and effectiveness of formal and informal rules of law are 
never known with certainty. 
Finally, the transition context presents problems concerning the actual data 
needed for study. There is no standardised, transparent, and widely used 
l s
 Smithey, S. I.-Ishyiama, J.: Judicial activism in post-communist politics. Law and 
Society Review 36 (2002) 719-741; Herron, E.-Randazzo, K.: The relationship between 
independence and judicial review in post-communist courts. Journal of Politics 65 (2003) 
422-438. 
14
 Russell, P.: Toward a general theory of judicial independence. In: Russell-O'Brien: 
op. cit. 1-24; Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 
211
 Boulanger: op. cit. 
21
 Stone Sweet, A.: A comment on Vanberg: rules, dispute resolution, and strategic 
behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998) 3, 327-338; Vanberg, G.: Reply to 
Stone Sweet. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998) 3, 339-346; Boulanger: op. cit. 
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database on court activity available, as there is for the world's most-studied 
court.22 Moreover, lack of basic familiarity with the new courts makes it hard 
for scholars to know what data to collect. Add to these problems the tremendous 
language barriers,21 numerous inconsistencies between the courts in what 
documents and statistics are publicly available, and the fact that most in-depth 
research continues to come f rom single-country studies where the authors 
frequently are sitting or former juris ts on the court they describe, and the 
challenges facing researchers of the new courts become quite daunting. 
2. Existing Literature on the new courts 
2.1. Methodologies and Findings of Prior Research 
The new constitutional courts of C E E and the FSU remain the most "under-
theorized" of any of the aspects of transition.24 Although they have received 
attention from around the world and from a variety of disciplines,21 much of 
this attention has been descriptive and exploratory in nature.26 Moreover, 
those studying the courts often bring with them established theories and models of 
judicial independence developed in other contexts,27 and thus comparatively 
little new theoretical ground has been broken.21 
22
 Prof. Harold Spaeth's databases for the United States Supreme Court is "certainly the 
most important and influential"-as well as the most comprehensive and transparent-dataset 
available for the study of that Court. Epstein, L.-Knight, J.-Martin, A.: The political 
(science) context of judging. Louis University Law Journal, 47 (2003) 783, 807. 
23
 Schwartz, whose book on the new constitutional courts in CEE is perhaps the most 
frequently cited major work on the topic, acknowledges: "I do not, however, know the 
languages of the many countries covered in this book, I certainly am not very familiar with 
either their legal systems or national cultures, and I have translations of only some of the 
decisions and actions I discuss" (2000, xix). 
"
4
 Sadurski: op. cit. 
~
5
 Dupré: op. cit. 3 -4 . 
J>
 Schwartz: op. cit.; Pribán-Roberts-Young (eds.): op. cit.; Krygier, M.-Czarnota, A. 
(eds.): The rule of law after communism: problems and prospects in East-Centred Europe. 
Aldershot, 1999. 55-76. Constitutional courts in the process of articulating constitutional 
rights in post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, Part I: social and economic 
rights. European University Institute Law Working Paper No. 2002/14. Florence, 2002; 
Harutyunyan, G.-Mavcic, A.: The constitutional review and its development in the modern 
world: a comparative analysis. Ljubljana, 1999. 
~
7
 Howard: op. cit. Burbank, S.-Friedman, В. (eds.): Judicial independence at the 
crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach. Thousand Oaks, California, 2002. 
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This is su rp r i s ing not o n l y because of t he ubiqui ty , ac t iv is t t endenc ies , and 
impor t ance of t h e s e courts to the t r ans fo rma t ion to d e m o c r a c y , but a lso b e c a u s e 
cons t i tu t ional j u d i c a t u r e in t rans i t ion lies at t he nexus of t w o r ich f ie lds of the 
poli t ical s c i ence and t rans i t ion l i teratures. F i rs t , the theore t ica l and e m p i r i c a l 
l i terature on cons t i tu t iona l j u d i c i a l poli t ics h a s p roduced seve ra l m e t h o d o l o g i e s 
a n d mode l s f o r inves t iga t ing es tab l i shed cons t i tu t iona l cour t s . 2 4 In te r twined w i t h 
these advances h a v e been e f f o r t s , incomplete as yet, to uncove r the nature, c a u s e s , 
and e f fec t s of j u d i c i a l i ndependence . 3 " Severa l appl ica t ions of these theor ies a n d 
m e t h o d s to t r ans i t ion con tex t s a re d i scussed in the fo l l owing sec t ion . 
Second , t he l i terature o n the " t ransp lan ta t ion" 3 1 or " i m p o r t a t i o n " 3 2 of legal 
s y s t e m s , and the expl ic i t e x t e n s i o n s of t h i s l ine of i nves t i ga t i on to p o s t -
c o m m u n i s t contexts , 3 3 o f f e r s several critical insights per t inent to const i tu t ional 
л
 There are exceptions, of course. See Procházka: op. cit.; Scheppele, K. L.: Declarations 
of independence: judicial reactions to political pressure. In: Burbank-Friedman (eds.): op. 
cit. 227-280. 
"'Shapiro, M.: Courts: a comparative and politiccd analysis. Chicago, 1981; Stone 
Sweet, A.: Governing with judges: constitutional politics in Europe. Oxford, 2000; 
Vanberg, G.: The politics of constitutional review in Germany. Cambridge, 2005; Garrett, 
G.-Kelemen, R. D.-Schulz, H.: The European Court of Justice, national governments, and 
legal integration in the European Union. International Organization. 52 (1998) 149-176; 
Epstein, L.-Knight, J.: The choices justices make. Congressional Quarterly, Washington, 
1998; Epstein-Knight-Martin: op. cit. As Boulanger recounts, three major threads of have 
taken shape in the literature on courts and their role in governance: formalist (i.e. rational 
choice) models, "behavioural/empiricist accounts" employing several tools of statistical 
analysis, and the more abstract "triadic dispute resolution" models such as that elaborated 
by Stone Sweet. Boulanger: op. cit. I f f . As scholars have begun to turn their attention 
toward CEE and FSU constitutional courts, they have made more use of the first two of 
these approaches, while the third has been partly subsumed in historical-contextual 
accounts, such as those of Procházka and Boulanger. 
" 'Russell-O'Brien: op. cit. Ackner, L.: The erosion of judicial independence. London, 
1997; Burbank-Friedman: op. cit. Lane, L.: Judicial independence and the increasing 
executive role in judicial administration. In: Shetreet, S.-Deschenes, J. (eds.): Judicial 
Independence: The Contemporary Debate. Dordrecht, 1985; Ramseyer, J. M.-Rasmusen, E.: 
Measuring judicial independence: the political economy of judging in Japan. Chicago, 2003. 
31
 Watson, A.: Legal transplants, 2nd ed. Athens, Georgia (USA), 1993; Watson, A.: 
From legal transplants to legal formants. American Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 43 (1995)469. 
32
 Ajani, G.: By chance and prestige: legal transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe. 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, 43 (1995) 93-117. 
33
 Dupré: op. cit. Pistor, K.: The demand for constitutional law. Constitutional Political 
Economy, 13 (2002) 73-87; Hendley, K.: Rewriting the rules of the game in Russia: the 
neglected issue of the demand for law. East European Constitutional Review, 8 (1999). 
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jurisprudence in transition countries. Most importantly, such explorations have 
identified several strategic and contextual factors-including a transitioning 
state's familiarity with and adaptation of the legal system transferred14-that 
can influence the successful transfer of legal norms and institutions f rom one 
state to another. When such factors are absent, the systems will not function as 
effectively as in their original context, a phenomenon that commentators call 
the "transplant effect."15 
Despite this intersection of disciplines and the possibilities it may hold for 
developing new theories of constitutional judicature, scholars have instead relied 
on two familiar methodologies: static rational choice models and statistical 
analysis of judicial decisions. Each offers distinct costs and benefits. Rational 
choice models are among most prevalent and provocative tools for modelling 
courts and other institutions in non-transition contexts.16 Because of the 
transition literature's youth, however, only a few attempts to apply rational 
choice models to new constitutional courts have appeared. The best example is 
the work of Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova,17 in which the authors employ 
rational choice theory to predict the interaction of constitutional courts with 
legislative and executive branches. 
Although rational choice does offer a window into the 'black box ' of 
judicial decision making, allowing outsiders to understand political influences 
on the courts as strategic actors, models like Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova's 
face serious limits. First, to the extent they can accurately reflect the strategic 
rubric of political decisions faced by courts in a given country, they are likely 
too closely tied to that country 's context to be of broader value. Second, as 
Alec Stone Sweet has observed,1" rational choice models are as yet unable to 
34
 Pistor, K.-Raiser. M.-Gelfer, S.: Law and finance in transition economies. Center for 
International Development Working Paper No. 49. Cambridge, MA 2000; Berkowitz, D . -
Pistor, K.-Richard, J. F.: The transplant effect. American Journal of Comparative Law, 51 
(2003) 163-204. 
35
 Berkowitz, D.-Pistor, K.-Richard, J. F.: Economic development, legality and the 
transplant effect. European Economic Review, 47 (2003) 165-195. 
3 6Ferejohn, J. A.-Weingast, В. R.: A positive theory of statutory interpretation. Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992) 263-279; Knight, J.: Law and rational 
choice. Paper (draft) presented at Politics and Rationality Lectures, Collective Choice 
Center, University of Maryland, 23 Feb 2001. <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/umccc/knight.pdf>; 
Vanberg, G.: Legislative-judicial relations: a game-theoretic approach to constitutional 
review. American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001) 346-361. 
37
 Epstein-Knight-Shvetsova: op. cit. 
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explain situations where the 'rules of the game' themselves are in flux, especially 
when such changes are the result of interaction among the players.19 
Third, the stylized portraits of political interactions that rational choice models 
present often include unrealistic, misleadingly oversimplified assumptions 
that affect their conclusions significantly. For example, Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova ground their model in the assumption that courts do not have the 
final say in determining the outcome of a given constitutional controversy, and 
accordingly they hypothesise-and confirm empirically-that constitutional courts 
can only survive, let alone increase their position in the political order, if they 
issue decisions which all of the other branches find it too costly to contest. 
Because many of the new courts' most important cases concern conflicts between 
other branches of government, however, the authors' underlying assumption 
leads them astray. Their model excludes the possibility of a court deciding in 
favour of one branch of government, over and against another, and if necessary 
relying on the branch it supported to protect it f rom attacks. Yet the courts of 
Hungary40 and Poland41 did precisely this.42 
The main alternative to formal rational choice models is statistical analysis, 
which Boulanger labels the "behavioural-empiricist" approach.4 ' Transition 
scholars have employed statistical modelling to study both the creation of 
constitutional courts in CEE and the FSU44 and the actual behaviour of the 
courts in deciding cases.41 Of the latter type, two studies deserve mention: 
using a same measure of judicial independence developed by Smithey and 
Ishiyama, both Smithey and Ishiyama themselves and Herron and Randazzo 
34
 The third analytical framework in the broader literature on courts-the 'triadic dispute 
resolution' model-sets out to solve precisely this problem. Shapiro: op. cit. Stone Sweet: 
op. cit. 
4,1
 Scheppele: op. cit. Schwartz: The struggle for constitutional justice... op. cit.; 
Halmai, G.: The Hungarian approach to constitutional review: the end of activism?: the 
first decade of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. In: Sadurski, W. (ed.): Constitutional 
justice, east ancl west; democratic legitimacy and constitutional courts in post-communist 
Europe in a comparative perspective. The Hague, 2002. 189-212. 
41
 Brzezinski, M.: The struggle for constitutionalism in Poland. London, 2000. 
42
 Additionally, the Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova model ignores the role of 
parties/coalitions within legislatures or cabinets, which ought not and need not be excluded 
from rational-choice-type models, as evidenced by Steunenberg, В.: Courts, cabinet and 
coalition parties: the politics of euthanasia in a parliamentary setting. British Journal of 
Political Science, 27 (1997) 551-571. 
43
 Boulanger: op. cit. 7. 
44
 Smithey, S. I.-Ishiyama, J.: Judicious choices: designing courts in post-communist 
politics. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33 (2000) 163-182. 
45
 Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicial activism... op. cit. Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 
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examined what relationship, if any, existed between the level of judicial 
independence and the incidence of judicial review. Except for differences in 
t ime span examined,4 6 the studies are markedly similar. Both aimed to capture 
the influence of various country-level attributes on the level of judicial review, 
and both examined a cross-sectional pool of constitutional court decisions 
f rom similar panels of countries through logit or probit analysis.47 
Both the Smithey-Ishiayama and Herron-Randazzo studies yielded similar 
but surprising results. First, though both studies hypothesised a positive relation-
ship between judicial independence and judicial review, the Herron-Randazzo 
study found no significant relationship, and Smithey and Ishiyama identified a 
significant negative relationship.48 Each study, however, highlighted several 
contextual factors-poli t ical , social, and even economic- that were strongly 
associated with judicial review. Smithey and Ishiyama found significant positive 
relationships between judicial review and the degree of legislative fragmen-
tat ion, the number of elected layers of government, and popular trust in the 
courts. Herron and Randazzo identified significant negative relationships between 
judicial review and change in the country's GDP growth as well as the level of 
presidential power.44 At the level of individual decisions, Herron and Randazzo 
also found that cases where the president or an ordinary individual citizen was 
the appellant were more likely to result in judicial review, as were cases 
concerning economic issues. Consequently, each pair of authors concluded that 
these aspects of context, rather than judicial independence embedded in insti-
tutional design, must be the dominating factor in explaining the experience of 
constitutional courts in CEE and the FSU. 
46
 Smithey and Ishiyama studied only the first three years of each court 's operation, 
while Herron and Randazzo examined all available years. 
47
 Each includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia; 
to this common set of six, Smithey and Ishiyama add Latvia and Slovakia, and Herron and 
Randazzo add Slovenia. Smithey and Ishiyama employ logistic (logit) regression, while 
Herron and Randazzo employ probit; as the underlying dependent variable is nominal, 
however, logit appears a more appropriate specification, and is thus used here. See Pampel, 
F. C.: Logistic regression: a primer. Thousand Oaks, CA. 2000. 
48
 In addition, Smithey and Ishiyama observed, but did not test statistically, that judicial 
activism (defined as the frequency of judicial review) rose with judicial independence 
(measured by their judicial independence index scale) up to around 0.55 on the judicial— 
approximately the mean and median of the countries in their sample as well as the sample 
utilised in their earlier work which first employed the index-and then judicial activism 
begins decreasing, thus presumably yielding a unimodal peak. This possibility is tested and 
verified in the replication study herein. 
Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 
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2.2. Grounds for Scepticism 
As noted, the main conclusion of the Herron-Randazzo and Smith-Ishiyama 
studies is surprising. Both political theory and elementary intuition suggest 
that judicial independence, if defined meaningfully, should bear some positive 
relationship to courts' exercise of their independence through judicial review.8" 
Accordingly, if these two studies are correct, then either conventional theory 
does not apply to these new courts, or that theory itself is incomplete or 
misguided. 
A closer look at the design and execution of both the Smithey-Ishiyama and 
Herron-Randazzo research, however, reveals that one should not take their 
conclusions at face value. Both studies exhibit two critical problems: the data 
and cases selected, and the conceptualisation of the independent variables. 
After reviewing these key deficiencies, the need to revisit the ground these 
authors covered will be clear. 
2.2.1. Data and Case Selection 
Three troubling attributes of the Herron-Randazzo and the Smithey-Ishiyama 
studies concerning data and case selection should immediately stand out to 
those familiar with the work of these courts. First, both studies exclude several 
of the most visible and most intensely investigated courts in the region. Each 
pair of authors excludes Hungary-which was at the time "perhaps the most 
activist constitutional court not only in the CEE but also in the world" 8 l -as 
well as Poland, a court which began as one of the weakest in the region, but 
began a steady rise to power years before its authority was formally expanded 
in the 1997 Constitution.52 
50
 Ibid. 425. 
81
 Sadurski: Postcommunist. . . op. cit. 3; Osiatynski, W.: Rights in new constitutions 
of East Central Europe. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 26 (1994) 111, 151ff.; 
Brunner, G.: Development of a constitutional judiciary in Eastern Europe. Review of Central 
and East European Law, 18 (1992) 535, 539-540. See also Scheppele: op. cit. Schwartz: 
op. cit.; Sólyom: op. cit.; Procházka: op. cit.; Halmai: op. cit. 
52
 Brzezinski: op. cit. Schwartz: op. cit. The authors of both studies indicated (in 
response to queries) data availability as the grounds for excluding Hungary, Poland, and 
other countries, both pairs of researchers indicated that data availability was a concern. 
However, it would appear that such data limitations result from those authors' decision to 
use decisions published on court websites as the source of their data, which is commented 
on below. Cases from Hungarian Court, however, were available in non-electronic form in 
Hungarian from the first case forward (in the Hungarian Official Gazette), began to be 
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S e c o n d , both s t u d i e s exc lude or m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e o n e of the m o s t impor t an t 
a r e a s of t he cou r t s ' a c t i v i t y : abs t rac t r e v i e w . T h e n e w cons t i t u t iona l cour t s in 
p o s t - c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s , a n d e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e of C E E , w e r e m o d e l l e d not on 
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n t e m p l a t e s , but r a t h e r impor t ed t he i r s t ruc ture m o s t l y f r o m 
W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n cons t i t u t i ona l c o u r t s , s p e c i f i c a l l y G e r m a n y ' s F C C . 5 3 T h e 
abs t r ac t r ev i ew c o m p e t e n c e - w h i c h e n a b l e s cou r t s t o a d j u d i c a t e the cons t i tu -
t ional i ty (or legali ty, f o r sub-s ta tu tory ac ts) outs ide of the contex t of a concre te 
d i s p u t e 5 4 - i s a b s o l u t e l y cent ra l to c o u r t s ' ac t ivi ty a n d power , 5 3 e spec ia l ly in 
t rans i t ion countr ies . 5 6 B u t the H e r r o n - R a n d a z z o s t u d y exc ludes c a s e s i nvo lv ing 
the exe rc i s e of abs t rac t rev iew f r o m the i r sample a l toge ther , 3 7 and the S m i t h e y -
I s h i y a m a study impl i c i t l y conf la tes a priori r ev iew, w h i c h is abs t rac t by nature , 
w i th a posteriori a b s t r a c t r e v i e w . 5 8 T h i s c o n f u s i o n - w h i c h w a s e x p l i c i t in 
t he i r ea r l i e r w o r k 5 9 - m a k e s it d i f f i c u l t to d e c i p h e r h o w S m i t h e y and I s h i y a m a 
c o n c e p t u a l i s e j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . 
published in German from 1995 forward, Dupré: op. cit. 7, and are now available in print 
in a number of languages including English. 
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 Tanchev: op. cit.; Sólyom-Brunner: op. cit.; Procházka: op. cit. The model adopted 
in CEE represents the third generation of Kelsenian constitutional courts, after the pattern 
designed by Hans Kelsen for Austria in 1920 and later imported into post-war Germany 
and Italy. Sólyom: op. cit. The new courts, importantly, are linked to the Kelsenian model 
both in that they imported much of their structure (and in some cases, substantive juris-
prudence-see Dupré: op. cit.) from Germany, and also through more direct ties to the 
original Kelsenian design. See Schwartz: op. cit. 270-271. n. 9. 
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 There remains, surprisingly, non-trivial disagreement over the border between concrete 
and abstract review. E.g., Procházka: op. cit. 79-80. Procházka distinguishes his own view 
from that of Stone Sweet in regard to review by constitutional courts of lower court 
decisions, which Procházka believes can be seen as abstract but which Stone Sweet 
classifies as concrete only. 
55
 Stone Sweet: Governing.. . op. cit. 45ff. 
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 Procházka: op. cit.; Sólyom: op. cit. 
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 Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 429. Herron and Randazzo give some reasons for their 
exclusion of cases of what they term "abstract review", but their description applies only to 
instances where legislators petition for review. The courts of CEE and the FSU do not limit 
this power to legislators, however, and thus their arguments, as stated, are unpersuasive. 
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 Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicial activism: op. cit. The difference between the two categories 
is actually quite important. For purpose of disambiguation, a priori rcview-or preventive 
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One final data concern relates to the actual source of the prior studies' data. 
Both works used cases available from the websites of the respective courts, 
using a combination of original language publications and English translations."" 
Courts ' selectivity in publishing decisions on their websites means that both 
studies relied on non-representative samples.61 Although most of the new 
constitutional courts are required by law to publish their decisions in an official 
state publication, publishing any, let alone all, of those decisions on websites is 
neither required nor frequently practiced.62 
Some degree of selectivity is unavoidable, of course, as many courts publish 
only their more important decisions even in print. The difficulty, however, lies 
in the differences between the courts ' procedures and standards for choosing 
cases for electronic publication. Whereas some courts offer electronic versions 
of every published decision (e.g., Slovakia), others offer only a selection of 
the most important cases (e.g., Hungary and the Czech Republic). Each country 
may employ different standards to choose which cases merit publication. 
Accordingly, the samples used by the Herron-Randazzo and Smithey-Ishiyama 
studies for country A may be more representative, while the sample taken f rom 
country В will reflect only the more important cases. Because of this selectivity 
differential, the prior studies may have distorted the actual practice of individual 
countries. 
2.2.2. Operationalising the Independent Variable 
Beyond data and case-selection concerns, both studies also suffer from a deficient 
conceptualisation of the key independent variable, judicial independence. As 
noted above, both Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and Ishiyama employ the 
"Smithey and Ishiyama Index" of judicial independence ("SH") the latter pair 
developed in an earlier work.62 The Sil is a scalar measure, ranging from 0 to 
1, with higher scores reflecting greater independence. It reflects the average of 
611
 Herron and Randazzo explicitly state this, Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 428, and-both 
pairs of authors confirmed this in response to queries by the author. 
61
 Herron and Randazzo do note that their study is limited only to published decisions, 
and thus generalizable only to the universe of published decisions, ibid.; however, it is 
their conflation of publishing of decisions with publishing electronically, and in some 
cases in an accessible language which creates the difficulty. 
(
'
2
 In Hungary, for instance, a total of 11 092 proceedings were initiated between 1990 
and 1996. Sólyom-Brunner: op. cit. 72. But the Court 's website currently lists only 3 837 
decisions or case descriptions in Hungarian, and fewer than 50 in English. 
63
 Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicious choices... op. cit. 167-169. 
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six individual scores-each also ranging from 0 to 1-representing six purported 
aspects of judicial independence.64 
There are several problems with the SII 's design and application in these 
prior studies, however. First, there is reason to doubt that it can measure a 
court 's judicial independence meaningfully. Its six components supposedly 
represent various (vaguely-defined) dimensions of judicial independence, but 
the metrics employed appear arbitrarily chosen.65 For instance, though Smithey 
and Ishiyama describe the SU as a measure of "judicial power,"66 only two of 
its six components relate to the competences of the courts, while the rest deal 
with elements of the judges ' protection from manipulation by other branches. 
Although both dimensions-powers and insularity-are conceptually important 
to judicial independence, the Sil makes unstated and unjustified assumptions 
about the weight and interaction of these two dimensions. Accordingly, the 
Sil does not reflect a well-grounded conception of the factors that comprise 
judicial independence, nor of the interactive relationships between those 
component factors. 
Moreover , both studies rely on apparently erroneous Sil values for the 
countries they study.67 Coding errors are apparent in measuring countr ies ' a 
priori review powers, judges ' relative term length, and number of parties 
involved in appointment of judges. Thus , even if the Si l were a valid measure 
by construction, there are reasons to question results achieved using it. 
This is not to say that the prior s tudies ' findings are necessarily incorrect-
only that their conclusion must be tested more rigorously through modified 
replication. Replication also presents the opportunity to incorporate additional 
independent variables-both to test alternative causal stories and to control for 
important factors not accounted for in the original studies. The remainder of 
this Article undertakes that task. 
64
 See Table 2 (and notes accompanying it) for original and corrected scores (corrections 
coded by the author) on each dimension of the index. See Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicious 
choices... op. cit. 167-169, for a detailed discussion of the construction and coding of the 
index. 
65
 Moreover, even if the balance of areas represented by the six components was 
appropriate, the particular measures used to reflcct each of the six components are markedly 
deficient proxies for the dimensions they are used to represent. 
66
 Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicial activism... op. cit. 731. 
67
 A full account of the errors described summarily here is provided in the notes to 
Table 2. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Hypotheses 
3.1.1. Hypotheses for Variables Studied in Prior Works 
The study undertaken here examines the effect on judicial review of judicial 
independence, legislative fragmentation,68 and several new variables not studied 
the in previous works (introduced to measure the 'receptiveness' of the transition 
countries to the new legal institutions64). Regarding judicial independence, both 
the Smithey-Ishiyama and Herron-Randazzo s tudies-drawing on substantial 
support from the literature-anticipated that judicial independence and/or power 
is positively related to the degree of judicial review, which both defined as the 
frequency of judicial review. This expectation is premised on the view that 
courts enjoying "greater guarantees of independence" are "freer to exercise their 
own will" without fear of censure or retribution by the other branches.711 The 
primary hypothesis for judicial independence is therefore: 
H!.A: Judicial independence is positively related to the frequency of judicial 
review (exercised by the constitutional court). 
Because the prior authors use the exact same measure (the Sil) to capture both 
judicial independence and judicial power, and because the present work aims to 
disambiguate these concepts, a second formulation of the first hypothesis is: 
Hi_B: Judicial power is positively related to the frequency of judicial 
review (exercised by the constitutional court). 
Also, because the present investigation also seeks to improve on several aspects 
of the execution of the prior works, this hypothesised relationship between 
judicial independence and judicial review should become gradually more 
apparent with each marginal methodological improvement. 
Regarding legislative fragmentation, the prior studies harboured diverging 
expectations. Herron and Randazzo, building on an argument advanced by 
Stone Sweet,71 argue that a more divided legislature is likely to pass laws that 
are "generally less contentious than those produced by one dominant party."72 
68
 As both the expectations and findings of Smithey and Ishiyama and Herron and 
Randazzo diverged on this issue, a clear hypothesis is necessary. 
m
 The other variables included by Smithey and Ishiyama and Herron and Randazzo are 
likewise tested here for purposes of replication, but separate hypotheses are not offered for 
these. Expectations for each variable are presented in the following section. 
70
 Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 425. 
71
 Stone Sweet: Governing... op. cit. 54ff. 
72
 Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 427. 
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Legislation thus produced should be less prone to challenge, as presumably 
more parties were involved in its design and thus have less reason to petition 
for its nullification. 
Although this argument is plausible, the literature more strongly supports the 
Smithey-Ishiyama study's hypothesis that legislative fragmentation is positively 
associated with judicial review, which that study confirmed empirically. Less 
unified legislatures or governing coalitions invite challenges by the judiciary, 
which (the judiciary expects) the legislature or coalition will be unable to 
override.7 ' With this in mind, the primary hypothesis for legislative fragmentation 
fol lows Smithey and Ishiyama's expectations and results: 
Fb A : Legislative fragmentation is positively related to the frequency of 
judicial review. 
The Herron-Randazzo view-that diverse participation may yield less contentious 
legislative output-should not be discarded entirely, however. Specifically, their 
expectation may be true of fragmentation within governing coalitions. Although 
overall fragmentation would not seem to guarantee that a par ty ' s preferences 
are incorporated into the legislative programme, membership in the coalition 
might offer some assurance of this. Additionally, whereas overall fragmentation 
would serve to weaken the legislature's ability to override a court which struck 
down the legislature's bills (in that overriding a court may require, as it does in 
many transition countries, a super-majority vote), fragmentation within the 
coalition seems less likely to generate this weakness: despite its internal 
divisions, the members of a coalition would presumably be willing to defend 
the coali t ion's policies against interference by the courts. Thus , a secondary 
hypothesis for legislative fragmentation is: 
FL-B: Legislative fragmentation within the governing coalition is negatively 
related to the frequency of judicial review. 
For the remainder of the variables included for purposes of replication, separate 
hypotheses are not necessary, as the original authors ' hypotheses and findings 
serve as the propositions to be verified or rejected.74 
73
 Vanbcrg: Legislative-judicial... op. cit.; Tate, C. N.-Vallinder, T. (eds.): The global 
expansion of judicial power. New York. 1995. 31 ff. ; Holland, K.: Judicial activism in 
comparative perspective. New York, 1991. 9ff. A possible exception pertinent to some 
transitioning states is noted by Procházka: op. cit. 117, who suggests that legislatures 
divided to the point of fragility might receive extra deference from a constitutional court 
concerned more with stability of the new state than with conformity of certain legal 
provisions with the constitution. 
74
 King, G.: Replication, replication. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (1995) 443-
499; Herrndon, P.: Replication, verification, secondary analysis, and data collection in 
political science. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (1995)443-499. 
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3.1.2. Hypotheses for Variables Not Studied in Prior Works 
A few other hypotheses are needed, however, for several new independent 
variables that were not examined by the Smithey-Ishiyama or Herron-Randazzo 
works. These variables reflect aspects of the "demand for constitutional law,"75 
namely: familiarity with the imported legal traditions, adaptation of imported 
institutions, and political participation in the design of new institutions. These 
variables aim to capture the 'receptiveness' of each country to the 'trans-
plantation' 7(1 or ' importat ion '7 7 of legal institutions, including constitutional 
adjudicatory systems. 
According to Pistor, Raiser, and Geifer,78 transplants of law to 'receptive' 
countries are more successful than those to 'unreceptive' countries. In countries 
which are receptive to the institutions they import, the import/transplant will 
be successful, whereas in unreceptive countries the institutions grafted in are 
more likely to operate dysfunctionally, exhibiting what scholars have termed a 
legal "transplant effect."74 Countries "without previous exposure to the modern 
formal legal order before the collapse of the socialist system" are termed "new 
transplants," which are expected to function similarly to unreceptive trans-
plants.80 
This may not be true, however, of constitutional systems transplanted into new 
contexts. A country with no exposure to a system of constitutional judicature 
might have a 'clean slate,' as compared to those which are distinguishably 
"unreceptive" for substantive reasons, and therefore the transplant may be more 
successful.81 Testing this requires a definition of 'dysfunctionality,' but what 
this means in the case of constitutional review is not clear f r o m the transplant 
literature. One possibility is that 'dysfunctional ' courts do not develop in the 
73
 Pistor: op. cit. 
76
 Watson: Legal transplants... op. cit. 
11
 Ajani: op. cit. Dupré: op. cit. Pistor: op. cit. 
78
 Pistor-Raiser-Gelfer: op. cit. 15ff. 
7
 ' Berkowitz-Pistor-Richard: Economic development.. . op. cit.; Berkowitz-Pis tor-
Richard: Transplant effect... op. cit.; Pistor: op. cit.; Dupré: op. cit.; Ajani: op. cit. Pistor, 
Raiser and Geifer (and works which build on this framework) identify countries classed 
either as exhibiting adaptation or familiarity as receptive; intuition suggests altering this 
definition to limit it to those countries exhibiting both. 
K0
 Pistor-Raiser-Gelfer: op. cit. 
81
 For example, in the case of Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal began operations 
several years prior to the formal transition to democracy, but this brief heritage proved all 
but fatal to the Tribunal as a potent political actor in its early years after transition. See 
Schwartz: op. cit. 264 n. 10. 
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spiral-shaped pattern characteristic of the judicialization-politicization cycle."2 
As this pattern is associated with continually (if subtly) increasing judicial 
power and purview, this study expects that judicial review will be positively 
associated with the aspects of the demand for law indicated above. Thus, the 
final hypotheses are as fol lows: 
H3: The more a country adapts the legal institutions it imports, the higher 
the level of judicial review its constitutional court exercises. 
H4: The greater a country ' s familiarity institutions it imports, the higher 
the level of judicial review. 
H5: Judicial review is higher in countries 'receptive' to legal transplants 
than those that are 'unreceptive' . 
H6: Judicial review is higher in countries which are 'new transplants' than 
those which are 'unreceptive ' . 
H7: The greater the diversity of political participation in the decisions to 
design and/or import legal institutions at the beginning of transition, 
the higher the level of judicial review. 
This last hypothesis connects also to the principal-agent theories of courts. The 
more 'principals' engaged in designing a new constitutional court should mean 
(1) more legitimacy and support for the court,"3 and (2) less unity among the 
principals, meaning (a) the court can become powerfu l by adjudicating 
disputes between principals, and/or (b) the principals may find it more costly 
to constrain the court. 
3.2. Variables and Data 
To test these hypotheses, the study examines decisions of constitutional courts 
of ten countries of CEE and the FSU: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia."1 All 
available cases (n=915) f rom these ten countries where judicial review was 
requested by the petition or referral to the court are included, from the earliest 
(available) year of each cour t ' s operation through the end of 2003. Table 1 
presents a comparison, by country, of the samples examined by Smithey and 
Ishiyama, Herron and Randazzo, and the modified replication study. 
The sample includes decisions involving both abstract review (both a priori 
and a posteriori) of legal norms and concrete review. The source of the data is 
Stone Sweet: Governing... op. cit. 
83
 Pistor: op. cit. 84. 
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 This includes all but one of the countries (Latvia, excluded to avoid overrepresenting 
the Baltic region) examined by both Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and Ishiyama. 
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the CODICES Database published by the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe, which provides full-text decisions and case descriptions from 
constitutional courts around the world. The CODICES Database does not 
entirely remove the problem of selection bias, but it significantly reduces the 
problem of differential selection bias, as cases are selected according to a 
single set of standards by a central agent. 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Judicial Review 
To replicate the prior works ' methods, both bivariate correlation analyses and 
logistic regression analysis (logit) are used here. For the logit analysis, which 
forms the main part of the study, the dependent variable is the likelihood of a 
constitutional court exercising its powers of judicial review. Following Her ron-
Randazzo and Smithey-Ishiyama, cases were coded 1 if the courts declared 
unconstitutional or otherwise annulled a statute, explicit government action, 
substatutory legislation or regulation, a treaty, or other similar legal norms, and 
0 if the courts did not. 
For the correlation analysis, following Smithey-Ishiyama, static, country-
level attributes are compared with an aggregate measure of judicial rev iew's 
frequency: the number of cases where courts did exercise review across all 
years divided by cases where it was petitioned (or otherwise empowered) to do 
so. Three measures of this were used: (1) the scores originally calculated by 
Smithey and Ishiyama covering the first three years of each court's operation, 
(2) the same scores supplemented by third-party data on Hungary and Poland,85 
and (3) scores calculated f rom the replication dataset. In a second set of corre-
lations presented side-by-side with counterparts of the first set, each of these 
three measures of the dependent variable is adjusted to reflect disparate levels 
of accessibility of the courts in each country. 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
3.2.2.1 Judicial Independence: Power, Access, and Insularity 
The prior works operationalise judicial power in the form of the Sil described 
above, a synthetic measure designed to encompass "both the extent to which 
the constitutional courts possess judicial review powers and the extent to 
which the constitution extends independence of action to the constitutional court 
or supreme court from other institutional actors."86 The present study begins 
85
 Data from Scheppele: op. cit. and Brzezinski: op. cit. 
86
 Smithey-Ishiyama: Judicious choices... op. cit. 167. 
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with this measure judicial independence, testing both the prior authors' values 
and corrected values (to fix arithmetical and coding errors in prior studies). 
Table 2A presents the Smithey and Ishiyama Index (Sil) of judicial independence 
as originally calculated. Table 2B presents the Sil when corrected for coding 
and calculation errors. 
Additionally, Smithey and Ishiyama observe casually, without testing 
systematically or attempting to explain, that the level of judicial review generally 
rises with judicial independence up to 0.55, a point immediately between the 
mean (0.54) and median (0.56) and mode (0.56) of the original distribution of 
judicial independence scores,87 but that judicial review declines thereafter. This 
possibility of a central peak is tested by comparing the absolute value of the 
distance of a country 's Sil score from this central 'peak' point (0.55) with its 
level of judicial review. If 0.55 is indeed at the apex of a curve, then the 
distance between a country's score and the peak will be negatively correlated 
to judicial review. 
The limits of the SU itself can only be pushed so far, however, before a 
wholly new measure is needed. At the very least, judicial independence and 
judicial power-nebulous concepts which the literature has failed to def ine 8 8 -
cannot be treated as coterminous. An improved measure of judicial independence 
must conceptually identify, separate, and thoughtfully recombine various 
dimensions of judicial independence, and should be designed from theoretical 
premises rather than an unbalanced, unrepresentative amalgamation of attributes 
of transition courts.84 
The present study achieves this by identifying three separate conceptual 
components of judicial independence: Access, Power, and Insularity. 'Access ' 
refers to the range of actors authorised to invoke the court 's jurisdiction and 
request judicial review. It is comprised of the average access score of four 
types of constitutional review cases, each weighted equally: a priori review, a 
posteriori abstract review, a posteriori concrete review, and unconstitutional 
omissions. The access score for each of these case types is determined by the 
number of categories of petitioner authorised to initiate a case of that type. 
87
 Ibid. 
18
 Burbank-Friedman: op. cit.; Shetreet-Deschenes: op. cit. 
81
 An alternative and/or supplement to designing such an index deductively is factor 
analysis, a data reduction method aimed to identify underlying forces in a range of inde-
pendent variables. However, when employed in the present case, no single component derived 
accounted for even a majority of variance, and the main components identified were not 
associated with groupings of independent variables which were intuitively meaningful. 
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'Power ' refers to the range of the cour t ' s substantive competences, reflecting 
the scope and depth of its judicial review authority. This measure is built in the 
same way as Access, constituted of four average power scores (reflecting the 
proportional number of powers within each of the four case types which the 
court possesses) which are also in turn averaged together. 
Finally, the measure 'Insularity' reflects the degree to which constitutional 
courts are shielded from political attacks or censure for decisions unfavourable 
to other political actors. It results from the average of five component scores 
(each ranging from 0 to 1) reflecting different aspects of judges ' protection 
from political retribution: judges ' immunity from prosecution,90 the number of 
effective appointing actors (deflated by a factor of 4 to yield an index with limits 
at 0 and l) ,9 1 the term length of the judges relative to a legislative session 
(likewise deflated by 4),92 the original S i l component for removal,93 and the 
original Sil component for who controls court procedure. '4 
Table 3a details the composition of the individual elements used to construct 
new indices of judicial independence; Table 3b lists the computations used to 
generate these indices. 
These basic elements are tested both by themselves and in certain specific 
combinations to test interactive relationships. Thus, the measure Power * 
Insularity captures the interactive relationship expected between competences 
and protection from censure, testing the inference that competences on paper 
only empower the court to the degree that judges are shielded from retribution. 
Power * Access aims to adjust the measure of the court 's competences on 
paper to reflect the ease with which those competences are invoked (since even 
the court with the greatest competences on paper can achieve nothing if no 
case can be brought because of justiciability requirements such as litigants' 
standing). Also, a "Composite" measure of courts' power and accessibility is 
computed by averaging the products of a priori power and access, a posteriori 
abstract power and access, a posteriori concrete power and access, and omission 
power and access. This Composite measure was also incorporated in an 
interactive measure: Composite * Insularity. 
Values: 0: Judges have no special immunity; 0.5: Judges can be removed only with 
legislature's consent; 1.0: Judges can be removed only with the Court's own consent. 
91
 = 1 / X (af)> where a; is the proportion of control over Court appointments allotted to 
each actor /'; same basic modification of Laakso-Taagepera (based on Herfindahl) formula 
for effective number of political parties. 
9
" = T / L, where T is the term length of a single judge in years and L is the length of a 
legislative session. 
93
 Values: Constitutional bar on removing judges = 1; Else 0. 
94
 Values: Court sets own procedures = 1; Else = 0. 
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All the foregoing measures of dimensions of judicial independence have 
values ranging from 0 to 1 (1 reflecting greater independence). Each reflects 
one of the many possible elements of judicial independence. All of these 
elements, taken separately and when combined interactively, should relate 
positively to judicial review. 
3.2.2.2. Additional Replication Variables 
For all independent variables included for replication purposes, variable speci-
fications computation (when necessary) fol lowed the formulae used by the 
original authors. Thus, following Herron-Randazzo, legislative fragmentat ion-
both at time of decision and in the first democratic election-was computed 
using the widely-used45 Laakso-Taagepera measure of effective political 
parties.46 Both of these variables should relate positively to judicial review. 
The number of parties within the governing coalition, however, should relate 
negatively to judicial review for reasons given above. 
The measure of and data for presidential power incorporates twenty-seven 
distinct competences potentially possess by presidents, adjusted for cases where 
powers are shared or if the president is indirectly elected. This is expected to 
relate negatively to judicial review, in line with both the hypothesis and 
findings of Herron and Randazzo. 
Both the Herron-Randazzo and Smithey-Ishiyama studies include a 
measure of rights guarantees in each country, both of which are tested here. 
Herron and Randazzo use each country's "Civil Liberties" score from annual 
Freedom House surveys. As lower scores on this scale (which ranges from 1 to 
95
 The measure, incidentally just the inverse of the Herfindahl ownership dispersion 
index from the economics literature, is given by: EPP = 1 I f (pf) . where Pi is the pro-
portion of seats allocated to each party /. The index was first presented by Laakso, M . -
Taagepera, R. (1979): 'Effective' number of parties: a measure with applications to West 
Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12, 3-27. It was later elaborated upon by Taagepera, 
R.-Shugart, M. (1989): Seats and votes: the effects and determinants of electoral systems. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. Despite numerous calls for modification some by its own 
creators, it remains the standard measure. Dumont, P.-Caulier, J.: The 'effective number of 
relevant parties': how voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera's index. Centre de 
Recherche en Economie (CEREC), Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC Discussion 
Paper Series, Cahier #2003/7. Available online: <http://centres.fusl.ac.be/CEREC/ 
document/cahiers/cerec2003_7.pdf>. Taagepera, R.: Supplementing the effective number 
of parties. Electoral Studies, 18 (1999) 497-504. 
96
 Data for political parties' proportions of seats came from the University of Essex 
Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe. 
All computations of effective political parties are original to the present author. 
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7) are associated with greater civil rights protection, a negative relationship is 
expected here, which Herron and Randazzo expected but were unable to find. 
Smithey and Ishiyama generate their own index reflecting the scope of rights 
guaranteed in each country 's bill of rights, which they expected but did not 
find to be positively related to judicial review. 
Smithey and Ishiyama's measure of popular trust in the courts is also 
included here. Higher values of public confidence in courts should correspond 
to higher incidence of judicial review, an expectation which Smithey and 
Ishiyama confirmed. Additionally, the degree of federalism in each count ry-
manifested in the number of elected subnational tiers of government-was also 
included in the Smithey and Ishiyama models and thus in the replication. The 
hypothesis, which Smithey and Ishiyama's data supported, is that greater 
divisions of power between the centre and regions should result in higher 
judicial review frequency.97 
The final replication variable is the identity of the petitioner requesting the 
court to exercise judicial review. Following Herron and Randazzo, dummy 
variables for individual citizen petitioners and the president as petitioner are 
included. In addition, this study includes dummies for legislators as well as 
administrative or cabinet officials (e.g. ministers, ombudsman, etc.) as peti-
tioners.98 Each of these dummy variables should relate positively to judicial 
review, following Herron and Randazzo's hypotheses and findings.99 
3.2.2.3. New Independent Variables 
Aside from legislative fragmentation in the first democratic election, variable 
specifications and data for measures of countries' receptiveness to legal trans-
plantation are taken from Pistor, Raiser, and Geifer1"0 and Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard.'"' Both sets of authors present the same coding scheme, used with 
modifications here, which identifies countries as possessing 'Famil iar i ty ' , 
'Adaptat ion ' , both, or neither. Those "without previous exposure to the modern 
formal legal order before the collapse of the socialist system" are coded as "new 
transplants." l u : In the present study, the presence of Familiarity, Adaptation, or 
47
 Smithey and Ishiyama cite the World Bank's annual World Development Report as 
their source, though there are discrepancies between the edition they cite and the numbers 
they report. In these cases, the original World Bank numbers are preferred. 
98
 Herron and Randazzo identify cases where the legislature is the respondent, not 
the petitioner. 
" Herron and Randazzo: op. cit., 431. 
100
 Pistor-Raiser-Gelfer: op. cit. 
"" Berkowitz-Pistor-Richard: Economic development... op. cit. 
102
 Pistor-Raiser-Gelfer: op. citAS. 
48 JONATHAN С. BOND 
both , as we l l as be ing c o d e d as " n e w t r a n s p l a n t s , " s h o u l d re la te pos i t i ve ly to 
judicial r e v i e w . 
3 .2 .2 .4 . C o n t r o l Va r i ab l e s 
Both as a poss ib le e x p l a n a t o r y i n d e p e n d e n t var iab le and as a necessa ry m a c r o -
level con t ro l , Herron and R a n d a z z o incorpora te the annual c h a n g e in G D P g rowth 
in the i r m o d e l . T h e y s u g g e s t s eve ra l r e a s o n s w h y such e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s 
may lead to e i the r h igher or l o w e r levels of jud ic ia l rev iew, 1 0 2 none of wh ich a re 
compe l l i ng , bu t their f ind ings are u n i f o r m l y negat ive and stat ist ically s ign i f i can t . 
T h e p r e sen t s tudy thus i n c o r p o r a t e s c h a n g e in G D P g r o w t h as wel l (base yea r = 
1990), expec t ing negat ive resul t s in line wi th Herron and R a n d a z z o ' s f i n d i n g . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , in the c o r r e l a t i o n a n a l y s i s on ly , e ach set o f co r r e l a t i ons w e r e 
run a s e c o n d t i m e to con t ro l f o r e a s e of a c c e s s to the cons t i t u t i ona l cour t ; to d o 
so, the j u d i c i a l rev iew a g g r e g a t e s ta t i s t ic w a s mu l t i p l i ed by the c o u n t r y ' s 
A c c e s s s c o r e . Th i s is d o n e to a c c o u n t f o r the poss ib i l i ty tha t eas i e r a c c e s s to 
the c o u r t s y i e l d s not on ly an i n c r e a s e in c a s e v o l u m e but a l s o a dec rea se in the 
p r o p o r t i o n of ca ses wi th s t r o n g legal mer i ts ." 1 4 Fo r e x a m p l e , f o r cour t s such as 
103
 Ibid. 426. 
104
 The aim of adjusting the dependent variable-the frequency of judicial review-for 
access to the courts is to control for the possibility that easier access permits not only more 
persons to petition the court, and thus presumably more cases, but also a higher proportion 
of cases with weak legal merits. The rationale for this expectation is complex, and can only 
be sketched briefly here: Assuming all parties are rational actors, if access to a court is 
suddenly opened to more parties and/or in more types of cases, the costs of petitioning the 
courts has effectively fallen (from infinity to a non-infinite level for those previously 
unable to petition the court at all; for some others, their ability to petition the court may 
have been indirect [as is common in CEE]-in that they could only request the ombudsman 
or an MP to petition the court on their behalf). Lower costs of petition, ceteris paribus, 
mean a fall in the cost-benefit ratio of petitioning the court-in short, a fall in the relative 
price of petitioning. That a fall in 'price' of petitioning should be met by an increase in the 
number of petitions, ceteris paribus, is not surprising. The important inference, though, is 
that presumably the group of 'sub-marginal petitioners'-for whom it was not on balance 
worthwhile to petition the courts (due to the cost-benefit ratio) before access was made 
easier, but for whom ex post petitioning is worthwhile-would come to make petitions with 
a lower average likelihood of success (since cases more likely to succeed would already 
have a lower cost-benefit ratio). In short, it is most likely, on average, sub-marginal cases 
(in terms of legal merits and/or likelihood of success in securing judicial review) which are 
added to the courts' docket when access is made easier. 
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Hungary's where access is wide open to all,105 it makes sense that a smaller 
proportion of the 11,092 cases submitted in the court 's first six years covering 
nearly every statute the legislature had passed were actually of sufficient legal 
merit to warrant judicial review.""' Correcting for access controls for this 
possibility to some extent. 
4. Results & Analysis 
The results of bivariate correlations and selected regression analyses conducted 
(forty-eight regression models in total) are presented in Tables 4-16, reflecting 
of each layer of corrections and expansions upon the original Smithey-Ishiyama 
and Herron-Randazzo models.107 The following sections discuss the key findings 
from these analyses. 
4.1. Effects of Alternative Measures of Judicial Independence 
Table 4 presents bivariate correlations of various independent variables with 
three aggregate measures of judicial review. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report results 
of logit regressions testing the Sil (original, arithmetically fixed, and data-corrected) 
against both pairs of authors' original models. 
The results concerning the influence of judicial independence on judicial 
review are indeed mixed, but a number of important are noteworthy. First, 
though the original Sil is clearly a poor predictor of judicial review, substantive 
corrections in coding improve it noticeably. Correlations yield weak negative 
105
 Under the actio popularis, any individual can petition for abstract review of any 
statute without having been affected by the statute herself; See Hungarian Constitution and 
Act on the Constitutional Court, Act XXXII of 1989. 
106
 Sólyom-Brunner: op. cit. 72. 
107
 All 48 logit regressions run employ a weighting procedure, developed by Herron 
and Randazzo and also used by Smithey and Ishiyama, to ensure that countries which issue 
comparatively fewer decisions are not treated as less important by the regression analysis. 
A similar, slightly modified method of weighting cases was employed here. The full 
technical details of Herron and Randazzo's weighting procedure are not detailed in their 
article, and were also not available on request; however, the procedure detailed above 
achieves the same purpose very similarly. In this study, the weight factor w given to each 
case decided by the court of country x is given by: 
(Total number of cases in the dataset) 
wx = 
(Total number of cases from country x) * (Number of countries in dataset) 
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results, and no significant results were obtained by regression,108 even when 
technical and arithmetical errors are corrected. However, the data-corrected 
version of the Sil reflects a small but important improvement in the SI I ' s 
predictive power: in correlation analysis it is positively correlated with judicial 
review (e.g. r = 0.297), a relation which is stronger when judicial review is 
adjusted for accessibility of the courts (r = 0.389 using original authors' data 
plus Hungary and Poland; r = .263 using the new replication dataset). It also 
yields a positive, statistically significant relationship in one of four regressions 
where it is tested, and in all others yields no significant relationship. 
Second, Smithey and Ishiyama's casual observation that judicial review 
increases up to around the midpoint of the judicial independence scale before 
declining is confirmed. Tables 8 and 9 present results from models testing the 
'peak' observation, but otherwise still following the authors' original template. 
Using Smithey and Ishiyama's own judicial review statistics, the correlation 
between judicial review and absolute value of the distance from 0.55 on the 
judicial independence Sil is -0 .668 and -0 .907 for the original and data-corrected 
indices, respectively. This negative relationship is also found in regressions 
based on Smithey and Ishiyama's (2002) models (where the relationship is 
statistically significant in every test), though not in those based on Herron and 
Randazzo's models. 
Although Smithey and Ishiyama do not offer an explanation for this, at least 
one possibility deserves m e n t i o n . A s both Vanberg"11 and Stone Swee t 1 " 
suggest, more powerful courts can influence policymaking without striking 
down statutes, or indeed without hearing a case, if the legislature (or other branch 
or body) anticipates that passing a bill which the court might unconstitutional 
will result in it being struck down by the court. In short, "the spectre of 
constitutional censure hovers over the legislative process."1 '2 This is true only 
to the extent that others anticipate court intervention and only to the extent that 
the court possesses the authority to do so. Thus, the degree of the court ' s 
formal authority determines, as it were, the length of the shadow that the court 
casts over the legislature process. If this is true, it may in part explain the 
118
 In all statistical procedures the a value is .10, as used by Herron-Randazzo: op. cit. 
104
 A second explanation may also account for this, which parallels the argument for 
adjusting the dependent variable for ease of access to the courts: the more powerful a court, 
the greater the demand for its services by individual appellants, and thus the greater its 
caseload and potentially the greater the proportion of cases with weak legal merit. 
110
 Vanberg: Legislative-judicial... op. cit.; Vanberg: Politics... op. cit. 
111
 Stone Sweet: Governing... op. cit. 
112
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finding of the 'peak ' in judicial review: the more power courts have, the less 
they need to exercise it, as statutes and other legal norms which they are likely 
to strike down are never passed in the first place. 
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13, report findings regarding new measures of judicial 
independence, tested in the framework of the prior authors' original models. 
Variables measuring countries' receptiveness to legal transplants are included 
in Tables 14 and 15. Finally, Table 16 presents three composite models which 
incorporate components from both the Smithey and Ishiyama or Herron and 
Randazzo template. 
The new measures of the dimensions of judicial independence developed 
above do reflect some improvement over the Si l , but the results are not 
consistent. On the one hand, the separate and combined measures of Power and 
Access (and the Composite power and access term) yield several positive, 
statistically significant relationships. On the other hand, both Insularity and its 
interactive term with Power (Power * Insularity) generate some positive and 
some negative statistically significant results. Moreover, no statistically 
significant relationships at all were evident in regressions based on Herron and 
Randazzo's models. 
Taken together, these findings thus warrant caution making generalizations 
about the relationships between judicial independence and judicial review. The 
central hypothesis, that judicial independence is positively associated with 
judicial review in CEE and the FSU, is confirmed in part and rejected in part. 
However, the alternative formulation of this hypothesis, that judicial power is 
positively related to judicial review (as the prior authors used the same Sil to 
reflect both independence and power on different occasions), is confirmed. At 
the very least, the findings show that excluding independence from the judicial 
politics puzzle in transition countries is premature. Better conceptualisations 
and operationalisations are certainly needed, but writing judicial independence 
out of the equation in CEE and FSU would be mistaken. 
4.2. Effects of Other Replication Variables 
Although the prior authors differed in their expectations of the effect of 
legislative fragmentation, the replication findings here resolve that question. In 
all but two models in which it is included (35 of 37 regressions), legislative 
fragmentation (at the time of the decision) is positively related to judicial 
review, statistically significant at or below the .01 level. The primary hypothesis 
concerning legislative fragmentation is thus confirmed, affirming the hypotheses 
findings of Smithey and Ishiyama but rejecting the hypotheses of Herron and 
Randazzo. 
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As noted earlier, however, Herron and Randazzo 's expectation may make 
sense if applied to fragmentation inside governing coalitions. This is supported 
by the evidence: party fragmentat ion is negatively associated with judicial 
review to a statistically significant degree in every model where it appears. 
This therefore confirms the secondary hypothesis regarding legislative fragmen-
tation inside coalitions (which neither previous work had tested). 
Findings for presidential power clearly aff i rm the findings of Herron and 
Randazzo. In the overwhelming majority of models where it is included, 
presidential power is negatively associated with judicial review to a highly 
statistically significant degree. This makes intuitive sense for reasons described 
above: a powerful executive is in a better position to constrain the courts (by 
action or by explicit or implicit threat). 
Findings for the degree of federalism, however, appear counterintuitive at 
first glance: in almost every regression, the number of elected sub-tiers of 
government is negatively correlated to judicial review, to a statistically sig-
nificant degree-directly contrary to Smithey and Ishiyama's findings. While 
the negative and significant relationship is surprising, part of the problem may 
lie in the original authors confusing direct with indirect effects of federalism. 
While it is reasonable to expect a higher number of central, regional, and local 
layers of authority to generate jurisdictional conflicts yielding increased judicial 
involvement, it need not result in increased frequency of courts invalidating 
laws or official acts. 
Smithey and Ishiyama's f inding concerning popular trust in the courts is 
also confirmed: in most models where it appears it is positively associated with 
judicial review, to a statistically significant degree. Those authors' own index 
of written rights guarantees is also, in most models, positively and significantly 
related to judicial review. 1" The measure used for rights guarantees by Herron 
and Randazzo, on the other hand, generated conflicting results: as higher degrees 
of civil liberties are reflected by lower scores on the index used, a negative 
relationship was expected, yet both positive and negative relationships appeared 
at statistically significant levels in different models. Herron and Randazzo them-
selves were likewise unable to find a clear-cut relationship. 
113
 Their data is taken from a variety of popular opinion surveys by the University of 
Strathclyde; however, direct access to this data was unavailable for replication, thus Smithey 
and Ishiyama's reported figures had to be relied upon. Yet again, these figures exclude 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, as well as Georgia, warranting considerable caution (as the 
sample size is more than halved when these countries arc excluded, and the represen-
tativeness of the panel is greatly reduced). 
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The final attribute replicated here is the identity of the petitioner requesting 
that the court engage in judicial review in each case. Herron and Randazzo 
included the categories of individual citizens and the president, and the repli-
cation study coded these in addition to legislative petitioners (Herron and 
Randazzo also coded cases where the legislature was the respondent) and where 
the petition was made by a cabinet member or administrative officer, such as 
an ombudsman. Cases where the president or a cabinet or administrative official 
made the appeal were positively and significantly associated with judicial review 
in almost every model where they appeared. Additionally, where the categories 
of individual petitioner and legislative petitioner were related significantly to 
judicial review, the relationship was positive, confirming Herron and Randazzo's 
hypotheses and affirming their findings. 
4.3. Effects of New Variables 
Replication also provided the opportunity to test additional causal factors 
influencing judicial review, namely those concerning the receptiveness of 
countries to legal transplantation. The present study set out f ive hypotheses, 
generally grounded in the existing literature on the 'demand for law' , and the 
empirical data confirms all five. 
First, it was hypothesised that in countries which showed a tendency for 
adapting the entire legal system (i.e. not just the constitutional court) which 
they had imported, the constitutional court the country imported would also 
function more 'normally' (i.e. resemble the model in the 'exporting' state more 
directly), meaning a higher level of judicial review than those which did not 
show a pattern of adaptation. Empirical findings clearly support this hypothesis: 
in all six regressions in which it is included, Adaptat ion"4 shows a positive 
relationship to judicial review (statistically significant to at least the 0.01 level). 
It was also hypothesised that a country's familiarity with the general legal 
system it imported during the transition period would be positive related to 
judicial review. The results here are less resounding, but they still confirm the 
expectation: statistically significant results appear in two of six regressions, and 
in both of these cases the relationship is positive. 
In light of these first two, the results of testing the third hypothesis are 
therefore unsurprising. It was expected that receptiveness-meaning the presence 
of both adaptation and familiarity-would be positively related to judicial review. 
In both models where ' receptiveness ' measured in this way is included, a 
highly statistically significant, positive relationship is evident. 
114
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The fourth hypothesis departed somewhat from the literature. It stated the 
expectation that countries which had no exposure at all to the "modern formal 
legal order"115 would also experience a higher level of judicial review. In each 
of eight models where it is included, the dummy variable for 'new transplants' is 
positive, and in seven of these the results are statistically significant, indicating 
that new transplants exhibit a higher level of judicial review than the reference 
category, 'unreceptive' transplants. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is also confirmed. 
Finally, it was hypothesised that the greater the diversity of participation in 
the constitutional design and negotiation process, the greater the legitimacy 
of the court, and thus the greater the support for an active, powerful tribunal. 
Thus, more varied participation at the constitutional design stage (measured 
by legislatively fragmentation at the first democratic elect ion"6) should be 
associated with higher levels of judicial review. This hypothesis is confirmed 
by the fact that the only model which includes this measure of participation 
yields a positive, statistically significant relationship between participation (i.e. 
legislative fragmentation at first election) and judicial review. Notably, in the 
models testing these new independent variables of receptiveness, the most 
important attributes of political context detailed above (viz. presidential power, 
legislative fragmentation at most recent election) return the expected results 
(negative and positive, respectively). 
4.4. Effects of Control Variables 
While change in GDP growth was included in Herron and Randazzo 's model 
as a control variable, they make a number of arguments concerning its potential 
substantive import. For instance, following Tate and Vallinder,117 that in periods 
of poor or declining economic performance, "if citizens and corporations are 
dissatisfied with the ability of the political branches of government to 
efficiently regulate the economy, then they may turn to legal remedies in order 
to advance their own self-interests."118 This argument is not totally implausible, 
but appears to explain increases or decreases in the public 's resorting to the 
courts, rather than judicial review. 
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Round Table negotiations was not available, thus a proxy measure was necessary; note, 
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While access to the courts was included as a component of the new measures 
of judicial independence, it was also incorporated as a type of dependent-
variable control in a second set of bivariate correlations. The purpose was to 
account for the possibility that courts where the right to petition was widely 
diffused would as a result receive far more cases, a larger proportion of which 
would have lower legal merit and thus not warrant the exercise of judicial 
review." 4 Adjusting the dependent variable (overall average of judicial review 
incidence) for access to the courts yielded much stronger correlations (e.g. r -
0.389 vs. 0.147; r = 0.263 vs. 0.007) with the data-corrected Sil than non-
adjusted measures. More strikingly, several dimensions of the new measures of 
judicial independence (Power; Composite power and access; Composite power 
and access * Insularity) switch f rom strong negative correlations (r = - 0 . 5 4 7 , 
-0 .547, and -0 .521 , respectively) to strong positive correlations with judicial 
review (using original Smithey and Ishiyama data plus Hungary and Poland, 
r = 0.744, 0.815, and 0.800, respectively; using replication dataset, r - 0 .851, 
0.972, and 0.943, respectively).12" Again, more rigorous and sophisticated 
methods of adjusting the dependent variable properly are still needed, but the 
elementary method employed here has yielded remarkable results.121 
5. Conclusion 
5. 1. Methodology 
As the foregoing study is designed partly to improve upon methodology and 
operationalisation of key variables, one of its most important findings is that 
the changes incorporated above to improve the execution, data-accuracy, and 
conceptualisation of judicial independence do make a difference. Technical and 
substantive corrections to the original Sil both (1) yield small but still note-
worthy improvements in the predictive power of judicial independence and 
also (2) bring the findings more in line with Smithey and Ishiyama's , Herron 
and Randazzo's, and this s tudy's hypotheses. 
119
 See the Note to Table 4, supra. 
120
 While it may appear that the including measures of access in both of the variables 
correlated is unsound, the computation of the measure of access incorporated into the 
Composite measure renders it quite different (in algebraic form and in outcome) from the 
single scalar measure used to adjust judicial review figures. 
121
 For instance, various non-logit regression models were tested where the dependent 
variable (viz. decision outcome) was adjusted by access, but the resulting synthetic 
dependent variable was too highly leptokurtic to remain within regression assumptions. 
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Moreover, the new, theoretically-grounded measures capturing several 
dimensions of judicial independence also mark a methodological advance. A 
number of statistically significant results, which are supported by the literature, 
indicate that the measures are at least a step in the right direction. Specifically, 
the new measures are designed to assess separately the different dimensions of 
judicial independence (before combining them via interactive terms), but which 
the prior measure does not. 
5.2. Substantive Findings 
Beyond these improvements in the study of judicial independence, the foregoing 
investigation yields a number of intriguing findings. The first hypothesis, 
that judicial independence positively correlates with judicial review, was 
partially confirmed and partially rejected. The Insularity dimension of judicial 
independence appears negatively related to judicial review, while the Power and 
Access of the court are both positively related. The second form of this hypo 
ethesis, that judicial power correlates with judicial review, is thus confi rmed. 
Additionally, a central 'peak ' does exist in the level of judicial review vis-à-vis 
the judicial independence distribution, fo r which there are several possible 
explanations. 
Additionally, the study answers conclusively at least one question left in 
doubt by the prior research and sheds at least some light on others. Overall 
legislative fragmentation at the time a decision is issued by a court is positively 
related to judicial review in the transition states studied. Fragmentation within 
the governing coalition, however, is negatively related to judicial review. These 
findings support the replication study's hypotheses, and make sense out of the 
disparate expectations and findings of Herron and Randazzo and Smithey and 
Ishiyama. 
The study further conf i rms several secondary findings of the prior works: 
presidential power is negatively related to judicial review, while popular trust 
in the courts, extent of rights guarantees in the bill of rights, and popular trust 
in the courts are all positively associated with the frequency of judicial review. 
Likewise, cases where the president or an administration or cabinet official is 
the petitioner are more likely to result in the striking down of the law named in 
the petition. 
Finally, the empirical data reveals relationships not studied in prior works. 
First, factors which affect the success of legal transplantations broadly speaking 
appear to influence the functionality of the newly imported constitutional 
courts. Second, the relative ease of access to courts has a significant, although 
complicated, effect on the frequency of judicial review. 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 57 
All of these findings, taken together, present a clearer and more complete 
picture of the contextual influences on judicial review than the prior works. 
Both the holistic portrait of the determinants of judicial review in transition 
and the new operationalisations of judicial independence offered here are merely 
first steps. While many scholars lament the dearth of theoretically sound, widely 
applicable conceptions and measures of judicial independence,122 fo r all its 
faults, Smithey and Ishiyama's work represents one of the few which actually 
sets out to fill the gap. 
More importantly, the integration of better conceptualisations of independence 
with measures of receptiveness represents an important step towards under-
standing how the process and conditions of transplanting constitutional 
adjudication institutions affects their development and behaviour. It is here in 
part where future research of constitutional jurisprudence in transition contexts 
must now focus. If it is true that the study of post-communist transition is 
rapidly becoming a matter of history,123 it is all the more important that the 
lessons taught by the experiences of constitutional judiciaries in CEE and the 
FSU be gleaned before the opportunity has vanished. 
* * * 
122
 Russell: op. cit.; Herron-Randazzo: op. cit.; Ramseyer-Rasmussen: op. cit. 
123
 Dupré: op. cit. 3ff. 
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T A B L E S 
Table 1. 
Sample Comparisons-Prior Research vs. Replication Study 
Herron and Randazzo 
(2003) 
Smithey and Ishiyama 
(2002) Replication Study 
Country N Years N Years N Years 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Poland 
Russia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
TOTAL 
11 
42 
11 
0 
0 
103 
228 
0 
86 
0 
93 
574 
1992-1996 
1993-2000 
1996-1997 
n/a 
n/a 
1993-2000 
1995-2000 
n/a 
1995-1998 
n/a 
1993-1995 
10 
19 
11 
0 
13 
41 
74 
0 
59 
96 
0 
323 
1993-1995 
1993-1995 
1997-1999 
n/a 
1993-1995 
1993-1995 
1995-1997 
n/a 
1995-1997 
1993-1995 
n/a 
61 1993-2003 
58 
17 
118 
136 
33 
250 
60 
47 
135 
915 
1994-2003 
1996-2003 
1991-2003 
n/a 
1993-2003 
1998-2003 
1991-2003 
1995-2003 
1994-2003 
1992-2003 
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Table 2a. 
Smithey and Ishiyama Index (Sil) of Judicial Independence (2000): Original Index 
Country 
(A) (B) 
Can Presence 
judicial of a priori 
decision be review? 
overturned? 
(C) 
Judges 
term 
relative 
legislative 
session 
(D) 
No. of 
actors 
involved in 
selecting 
judges 
(E) (F) Judicial 
Who Conditions power 
establishes for judicial score: 
court removal A+B+C+ 
procedures D+E+F/6 
Czech 
Republic 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.56 
Estonia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.39 
Georgia 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 (0.39) 
Hungary 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.58 
Lithuania 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.70 
Moldova 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 
Poland 
(1989- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1997/9) 
Poland 
(1997/9) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Russia 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.42 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.31 
Slovenia 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.56 
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Table 2b. 
Smithey and Ishiyama Index (sii) of Judicial Independence (2000): Data-corrected Index 
Country 
(A) 
Can 
judicial 
decision 
be over-
turned?1 
(B) 
Presence 
of a priori 
review?2 
(C) 
Judges 
term 
relative 
legislative 
session' 
(D) 
No. of 
actors 
invol-
ved in 
selecting 
judges 
(E) 
Who 
estab-
lishes 
court 
proce-
dures 
(F) 
Condi-
tions for 
judicial 
removal 
Judicial 
power 
score: 
(A+B+ 
C+D+ 
E+F)/6 
Net 
Diffe-
rence 
Czech 
Republic 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.61 0.05 
Estonia 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.64 0.25 
Georgia 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 
-0.11 
(0.06)5 
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.13 
Lithuania 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.00 
Moldova 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.00 
Poland 
(1989- 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 
97/9) 
Poland 
(1997/9) 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 
Russia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.05 
Slovenia 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.14 
1
 Poland 's Constitutional Tribunal gained the ability to issue binding decisions which 
the Sejm cannot override in the 1997 Constitution (which took ef fec t in October 1997), and 
the provisions concerning binding decisions (not open to overruling by the Sejm) took 
effect in October 1999. Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) acknowledge this but ignore the 
change in computing Poland 's index score. 
2
 From the text of their respective constitutions and laws empowering their constitu-
tional courts, it is clear that the Supreme Court (Constitutional Chamber) in Estonia and the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary can each consider constitutional challenges prior to the 
final promulgation (and thus application) of legislative acts. Also, though Smithey and 
Ishiyama specifically consider the possibility that a court could have a priori jurisdiction in 
a narrow area of cases, such as the review of not-yet-ratified treaties, they do not count 
Russia nor Slovenia in this group, in contrast to the text of those courts' respective 
empowering statutes. 
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3
 Smithey and Ishiyama (2000, 168) define the values of this variable as follows: the 
variable "was coded as 0 when the term of the constitutional court judge was less than or 
equal to one term of the actor with the longest constitutional term; 0.33 when it was less 
than or equal to two parliamentary sessions; 0.67 when the judges term was more than two 
parliamentary sessions (but had constitutionally specified limit in the number of terms) and 
1 when the term was life or until voluntary retirement". However, the maximum term 
length of parliamentarians in all of these countries is four years, and the term lengths of 
judges are as follows: Czech Republic, 10 years; Georgia, 10 years; Poland, 9 years; 
Slovakia, 12 years; and Slovenia, 9 years. 
4
 In Estonia, the chairman of the Supreme Court is proposed by president, and adopted 
by national assembly; others are p roposed by the chai rman, and adopted by national 
assembly; the five members of constitutional panel elected by General Assembly of the 
Supreme Court. In Hungary, the court is chosen by a special committee of the (unicameral) 
parliament comprised of one member f rom each political party represented in parliament. 
In Poland, the panel of judges is chosen by the Sejm, but the President can appoint any of 
these to be the President and Vice-President, without the approval of the Sejm. Thus, for 
Estonia, a score of "1" seems more appropriate, and " .25" for Hungary and Poland. 
In their original table, Smithey and Ishiyama report this total as .56, when data in 
their table yield a value of .39. 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) Judicial 
Can Presence Judges No. of Who Condi- power Net 
Country: 
judicial of a priori term actors estab- tions for score: 
decision review? relative invol- lishes judicial (A+B+ Diffe-
be over- legislative ved in court removal C+D+ 
turned?' session3 selecting proce- E+F)/6 rence 
judges dures 
Poland 
(1989- 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 
97/9) 
Poland 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 (1997/9) 
Russia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08 
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.05 
Slovenia 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.14 
N.B.: Scores in bold underline indicate a change from the original Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) 
score. 
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Table За. 
New Measures of Judicial Independence: Elements of New Indices 
Power Average of binary scores for each of the following powers 
(1: court has this power; 0: court lacks this power): 
A priori Review of: Constitution itself; International Agreements; 
Statutes; Regulations; Acts of the President; Acts of 
local/regional units; Other General Acts 
A posteriori abstract Review of: Constitution; International Agreements; 
Statutes; Parliamentary Resolutions; Regulations; Acts of 
the President of the State; Local Government Statutes; 
General Acts-Exercise of Public Powers; Other General 
Acts; National Norms versus Treaties; Regional 
Agreements 
A posteriori concrete Review of constitutional complaints 
Unconstitutional Omission Declare instance of unconstitutionality by omission (i.e. 
legislature has failed to act where it is obligated to do so) 
Access Average of binary scores for each of the following actors 
who have this right of access (1: this actor can invoke 
court for this power; 0: this actor cannot invoke court for 
this power): 
A priori Initiation by: President; Parliamentary leadership/cabinet; 
Individual members of parliament; Second legislative 
chamber's leadership; Individual members of second 
legislative chamber; Court itself; Other/lower courts; 
Administrative or legal official; Any citizen. 
A posteriori abstract Initiation by: President; Parliamentary leadership/cabinet; 
Individual members of parliament; Second legislative 
chamber's leadership: Individual members of second 
legislative chamber; Court itself: Other/lower courts; 
Administrative or legal official; Any citizen. 
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A posteriori concrete Initiation by: Court itself; Lower court; 
Administrative/legal official; Local/regional government; 
Individuals with specific vested interest; Any individual 
citizen regardless of interest 
Unconstitutional Omission Initiation by: Court itself; Any individual citizen 
regardless of interest 
Immunity Values: 0; Judges have no special immunity; 0.5: 
Judges can be removed only with legislature's consent; 
1.0: Judges can be removed only with the Court 's own 
consent. 
Number of Effective Appointers = 1 / X (a,2) Where ai is the proportion of control over 
Court appointments allotted to each actor i; same basic 
modification of Laakso-Taagepera (based on Herfindahl) 
formula for effective number of political parties. N.B. 
where two parties share authority for the same 
appointment, the proportion they share is split between 
them (e.g. if Legislature and President each must confirm 
every appointee, they are each coded 0.50). 
Relative Term Length = T / L Where T is the term length of a single judge in 
years and L is the length of a legislative session 
Control of Court's Procedures Smithey and Ishiyama Index, component E; Values: Court 
sets own procedures = 1 ; Else = 0 
Removal Score Smithey and Ishiyama Index, component F; Values: 
Constitutional bar on removing judges = 1; Else 0 
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Table 3b. 
New Measures of Judicial Independence: Computation of New Indices 
New Indices of Dimens ions of Judicial Independence 
Power = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) + 
a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4 
Access = [(a priori access) + (a posteriori abstract access) + 
(я posteriori concrete access) + (omission access)] / 4 
Insularity = [(Immunity score) + (number of effective appointers)/4 + 
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5 
Composite measure of power 
and access 
= [(я priori power)*(a priori access) + (я posteriori abstract 
power)* 
(a posteriori abstract access) + (a posteriori concrete 
power)*(a posteriori concrete access) + (omission 
power)*(omission access)] / 4 
Power * Access = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) + 
(a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4* [(a 
priori access) + (a posteriori abstract access) + (a posteriori 
concrete access) + (omission access)] / 4 
Power * Insularity = [(a priori power) + (a posteriori abstract power) + 
(a posteriori concrete power) + (omission power)] / 4* 
[(Immunity score) + (number of effective appointers)/4 + 
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5 
Composite measure of power 
and access * Insularity 
= ) [(я priori power)*(a priori access) + (я posteriori 
abstract power)* 
(a posteriori abstract access) + (я posteriori concrete 
power)*(a posteriori concrete access) + (omission 
power)*(omission access)] / 4 } * {[(Immunity score) + 
(number of effective appointers)/4 + 
(relative term length)/4 + (removal score) + (control of 
procedure)] / 5} 
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Table 4. 
Correlation Results (Modified Replication of Smithey and Ishiyama [2002]) 
Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Incidence of Incidence Incidence 
Incidence Judicial Incidence of Judicial Incidence of Judicial 
Variable Statistic of Judicial Review of Judicial Review of Judicial Review 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Judicial 
Independence 
Smithey and 
Ishiyama Index 
Original Index Pearson's r -0.117 -0.276 -0.021 0.225 -0.024 0.181 
(fixed) Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.802 0.549 0.957 0.561 0.947 0.618 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r 0.014 0.076 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.033 
Data-corrected Pearson's r 0.297 -0.074 0.147 0.389 0.007 0.263 
Index Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.518 0.875 0.706 0.301 0.985 0.462 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
f 0.088 0.005 0.022 0.151 0.000 0.069 
Original Index Pearson's r -0.421 -0.668 -0.147 -0.595 * -0.262 -0.418 
(fixed): Absolute 
Value of 
Distance from 
0.55 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
N 
0.347 
7 
0.101 
7 
0.706 
9 
0.091 
9 
0.465 
10 
0.229 
10 
r2 0.178 0.446 0.022 0.354 0.068 0.175 
Data-corrected Pearson's r -0.6.4 5 -0.907*** -0.441 -0.378 -0.457 -0.126 
Index (fixed) 
Absolute Value 
of Distance from 
0.55 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
N 
0.110 
7 
0.005 
7 
0.235 
9 
0.317 
9 
0.184 
10 
0.729 
10 
d 0.429 0.822 0.194 0.143 0.209 0.016 
New Measures: 
Power measure Pearson's r -0.338 0.272 -0.547 0.744** -0.157 0.851 *** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.458 0.556 0.127 0.022 0.665 0.002 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
с 
0.114 0.074 0.300 0.553 0.025 0.724 
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Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Incidence of Incidence Incidence 
Incidence Judicial Incidence of Judicial Incidence of Judicial 
Variable Statistic of Judicial Review of Judicial Review of Judicial Review 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Insularity Pearson's r -0.257 -0.437 -0.147 -O.I 07 -0.256 -0.063 
/Measure Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.578 0.326 0.705 0.785 0.475 0.863 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r2 0.066 0.191 0.022 0.011 0.066 0.004 
Power * Pearson's r -0.289 -0.064 -0.483 0.643* -0.229 0.730** 
Insularity Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.530 0.892 0.188 0.062 0.524 0.017 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r2 0.083 0.004 0.233 0.413 0.053 0.533 
Composite Pearson's r -0.587 0.183 -0.547 0.815 *** 0.065 0,972 * * * * 
power and 
access measure 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.166 0.695 0.128 0.007 0.859 0.000 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r2 0.344 0.033 0.299 0.664 0.004 0.945 
Composite Pearson's r -0.522 0.009 -0.521 0.800 *** 0.024 0.943**** 
power and 
access 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.229 0.985 0.150 0.010 0.948 0.000 
measure * 
Insularity 
N 
r2 
7 
0.273 
7 
0.000 
9 
0.272 
9 
0.639 
10 
0.001 
10 
0.889 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
At first election Pearson's r 0.350 ÍLűZi* 0.357 -0.126 0.045 -0.263 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.442 0.097 0.346 0.746 0.901 0.462 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
/ 0.122 0.453 0.127 0.016 0.002 0.069 
Overall average Pearson's r 0.068 0.559 0.155 0.101 0.363 -0.016 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.884 0.192 0.691 0.797 0.303 0.965 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r2 0.005 0.313 0.024 0.010 0.132 0.000 
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Data for Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) 
Smithey & Ishiyama 
(2002) plus Hungary 
and Poland 
Replication 
Incidence of Incidence Incidence 
Incidence Judicial Incidence of Judicial Incidence of Judicial 
Variable Statistic of Judicial Review of Judicial Review of Judicial Review 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Review Adjusted 
for Access 
Popular Trust in 
Courts 
Pearson's r Ü.620 0.084 ÍLÚ2Ü 0.084 0.364 -0.243 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.189 0.874 0.189 0.874 0.478 0.643 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
ri 0.384 0.007 0.384 0.007 0.132 0.059 
Rights Index Pearson's r -0.577 0.178 -0.577 0.178 0.329 0.792 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.175 0.702 0.175 0.702 0.471 0.034 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
r
2 0.333 0.032 0.333 0.032 0.108 0.627 
Federalism Pearson's r 0.033 0.517 -0.170 0.228 -0.145 0.191 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.944 0.235 0.661 0.554 0.690 0.597 
N 7 7 9 9 10 10 
t2 0.001 0.267 0.029 0.052 0.021 0.036 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001. 
T a b l e 10. 
Logit Results: Factors Affecting Judicial Review (Modified Replication of Smithey & Ishiyama 2002) - Original & Corrected Indices 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable Original Index 
Original Index 
(Calculations Fixed) 
Corrected Index 
(Coding Fixed i Original Index 
Corrected Index 
(Coding Fixed) 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald S (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial 
Independence 
Original S I 
Index 
0.430 0.143 
(1.135) 
5.100 
(3.398) 
2.252 
Index, 
Georgia Fixed 
0.301 
(0.856) 
0.124 
Corrected S 1 
Index 
0.598 0.269 
(1.152) 
8.660* 
(4.640) 
3.482 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
0.463**** 11.072 
(0.139) 
0.445**** 
(0.113) 
15.436 0.438 **** 18.255 
(0.102) 
Popular Trust in 
Courts 
0.099 ** 
(0.045) 
4.803 0.091 *** 
(0.033) 
7.636 
Rights Index 5.568 * 2.924 5.332* 2.899 6.184 * 2.875 30.214** 5.215 42.516** 6.036 
(3.256) (3.132) (3.647) (13.23) (17.30) 
Number of Sub- -0.955 **** 11.490 -0.924 * * " 12.621 
-0.918 **** 12.684 -0.205 1.041 -0.437 * 3.302 
tiers (0.281) (0.260) (0.257) (0.201) (0.240) 
Constant -0.721 0.516 -0.591 0.657 -0.834 0.745 -7.694 * 2.997 -10.702** 4.251 
(1.004) (0.729) (0.966) (4.444) (5.191) 
О 
z 
я 
> 
p CO 
О 
z 
о 
N 414 414 414 397 397 
-2LL 503.314 503.334 503.188 478.000 476.610 
Model Chi Square 24.695 24.675 24.821 14.968 16.357 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.003 
Pseudo R Square 0.080 0.080 0.081 0.052 0.057 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 6950% 69.50% 6950% 68.70% 68.70% 
Reduction of Error 39.00% 39.00% 39.00% 37.40% 37.40% 
с 
о 
о > 
Z 
о 
m 
-о 
m 
Z 
о 
m 
z 
о 
m 
z 
H 
то 
> 
z {Л 
О 
z 
а = .10; */>< .10: ** ^ < .05; *** р < .01; **** р < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
N.B.: Smaller sample sizes (414 and 397, respectively) result from unavailability of data for Smithey and Ishiyama's synthetic rights index for Hungary, 
Poland, or Slovenia, and in the case of Model 2, popular trust score for Georgia. 
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Table 6. 
Logit Results: Factors Affecting Judicial Review 
(Modified Replication of Herron and Randazzo 2003) - Original & Corrected Indices 
Original Index Original Index Corrected Index 
Independent Variable (Calculations Fixed) (Coding Fixed) 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial Independence 
Original S-l Index -0.146 0.151 
0.374 
Index, Georgia 
-0.123 0.113 
Fixed (0.365) 
Corrected S-I Index 
-0.552 1.404 
(0.465) 
Economic Conditions 
Change in GDP -0.147*** 7.308 
—0.147*** 7.309 -0.152*** 7.785 
Growth (base (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
year = 1990) 
Contextual Influences 
Presidential Power -0.084**** 13.586 -0.084**** 13.275 
-0.092**** 14.949 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Legislative 0.193**** 13.532 0.195**** 14.307 0.186**** 13.477 
Fragmentation (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Civil Liberties 0.133 1.503 0.128 1.470 0.140 1.857 
(0.108) 0.106) (0.103) 
Constant 0.390 1.000 0.380 1.000 0.714 1.000 
(0.337) (0.338) (0.434) 
N 915 915 915 
-2LL 1162.729 1162.768 1161.465 
Model Chi Square 36.200 36.161 37.464 
Prob < Chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.053 0.053 0.055 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.50% 63.90% 63.90% 
Reduction of Error 29.00% 27.80% 27.80% 
a = .10; * p< .10; ** p< .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
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Table 7. 
Logit Results: Factors Affecting Judicial Review, continued 
(Modified Replication of Herron and Randazzo 2003) - Original & Corrected Indices 
Original Index Original Index Corrected Index 
Independent Variable (Calculations Fixed) (Coding Fixed) 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial Independence 
Original S-l Index 0.012 0.001 
(0.431 
Index, Georgia -0.168 0.155 
Fixed (0.427) 
Corrected S-l Index -0.671 
(0.551) 
1.482 
Economic Conditions 
Change in GDP -0.123** 4.020 -0.123** 4.042 -0.126** 4.219 
Growth (base year (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
= 1990) 
Contextual Influences 
Presidential Power -0.077*** 9.175 
(0.026) 
-0.081*** 
(0.026) 
9.656 -0.088**** 
(0.027) 
11.003 
Legislative 0.262**** 17.375 0.257**** 17.517 0.249**** 16.681 
Fragmentation (0.063) (0.061) (0.061) 
Civil Liberties 0.099 0.644 
(0.124) 
0.113 
(0.121) 
0.871 0.118 
(0.119) 
0.991 
Petitioner 
Individual -0.188 1.013 
(0.187) 
-0.195 
(0.187) 
1.080 -0.209 
(0.187) 
1.247 
President 1.247*** 8.162 
(0.437) 
1.236*** 
(0.436) 
8.035 1.218*** 
(0.436) 
7.819 
Administration or 0.616** 3.958 0.586* 3.600 0.541* 3.110 
Legal Official (e.g. (0.310) (0.309) (0.307) 
Ombudsman ) 
Members of 0.226 0.911 0.243 1.035 0.255 1.156 
Legislature (0.237) (0.239) (0.238) 
Constant -0.133 1.113 
(0.397) 
-0.034 
(0.400) 
0.007 0.370 
(0.520) 
0.506 
N 764 764 764 
-2LL 962.366 963.708 962.366 
Model Chi Square 53.944 54.099 55.441 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.093 0.093 0.095 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.90% 64.40% 63.9091 
Reduction of Error 29.80% 28.80% 27.809! 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down). 
N.B. Smaller sample size results from missing data on petitioners in some cases in the dataset. Weights 
have been adjusted. 
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Table 8. 
Log it Results: Effect of Distance front 'Peak' of Judicial Power on Judicial Review 
(Eollowing Smithey and Ishiyama's [2002] Models) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable Distance from Peak 
Distance from Peak, 
Controlling for 
Access 
Distance from Peak 
Distance from Peak. 
Controlling for 
Access 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Distance from 
'peak' of Judicial 
Independence 
-3.402 * 
(1.945) 
3.059 -3.632 * 
(1.971) 
3.395 -3.524 * 
(1.869) 
3.555 -3.740 ** 
(1.887) 
3.927 
Accessibility of 
Courts 
-2.116 
(2.321) 
0.831 -2.362 
(2.209) 
1.143 
Number of Sub-
tiers 
-0.968 **** 
(0.259) 
4.010 - 0 955 **** 
(0.259) 
13.589 
-0.281 
(0.206) 
1.855 -0.282 
(0.206) 
1.875 
Rights Index 5.896* 
(3.070) 
3.689 4.935 
(3.260) 
2.291 12.478 **** 
(3.732) 
11.177 10.902*** 
(4.017) 
7.366 
Popular Trust in 
Courts 
0.034**** 
(0.010) 
11.582 0.032*** 
(0.010) 
9.704 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
0.425**** 
(0.099) 
8.363 0.411 **** 
(0.100) 
16.803 
Constant 0.155 
(0.444) 
0.121 0.572 
(0.639) 
0.801 -0.629 
(0.604) 
1.084 -0.095 
(0.787) 
0.014 
N 414 414 397 397 
-2LL 500.192 499.366 476.488 475.350 
Model Chi Square 27.817 28.644 26.479 17.617 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Pseudo R square 0.080 0.080 0.057 0.061 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00%. 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 69.50% 69.50% 68.70% 68.70% 
Reduction of Error 39.00% 39.00% 37.40% 37.40% 
a= .10; * p< .10; * * p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
N.B.: Smaller sample sizes(414 and 397, respectively) result from unavailability of data for Smithey and 
Ishiyama's Hungary, Poland, or Slovenia, and in the case of Model 2, popular trust score for Georgia. 
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Table 9. 
Logit Results: Effect of Distance from 'Peak' of Judicial Power on 
Judicial Review (Following Herron and Randazzo's [2003] Models) 
Without Controlling for Petitioner Controlling for Petitioner 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Waid 
Distance from 'peak' of Judicial 0.352 0.427 -0.217 0.122 
Independence (0.539) (0.621) 
Contextual Influences 
Legislative Fragmentation 0 202 **** (0.050) 
16.064 0.260**** 
(0.061) 
18.176 
Presidential Power 0.144 (0.109) 
1.750 0.085 
(0.124) 
0.473 
Civil Liberties -0 090 **** (0.025) 
12.496 -0.073 *** 
(0.028) 
6.639 
Economic Conditions 
Change in GDP Growth -0.148*** 7.422 -0.123** 3.979 
(hase year = 1990) (0.054) (0.061) 
Petitioner 
Individual -0.195 
(0.188) 
1.082 
President 1.254*** 
(0.436) 
8.255 
Administration or Legal 0.639** 4.245 
Official (0.310) 
Members of Legislature 0.225 
(0.235) 
0.913 
Constant 0.251 
(0.285) 
0.776 -0.090 
(0.340) 
0.071 
N 915 764 
-2LL 1162.453 963.742 
Model Chi Square 36.477 54.065 
Prob < Chi square 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.054 0.093 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.50% 65.00% 
Reduction of Error 29.00% 30.00% 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review ( 1 = legal norm/government action struck down). 
N.B. Smaller sample size results from missing data on petitioners in some cases in the dataset. Weights 
have been adjusted. 
Tab le 10. 
Logit Results: Effect of New Measures of Judicial Independence on Judicial Review Following Smithey and Ishiyama's (2002) 'Model 1 ' 
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E. ) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Legislative 0.368*** 6.739 0.371 *** 7.219 0.388 *** 10.103 0.444**** 19551 0.477**** 19.117 
Fragmentation (0.142) (0.138) (0.122) (0.100) (0.109) 
Rights Index -4.886 0.468 -8.913 1.103 -10.231 1.234 -6.788 0.736 0.920 0.041 
(7.139) (8.487) (9.209) (7.911) (4.557) 
Federalism -0.801 *** 8.621 -1.166**** 14.458 —0-591 * 3.724 -0.652 ** 4.894 -0.777*** 7.985 
(0.273) (0.307) (0.306) (0.295) (0.275) 
Judicial 
Independence 
Access Measure 8.999 
(6.053) 
2.211 
Power * Access 57.588 * 
(34.391) 
2.804 
Power * 1.443 0.198 -11.622 1.278 
Insularity (3.243) (10.281) 
Composite 19534 * 3.040 15.001 2 5 94 
power and 
access measure 
(11.203) (9.314) 
Composite 10.998 1.513 
power and 
access measure 
(8.942) 
* Insularity 
Insularity 1.855 
(2091) 
0.787 -0.825 
(1.062) 
0.604 
Constant -1 .328* 3.050 -0.538 0.334 -0.047 0.003 -0.687 * 3.140 -0.786 2.677 
(0.761) (0.932) (0.905) (0.387) (0.480) 
О 
z 
s 
> 
ш 
О 
N 414 414 414 414 414 
-2LL 500.989 500.175 500.165 501.527 501.934 
Model Chi Square 27.020 27.835 27.844 26.482 26.076 
Prob < Qii Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.088 0.090 0.090 0.086 0.085 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 67.30% 6950% 69.50% 67.30% 69.50% 
Reduction of 
Error 
34.60% 39.00% 39.00% 34.60% 39.00% 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; * * * * p < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) О z 
-J 
Table 10. 
Logit Results: Effect of New Measures of Judicial Independence on Judicial Review Following Smithey and Ishiyama 's (2002) 'Model 2 ' 
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E. ) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald 
Rights Index -20.765 
(20.685) 
1.008 -20.765 
(20.685) 
1.008 -17.336 
(40.915) 
0.180 -1.684 
(7.667) 
0.048 7.460* 
(4.062) 
3.373 
Federalism -0.399 
(0.279) 
2.048 -0.399 
(0.279) 
2.048 -0.130 
(0.658) 
0.039 0.106 
(0.254) 
0.175 0.179 
(0.277) 
0.419 
Popular Trust in -0.038 0.389 -0.038 0.389 -0.011 0.007 0.040**** 13.697 0.057 *** * 12.073 
Courts (0.061) (0.061) (0.132) (0.011) (0017) 
Judicial 
independence 
Power * Insularity 
-10.636 
(11.349) 
0.878 -10.636 
(11.349) 
0.878 
Access Measure 21.320* 
(12.652) 
2.840 21.320* 
(12.652) 
2.840 
Composite power 
and access 
measure 
24.116 
(17.052) 
2.000 18.756* 
(10.037) 
3.492 
Insularity 
-3.860 
(9.910) 
0.152 
Composite power 
and access 
measure * 
Insularity 
25.717 * 
(13 544) 
3.605 
Constant 1.129 
(2.929) 
0.149 1.129 
(2.929) 
0.149 3525 
(13.754) 
0.066 -1.825 *** 
(0.688) 
7.030 -3.079 ** 
(1.196) 
6.623 
5 
X 
> 
z 
Ш 
о 
z 
о 
N 414 414 414 414 414 
-2LL 500.989 500.175 500.165 501.527 501.934 
Model Chi Square 27.020 27.835 27.844 26.482 26.076 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.088 0.090 0.090 0.086 0.085 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 67.30% 69.50% 69.50%' 67.30% 69.50% 
Reduction of 
Error 
34.60% 39.00% 39.00% 34.60% 39.00% 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
H 
О 
Table 10. 
Logit Results: Effect of New Measures of Judicial Independence on Judicial Review Following Modified Herron and Randazzo (2003 ) 
Model (Without Controls for Petitioner Identity) 
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E. ) Wald В (S.E.) Wald B(S.E.) Wald 
Presidential -0.083 **** 14.124 -0.082**** 13.375 -0.083 **** 13.624 -0.082**** 13.830 -0.082**** 13.714 
Power (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Civil Lliberties 0.146 
(0.108) 
1.842 0.179 
(0.111) 
2.595 0.123 
(0.103) 
1.426 0.117 
(0.100) 
1.367 0.116 
(0.100) 
1.356 
Change in GDP -0.143 *** 6.896 -0.134** 5.860 -0.146*** 7.222 -0.146*** 7.197 -0.146*** 7.214 
Growth ( 1990 = (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
base year) 
Legislative 0.174 *** 8.897 0.182*** 10.207 0 ( 9 2 **** 11.344 0.199**** 15.715 0.199 **** 15.403 
Fragmentation (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.050) (0.051) 
Judicial 
Independence 
Power * -1.736 0.631 -5.397 1.832 
Insularity (2.186) (3.988) 
Power * Access 2.582 
(2.028) 
1.622 
Access Measure 0.407 
(0.668) 
0.371 
Composite 0.032 0.002 0.036 0.003 
power and (0.643) (0.642) 
access measure 
Composite 
-0.042 0.001 
power and (1-150) 
access measur* 
Insularity 
Insularity 0.918 
(0.943) 
0.947 -0.131 
(0531 
0.061 
Constant 0.441 
(0.341) 
1.677 0.142 
(0534) 
0.071 0.401 
(0.499) 
0.647 0.303 
(0.304) 
0.999 0.317 
(0.313) 
1.027 
О 
z 
s = 
> z 
03 
О 
z 
о 
N 915 915 915 915 915 
-2LL 1162.238 1160.982 1162.817 1162.880 1162.881 
Model Chi 
Square 36.691 37.948 36.112 36.050 36.049 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.054 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.053 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 63.90% 65.10% 63.90% 64.50% 64.50% 
Reduction of 
Error 27.80%. 30.20% 27.80% 29.00% 29.00% 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; ****p< .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review ( 1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
- j 
ЧС 
Tab le 10. 
Logit Results: Effect of New Measures of Judicial Independence on Judicial Review Following Modified Herron and 
Randazzo (2003) Model (With Controls for Petitioner Identity) 
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Presidential -0.083 *** 10560 -0.085 *** 10.771 -0.082 *** 10.349 -0.078 *** 9.780 -0.079 *** 9.835 
Power (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Civil Liberties 0.191 2.270 0.233 * 3.170 0.117 0.961 0.100 0.723 0.098 0.707 
(0.127) (0.131) (0.119) (0.117) (0.117) 
Change in GDP -0.112 * 3.348 -0.105 * 2.898 -0.122** 3.951 -0.123 ** 4.022 -0.123 ** 4.028 
Growth (1990 = (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
base year) 
Legislative 0.191 *** 8.309 0.216*** 10.805 0 235 * * * * 12.620 0.261 **** 18.200 0.259**** 17.506 
Fragmentation (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.061) (0.062) 
Petitioner 
Individual -0.196 1.024 -0.114 0.328 -0.214 1.194 -0.185 0.913 -0.177 0.842 
(0.194) (0.199) (0.196) (0.194) (0.192) 
President 0.594 * 3.828 0.705 ** 5.010 0568 * 3.461 0.613 ** 4.114 0.607** 4.028 
(0.303) (0.315) (0.305) (0.302) (0.303) 
Adminis tration 0.357 2.106 0.323 1.713 0.289 1.389 0.227 0.927 0.227 0.928 
or Legal (0.246) (0.247) (0.245) (0.235) (0.235) 
Official 
Members of 1.258 *** 8.206 1 325 *** 8.947 1 223 *** 7.797 1.249 *** 8.158 1.255 *** 8.246 
Legislature (0.439) (0.443) (0.438) (0.437) (0.437) 
Judicial 
Independence 
Power * -5 .442** 4.428 - 1 0 5 9 1 ** 5.201 
Insularity (2586) (4.644) 
Power * 4.903 ** 4.458 
Access (2.322) 
$ 
X 
> 
z 
о 
го 
О 
z 
Access 1.399 * 2.989 
Measure (0.809) 
Composite -0.012 0.000 -0.043 0.003 
power and (0.749) (0.748) 
access measure 
Composite -0.318 0.057 
power and (1.329) 
access mesu re 
* Insularity 
Insularity 1.519 1.775 -0.614 0.890 
(1.140) (0.651) 
Constant 0.196 0.249 -0.259 0.163 0.321 0.299 -0.118 0.106 -0.083 0.051 
(0.393) (0.641) (0.587) (0.361) (0.371) 
N 764 764 764 764 764 
-2LL 959.401 957.678 962.969 963.860 963.806 
Model Chi 58.406 60.129 54.837 53.947 54.000 
Square 
Prob < Chi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Square 
Pseudo R Square 0.100 0.103 0.094 0.093 0.093 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.90% 65.10% 64.90% 65.10% 65.10% 
Reduction of 
Error 29.80% 30.20% 29.80% 30.20% 30.20% 
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z 
а = .10; * р < .10; ** р < .05; ***р < .01; ****р < .001. 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) 
00 
Table 14. 
Influence of Legal "Transplant Effect" on Judicial Review (Panel A) 
00 to 
Independent 1 О 3 4 5 
Variable 
В (S.E.) Wald 
В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald В (S.E.) Wald 
Judicial 
Independence 
Corrected Index -0.828 
(0.887) 
0.871 -0.503 
(0.509) 
0.977 -0.876 
(0.880) 
0.989 -1.030 
(0.892) 
1.333 
Presidential -0.044 2.230 -0 .047* 2.722 -0.032 1.253 0.000 0.000 -0.032 1.267 
Power (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.036) (0.028) 
Legislative 0.181 *** 9.605 0193 **** 13.027 0.151 *** 7.410 0.206*** 8.842 0.179 **** 13.249 
Fragmentation (0.059) (0.053) (0.056) (0.069) (0.049) 
Civil Liberties -0.110 
(0.205) 
0.289 -0.116 
(0.205) 
0.320 -0.037 
(0.201) 
0.033 -0.044 
(0.200) 
0.048 -0.092 
(0.192) 
0.229 
Change m GDP -0.140** 6.110 -0.141** 6.187 
Growth (1990 = (0.057) (0.057) 
base year) 
Federalism 
-0.306 
(0.210) 
2.119 
Adaptation 0.587 *** 
(0.224) 
6.897 0.644 *** 
(0.221) 
S.470 0.861 *** 
(0.268) 
10.297 0.674 *** 
(0.219) 
9.450 
Familiarity 0.813 
(0.506) 
2.580 0.909 * 
(0.503) 
3.265 0.691 
(0528) 
1.714 0529 
(0.327) 
2.614 
Receptive 0.609*** 7.788 
Transplant (0.218) 
New Transplant 1.273 ** 
(0.527) 
5.833 0.563 
(0.357) 
2.488 1.252 ** 
(0.525) 
5.688 1.047 * 
(0540) 
3.755 1.130** 
(0509) 
4.920 
Constant -0.053 
(0.546) 
0.010 -0.509 
(0.449) 
1.284 -0.364 
(0.524) 
0.483 -0.231 
(0531) 
0.189 
- 0 5 9 0 
(0.473) 
1559 
о 
z 
a 
X 
> 
03 
О 
z 
с 
N 915 915 915 915 915 
-2LL 1153.029 1153.229 1159.167 1157.037 1160.155 
Model Chi Square 45.900 45.701 39.762 41.892 38.774 
Prob < Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.067 0.067 0.058 0.061 0.057 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 65.93% 64.43% 64.73% 65.39% 61.89% 
Reduction of 
Error 31.86% 28.85% 29.45% 30.78% 23.78% 
a = .10; * p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001. ~ 
DV: Dichotomous measure of judicial Review (1 = legal norm/government action struck down) О 
oo 
<->J 
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T a b l e 15. 
Influence of Legal "Transplant Effect" on Judicial Review (Panel B) 
Independent 
Variable 
6 7 8 
B(S.E.) Wald B(S.E.) Wald B(S.E.) Wald 
Judicial 
Independence 
Power measure 21.457*** 6.879 19.035 ** 5.291 
(8.181) (8.276) 
Insularity measure 7.220*** 8.311 9 419 **** 11.829 
(2.505) (2.739) 
Power * Insularity -36.925*** 7.861 -40.481 *** 9.176 
(13.170) (13.364) 
Access measure -1.430 0.889 0.966 0.252 
(1.516) (1.926) 
Presidential Power -0.066 * 3.731 -0.082 ** 5.181 
(0.034) (0.036) 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
At time of decision 0.163*** 7.553 0 225 *** 10.342 
(0.059) (0.070) 
At time of first 0.126** 6.120 
election (0.051) 
Civil Liberties -0.074 0.135 0.035 0.026 
(0.203) (0.215) 
Federalism -0.242 2.471 
(0.154) 
Adaptation 1.333**** 17.852 0.902**** 17.770 
(0.315) (0.214) 
Familiarity 0.283 0.257 0.625 * 3.647 
(0.558 (0.327) 
Receptive Transplant 1 216**** 15.245 
(0.311) 
New Transplant 0.868** 6.074 1.468** 5.255 1.090*** 10.548 
(0.352) (0.640) (0.336) 
Constant —3 738 *** 7.226 -5.633 **** -0 .770* 3.128 
(1.391) (1.612) (0.435) 
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N 915 915 915 
-2LL 1149.981 1145.895 1177.614 
Model Chi Square 48.949 53.034 25.948 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.071 0.077 0.038 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 64.72% 63.46% 61.80% 
Reduction of Error 29.44% 26.92% 23.60% 
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Table 16. 
Selected Composite Models of Factors Affecting Judicial Review 
Independent Variable -
1 
B(S.E.) Wald 
2 
B(S.E.) Wald 
3 
B(S.E.) Wald 
Change in GDP Growth -0.118** 4.403 -0.098* 3.222 -0.105 3.319 
(1990 = base year) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) 
Presidential Power - 0 257 **** 
(0.057) 
20.430 —0 273 **** 
(0.055) 
24.448 —0 353 **** 
(0.105) 
11.374 
Civil Lliberties 0.436*** 
(0.169) 
6.652 0.368** 
(0.160) 
5.318 0.641 *** 
(0.242) 
7.037 
Legislative 
Fragmentation 
At time of decision 0.173 
(0.114) 
2.309 0.198* 
(0.118) 
2.786 
Inside Coalition -0.693 **** 
(0.193) 
12.827 -0.628**** 
(0.187) 
11.318 -0.602*** 
(0.225) 
7.177 
Federalism 0.556*** 
(0.205) 
7.385 0.540*** 
(0.201) 
7.186 1.332** 
(0.658) 
4.103 
Judicial Independence 
Composite power and -4.256** 6.499 -4.774 *** 8.644 
access measure * 
Insularity 
(1.669) (1.624) 
Power * Insularity -8.002 
(7.557) 
1.121 
Power * Access 0.026 
(3.192) 
0.000 
Insularity 4.164 
(3.518) 
1.401 
Constant 3.061 *** 
(0.991) 
9.543 3.838**** 
(0.846) 
20.574 0.161 
(2.457) 
0.004 
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N 915 915 915 
-2LL 913.872 916.371 912.546 
Model Chi Square 39.603 37.103 40.929 
Prob < chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 0.072 0.068 0.075 
Null Model 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Predicted Model 66.50% 64.60% 66.20% 
Reduction of Error 33.00% 29.20% 32.40% 
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After the First Lessons and Experiences -
Cases Concerning Hungary before ECJ (2004-2007) 
Abstract. The essay attempts to give an overview on the cases relating to Hungary before 
European Court of Justice in the period between 2004-2007, which are classified into four 
categories. The first part of the article analyses eleven procedures concerning petitions for 
preliminary rulings, illustrating the bearings of the cases and pointing out the importance as 
well as consequences from the point of view of the Hungarian legal order. The essay refers 
to the fact that activity of Hungarian courts to apply preliminary ruling procedures is 
exceptionally high comparing with the other nine Member States acceded to EU in 2004 and in 
almost each cases concerned, the references were profoundly considered by the Hungarian 
court. The second category described in this paper includes cases, in which Hungarian 
individual persons participate as litigants (including the cases before Civil Service Tribunal). 
The experiences of these procedures on the basis of direct complaints indicate the conclusion 
that in several cases, the attorneys representing the plaintiff before ECJ involve not enough 
responsibilities to avoid bringing obviously inadmissible actions. In the third part of the paper 
the reader can get an insight into the cases in which the Republic of Hungary appears as 
litigant. Finally the fourth category embraces cases with indirect interest relating Hungary. 
These are referred but not deeply examined in the article. 
Keywords: European Union, European law, EC law, European Court of Justice, Hungarian 
law, case law 
I. Introductory remarks 
With the accession of Hungary to the European Union, besides law-makers and 
law-applying organs, Hungarian law-seeker citizens and undertakings must 
take into consideration that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) bestowed with 
peremptory legal authority is entitled to make ultimate decisions on the 
interpretation and effect of EU Law. Thence, the updated monitoring of the 
judicial practice of the Luxembourg Court becomes indispensable and we need 
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to expend more substantial care in cases, in which Hungarian parties are 
directly concerned. 
It can be quoted cases with Hungarian implications in the period before 
our accession, as well. One of the most familiar ones was the Balog Case (C-
264/98)1 also referred abroad. It was initiated by Tibor Balog, a former football 
player of M T K (a Hungarian League) by reason of the obligation illegally 
imposed on him to pay fees related to his registration to a European club. 
Subsequently to our accession to the EU, the cases concerning Hungary 
before the ECJ will be classified into four categories. In petitions for pre-
liminary ruling, interested parties are established in the main proceedings 
conducted by Hungarian judicial organs. The second category as follows includes 
cases, in which Hungarian individual persons participate as litigants, whereas, 
in the third category, the Republic of Hungary appears as litigant: either as 
plaintiff or defendant. Finally, the fourth category consists of cases, in which 
on the basis of indirect interest, the Hungarian party appears in various statuses 
in the proceedings, e.g., as an intervener or submitting observation.2 
II. Petitions for preliminary ruling referred by Hungarian courts 
a) The role of the preliminary ruling procedure 
References for preliminary ruling under article 234 TEC guarantee the uniform 
application and interpretation of Community Law within the EU. If the court 
of a Member State applies Community Law during its proceedings, it may refer 
the case for preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice. It may request 
1
 The documents related to the specific cases can be searched on the basis of case 
numbers and downloaded f rom the homepage of the European Court of Justice, see: 
www.curia.eu. After having had terminated the proceeding in the referred Balog Case, it 
has been cancelled in the register of ECJ, thus, the relevant facts can be found only in the 
print edition of the European Court Reports (ECR). 
This last category of cases include proceedings between other parties concerned, in 
which the Hungarian Government participates as an intervener or has the right to submit 
observation. These cases will not be analysed in this essay, but with respect to the practice 
so far. it can be mentioned some example. The Hungarian Government participated as an 
intervener e.g. in the Case Commission v. Republic of France (C-304/02), and submitted 
observation in Tokaji I. Case (C-347/03), Suzuki Case (joined with C-23/02, C-24/02, C-
25/02), Bondi Case (C-341/04), Mostaza Case (C-168/05), Banca Popolare di Cremona 
Case (C-475/03), Vorel Case (C-437/05), Wienand Meilicke Case (C-292/04), RUMA 
GmbH Case (C-183/06) etc. 
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the interpretation of the acts of Community organs and the establishment of the 
validity of the latter ones. In some cases, the proceeding court is obligated to 
have recourse to the ECJ. Whereas, the European Court of Justice can neither 
make decisions on the merits of the case, nor can it annul national legal norms. 
Comparing with the other courts of new Member States acceding to EU in 
2004, the Hungarian courts are relatively active to refer cases for preliminary 
ruling to ECJ. For the time being, eleven petitions have been referred to the 
ECJ from Hungarian judicial organs, out of which preliminary ruling has been 
accomplished in eight cases. Among that, there are cases referred in criminal 
procedures, but the 'hits' of the cases have concerned taxation issues. 
b) The 'fallen ' of the red star: Fiasco in the first Hungarian case before ECJ 
Following the accession of Hungary to the EU, the first concluded proceedings 
were the Vajnai Case (C-328/04)3 referred by the Fővárosi Bíróság (Metro-
politan Court). The Metropolitan Court initiated criminal proceedings against 
Mr Attila Vajnai, deputy secretary-general of the Hungarian Communist Workers' 
Party, on grounds of the charge of the use of totalitarian symbols. That is to 
say, because according to the Article 269/B. of Hungarian Criminal Code, the 
person who uses a symbol representing the red star (or other totalitarian 
symbol4) in public or publicly exhibits it commits a minor offence. The order 
for reference states that criminal proceedings were brought against Mr Vajnai 
for displaying on his clothing in public a five-point red star, made of cardboard 
with a diameter of 5 cm, during a demonstration held in Budapest . A police 
officer who was on duty requested him to remove that symbol, which he agreed 
to do. By judgment the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, 
Pest) found Mr Vajnai guilty of having used a 'totalitarian symbol ' in violation 
of Hungarian Criminal Code. The court decided to impose a one-year suspended 
sentence and ordered confiscation of the symbol. Hereupon, Mr Vajnai appealed 
against that judgment to the court which has made the reference for a 
preliminary ruling. 
The referring court, Fővárosi Bíróság, addressed the question to the Luxem-
bourg Court, whether the Criminal Code coll ides with the provisions of 
Community Law pertaining to discrimination or with other provisions. In the 
3
 The case was commented by Osztovics A.: Az első magyar előzetes döntéshozatali 
eljárás [The first Hungarian preliminary ruling case]. Európai jog, 4/5 (2004) 16-21. 
4
 Beside the red star, the swastika, the insignia of the SS. the arrow cross, the hammer 
and sickle, the five-point red star or any other symbol representing one of those signs fall 
within this article of Hungarian Criminal Code. 
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reference was cited Article 6 TEU,5 Council Directive 2000/43/EC,6 and 
Articles 10, 1 1 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,7 as well . The 
court has observed that in several Member States, such as the Italian Republic, 
the symbol of left-wing parties is the red star or the hammer and sickle. It 
follows that members of Italian left-wing organisations may wear symbols of 
the labour movement without contravening any prohibition, whereas the 
Hungarian Criminal Code prohibits the use of those symbols. Therefore, the 
question arises whether a provision in one Member State prohibiting the use of 
symbols of the international labour movement on pain of criminal prosecution, 
whereas the display of those symbols on the territory of another Member State 
does not give rise to any sanction, is discriminatory. 
The Advocate General did not submitted written opinion in the case, then, 
the ECJ terminated its proceedings with reference to an obvious lack of its 
jurisdiction on 6lh October, 2005. According to the brief reasoning of the order, 
the questions raised in the main proceedings cannot be interpolated into the 
frames of EC Law and the elaboration of criminal regulations is basically 
subject to the separate authorities of the Member States.8 
Albeit the order has not mentioned because of needlessness of substantial 
analyse in the case, but it may be emphasized that the referring Hungarian 
court was at fault not only in the question of ECJ's competence. Namely, the 
reference was partly based on such of legal ground which is obviously 
incorrect and irrelevant. The judge has cited some articles of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of European Union. But the Charter had no binding force 
yet and regarding its not compulsory character it does not belong to the acts of 
the EC Law. 
5
 Article 6 TEU para 1: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States." 
6
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. OJ L 180, 19.7. 2000. 
22-26. 
7
 The articles of the Charter mentioned in the reference concern freedom of thought, 
the freedom of opinion, the freedom of speech, and right of public meeting, right of 
combination and assembly, as well. 
8
 The ECJ referred directly to the doctrine laid down in the Kremzow Case. See Case 
С-299/95 Kremzow ECR [1997] 1-2629, paragraph 15. 
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с) Reviewing The consumer protection regulation: the Hungarian Civil Code 
before EC J 
In the Ynos Case (C-302/04, Ynos Kft. v. János Varga) , the facts were 
constituted by an action taken in connection with a contract of sale of real 
estate at the Szombathelyi Városi Bíróság (Municipal Court Szombathely). In 
his petition to the ECJ, the Hungarian judge requested the interpretation of 
some of the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Agreement 
Conditions. The two related questions exposed the issue, whether a rule of a 
member state conforms to the respective directive, according to which an 
unfair agreement condition can only be considered invalid, if the consumer 
expressly challenged it, and according to which other parts of the agreement 
can only persist as valid, if it had been concluded by the parties even without 
the condition that has proved to be unfair. Nevertheless, the third question was 
by far more important: does the element that the facts of the case of the main 
proceedings had been established before the accession of Hungary to the EU, 
i.e., before Is ' May, 2004 influence the judgement of the former questions. The 
importance of the questions to be answered was indicated by the fact that the 
case was remitted to the Grand Chamber and that besides the Hungarian 
Government, the Commission and five other member states also made observa-
tions during the proceedings. Related to the third question, the Advocate 
General in his motion made on 22nd September, 2005 referred to the fact that 
since Hungary had not been a member of the EU at the time of the main pro-
ceedings, i.e., in 2002, the rules of the respective directive were not relevant, 
consequently, the European Court of Justice did not have competence to answer 
the questions. In case, nevertheless, the Court did establish its competence and 
considered the case on the merits, the Advocate General briefly dealt with the 
first two questions and according to his standpoint, the quoted regulations of 
the member state would be contrary to the directive. 
In its Judgement of 10th January, 2006, the ECJ explicated that it was 
incompetent to examine the questions on their merits, since it had jurisdiction 
exclusively in those cases, the underlying facts of the cases of which were 
established following taking effect of the Accession Treaty.4 This doctrine had 
been consequentially adhered to by the ECJ related to former enlargements.10 
9
 Cf. C-321/97. Andersson and Wâkerâs-Andersson, ECR [1999] 1-3551, paragraph 31. 
111
 For further comments, see Láncos, P. L.: Case note; Ynos-intertemporality and the 
jurisdictional jurisprudence of the ECJ. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48/1 (2007) 87-93, 
Szabó P.: Az Ynos Kft.-tigyben hozott luxemburgi bírósági ítélet előzményei és utóélete - az 
előterjesztő magyar bíró szemével [The antecedents and the consequences of the judge-
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cl) Importing cars from the inner European market: the successful attack on 
the registration tax 
The registration tax regulation on import cars introduced after the Hungarian 
accession to EU was much discussed not only in the theory: several business 
federations, chambers etc. have heavily criticised the obviously discriminatory 
character of this Hungarian tax regulation. Two preliminary ruling procedures 
concerned this matter, which were finally joined and the ECJ passed common 
judgement in these cases. 
Firstly, the Nádasdy Case was referred to ECJ, (C-290/05, Ákos Nádasdy v. 
Vám és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága). After the 
suspension of a procedure concerning the judicial review of an administrative 
decision, the Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Bíróság (County Court Hajdú-Bihar) had 
recourse to the ECJ. The plea in law exposed the issue, whether the domestic 
regulation of registration tax was in accordance with EC Law. Namely, whether 
a kind of tax imposed on motor vehicles imported from other member states is 
applicable, when it ignores the value of the car and determines the amount of 
the tax to be paid exclusively on the basis of the technical features of the motor 
vehicle (engine type, engine capacity) and of its environmental classification. 
On the other hand, how can the circumstance in re EC Law be evaluated, that 
no registration tax is imposed on motor vehicles placed in circulation before 
taking effect of the act on registration tax in Hungary. During the proceedings, 
the Hungarian and Polish Governments as well as the Commission submitted 
observation. According to the former ones, the regulation was in accordance 
with Community Law and the ECJ should reject the petition, since it could not 
reply, so as to promote the conclusion of the main proceedings. Nevertheless, 
the Commission deemed the Hungarian system of registration taxes discri-
minative and contrary to Community Law, which was not accidental, since it 
had conducted a related examination vis-à-vis Hungary in so-called breach of 
obligation proceedings. The Advocate General brought forward his motion on 
13,h July, 2006. According to his standpoint, the system of registration taxes 
discriminated against cars imported from other Member States vis-à-vis used 
cars purchased in Hungary, since no registration tax had to be paid in case of 
ment of Luxembourg Court in case Ynos Kft . - f rom the aspect of the referring judge). 
Európai jog, 4/5 (2006) 31-36. Kovács, B.-Nemessányi, Z.: Az első magyar előzetes 
döntéshozatali eljárás margójára: a közösségi jog visszaható hatályának és a Dzodzi-elv 
alkalmazhatóságának kérdése [To the margin of the first Hungarian preliminary ruling 
case: the question of the retroactive for of Community Law and the application of doctrine 
'Dodzi']. Európai jog. 1 (2006) 3-11. 
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purchases in Hungary. Furthermore, the registration tax was not proportionate 
to the value, since it was not adjusted to the age of the vehicle, this, however, 
pertained merely to the period examined during the proceedings, since the 
respective rule was amended as of 1" January, 2006. 
The other case regarding registration tax was the Németh Case (C-333/05), 
Ilona Németh v. Vám és Pénzügyőrség Dél-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága). 
As mentioned before, was lodged independently from the case above, but its 
subject-matter was similar, therefore the ECJ has jointed the two cases. The 
Német Case was initiated before the Bács-Kiskun Megyei Bíróság (County 
Court Bács-Kiskun). The court addressed four questions to the European Court 
of Justice. The first two questions focused on the issue, whether a tax imposed 
by a member state, such as the Hungarian registration tax may be considered 
to be a customs duty or a measure having an equivalent effect, or, if it cannot, 
can it be considered to be a type of import duty. If the former questions are 
answered in the negative, the third and fourth questions combined were directed 
at the issue, whether the domestic registration tax can be considered to be in 
conformity with Community rules. The Advocate General proceeding in the 
Nádasdy Case made a motion in this case, as well. According to his standpoint, 
the registration tax can by no means be considered a customs duty, since it was 
not imposed related to border-crossing, but by reason of the registration of 
motor vehicles in the territory of a specific member state. The logic of his final 
conclusion more or less coincided with his opinion explicated in the Nádasdy 
Case, scilicet, the registration tax was merely admissible in a member state, on 
condition that it was applied without differentiation, i.e., discrimination. 
It was expectable on the basis of the former adjudicational practice of the 
European Court of Justice, that if it accepted the standpoint of the Advocate 
General, the Hungarian State would have to reimburse those entitled the 
amount of the registration tax collected pursuant to the regulation effective 
between May, 2004 and December, 2005. On the basis of the Judgement of the 
ECJ pronounced on 5th October, 2006, the registration tax was contrary to EC 
Law, so far as it imposed a higher amount of tax on used imported cars, than 
on used cars already registered in Hungary. In other words, the registration tax 
was contrary to Community Law, so far as its amount was calculated without 
taking the depreciation of the vehicles into account, in such a way that when 
applied to used vehicles imported from other member states, it exceeded the 
amount of the tax included in the residual value of similar used vehicles which 
have already been registered in the member state of importation." 
" For the cases concerning Hungarian registration tax, see: Simon, D.: Taxation de 
l'immatriculation des véhicules automobiles. Europe, 2006 Décembre Comm. n° 367. 
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e) Controversy on compatibility of local business tax with EC Law 
Not only registration tax, but the Hungarian local business tax (HIPA) has 
given rise to much controversy. The first case referred to ECJ was the Lakép 
Case (C-261/05, Lakép Kft., Pár-Bau Kft., Rottelma Kft. v. Komárom-Eszter-
gom Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal) which was taken related to judicial review 
of administrative decision to impose local business tax by tax authority. In its 
petition for preliminary ruling, the referring court requested the construction of 
specific rules of the so-called Sixth Tax Law Directive (Council Directive 
no. 77/388/EEC). It expected an answer to the question, according to which 
conditions a kind of tax qualifies as sales tax, or, whether only one kind of 
sales tax was admissible. The essential question in this case was also the third 
one, since the main proceedings dealt with tax obligations deriving from legal 
relations established before our accession to the EU. Consequently, it was 
questionable, whether a retrospective calculation of taxes on the basis of tax 
obligations established in the period before the accession was admissible, if in 
the period before the accession a member state had applied two or more kinds 
of sales tax. With reference to its ruling on the above-mentioned Ynos Case, 
the European Court of Justice declared the lack of its competence on 9lh 
February, 2006, since it had competence to construe Council Directives in new 
member states exclusively as of the date of accession. Whereas, the taxes 
contested in the main proceedings had been imposed in the period before the 
EU membership of Hungary.12 
In the second case relating to local business tax was the Kögáz Case (C-
283/06, Kögáz Rt. és tsai v. Zala Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal), which was 
later joined with OTP Garancia Case (C-312/06, OTP Garancia Biztosító Rt. 
v. Vas Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal). Contrast with the Lakép Case analysed 
20-21, Domahidi Á.: Ungarische Zulassungssteuer für Pkw gemeinschaftswidrig. 
Europäische. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007. 127-128. Adobati, E.: Diritto 
comunitario e degli scamhi internazionali. 2006. 758-759, Anon.: Az Európai Közösségek 
Bírósága 2006. október 5-én, a C-290/05. és a C-333/05. számú egyesített Nádasdi Ákos 
kontra Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Eszak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága ügyekben hozott 
ítélete [Judgement of ECJ in the joined cases C-290/05 and C-333/05 Ákos Nádasdi versus 
Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága on 5 October 2006|. 
Európai jog, 6 (2006) 38^15, Vincze A.: Széljegyzetek a regisztráció adóhoz közösségi jogi 
nézőpontból [Marginal notes to the registration tax from a Community Law's perspective]. 
Európai Jog, 4/5 (2004) 3-9. 
12
 See: Anon: Az Európai Közösségek Bírósága 2006. február 9-én, a C-261/05. számú 
Lakép Kft. ügyben hozott végzése [Judgement of ECJ in the case C-261/05 Lakép Kft. on 9 
February 2006]. Európai jog, 6/2 (2006) 44-46. 
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above, a feature of the /Kögáz Case was that it did not concern an obligation 
obtaining before the accession, but taxes imposed following 1st May, 2004. 
After suspending its proceedings, the Zala Megyei Bíróság (County Court) had 
recourse to the European Court of Justice. The first question exposed the issue, 
whether the provision of our Accession Treaty, according to which Hungary 
may maintain local business tax allowances to an extent of at most 2 per cent of 
the tax base until 31st December, 2007 can be interpreted as a provisional 
exemption from the maintenance of the local business tax or the possibility of 
the maintenance of the local business tax allowances implies the further 
applicability of the local business tax. In case of a negative answer to the first 
question or more exactly, to the two partial questions, the County Court seeks 
answer to the question, whether according to the correct interpretation of the 
Sixth Tax Law Directive, according to which criteria can a kind of tax "qualify 
as not a kind of turnover tax". 
The case joined to Kögáz Case has arrived from the Hungarian Supreme 
Court. In the OTP Garancia, the Supreme Court formulated its first question in 
a similar manner, but logically more precisely, than the Court referring in the 
Kögáz Case. Accordingly, the first question concerned the issue, whether the 
pertaining provision of our Accession Treaty concerning allowances in the 
local business tax can be interpreted as a provisional exemption from the 
maintenance of the local business tax or does that simultaneously imply that 
the possibility of the maintenance of local business tax allowances just if ies 
the further maintenance of local business tax. In fact, the second question 
challenges the compliance of the disputed form of tax with Community Law, 
however, here again, the Supreme Court formulated its question more precisely: 
do we need to interpret the Sixth Tax Law Directive "in such a manner that it 
prohibits the maintenance of local business tax directed at the taxation of 
activities pursued with the aim of the acquisition of profit and income in the 
capacity of an undertaker, the main feature of which is that it is imposed on net 
income, so that it is reduced by the acquisition price of articles sold, by the 
value of certain intermediary services and by the cost of materials, that is, does 
such a tax with respect to this article qualify as sales tax." 
Consequently, the question was whether the HIPA can be evaluated as type 
of VAT according to the Sixth Directive. If yes, the HIPA could be in-
compatible with the EC Law, because the Member States should maintain only 
one type of VAT in their taxation system. For this reason, the ECJ attempted to 
make comparison the character of HIPA to which of VAT. The ECJ regarting 
to this declared that the VAT is levied on individual transactions at the 
marketing stage and its amount is proportional to the price of the goods or 
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services suppl ied ," a tax such as the HIPA is, by contrast, based on the 
difference, calculated under accounting legislation, between the turnover linked 
to the goods sold or the services supplied during a fiscal period, on the one 
hand, and the purchase price of the goods sold, the value of the intermediary 
services and the costs of the materials, on the other. Since a tax such as the 
HIPA is therefore calculated on the basis of periodic turnover, it is not possible 
to determine the precise amount of that charge which may be being passed on 
to the client when each sale is effected or each service supplied, such that the 
condition that this amount should be proportional to the price charged by the 
taxable person is not satisfied. Moreover, the legislation on the HIPA includes, 
with regard to a number of situations, simplified rules, broadly based on a 
standard rate, for establishing the basis of assessment by reference either to 
the basis of another tax plus a f ixed percentage (for sole traders and small 
agricultural producers), or to a fixed percentage of another tax (for undertakings 
subject to simplified business tax). The conclusion of the ECJ was that a tax 
such as the HIPA is not intended to be passed on to the final consumer in a way 
which is characteristic of VAT. It means that would not suffice to classify a tax 
such as the HIPA as a turnover tax within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, 
inasmuch as it is not levied on transactions in a manner comparable to VAT. 
This standpoint declared by ECJ was not a surprise. Although in a very 
similar case concerning the Italian regional tax (irap),14 it was considered 
incompatible with Community Law by the Advocate General, but the Court 
was later more permissive and did not accept the opinion of the Advocate 
General. Consequently, the characteristics of turnover taxes is strictly inter-
preted in the adjudicational praxis of ECJ. 
It can be mentioned two other case concerning the HIPA regulation which 
were not joined with Kögáz and O T P Garancia cases. In the OTP Bank Case 
(C-195/07, OTP Bank Rt. and Merlin Gerin Zala Kft. v. Zala Megyei Köz-
igazgatási Hivatal), the Zala Megyei Bíróság (County Court Zala) requested 
preliminary ruling proceedings. Since the subject of the petition is related to 
the local business tax, the two questions posed by the Court fully coincide with 
the formerly formulated ones related to the Kögáz Case. Due to the judgement 
of the Kögáz Case, the referring court has revoked its reference and the case 
has been cancelled. 
13
 See by analogy: Case С 475/03 Banco Populäre di Cremona [2006] ECR I 9373, 
paragraph 30. 
14
 The above referred Case С 475/03 Banco Popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I 9373. 
I can be mentioned that Hungary has been concerned by this Italian Case as well, because 
the Government submitted observations. 
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The other case in this field was the Vodafone Case (C-447/06, Vodafone 
Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt., Innomed Medical Orvostechnikai Rt. v. 
Hungarian State, Budapest Főváros Képviselő-testülete, Esztergom Város 
Önkormányzat Képviselő-testülete). The referring court was Fővárosi Bíróság 
(Municipal Court). In the questions referred, the Court asked whether the norms 
of Act of Accession, which allowed to Hungary to apply, up to and including 
31 December 2007, local business tax reductions of up to 2% of the net receipts 
of undertakings, granted by local government for a limited period of time on 
the basis of Hungarian tax law, must be interpreted as meaning that it concerns 
a temporary derogation which al lows Hungary to maintain the complete 
business tax until that time. The last question was significantly interesting. The 
referring court in this case asked the interpretation of ECJ on the practice of 
Hungary's first and second-level tax authorities, which has consisted in 
avoiding any examination of the compatibility with Community law of the 
local business tax (HIPA), by suggesting to taxpayers that they amend their 
tax returns by means of self-revision, thus making difficult or impossible the 
practical application of Community law and requiring taxpayers to initiate tax 
proceedings with uncertain consequences. Namely, the question referred to the 
compatibility of this administrative practice with Article 10 TEC implying the 
doctrine of so called 'loyal/sincere cooperation with the Community ' .1 5 
Unfortunately, the ECJ had not opportunity to pass judgement in this case. 
After having registered the case, the ECJ ordered to discontinue the procedure, 
because the referring Court informed ECJ about the appeal of the Parties in the 
main proceeding against the reference to preliminary ruling. Therefore, the 
referring court has revoked its reference and the case has been cancelled. 
f ) Pending cases 
Two references from Hungarian courts are actually in process. In the Cartesio 
Case (C-210/06, the case of Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt. related to the 
registration of change) the Szegedi ítélőtábla (Court of Appeal Szeged) instituted 
proceedings related to the Decision of the Cégbíróság (Court of Company 
Registration), which had rejected the transfer of the seat of a limited partnership 
based in Baja to Italy. The petition for preliminary ruling propounded general 
15
 Art 10 TEC: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achieve-
ment of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty." 
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and specific questions. The general questions inquired into the issue, whether 
the Court of Appeal was entitled to refer a case of appeal against the decision 
of the Court of Company Registration to preliminary ruling to the European 
Court of Justice. On the other hand, can the Court of Appeal of Second Instance 
be considered a forum that proceeds in the last instance in re Community Law, 
scilicet, a court that is obligated to refer a case to the ECJ for preliminary 
ruling, if a question of interpretation arises. Finally, an interesting problem of 
procedural law was also exposed: can the entitlement of a court to request 
preliminary ruling be limited by the fact that an appeal against the decision 
suspending the proceedings and initiating preliminary ruling is admissible and 
the forum adjudging such an appeal may supervise this decision, that is, may 
instruct the court to continue the proceedings. The meritorious questions 
concerned the specific problems of the main proceedings, scilicet, whether on 
the basis of EC Law (the right of establishment) a company of a member state is 
permitted to transfer its seat into another member state and maintain its 
original nationality. The European Court of Justice registered the case and no 
further proceedings have been conducted till this t ime. 
Concerning the meritorious question of the case, it is notable that according 
to the facts of the case of the main proceedings, the transfer of headquarters 
had not been deemed to be substantiated on grounds of the freedom to settle 
down in former cases in the adjudicational practice of the European Court of 
Justice. The transfer of seat and the maintenance of legal entity are deemed to 
be admissible exclusively in the framework of Community associations, such as 
European Company (SE, Societas Europaea) and European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG). 
The case mentioned at last in this section is connected with the EU's third 
pillar legislation. A reference for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Bíróság 
(Municipal Court) has been lodged on 7 August 2007 relating to a criminal 
proceedings (Katz Case, C-404/07). The question submitted by the Hungarian 
Court concerns the compatibility the Hungarian criminal procedure law to the 
Council Framework Decision 2001/220 of 15 March 2001 on the standing of 
victims. The dilemma is given by a controversial norm of the Hungarian criminal 
procedure code which defines the main rules on the so called 'supplementary 
private prosecution' (a person who can sustain a charges instead of a public 
prosecutor in certain cases, e.g. if the public prosecutor withdraw it etc.). But 
according to an other general norm, it is forbidden a witness who was heard 
in a case, to act as a prosecutor in the same case. It means, if a victim was 
interrogated as a witness (that is of ten the case), this person would not act 
supplementary private prosecution in the same procedure. Despite this 
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A K A D É M M T 
KÖNYVTARA 
AFTER THE FIRST LESSONS AND EXPERIENCES. 101 
Hungarian norms, the Council Framework Decision obliges the Member States 
to take measure on protect the rights of the victims. 
III. Direct Petitions of Hungarian Individual Persons 
a) Individuals before the ECJ 
Another significant scope of proceedings conducted by the judicial forum in 
Luxembourg is constituted by proceedings instituted as a consequence of 
direct petitions. Individual persons may have recourse to the European Court 
of Justice with five specific types of petitions: with a view to the annulment of 
specific Community actions in case of direct concern, in case of institutional 
default, with a view to the compensation of damages incurred by the institutions 
of the Community and their employees during the accomplishment of their tasks, 
in case of legal disputes related to agreements concluded by the Community , so 
far as the European Court of Justice has been designated as an arbitration court, 
and in case of legal disputes concerning civil service between the Community 
and its employees. 
Adjudication of the first four types of petitions is subject to the competence 
of the European Court of First Instance (cases registered as type "T"), whereas, 
in case of a petition of type 5, the Civil Service Tribunal is entitled to proceed 
(cases registered as type "F"). Upon the submission of direct petitions, repre-
sentation by a lawyer is obligatory, appeals vis-à-vis the decisions of the Court 
are admissible. The following direct petitions have been submitted to the Court 
from Hungarian individual persons, scilicet, natural and legal entities. 
b) Cases obviously inadmissible 
In his action in the Szolnoki Case (T-193/05, A. Szolnoki v. Hungary), the 
plaintiff imputed various kinds of breaches of law to Hungary, the defendant, 
and requested the European Court to obligate the defendant to terminate its 
unlawful conduct. Before the Court could have reached a decision on the case, 
which would have by all means been a rejecting judgement with reference to 
the lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff withdrew his petition and the case was 
cancelled f rom the register. The other case, in which the European fo rum had 
obviously no power to pass judgement, was Varga Case (T-203/05, Zsuzsanna 
Varga v. Hungary/Greece). On the basis of the act ion of the pla int i f f , the 
Hungarian Court had obligated the father of the son of the plaintiff living in 
Greece to pay alimony. Since the implementation of this decision was thwarted 
102 BALÁZS HORVÁTHY 
in Greece, the plaintiff took action at the Hungarian Court against the Republic 
of Greece by reason of alleged defaults during the implementation of the 
decision above by Greek authorities. Since the latter was also ineffective, she 
took direct action at the European Court and requested the establishment both 
of the fact that both Hungary and Greece violated several provisions of inter-
national and Community law pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in civil and commercial cases and of the obligation of those to pay a 
specific amount of money (practically a compensation equivalent to the amount 
of the alimony). Under its Judgement of 18th October, 2005, the European Court 
terminated its proceedings with reference to the obvious lack of its competence 
and to the fact that the European Court may exclusively decide on the compen-
sation of damages incurred by Community institutions and their employees 
during the implementation of their duties. And finally, the third case followed 
by same consequences was the Tóth Case (T-153/07, Tóth v. Hungary). The 
case has been registered by the Court of First Instance. The complaint referred to 
several presumptive unlawfulness at a Hungarian university which caused injure 
to former student, Ms. Tóth. The proceeding is not closed yet, but its outgoing is 
absolutely not doubtful: the founding treaties and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court do not guarantee individual persons the option of the submission of direct 
petitions vis-à-vis member states. In such cases, petitions are normally rejected 
by the Court of First Instance by reason of an obvious lack of competence. 
Supposedly, the Court of First Instance will order to reject this complaint. 
с) Annulment procedures 
The Budapesti Erőmű Case (T-80/06, Budapesti Erőmű v. Commission) is 
linked to proceedings concerning state subsidies. The plaintiff requests that the 
Court of First Instance annulled the decision of the European Commission to 
open a formal investigation procedure in the case of state subsidising of the 
costs of readjustment in Hungary, alternatively annul that decision, so far as it 
applies to the electric energy purchase agreements concluded by the plaintiff. 
The Commission decided on launching official proceedings concerning the 
contested decision on the assumed new state aid provided in the form of electric 
energy purchase agreements concluded between Hungarian electricity generators 
and the public Hungarian transmission operator. In its reasoning, the plaintiff 
refers primarily to a lack of competence, since according to its standpoint, it 
can be inferred f rom specific provisions of the Accession Treaty that the 
Commission has jurisdiction exclusively over state subsidies granted after the 
accession of the new member state. However, the electric energy purchase 
agreements had been concluded prior to accession and they are not applicable 
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after the accession. For the purpose of the justification of its action, the plaintiff 
refers to a manifest error of law and erronious discretion. According to its view-
point, it cannot be objectively jus t i f ied that the electric energy purchase 
agreements of the plaintiff do contain State Aid. According to the plaintiff, the 
Commission failed to assess the nature of these agreements, made an inadequate 
assessment of the notion of economic advantage, of the notion of distortion of 
the competition and impact on trade. The case has not been adjudged by the 
Court of First Instance before the completion of the present review. 
The other example to this category is the E.ON Case (T-57/07, E.ON Ruhrgas 
International AG and E.ON Földgáz Trade Zrt. v. Commission). In their pleas, 
the plaintiffs requested the partial annulment of specific documents of the 
European Commission proceeding as a competition authority. In a competition 
authority procedure, the Commission declared that the acquisition of two 
Hungarian gas companies by the applicant E.ON Ruhrgas International AG 
was compatible with the common market and the functioning of the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area on condition that the parties concerned complied 
with certain conditions and obligations. As one of the obligations, the plaintiff, 
E.ON Ruhrgas International AG undertook to organise and implement a gas 
release programme on the Hungarian market. Furthermore, the initial auction 
price was to be set at a definite rate of the weighted average cost of gas, so that 
the applicants did not suffer aggregate losses. In the contested letters, the 
Commission indicated that the losses made by the applicants in a given 
auction should be offset by any profi ts made by the plaintiffs in other 
auctions. Nevertheless, the applicants contest this and are of the opinion that 
losses which result f rom gas release auctions do not need to be offset by 
potential profits that may derive f rom future auctions. In support of their 
arguments, the applicants maintain that the Commission has no legal basis for 
increasing the financial burdens and thereby, subsequently, change the legal 
obligations deriving from a former related decision. Furthermore, the applicants 
contend that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission have been infringed, 
namely, neither have all the members of the Commission deliberated on the 
content of the two contested letters, nor has there been a proper delegation 
of powers to the Directorate General of the Commission. The Court of First 
Instance has not reached a judgement until the completion of the present 
review. 
d) Civil servants before the ECJ 
Quant i fying the cases in context with Hungary in point of numbers , its 
considerable part concerns legal dispute civil servants belonging to the 
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institutions of the EU. In the following section will be mentioned examples to 
this type of procedure. 
The plaintiff in the Lesetár Case (T-453/04, Péter Lesetár v. European 
Commission) intended to undertake employment in an institution of the Commu-
nity, therefore, he took written and oral entrance examinations. According to his 
standpoint, the evaluation of his written exam notably underevaluated his 
performance, furthermore, the oral exam was not adequately conducted. For that 
reason, he requested in his petition that the Court of First Instance changed the 
decision of the admissions committee, he was taken in employment and that 
the Court ordered the payment of his average salary for the lagging time. The 
Court cancelled the case from the register without conducting the proceedings. 
In the Tóth Case (F-107/05, Gergely Tóth v. European Commission), the 
p la in t i f f s complaint pertained to his placement on the payroll and his civil 
service grade as an employee. He challenged his placement with reference to 
his standpoint, according to which on the one hand, the substantiating Staff 
Regulations cannot be applied to temporary employees, on the other hand, that 
it violated equal treatment. He also referred to discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship and to the infringement of the free movement of employees, since 
the citizens of new member states are by all means appointed according to more 
unfavourable provisions. He requested his replacement and a compensation for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The Civil Service Tribunal suspended 
the proceedings under its Ruling of 6th April, 2006, until a decision in a similar 
case is passed. The plaintiff in the Borbély Case (F-126/05, Andrea Borbély v. 
European Commission) had been formerly employed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Hungary. She was appointed for probation as an official of the 
European Commission. According to her petit ion, she had requested her 
employer to grant her benefits and the reimbursement of travel expenses due 
on various titles according to the Staff Regulations, however, the Commission 
rejected this. The Civil Service Tribunal, which had jurisdiction in the 
proceedings, partially justified the claims of the plaintiff under its Judgement 
of 16th January, 2007. It considered her claim for installation allowance and 
daily subsistence allowance substantiated, therefore, it instructed the employer 
of the plaintiff, i. е., the European Commission to retrospectively compensate 
the plaintiff for these benefits supplemented by the amount of the interests. 
Mr. Simon attempted to claim in two separate proceedings law. In the 
Simon /. Case (F-58/06, Balázs Dániel Simon v. Court and Commission), the 
plaintiff was employed by the European Court as an official being a lawyer-
linguist, then he submitted an application to the European Commission for a 
post. The Commission selected the plaintiff for the position, who requested the 
Court to transfer him to the European Commission, however, the Court rejected 
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the repeated requests of the plaintiff, who subsequently lodged an appeal to the 
Civil Service Tribunal to annul the latter decisions with reference to the 
deficiencies of the reasoning, obvious errors of discretion and abuse of compe-
tence. He also referred to the infringement of the principles of the protection of 
legitimate expectations and of non-discrimination as legal bases of the annulment. 
Finally, the plaintiff revoked his action, and subsequently, the Tribunal terminated 
the proceedings under its Judgement of 15th March, 2007. In the second claim 
(Simon II. Case (F-100/06, Balázs Dániel Simon v. Court and Commission), the 
plaintiff requested that specific decisions of the authority entitled to the 
appointment were annulled, so far as they deprived the plaintiff of his rights 
deriving from his appointment to a probationary official (his seniority and grade), 
as well as of his rights deriving from the confirmation in his position. His 
reasoning was based on the principle of the prohibition of declining the rights 
secured under the Staff Regulations, the prohibition of the infringement of 
obtained rights and the prohibition of the abuse of authority. He explained in 
his petition that he did not intend to abandon the staff of officials, but wished 
to change his workplace and sphere of activity, thereby, he would not have lost 
his obtained rights. The plaintiff later revoked his action, consequently, the 
Tribunal terminated the proceedings under its Judgement of 15th March, 2007 
and prescribed the cancellation of the case from the register. 
Lastly, one should refer to the Dálnoky Case (F-120/06, Noémi Dálnoky v. 
Commission). Although, in this case the plaintiff is of Romanian nationality, in 
her claim, she expressly refers to her Hungarian ethnic origin and mother 
tongue, furthermore, the subject-matter of the case is also related to that aspect, 
therefore, it is expedient to consider the case to have Hungarian implications. 
In her plea in law, the plaintiff requested that the Civil Service Tribunal 
annulled the notice of the European Personnel Selection Off ice (EPSO) for an 
open competition aimed at the employment of inter alia counsellors of Romanian 
citizenship. On the other hand, she requested that the defendant be ordered not 
to advertise or conduct a competition in the future, according to which the 
Candidate was expected to have a thorough knowledge of a specific language 
of the Community, but it should require the thorough knowledge of any 
language of the Community, disregarding the case, when the knowledge of a 
specific language is required with regard to the specific nature of the position 
to be filled. In case the competition requested to be cancelled would be conducted 
before the decision of the Civil Service Tribunal is passed, she requested that 
EPSO was obligated to eliminate all disadvantages suffered by the plaintiff or 
other persons concerned by reason of the discriminatory provision of the notice of 
the competition (e.g., announcement of a new opportunity for those, who had 
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been discouraged from the submission of an application by the discriminative 
provision mentioned above.) 
According to the plaintiff, who is of Hungarian ethnic origin and has a 
Hungarian mother tongue, the contested announcement violated Community 
Law, since it required that candidates had a thorough knowledge of Romanian. 
In other words, the announcement violated the right of the plaintiff to equal 
treatment and the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, since 
Romanian citizens with Romanian mother tongue were unreasonably advantaged. 
Furthermore, according to the reasoning of the plaintiff, the announcement 
enforced discrimination on grounds of nationality prohibited under Staff 
Regulations and Article 12 EC, so far as a number of notices for competitions 
published in the past had permitted the nationals of certain member states to 
prove the thorough knowledge of an official language of the Community, other 
than the main language of the member state of which they were nationals. 
Furthermore, she also mentioned that the announcement of the competition 
included a requirement precluded under the Staff Regulations, that is, the Staff 
Regulations permits the prescription of the thorough knowledge of a specific 
language (cf. any language) of the Communi ty as a requirement, if that is 
specially necessitated by the position or if that is justified by another impartial 
and lawful objective. Besides, in a special plea, the plaintiff requested as an 
interim measure that the Civil Service Tribunal suspended the contested 
application procedure, until a decision on her plea in the main proceedings was 
reached. 
The Civil Service Tribunal has rejected the plaintiffs plea for interim 
measures under its Judgement of 14th December, 2006. Then, on 27 September 
2007 has ordered that the action of the plaintiff is manifestly inadmissible. As 
the most important argument, the Tribunal has referred to the too late submit 
of the pla int i f f ' s claim. The Tribunal pointed out that according to the Staff 
Regulations, a notice of competition is an act drawn up by the appointing 
authority. Thus, the challenging of a notice of competition must be preceded 
by a complaint lodged, in accordance with the Staff Regulations, an action 
before the Tribunal must be brought within three months of the date of 
notification of the decision taken in response to the complaint. This time limit 
is to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days. How-
ever in the present case, the Tribunal has found that, the main action was 
brought af ter the expiry of the time-limit for doing so. 
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IV. The Republic of Hungary in a position of a defendant or a plaintiff 
a) The procedures concerned 
At the European Court of First Instance, any member state including the 
Republic of Hungary may take action as plaintiff related to complaints against 
the Commission, furthermore, in issues of state subvention and of commercial 
protective measures vis-à-vis the Council and in proceedings launched following 
petitions submitted against measures taken by the Council as an executive power. 
Before the European Court, member states can come up both as defendants 
and plaintiffs. In proceedings instituted for the purpose of the establishment 
of a breach of obligation by a member state, the Commission shall proceed 
as plaintiff vis-à-vis the Member State, disregarding the exceptional case, 
when in lieu of the Commission, another member state initiates proceedings 
by reason of a breach of obligation. As a matter of course, in such a case, the 
latter member state will proceed as plaintiff. Furthermore, member states may 
take action as plaintiffs before the European Court, if they submit a petition 
with a view to the annulment of an institutional action or to the establishment 
of an institutional default, or, in case of appeals against the Judgements of 
Court of First Instance. 
b) Criteria of the quality for maize: the first victory of Hungary 
In its first direct action, namely in the Case T-310/06 (Republ ic of Hungary 
v. Commission), the Republic of Hungary requested the partial annulment of 
specific rules pertaining to maize intervention affecting domestic producers 
expressly detrimentally. According to the reasoning of Hungary, the Commission 
breached the legitimate expectations of the producers by introducing during the 
financial year a requirement relating to the specific weight of maize. Further-
more, the Commission failed to take account of the principles of legal certainty 
and proportionality and the requirement of gradual adjustment, which are 
incompatible with the inordinately short preparatory period between the date 
of publication and the date of entry into force. As a conditional viewpoint, the 
plea of Hungary mentioned that the Commission did not have the authority to 
lay down the requirement relating to the specific weight of maize. In case the lack 
of authority cannot be justified, the plea refers to an abuse of power, scilicet, 
the Commission exceeded its powers, when it substantially altered the inter-
vention regime for maize in practice, under the pretext of amending the 
qualitative parameters for intervention. Notwithstanding, even if the Commission 
was empowered to lay down the requirement relating to the specific weight of 
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maize, according to the Hungarian standpoint, the Commission made a manifest 
error of assessment by establishing a criterion for the average quality of maize, 
since it did not take account of the fact that the maize produced in the 
Community is mainly used for fodder. We have already referred to the fact that 
the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 253 EC to state 
the reasons on which legal acts are based and has also infringed the procedural 
rules of the Management Committee for Cereals in not respecting the t ime 
limit laid down by those rules. 
Hungary, the applicant requested the expedition of procedures as a pro-
visional measure, which was rejected under the Judgement of the Court of 16th 
February, 2007. The Court acknowledged the argument of the applicant that 
the date on which the contested provisions entered into force took producers 
by surprise, for they had reasonably expected to have time in which to adjust to 
the introduction of such a novel obligation. On this too late date, the producers 
had no opportunity to modify their structure of production. Because of the 
short period of the introduction, the Hungarian producers, even if prudent and 
circumspect, could not, for want of prior information, reasonably have expected 
that the variety of maize sown and the technology used would no longer enable 
them to produce maize meeting the quality conditions for buying in inter-
vention. Although farmers produce for the free market, the conditions for 
intervention buying nevertheless influence their financial decisions. Moreover, 
the Court pointed out that the Regulation of the Commission does not state 
clearly and expressly that the introduction of the criterion of specific weight 
for maize is intended, in addition to the need to ensure consistency with the 
rules applicable to other cereals, to upgrade the quality criteria for maize. 
Consequently, the explanations furnished by the Commission during the 
proceedings, to the effect that specific weight forms a relevant criterion of 
quality, do not reflect the fundamental reason for the introduction ofthat criterion 
as it appears from a close reading of the Regulation. Besides, according to the 
Court 's decision, the Commission was not able to dispel the established contra-
diction, with the result that not only is its claim that specific weight reflects the 
nutritional value of maize not supported by any evidence but it constitutes, 
moreover, a manifest error of assessment in light of the only evidence available 
to the Court in these proceedings. After that all, the Court declared that the 
Regulation is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and the claimed 
provisions of the Regulation relating to the criterion of specific weight for 
maize must be annulled. 
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с) Infringement procedures against Hungary 
The first case opened by the Commission was Case C-30/07 (European Com-
mission v. Republic of Hungary). The proceedings were related to defaults of 
legal harmonisation and notification. According to the plea of the Commission, 
the defendant, i. е., the Republic of Hungary did not comply with its obliga-
tions deriving from Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC concerning the status 
of third country nationals who are long-term residents in Hungary, since it failed 
to adopt respective and compliant law, decrees and administrative provisions 
and to inform the Commission thereof. The period prescribed for the implemen-
tation of the directive in national law expired on 23rd January, 2006. After the 
Hungarian Országgyűlés (Parliament) have passed the required modifications 
of law at the close of the year 2006, the Commission revoked the claim and the 
ECJ ordered to cancel this case from the register. 
The other infringement procedure, the Case C-148/07 (European Commission 
v. Republic of Hungary) was initiated by the Commission before ECJ also because 
of reason of the breach of obligations deriving from legal harmonisation. Namely, 
the Commission requested the establishment of the fact that the Hungarian 
law-maker, by failing to eliminate the restrictions to the provision of cable 
television services imposed by Para. (4) of Article 115 of Act 1 of 1996 on Radio 
and Television, failed to fu l f i l its obligations under Commission Directive no. 
2002/77/EC on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services. According to the Commission, pursuant to the above-
mentioned law, the Republic of Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
above-mentioned directive by restricting the right of cable television service 
providers to broadcast programmes, so that in territorial coverage it is no more 
than one third of the population. The obligation of transposing the directive 
should have been fulfilled by the date of our accession to the EU, scilicet, the 
period prescribed for transposing the directive into national law expired on 30th 
April, 2004. The default of the Hungarian legislative organs was also in this 
case quiet evident. Országgyűlés has modif ied the act complained, then, the 
claim was revoked and the procedure terminated. 
V. Conclusion 
From the foregoing it will be seen that the embedment of the Hungarian 
adjudicational system in the Courts of the European Union is possibly more 
noteworthy than that was expected before the accession. The participation is 
especially outstanding in the preliminary ruling procedures. In the first three 
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years period of our membership, the number of cases referred by Hungarian 
courts counts almost so much as which of preliminary ruling procedure referred 
by the other 9 Members States acceded with us in 2004 (Hungary ' s had 11 
references, the other nine Member States had altogether 14 between 2 0 0 4 -
2007). Consequently, it can be declared, that Hungarian courts refer most actively 
to ECJ for interpretation of EU Law within preliminary ruling procedure among 
the countries of the region, even if the ma jo r part of the cases described in 
this essay were in connection with the local business tax (5 cases) and with 
registration tax imposing on cars (2 cases). Generally, these preliminary ruling 
procedures referred by Hungarian courts were well and profoundly prepared, 
only one case may be regarded as an example for unconsidered reference: in 
Vajnai Case concerning the use of totalitarian symbols, the ECJ has not 
examined the substance of the case but refused the request for obvious lack of 
competence. 
The cases relating to procedures initiated by individuals are not of importance 
until now but one consequence can be formulated. As the cases Varga and 
Szolnoki have shown the attorneys representing the individuals have significant 
responsibility for avoid to lodge unnecessary requests before ECJ. In these 
cases previously mentioned, the plaintiffs claimed for such cause of action 
which is unquestionably outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ (action for damages 
against M e m b e r States etc.). These cases cause not only superfluous work 
and costs for ECJ but it g ives an awkward evidence of a t torney 's imperfect 
professional skills. 
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1
 This p rob lem is refer red to in the l i terature a l so as horizontal appl icabi l i ty , third-
par ty e f f ec t which is a literal t rans la t ion of the G e r m a n express ion 'Dr i t tw i rkung . ' AU of 
those terms express the appl icabi l i ty of the cons t i tu t ion in pr iva te relat ions. 
E.g, Sajó , A . - U i t z , R. (eds.) : The Constitution in Private Relations: Expanding 
Constitutionalism. U t rech t , 2006. 
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always implement rules in order to protect defenseless individuals from the 
derogatory conduct of other private entities, as far as this does not contradict 
the constitution: private law provisions bring good examples for this and the 
fairly new anti-discrimination legislation also belongs to this category. As the 
state has this regulatory power, in most of the cases it is not necessary to 
invoke one 's fundamental rights granted by the Constitution in legal debates, 
but it is enough to call a statutory provision when seeking legal protection. The 
horizontal effect of constitutional rights is thus a "residual category", which 
means that the horizontal application of constitutional rights occurs only if 
ordinary legislation fails to protect fundamental rights.3 Therefore, the relation 
of the anti-discrimination legislation and the traditional concept of third party 
effect is of high interest. The aim of this essay is-regarding the contribution to 
the debate on how far the constitution applies in private relations-to discover 
this nexus, and draw the attention to the different context that the new anti-
discrimination legislation created for the assessment of the implications of 
horizontal effect. This analysis will lead to the consideration of the controversies 
emerging in the codification process of the new Civil Code. 
1. The constitution in private relations 
The debate in Hungary on the issue of horizontal applicability of the consti-
tution is fairly heated, with special regard at the present codification process of 
the new Civil Code.4 The fairely new act on equal treatment and the promotion 
of equal opportunities5 adds some interesting additional information to the 
discussion. 
Some authors argue in Hungary that direct horizontal applicability is 
desirable to develop'1 to gain the full protection of constitutional rights as the 
Constitution itself suggests, some others contest in favor of the autonomy of 
Tushnet, M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law, with reference to third party effect. In: Sajó-Uitz (eds.): 
op. cit. 169. 
4
 Vékás, L.: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv Elméleti Előkérdései [The theoretical preliminary 
problems of the new civil code], Budapest, 2001. 
5
 Act CXXV of 2003 On Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities, 
MK 2003/157. XII. 28. 
h
 Halmai, G.: Az Alkotmány mint norma a bírói jogalkalmazásban [Constitution as 
legal norm in jurisprudence]. Fundamentum 2 (1998) 77; Kovács, К.: Emberi jogaink 
magánjogi viszonyokban [Expanding the prohibition of discrimination in the European 
Convention of Human Rights]. Fundamentum 2 (1998) 85. 
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the civil law, and the impossibility of any kind of third-party effect of the 
Constitution.7 The advocates of the indirect horizontal effect state that the 
German model , Drittwirkung, would possibly suit the Hungarian system.8 
Legal practitioners often find arbitrary solutions in individual cases due to the 
lack of adequate guidelines.9 
As to the origins of the problem we must note the following. The first 
written constitution in the United States was undoubtedly drafted with the 
aim to govern the relationship of the state and its citizens. The Bill of Rights 
incorporates limitations on the competencies of the Congress concerning 
some fundamental rights of citizens, but does not contain any requirement 
concerning private relations.10 In the United States, even these days, only the 
Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery has direct horizontal effect,1 1 
while in other cases, the "state action doctrine"1 2 applies. However, in spite 
of the clear lack of mandate to apply the Constitution in private relations, U.S. 
courts tend to find state action in more and more dubious situations.13 The 
German social state answers the question of horizontal applicability differently. 
In the famous LUTh decision,14 the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(GFCC) declared that besides individual and collective rights, the post-war 
1949 German Constitution incorporates an objective order of values as well . 
These objective values are present in the entire legal system, thus courts are 
constitutionally obliged to interpret all norms that apply to private relations 
in the light of the Constitution.'3 These two examples provide us with two 
entirely different solutions to our question, namely the role of constitutional 
norms in private relations. 
7
 Vincze. A.: Az alkotmány rendelkezéseinek érvényre juttatása a polgári jogviszo-
nyokban [Enforcing constitutional rules in private relations]. Polgári Jogi Koclifikáció, 6 
(2004) 3. 
8
 Vékás: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv... op. cit. and Sonnevend, P.: Az alapjogi 
bíráskodás és korlátai [Basic rights adjudication and its limits]. Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 79. 
9
 Halmai, G.-Tóth, G. (eds.): Emberi Jogok [Human Rights], Budapest, 2003. 224. 
10
 Ibid. 
" Tribe. L. H. (ed.): American Constitutional Law. St. Paul, Minn. 1988. 
E.g. Stone, G. R.-Seidman, L. M.-Sunstein, C. R. et al.: Constitutional Law. Boston, 
1993. State action doctrine means that the Constitution directly applies if the court finds 
that the violation is imputable to the action of a state organ, or it occurred while a private 
actor fulfilled a state obligation. 
13
 E.g. Tribe, L. H.: Constitutional Choices. Cambridge, Mass. 1985. 
14
 Bundesverfassungsgesetz. 198 (1958). 
15
 Kommers, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Durham, North Carolina, 1989. 
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Similarly, we could mention as further examples Ireland16 and Poland,17 
where constitutional norms have direct horizontal effect, or Slovakia, where 
neither ordinary courts nor the constitutional court or the legislature accept that 
constitutional rights have any effect on private relations.18 As to the European 
Union: the „ECJ has developed a limited doctrine of horizontal direct effect for 
some legal provisions of the Treaties. The principles of non-discrimination 
on grounds of sex and nationality and the fundamental f reedoms-as far as 
powerful social associations confronting the individual are concerned-have a 
horizontal direct effect in this jurisdiction."14 
1.1. The perception of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and ordinary courts 
Examining Hungary, an example of the young democracies of Central 
Eastern Europe, we cannot find final answers for the question of horizontal 
applicability. The Constitutional Court has never been clear on the general 
scope of the protection of fundamental rights. However, it implemented the 
doctrine of the objective institutional protection of fundamental rights.20 In 
the 64/1991. AB decision, which dealt with the constitutionality of abortion, 
the Constitutional Court declared the following: "The state 's duty to respect 
and to protect subjective fundamental rights is not exhausted by the duty not to 
encroach on them, but incorporates the obligation to ensure the condition for 
their realization."'1 
The Constitutional Court accepts that there is a burden on the state to act as 
a protective entity of human rights, in some cases in horizontal as well as in 
vertical relations; however it is not clear to what extent and in what way the 
16
 Casey, J. P.: Constitutional Law In Ireland. 2. ed. Dublin. 1992. 
17
 Kühn, Z.: Making Constitutionalism Horizontal: Three Different Central European 
Strategies. In: Sajó-Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 231-235. 
n
 Ibid. 229-231. 
19
 Case 43/75, Defrenne II v. Sabena, 1989 E.C.R. 455, para. 40; Case 36/74. Walrave 
v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Internale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, paras. 16,19; Case 415/93 Union 
Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass'n v. Bosman. 1993 E.C.R. 1-4921. para. 82; Case 
281/98, Agonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. 1-4139, paras. 30-36. 
20
 Halmai, G.: The third party effect in Hungarian adjudication. In: Sajó-Uitz (eds.): 
op. cit. 104. 
21
 64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB határozat, Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai. 1991. 297, 302 
translated by Halmai: ibid. 104. 
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state should protect the individuals against each other. Taking a clear stance on 
these issues has always been postponed so far.22 
The Constitution contains several articles about the rights of the judiciary 
in Article 50 and 57.21 However, article 70/K., in the chapter of fundamental 
rights and obligations, is in the center of the debates concerning the issue of 
horizontal effect. It states the following: "claims arising from infringement on 
fundamental rights, and objections to the decisions of public authorities 
regarding the fulfil lment of duties may be brought before a court of law". 
Art. 70/K. is a rule that creates competence for the courts in case of the 
infringement of fundamental rights. However, the debate concerns the question 
if it declares that courts have to defend fundamental rights also in case of a 
conflict between private individuals where no other legal instrument applies. 
This controversy is rooted in the wording of this article, though it is quite clear 
that the intent of the framers was not as broad as to imply that the courts 
should apply constitutional provisions directly or indirectly. 
The Constitutional Court declared in its decisions, defining the content of 
this article that this rule is not even as broad as to open the courts door in front 
of all claims concerning rights violation of state actors.24 Hence, it is striking 
that the Constitutional Court has also never thought about the possibility of 
getting the judiciary to protect horizontal violations by referring to this article 
"
2
 Holló, A.-Balogh, Zs. (eds.): Az értelmezett alkotmány |The constitution interpreted], 
Budapest, 2005. XII. chapter. 
23
 Art. 57 (1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to have the accusations brought against him, as well as his rights and duties in legal 
proceedings, judged in a just, public trial by an independent and impartial court established 
by law. 
(5) In the Republic of Hungary everyone may seek legal remedy, in accordance with 
the provisions of the law, to judicial, administrative or other official decisions, which 
infringe on his rights or justified interests. A law passed by a majority of two-thirds of the 
votes of the Members of Parliament present may impose restrictions on the right to legal 
remedy in the interest of, and in proportion with, adjudication of legal disputes within a 
reasonable period of time. 
50. § (1) The courts of the Republic of Hungary should protect and uphold constitu-
tional order, as well as the rights and lawful interests of natural person, legal persons and 
unincorporated organizations, and should determine the punishment for those who commit 
criminal offenses. 
(2) The courts should review the legality of the decisions of public administration. 
(3) Judges are independent and answer only to the law. Judges may not be members of 
political parties and may not engage in political activities. 
24
 46/1994. (X. 21.) AB határozat. Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 1994. 260, 267-
268; 998/B/1994. AB határozat. Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 2005. 752, 753. 
116 FRUZSINA GÁRDOS-OROSZ 
where no other legal instrument applied. In sum, the meaning of this article is 
definitely diffuse, but could undoubtedly serve as a possible basis if the Consti-
tutional Court wishes to hold that the judiciary is obliged to protect constitu-
tional rights in private relations even if there is not any other applicable law. 
However, in this case the Constitutional Court would face, as the German 
type real constitutional complaint does not exist in Hungary,25 the problem that 
it cannot supervise and thus standardize constitutional interpretation. Presently, 
the Constitutional Court does not have the right to override and repair statutory 
or, in some courageous cases, constitutional interpretation of ordinary courts, 
while the ordinary courts does not seem to be competent to decide purely on 
grounds of constitutional provisions. They usually reject claims based only on 
the infringement of a constitutional right,''1 usually require a reference to a 
statute or a sub-statutory legal instrument to handle the case in the merits. 
Once, for example the state prosecutor argued that courts should take into 
consideration all legal arguments; hence the Constitution should also apply in 
private relations. The Supreme Court in its judgment replied that it was the 
exclusive competence of the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution 
and the task of the ordinary courts are to use all valid, thus presumably con-
stitutional legal instruments.27 
Several times ordinary judges interpret the Constitution together with the 
applicable legal rule,21 though usually do not name constitutional provisions. 
As the Civil Code, for example, in Art. 76 contains provisions on inherent 
personality rights,"4 the violation of these rights violates the Constitution as 
25
 With the adjective "real" we distinguish here the German and the Hungarian type 
constitutional complaint, because in Hungary the applicants can solely turn to the 
Constitutional Court asking for the annulment of the legal instrument applied in their very 
case, and demand the Constitutional Court to prohibit the application of that unconstitutional 
law in the case retroactively, but can not ask for the supervision of the constitutionality of 
the legal procedure, and the interpretation of the ordinary court. Act 1989. XXXII. Art. 48. 
26
 Halmai: The third party effect... op. cit. 106. 
27
 BH 1994.1. 
28
 E.g. Gazette of the Supreme Court 1992/14. BH1997. 489; BH 1998. 132; PKKB 
29.P.87.533/1996/4. find this in Halmai: The third party effect . . . op. cit. 109. 
29
 See Chapter VII of the Civil Code (Act. IV of 1959), the ban on discrimination 
between individuals according to sex, race, nationality and religion, and prohibition of 
infringements of personal honor and human dignity. 
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well. Judges deciding these cases, however, almost never refer to the Consti-
tution, but merely to the Civil Code.30 
There are only few exceptions which show that the practice of the courts is 
not carved in stone. In an abortion case in 1998, the judge referred to the right 
to life provision of the Constitution and based its decision on the fetus 's right 
to life, though no Hungarian statute declared this standpoint, and this view is 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the Constitutional Court.31 In another 
case the issue was gender discrimination in an employment matter. Here the 
court succesfully referred directly to the constitutional provisions without 
naming any civil law rule.32 
These cases shed light on the perils of direct application of constitutional 
rules, show that there is not any guarantee for an interpretation consistent with 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In the lack of the German type 
real constitutional complaint when the parties can question the constitutionality 
of the statutory interpretation of ordinary courts, and the Constitutional Court 
can revise the decisions of ordinary courts, it is probably not feasible to provide 
reliable, calculable decisions to the parties seeking the protection of the law. 
Although judges usually do not adjudicate pure constitutional matters, in 
the flow of interpretation they are obliged to interpret the provisions of the 
legal instruments in conformity with the Constitution. Although this duty is not 
explicitly stated in any legal instrument, it follows from the competencies of 
the courts and the legal status of the Constitution as the basic law of Hungary, 
declared in the last provision of it. 
I argue that the means in the Hungarian legal system and legal thinking are 
sufficient to talk about the indirect horizontal effect of constitutional rights. 
Although this interpretation does not have a binding force, a slight effort is 
enough to affirm this theory, because every step of the Constitutional Court 
and ordinary courts points towards this direction. Ordinary courts if open-
minded are capable to carry out statutory interpretation in accordance with 
constitutional requirements. 
30
 See e.g. Góman case, a Roma who was not served in a restaurant. Fundamentum 2 
(1998) 133; Roma schoolchildren segregated graduation ceremony case, Fundamentum 3 
(1999) 124. 
31
 For the full text of the judgement see Fundamentum, 2 ( 1998) 73. Comments on the 
decision e.g. Halmai: Az Alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 77. Hanák, A.: Egy különös 
abortusz után [After a strange abortion], Fundamention, 2 (1998) 82. 
32
 Gender discrimination regarding the admission criterias to a job, Fundamentum, 4 
(2000) 72. 
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Art. 38 of the 1989. XXXII . Act on the Constitutional Court ensures that 
judges can initiate the constitutional review of legal instruments to be applied 
in the pocedure with the suspension of the case. Under the present rules, 
judges cannot deny the application of allegedly non-constitutional provisions, 
but are obliged to refer the case to the Constitutional Court in case of alleged 
unconstitutionality so that it decides on the constitutionality of the legal 
instrument. The parties can also initiate this step in the procedure. This would 
be an excellent vehicle to guarantee not only the constitutionality of the legal 
instruments,33 but the constitutional interpretation of the law as well. Ordinary 
judges must have the right to ask for a constitutional interpretation of the law, 
if any doubt emerges. 
Furthermore, the "law in action doctrine" existing in the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, namely that the Constitutional Court can examine and 
invalidate law if there is a tendency of unconstitutional interpretation, approves 
and helps to secure the guarantees of indirect horizontal effect . The roots of 
this idea imply the acknowledgment of indirect effect of the Constitution, 
namely the requirement that ordinary courts interpret legal norms in conformity 
with the Constitution. This doctrine was quite neglected for a lond time and is 
rarely used in present jurisdiction as well, however forms the bases of some 
recent decisions, where the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional and 
invalidated the guiding decisions of the Supreme Court, obligatory to lower 
courts. 4 This jurisprudence also helps to secure the constitutional interpre-
tation of ordinary courts, because the Constitutional Court is able to act if the 
judiciary is on the wrong track. 
In sum, on the surface both the standpoints of ordinary courts and the 
Constitutional Court are unclear on the issue of horizontal application. How-
ever, this overview suggests that the explicit introduction of indirect horizontality 
would not meet much resistance while it is already comfortable for the actors 
of the Hungarian courts. 
1.2. Scholars' arguments 
Having all this in mind, we examine the three main positions taken by 
Hungarian scholars regarding the horizontal application of constitutional rules 
de lege ferenda: one argues in favor of the exclusively vertical nature of the 
33
 See examples to these motions in Uitz, R: Egyéni jogsérelmek és az Alkotmánybíró-
ság [Violation of individual rights and the Constitutional Court], Fundamentum 3 (1999) 39. 
34
 42/2005. (XI. 14.) ABH 2005. 504. 
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Constitution, and the other two represents direct and indirect horizontal 
application of it. 
János Sári denies the horizontal applicability of the Constitution. He argues 
that Article 70/K. of the Constitution refers only to the infringement of funda-
mental rights by governmental bodies, but definitely does not include the right 
to issue a claim when the fundamental rights of a person are infr inged by 
another private person. Hence the only possible textual ground on which 
horizontal applicability could be introduced into the Hungarian legal system 
is not a sound one.15 Albert Takács 's view is slightly less radical, although it 
leads us in the same direction. He states that it is not possible that ordinary 
courts base their decisions on the Constitution because practically the statutes 
must be able to govern private relationships. He claims that under Art. 32/A. of 
the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the sole body that may decide on 
questions of constitutionality. He argues that 70/K. of the Constitution would be 
applicable only if there were no statutory provisions on fundamental rights, but 
in this case referring merely to constitutional provisions theoretically would 
also mean that statutes must be regarded as invalid when they conflict with the 
Constitution which is not acceptable under the current Constitution.36 
Contrary to this, Gábor Gadó and Gábor Halmai suggest introducing direct 
horizontal effect in the Hungarian legal system, where judges may freely 
interpret the Constitution and disregard unconstitutional rules,37 what is more, 
judges should be empowered to base their judgments merely on constitutional 
provisions. Halmai argues that only the holding of the Constitutional Court 's 
judgments should be binding on everybody, while the reasoning of the 
decisions, containing the interpretation of the Constitution, should not. The 
interpretation of the Constitution should belong to the competence of ordinary 
courts as much as to the Constitutional Court.38 He also suggests the imple-
mentation of the the German type "real constitutional complaint" as a new 
competence for the Constitutional Court. This solution would bring a similar 
solution as the one of the German Constitutional Court, where the applicants 
35
 Sári J.: Alapjogok. Alkotmánytan II. [Fundamental Rights. Constitutional law II], 
Budapest, 2000. 278. 
36
 Takács, A.: Kinek feladata az alkotmány közvetlen alkalmazása? Fórum, [Whose 
task is the direct application of the constitution? Forum] Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 50-56. 
37
 On the same opinion see Hanák A.: Egy különös abortusz, op. cit., Halmai: Az 
alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 77-81. 
38
 Ibid. 
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may turn to the Constitutional Court if the law was presumed to be constitu 
tional, but applied in an unconstitutional manner.39 
Halmai also argues that Art. 77 § (2) of the Constitution implies that judges 
have to apply the Constitution as much as other rules of the legal system,411 while 
others suggest that Art. 77 (2) requires a different interpretation principally 
because of its historical background.41 Regarding the Supreme Court decision 
which stated that solely the Constitutional Court can interpret the Constitu-
tion,42 a counterargument may be that Art. 32/A. of the Constitution43 does not 
require the exclusivity of the interpretative power, but purely wishes to fix the 
exclusive competence on the annulment of unconstitutional legal instruments.44 
Gábor Attila Tóth suggests that ordinary judges have the right to interpret 
the Constitution and apply it directly in the decision-making process, although 
this solution would require the implementation of the German type real con-
stitutional complaint.4 5 Krisztina Kovács also argues in favor of the direct 
horizontal effect of the Constitution. She s ta tes-sharing the view of Gábor 
Kardos-that the fundamental feature of rights requires their direct applicability 
in private relations as long as it does not interfere with the constitutionally 
protected sphere of private autonomy. This is how one may gain the full 
protection of fundamental rights.46 
Zoltán Lomnici is also in a fight for the rights of ordinary courts to interpret 
and take constitutional provisions into consideration while carrying out judg-
ments. He respects the separation of powers between ordinary courts and the 
Constitutional Court, however finds necessary in certain cases to base ordinary 
court decisions solely on constitutional provisions. He bases his argument on 
Art. 70/K. of the Constitution, which he interprets as establishing the powers 
34
 Halmai G.: The third party effect in Hungarian adjudication, op. cit. 112. 
411
 Halmai G.: Az Alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 77-81. 
41
 Sonnevend: Az alapjogi bíráskodás, op. cit. 79-84. 
42
 See BH 1994. I. 
43
 Constitution 32/A. (1) The Constitutional Court should review the constitutionality 
of laws and attend to the duties assigned to its jurisdiction by law. 
44
 Halmai: Az Alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 80. 
45
 Tóth, С. A.: Az emberi jogok bírói védelme [The judicial protection of human 
rights). Társadalmi Szemle, 50 (1995) 39-44. 
4(
' Kovács, К.: Emberi jogaink - magánjogi jogviszonyokban [Human rights-in private 
law relations. Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 85-90. and Kardos, G.: Az új Alkotmány emberi 
jogi fejezete [The chapter on human rights in the new Constitution], In: Ádám A. (ed.): 
Alapjogok és alkotmányozás. Az emberi jogok szabályozása az új Alkotmányban [Funda-
mental rights and making constitution: the regulation of human rights in the new 
Consitution], Budapest, 1996. 17. 
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of ordinary courts to decide in all cases where there is violation of fundamental 
rights.47 
Pál Sonnevend convincingly argues in favor of indirect horizontal effect. He 
states that judges are not authorised to decide about the conflict of constitutional 
rights because Art. 8 (2) of the Constitution declares that in the Republic of 
Hungary regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and duties are determined 
by law. He takes the oneness of fundamental rights a starting point and claims 
that augmenting the right on one side will definitely lead to the diminishing of 
rights on the other side of the relation. When a judge has to decide in conflicts 
of fundamental rights, he will definitely diminish one right in favor of securing 
the other one. This is, in his view, not acceptable under Art. 8 (2) of the 
Constitution.48 
Sonnevend also suggests that a German type Drittwirkung solution should 
be applicable in Hungary.44 He argues that Art. 70/K. of the Constitution may 
not be applied against non-state actors, meanwhile Art. 77 § (2) demands that 
the courts interpret the applicable rules in the light of the Constitution. 
Sonnevend also argues that it may follow from the practice of the Constitu-
tional Court that a German type "real constitutional complaint" be implemented 
in Hungary, while the 23/1998. (VI. 29.) AB decision holds that there must be 
due reparation if the Constitutional Court has declared an infringement of a 
constitutional right.50 
In sum, we may note that it is hard to find the common denominator in the 
scholars' wiews. This might be reasoned with the different interpretations of 
constitutional provisions. We observed that horizontal application of constitu-
tional rights could be approached from several points of view and involves a 
broad range of aspects of modern constitutionality. There is an underlying 
question about the extent of fundamental rights and the separation of powers, 
namely who will and should decide on the concrete extent of rights protection. 
Many authors have fears f rom the loss or at least the diminishing of private 
autonomy; however it is very clear that this so called private autonomy is far 
from being absolute in present legal theory and practice as well. The duty to 
decide how the constitution applies in private relations should not be solely the 
task of judges, but burdens the legislative as well, if not primarily. 
47
 Lomnici, Z.: Kinek a feladata az alkotmány közvetlen alkalmazása? [Whose task is 
the direct application of the Constitution?] Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 47. 
48
 Sonnevend: Az alapjogi bíráskodás, op. cit. 80. 
49
 Ibid, at 79-84. 
50
 Ibid, at 83. 
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The essence of direct effect of fundamental rights is that the judiciary can 
specify rules in the light of the contsitution where the legislation did not intend 
to regulate. The principal question is thus if the judiciary should have this 
competence or not. This problem occurs where the legislative has decided to 
refrain from regulating a certain private relations as a policy consideration, and 
the court applying this doctrine in fact overrides the decision of the legislative.51 
The relations in modern societies indeed necessitate expanding the scope of 
the constitution, because private entities with enormous powers may represent a 
danger to fundamental rights.52 Nonetheless, I argue that direct horizontal 
applicability leads to arbitrariness, judicial legislation ahd what is even more 
important, suggests that there is not any segment of life free from legal intrusion. 
It is problematic to demonstrate how fundamental rights in general have 
indirect horizontal effect, this question should not be forcibly answered in the 
same manner in case of different constitutional rights. This approach helps to 
liberate the issue from its dogmatic nature, and examine as a question of classic 
constitutional interpretation.53 
2. Constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination 
We have learnt so far the most important decisions and scholarly developed 
ideas which influence the horizontal application of the Constitution. After 
having recognized that the question of third party e f fec t emerges only in 
exceptional situations when ordinary laws fail to protect fundamental rights, a 
further step to make is to ask how ordinary laws protect constitutional rights. 
In Europe the anti-discrimination legislation is the best example to trace this 
phenomenon.14 We have thus two tasks for the rest of this paper. Firstly we 
examine how the fairly new act on equal treatment interacts with the concept 
of horizontal applicability. Secondly we try to demonstrate what implications 
this new tendency has on the new civil code afoot. 
51
 Tushnet M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law.. . op. cit. 170-171. 
52
 Cf. Walt, J. van der: Blixen's Difference: Horizontal Application of Fundamental 
Rights and the Resistance of Neocolonialism. Law, Social Justice and Global Development 
Journal. 2003 (1) http:// elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/03-l/vanderwalt.html. 
53
 Explanatory preamble to the Bill of fundamental rights which was eventually to 
become part of the Dutch Constitution. Clapham, A.: Human Rights in the Private Sphere. 
Oxford. 1993. 178. 
54
 Sajó-Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 5. 
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I wish to demonstrate that anti-discrimination legislation, in fact, directs 
towards the direct effect of certain provisions of the constitution in certain 
well-defined matters. It introduces the direct effect in an indirect manner. The 
area, where the constitution applies with the help of anti-discrimination laws 
extends beyond the traditional private law protection of parties of generally 
weaker bargaining position, and aims to protect equal human dignity in these 
precisely defined private situations. I focus my research on provisions 
prohibiting discrimination on different grounds concerning the access to and 
supply of goods and services, which are available to the public, including 
housing. These new standards are in the crossfire of debates because they 
prohibit discrimination also in situations where previously the discrimination 
as such was not explicitly prohibited and the economic analysis of law 
questions the efficiency of such a rule.55 
However, I argue that the constitutional protection of equal human dignity 
indeed requires that the law intrudes into certain private spheres, which were 
previously free. This, however, cannot interfere unconstitutionally with the 
freedom to contract, which is a matter of private autonomy and thus rooted in 
the protection of equal human dignity as well. Having all this in mind, let us 
see how the horizontal effect of the constitutional right to non-discrimination 
in private relations develops through legislative vehicles.56 
55
 Cf. Menyhárd, A.: Diszkrimináció-tilalom és polgári jog fProhibitation of discrimi-
nation and civil law]. Polgári jogi kodifikáció, 8 (2006) 8, see generally Posner, R. A.: 
Economic Analysis of Law. 4. edition, Boston, 1992. 
56
 1 do not differentiate in this paper between non-discrimination and equal treatment, 
however I am aware of the fact that this difference in language is in the center of certain 
debates. Equal treatment can be interpreted in two ways: one understands non-
discrimination when it comes to equal treatment, thus uses these two as synonyms, and the 
other means the positive duty to provide equal treatment for others. I argue that nothing in 
the constitutions leads into the direction to require the application of the second 
interpretation in relation to private matters, because it would pose a positive duty on 
citizens to solidaritate, and do help defenseless people in order to provide them equal 
treatment. I argue that the aim of equal treatment, when it has an additional meaning to 
non-discrimination can only be understood as the constitutional task and duty of the state. 
However, to elaborate on this issue would be a subject matter of another thesis, hence now, 
we need to take this standpoint as granted for the purpose of this paper, and regarded as 
underlined by the language of the Directive implementing the equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. The legislative intent is the following: 
"For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that 
there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin." 
(Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
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2.1. The Constitution and the Act on equal treatment and the promotion of 
equal opportunities37 
Art. 70/A. of the Hungarian Constitution states that 
(1) The Republic of Hungary should respect the human rights and civil 
rights of all persons in the country without discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any other grounds whats-
oever. (2) The law should provide for strict punishment of discrimination on 
the basis of Paragraph (1) (3) The Republic of Hungary should endeavor to 
implement equal rights for everyone through measures that create fair 
opportunities for all.5* 
Reading these articles the grammatical interpretation suggests that these 
provisions do not regulate the entire legal order, but purely circumscribe the 
tasks of the state. However, the Constitutional Court elaborated on equal dignity 
of persons concerning this provision, first in the 9/1990. (IV. 25.) AB decision 
( A B H 1990, 46). This standpoint led to the extension of the scope of the 
Constitution towards private relations in the 61/1992. (XI. 20.)59 AB decision 
( A B H 1992, 280).60 
The constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination formulates boundaries 
for the legislation, and thus certainly influences up to a certain level private 
relations as well.61 However, the Court refused to determine what precise 
obligation the legislative has, where must be the discrimination outlawed in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the Constitution.6" 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L 180/24. 19. 7. 2000. Art, 2, 1.) 
57
 Act. CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment MK 2003/157. XII. 28. Find the english text 
of the law at http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/index.php?g=tej.htm, when it is not 
otherwise indicated. 
58
 1949. XX. Act on the Constitution, paragraph 70/A. 
59
 See further Sólyom L.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon [Early 
years of constitutional adjudication in Hungary], Budapest, 2001. 460, 463. 
611
 Menyhárd, A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgári jog [Prohibition of discrimination 
and civil law]. In : Sajó, A. (ed.): Alkotmányosság a magánjogban [Constitutionality in 
civil law], 2006. 132. 
61
 E.g. Győrffy, T.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás politikai karaktere [The Political Character 
of Constitutional Adjudication]. Budapest, 2001. 133. 
62
 45/2000 (XII. 8.) AB határozat (ABH 2000, 344.). 
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Before the accession to the European Union, in 2003, the Hungarian state 
implemented the Act CXXV. of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of 
equal opportunities (the Act on equal treatment). The birth date of this act is 
not accidental; it was urged by EU obligations,63 which among others imposed 
the content of certain directives (2000/43/EC, 2004/113/EC directives).64 
Scholars state that it tries to touch upon "publ ic private relations"65 and 
prohibit discrimination on this field. 
The preamble of the Act declares the aim of the legislation: 
The Parliament, acknowledging every person's right to live as a person of 
equal dignity, intending to provide effective legal aid to those suffering from 
negative discrimination, declaring that the promotion of equal opportunities 
is principally the duty of the State, having regard to Articles 54 (1) and 
70/A of the Constitution, the international obligations of the Republic and 
the legal acts of the European Union, hereby enacts the following Act: 
The Official explanation to the preamble states that according to the decade-
long practice of the Constitutional Court, the prohibition of discrimination 
established in Art. 70/A. (1) in connection with human dignity stated in Art. 54 
(1), establishes the duty of the state to protect and provide equal dignity for 
everybody in the legal system. In accordance with the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court, the discrimination violates human dignity if it is arbitrary, 
does not have a rationally acceptable reason [35/1994 (VI. 24.) AB decision, 
ABH 1994, 197, 200]. The Constitutional Court declared the basic requirements 
concerning Art. 70/A. in its early decision, 61/1992 (XI. 20.): 
63
 Art. 65 of the law on equal treatment: "This Act contains regulation in harmony with 
the provisions concerning law approximation of the Europe Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States on the one part 
and the Republic of Hungary on the other part, signed in Brussels on 16 December 1991 
and promulgated by in Act I of 1994, compatible with the following legal acts of the 
European Union". 
64
 Bíró, A.: Pro és contra, az egyenlő bánásmódról és az esélyegyenlőség előmozdítá-
sáról szóló törvény margójára [Pro and contra, to the margó of the law on equal treatment 
and promotion of equality of chances]. In: Parlamenti ösztöndíjasok [Parliament scholar-
ship], Budapest, 2004. at 316, 320. 
65
 The expression is used first by the Final Concept to the Act, March, 2003. Cf. Farkas 
L.-Kádár А.-К.-Kárpáti J.: Néhány megjegyzés az egyenlő bánásmódról szól törvény kon-
cepciójához [Some remarks to the conception of the act on equal treatment]. Fundamentum, 7 
(2003) 121. 
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...the state as the public authority is obliged to provide equal treatment for 
all present on the territory of the state. In connection with this in cannot 
discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, ethnic or social origin, financial, natal or other situation. 
The prohibition contained in Art. 70/A. of the constitution does not only 
extend to human or basic citizen's rights, but this prohibition—when the 
discrimination violates the right to equal human dignity-extends to the 
whole legal system. (ABH 1992, 280, 281). 
The Official explanation also d raws the attention to the requirement 
following from Art. 8 (1) of the Constitution.66 It declares that it is the principal 
aim of the state to respect and protect fundamental rights. The Official explanation 
refers then again to the practice of the Constitutional Court elaborating on the 
detailed content of this provision providing that the state has the duty under 
Art. 8 of the Constitution to provide sufficient conditions in order to protect 
these fundamental rights as the rights to equality and human dignity as well 
[64/1991 (XII. 17.) AB decision, ABH 1991, 258. 262]. 
Let us compare this argument to the one of the decision 45/2000 (XII. 8.) 
(ABH 2000, 344, 351). The Constitutional Court claimed here that the state does 
not have the duty to provide a uniform law on non-discrimination, there is no 
omission regarding the required level of rights protection on this field, 
although the state has not exhausted all possibilités in order to provide legislative 
protection.67 It is easy to recognise the ambiguity of this statement. If the state 
"' Reasoning to the Act on equal treatment. Preamble point 2. Translated by the author 
of this paper. 
'" See the critics of this decision in Halmai G.: Hátrányos passzivizmus (Negative 
passivism!. Fundamentum. 4 (2000), and Halmai G.: Szükség van-e antidiszkriminációs 
törvényre Magyarországon? [Is an anti-discrimination law necessary in Hungary?| In: 
Petrétei J. (ed.): Emlékkönyv Bihari Ottó egyetemi tanár születésének 80. évfordulójára 
[Festschrift]. Pécs, 2001 and Kiss, В.: Az egyenlő bánásmód követelménye az Alkotmány-
bíróság gyakorlatában |The Duty of Equal Treatment in the Practice of The Constitutional 
Court]. Acta Universitas Szegediensis. Acta Juridica Et Politica. 67/12 (2005) 15-16. 
Gábor Halmai and Balázs Toth suggest that the legislation is indeed in omission, when not 
enacting rules to protect individuals against every kind of discrimination. They base their 
arguments on Art. 70/A. (2) of the Constitution, which identifies as a state duty to punish 
all violation of discrimination enacted in paragraph (1) of the same article. Cf. Halmai. G.: 
Előszó [Foreword]. In: Halmai G. (ed.): A hátrányos megkülönböztetés tilalmától a pozitív 
diszkriminációig - A jog lehetőségei és korlátai [From the Prohibition of Negative Treat-
ment to Positive Discrimination-Potentials and Limits of Law], Budapest, 1998. 4; Tóth, В.: 
Impossibilum nulla obligatio est, avagy szülessen-e antidiszkriminációs törvény Magyar-
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can do even more than it presently provides in order to protect fundamental 
rights, namely to protect human dignity violation through discrimination, why 
does not it commit an unconstitutional omission if it fails to do so? This is a 
little bit controversial, but definitely demands the conclusion that the Constitu-
tional Court holds, it is the duty of the state to provide protection, although the 
possible level of the exact constitutional protection has not been established. 
As a conclusion, the legislative is not constitutionally obliged under the present 
concept of the Constitutional Court to implement further measures on equal 
treatment or non-discrimination. 
In the light of this, Art. 5 and 6 of the Act on equal t reatment brings 
dogmatic novelty compared to any previous private law rules, because indeed 
requires the application of constitutional standards in private law matters. 
Moreover, the act goes much further than the required level by the EU in the 
above mentioned directives. We cannot find explicit orders in the directives to 
implement such a wide concept as the Hungarian one, intruding into the private 
sphere through assigning a barrier on all private actors concerning their choice 
to decide who they contract with, when they make a proposal to persons not 
previously selected to enter into contract, or invite such persons for tender or 
provide services or sell goods at their premises open to customers (Art. 5-6). 
Furthermore, the prohibition applies to all enlisted grounds (Art. 8), the 
legislative rejected the idea of the hierarchy of discrimination as well. 
According to the original version of the Act, only Art 22 provided the 
possibility for exception. It is worth to see how constitutional adjudication 
sneaks into the words of the law. 
The principle of equal treatment is not violated if 
a) the discrimination is proportioned, justified by the characteristic or 
nature of the work and is based on all relevant and legitimate terms and 
conditions, or 
b) the discrimination arises directly from a religious or other ideological 
conviction or national or ethnic origin fundamentally determining the 
nature of the organisation, and it is proportional and justified by the 
nature of the employment activity or the conditions of its pursuit. 
It is obvious for the first sight that the legislative (indirectly) required the 
judiciary to apply constitutional standards directly, by giving the same tests as 
országon [Impossibilium nulla obligatio est, or do we want an antidiscrimination law in 
Hungary]. In: Haimai: ibid. 94. 
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the Constitutional Court has developed as a tool for the assessment of the legal 
debates. 
However, a mistake poisoned the concept, because, it is well known that 
the test of the Constitutional Court does not sound exactly like this. Hence the 
rules were modified in 2006. The modification contains that Art. 7 should be 
completed with the following: if this law does not indicate otherwise, the acts 
do not violate the requirement of equal treatment 
a) if the fundamental right of a person is restr icted in inevitable cases in 
order to provide the prevalence of an other fundamental right if the 
restriction is capable to reach the aim and proportionate with that. 
b) When in cases beyond Art. 1, the act has an objective reason under 
rational assessment. 
The reasoning to the modification of this paragraph explains that the rules 
follow the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court , which has stated in 
several decisions that an act is not discriminative when it restrict a funda-
mental right necessarily and proportionately, and a non-fundamental right in a 
not arbitrary manner, (e.g. 30/1997 (IV. 29.) AB decision, ABH 1997, 130, 140.). 
Finally the Act indeed requires from the judiciary and the Authority68 to 
assess individual cases in the light of the Constitution, applying the tests 
developed by the Constitutional Court . This phenomenon might be labeled as 
the "indirect direct" effect of the constitutional provision in a thouroughly 
circumscribed, but not quite narrow scope. 
f>8
 As to the practice of the Authority established by the act, but working only since 
February 2005,68 we must emphasize that the provision stated in Art. 5 a) means in factthat 
banks and insurance companies can make an offer, which is understood as a proposal to 
persons not previously selected to enter into contract. However it was not understood as 
such a contract, when a condominium did not enter into contract with a disabled, or a 
wholesale trade did not contract with a Roma. Demeter. J.: Az egyenlő bánásmód és az 
esélyegyenlőség előmozdítása |Equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities]. 
Acta Humana 17 (2006) 53. 
As to the second point b) of Art. 5, it regulates restaurants and pubs or discos, who 
intend to discriminate against Romas and others on grounds of skin colour. The 
interpretation problems from this regard has not yet emerged at the authority, and there 
were not yet many cases concerning the two other points of this statutory provision. Cf. 
Demeter: ibid. 
In sum, we can already see that the most problematic point concerning the new law on 
equal treatment, which touches upon the problems raised in this paper relate to the 
provision Art. 5 point a), namely concerns the case when someone makes a proposal to 
persons not previously selected to enter into contract or invite such persons for tender. 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: HORIZONTAL EFFECT AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW. . . 129 
2.2. The codification of the new Civil Code: questions to be answered 
After having had regard on the interrelated nature of the concept of horizontal 
applicability and the Act on equal treatment, I would like to draw the attention 
to the present codification process of the new civil code. The constitutionally 
required level of protection against discrimination in private matters, and in 
relation to this the necessity of the declaration of indirect horizontal e f fec t is a 
matter of current debates. I try to demonstrate that the above draw conclusions 
might help here to add to the solution of the emerging problems. First of all 
have a look at the standpoints of the scholars and the leader of the codification 
procedure, Lajos Vékás. 
Vékás argues that it is not possible to measure constitutional rights in civil 
law adjudication with the tests developed in constitutional law. Civil law 
litigation, even if it concerns fundamental rights in conflict , is not about the 
constitutional evaluation of legal instruments. Hence it is a crucial question to 
answer how civil law courts should reach the required protection of funda-
mental rights.64 
Lábady emphasizes that the dogmatic of private law had great effect on the 
development of the Constitutional Cour t ' s jurisprudence. It is a tendency that 
private law gains the more and more territory from other public branches of the 
law, namely tries to incorporate important public law rules into its codes, 
because it feels the more and more concern about the public sphere.7" This is 
why it becomes possible to use the same standards in private law as in consti-
tutional law. Lábady argues that the Constitution binds everybody this is why it 
has to be directly applicable in private litigations as well. The Constitution 
determines private relations, because otherwise they would not be always 
consistent with constitutional values. This means first of all that statutes and 
other legal instruments have to be conform to the Consti tution, and if there is 
no civil law regulation on the matter, the Constitution directly has to protect 
the individuals against each other.'1 There are many civil lawyers however, 
who feel that it is impossible to give direct or indirect horizontal effect to the 
Constitution, because it is completely strange to the logic of private law.7 2 
69
 Ibid. 160. 
711
 Lábady, T.: Alkotmányjogi hatások a készülő Ptk. szabályaira [Effects of constitutional 
law on the draft Civil Code]. Polgári jogi kodifikáció, 2 (2000). 
71
 Ibid. See also Lábady, T.: Alkotmányos alapjogok és személyiségi jogok [Basic 
rights and personality rights]. Jogi Beszélgetések [(Discussion in law], Kaposvár, 2000. 
72
 Cf. Vincze: Az alkotmány rendelkezéseinek érvényre juttatása, op. cit. 
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Lábady puts the essence of the debate the following way: if the constitutional 
provisions should apply indirectly to private relations through interpretations 
of civil law rules, it is the task of the codification and the codificators to tell 
how and to what extent. 
However, if the Constitution applies directly, it is not problematic to exclude 
any special rules from the Civil Code.7 , Vékás-rejecting Lábady 's v iews-draws 
the attention to the discretion of the judges in private matters. They intend to 
decide applying general clauses, and in this process they have the power to 
interpret legal rules, which will provide anyway the full protection of funda-
mental rights without any change in the legal system.74 
At present, the Civil Code in paragraph 76. contains the prohibition of dis-
crimination as a traditional personality right. The ministerial reasoning of the 
1959/ IV. Act on the Civil Code makes it explicit that the pr imary aim of the 
prohibition of discrimination is to protect individuals in pr ivate relations. In 
2004, the Act on equal t reatment amended this provision requiring equal 
treatment instead of non-discrimination of individuals.73 
Some examples from the jurisprudence of ordinary courts show how they 
interpret this general personality right provision; how far they went in the so 
called constitutional interpretation. In 2002, the court charged a pub owner to 
pay for non-pecuniary damage of Roma applicants, who were not allowed to 
enter to the pub.76 Also, when Roma students of a school were organized separate 
farewell parties f rom non-Roma students, the court based its argumentation on 
Art. 76 of the Civil Code.77 A handicapped person, who could not get into a 
bank building also sued with success.78 
The bounderies of the f reedom to act in private relations are established in 
the Civil Code as well as in the Constitution, namely we may find obligatory 
general clauses in the civil law regulations as well. The main question thus 
refers to the content of these rules in private law, how they should comply with 
the Constitution if it comes to interpretation. Vékás argues in favour of the 
explici t codification of indirect horizontal e f fec t , which would necessitate 
that the judges fill up the content of the general civil law provisions with 
73
 Lábady: Alkotmányjogi hatások... op. cit. 
74
 Vékás: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv... op. cit. 159. 
75
 2003. évi CXXV. törvény 37. §, in effect from Ol. 27. 2004, see this in: Menyhárd 
A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgári jog. op. cit. 34. 
76
 EBH 2002,case 625. 
77
 EBH 200l.case 515. 
78
 BH 1995/12, 698. In accordance with similar cases and hypotheticals a recent study 
of Attila Menyhárd tries to prove that the limitation on private liberty will not produce 
general welfare. Menyhárd A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgáijog. op. cit. 8-15. 
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constitutional content.74 However, it is still not clear what exactly this "consti-
tutional content" means in case of the anti-discrimination provision. 
At this point we might be able to refer to the implications of the solution of 
the anti-discrimination act. We can observe that the idea of indirect horizontality, 
where the Constitution radiates through the provisions of ordinary civil law, 
gives certainly less identified protection against non-discrimination in private 
relations, than the Act on equal treatment, with its "indirect direct" horizontal 
effect. Hence it is worth to consider that the Civil Code should regulate more 
extra-contractual relations in accordance with the Act on equal treatment in 
order to provide as wide protection as other vehicles of law on this field. 
Also, it would be possible that the new civil code borrows the idea of the 
Act on equal treatment and introduces the "indirect direct" horizontal effect. 
The practical side of this suggestion, as we saw above, that the legislative, 
the codificators can determine the scope where the constitutional rules may 
intrude, but the way of constitutional adjudication can facilitates the right 
balance between the person 's liberty and equality in each and every case. 
Above, we considered the principal difference between the three solutions 
and now we try to reconcile those. Namely acknowledge that accepting the 
direct effect would leave it with the judiciary to decide where the Constitution 
applies and what that provokes in private matters, even outside the sphere of 
present judicial intrusion. Contrary to this, in case of the indirect doctrine, the 
Constitution is not capable to intrude into the private sphere unless the 
ordinary law, preferably a general clause lives open the door for it. 
The highlighted idea brings a new and important trend into this debate 
because offers a medium way hopefully a golden medium. The solution of the 
Act on equal treatment offers dogmatically a clear compromise between the 
three concepts of horizontal applicability of the non-discrimination clause of 
the Constitution. If the legislative wishes to extend the scope of the protection 
against arbitrary discrimination in private relations, the implementation of new 
provisions-declaring the "indirect-direct horizontal e f fec t"-become necessary 
in order to reach demonstratively the desired level of protection. This solution 
preserves the idea of value monism, at the same time gives opportunity to the 
legislation to differenciate between private relations of different nature. 
74
 Vékás L.: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv... op. cit. 149, also in Vékás, L.: A szerződési 
szabadság alkotmányos korlátai [The constitutional limits of freedom of contract]. Jog-
tudományi Közlöny 47 (1992) 56-59 and Vékás, L.: Egyenlő bánásmód polgári jogi jog-
viszonyokban? [Equal treatment in private law relationships?] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
61 (2006) 355. 
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2.3. Towards a solution 
Finally it would be important to give guidelines to the legislative concerning 
what to bear in mind when determining the scope of the constitutional 
protection in private law, when reconsiliating guiding constitutional rights. 
There is no general right to liberty as such. The argument in case of a 
particular liberty is an independent argument f rom any other concerning other 
liberties.80 The meaning of anti-discrimination can also be different in relation to 
property rights as in the context of school or voting.81 Contrary to the Anglo-
Saxon system of constitutional rights, the just if icat ion of l iberty and equality 
both root in the concept of equal human dignity in the Hungarian juris-
prudence. The state recognizes everybody's right to equal human dignity; 
this is the basic rule of the Hungarian constitutional system. Furthermore 
individuals have the right against the legislature that it protects them against 
o ther citizens.82 
As both liberty and equality are grounded in the concept of dignity, and 
every case differs from the other, the legislative cannot set up more precise 
norms under the presently ruling constitutional theory than we have seen in the 
jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Courts or we found in the text of 
the Act on equal treatment. Balancing8 3 must be the keyword.84 88 
We must also consider that one of the principal problems of solving this 
battle between the right to liberty and equality lies in the fact that there is two 
equal ly valid interpretation of equality: "equal i ty-non-discriminat ion (in the 
publ ic sphere) and equal i ty-equal i ty in autonomy (in the private sphere)". 
811
 Dworkin R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass. 2001. 
81
 Tushnet M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law... op. cit. 180. 
8
~ See the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court above, and Alexy. R.: A theory of 
constitutional rights. Oxford. 2002. 324. 352. 
83
 However, the "reluctance also may be apparent even when constitutional balancing 
is applied to private law adjudication which may itself sometimes require the balancing of 
countervailing private rights. To judges brought up in the tradition of the private law, the 
weighing of countervailing private rights may seem to involve balancing of a mor e limited 
and familiar kind than the weighing of more capacious public interests required in consti-
tutional balancing." Quint, P. E.: Free speech and private law in German Constitutional 
Theory. Maryland Law Review, 48 (1988) 247, 290. 
84
 Alexy: A theory of constitutional rights... op. cit. 82 
88
 See a contrary opinion from the anglo-saxon heritage in Dworkin: op. cit. 184. He 
describes why constitutional rights should not apply to private relations. According to 
Dworkin the essence of constitutional rights is to give standards to policy consideration, to 
determine the limits of policy actions, hence they cannot be balances against each other per se. 
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Through anti-discrimination laws the legislative introduced equality in the 
meaning of public law, which has naturally changed the situation, because 
substituted the choice of the individual with the standards of the community.8 6 
The words of the constitutions refer to the duties of the state to do or to 
refrain from doing something. This would suggest that private actors can behave 
differently f rom state actors because the constitution names rules concerning 
public relations.87 This paradigm is in alteration now, which makes confusion, 
and raises the question of value monism. But it is reasonable to accept the 
changing role of the constitutions, and it will help to understand the new 
phenomenons. 
Even if we reject value pluralism, and accept value monism we can easily 
differenciate between public and private and within private relations as well 
with the help of the balancing system. Aharon Barak makes two clear case 
studies in order to illustrate the solution: The restaurant owner certainly have 
the right to choose who to contract with, but can not discriminate on the basis of 
race, gender or religion, meanwhile an owner, who wishes to rent out one room 
of his flat should have the right to pick whoever he likes. But wha t is the 
difference between the two cases? The "proper balance" between the right to get 
a service without discrimination and the right to freedom of contract will give a 
solution for the problem; namely, in the former case the right to get the service 
without discrimination prevails over the right of the owner to choose his guests. 
Meanwhile in the second case the right to choose freely a person to rent a room 
in my flat prevails over the others right not to be discriminated arbitrarily. 
Barak continues that the root of this balance lies in the concept that the 
freedom of contract is stronger in relation to a pe rson ' s privacy, meanwhi le 
it is weaker when directed against the public at large. Per ana log iam-he 
demonstrates-the right not to be discriminated is weaker when of fe red to a 
general public. In this case, the discriminated person is segregated f r o m the 
public on the basis of race, gender, religion etc. However, the right not to be 
discriminated becomes weaker when the service, in its nature is not open to the 
public but provided on a personal basis.88 
In order to understand the idea of the right balance, the assessment of 
bargaining power relations could also help if taken into account. If one party 
has power over the other one, if one of the parties is defenseless the sheer 
86
 Sommeregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality. In: Sajó-Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 
87
 Garvey, J. H.-Aleinikoff, A. T.: Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader. St. Paul, 
Minn. Third Edition, 1994. 695. 
84
 Barak, A.: Constitutional Human rights and Private law. In: Friedman, D.-Barak-
Erez, D.: Human Rights In Private Law. Oxford, 2001. 39. 
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sense tells that the state has to protect the weak one in order to provide the 
same liberties to everyone because the stronger party is capable to take away 
the other's constitutional rights.84 
It is easy to understand that direct horizontal effect denies the public-private 
divide.4" although this divide exists , because the results of the balancing will 
be definitely different on the different fields of laws. The anti-discrimination 
laws seemingly uphold the public-private divide; just shift the borders of it, 
meanwhile upholding the theory of value-monism. 
Private law has always prohibited certain kinds of discrimination on certain 
grounds, but this issue at stake calls for a different approach. The legislation 
has developed the idea that fundamental rights indeed apply in private relations, 
and thus the legislative and the judiciary will apply the scrutiny developed by 
the national constitutional court. The standards became the same on both fields 
of private and public law, however we should not forget about the balancing of 
constitutional rights, which will provide different end results in cases of fields 
closer to the public law, than on fields closer to private matters. 
We find a gradual system, where between the two ends, controversial cases 
with public law and private law elements emerge. The legislative must determine 
this scope of the potencially controversial cases and in those cases guarantee 
judicial assessment under constitutional standards ("indirect-direct horizontal 
89
 This idea is present in many fields of legislation, such as consumer protection, 
employment matters, or certain rules of the Civil Code. For example, if there is one store in 
the village and the salesman does not want to serve somebody on the basis of his skin 
color, or handicap, we feel that the state should intervene and protect the individual. 
However, if there are several shops in the village and they have the same offer for the same 
price, and one of the owners does not want to serve a person with colored skin, the 
situation is slightly different. Here the situation is more horizontal in reality, because the 
discriminated person can go to the other shops and the discriminative owner is in a worse 
financial position as a result, because he looses a guest. However this reasoning leads us 
back finally to the "separate but equal" interpretation of equality, which was declared bad 
law a long-long time ago. (The idea of separate, but equal came from the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, Plessy v. Fergusson (1986, 163 U.S. 537) and was overruled in 1954 by 
Brown v. Board of education (347 U.S. 483). In the former decision the court concluded 
that it is constitutional that states could prohibit the use of certain train carriges by blacks, 
if they were provided with other carrigies.) This example calls our attention to the perils of 
this interpretation and affirms the view that the discrimination, which violates the human 
dignity of a person is not much different is horizontal and vertical private relations. 
90
 See about these fears more, in Pfeiffer, Th.: Diskriminierung oder Nichtdiskriminierung-
Was ist hier eigentlich die Frage? Zeitschrift für das gesamte Schuldrecht. (2002) 165; 
Pickler, E.: Antidiskriminierungsgesetz - Der Anfang vom Ende der Privatautonomie? 
Juristenzeitung. 57 (2002) 880. 
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effect") . In other cases fo l lowing a constitutional balancing process within 
its own competence, the legislative can decide on excluding the possibili ty 
of the juducial direct application of constitutional norms in order to secure a 
calculable rights protection respecting the idea of separation of powers. This 
legislative decision, the Civil code e.g. can be subjected to rewiew by the 
Constitutional Court. This modern constitutional idea definitely changes the 
role of the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
This contribution aimed to analyze the conception of the "horizontal effect of 
the Constitution", namely how the Constitution applies in private relations 
through judicial activity and what the posit ions of the legislative and the 
constitutional court of Hungary are. I argued that the question as to whether 
constitutional rights apply in private litigations does not exclusively depend on 
the acknowledgement of direct or indirect horizontal effect. I suggested that it 
was better to leave the decision on this problem with the legislation and as to 
the measure already set up the review of the right balance will stay at constitu-
tional courts as the final instance of constitutionality. In Hungary, where the 
constitutional court does not have the competence to review the decisions of 
ordinary courts, it is quite dangerous to require from the judiciary to apply 
constitutional norms in their vaguely abstract form. However, I demonstrated 
that the judiciary has to interpret legal provisions in the light of the 
constitution even if the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect is not explicitely 
introduced into the constitutional system. 
A separation of power point of view supports my position. The constitution's 
original purpose was to regulate the relation of the state and the individual. If 
there is intent to extend the scope of the constitution to certain private relations, 
it should be as well left with the legislative to determine, how far the consti-
tution should apply in private relations. The necessity, proportionality test and 
the "objective reason" justification, that the constitutional court established as a 
standard to justify discrimination in certain cases applies thorugh anti-discrimi-
nation laws presently as well in the described situations. The legislative in fact 
orders that judges decide on possible violations under these standards in the 
scope of cases the legislative previously determined in the Act. This is the 
"indirect-direct" horizontal application. 
This idea could be useful when finding answers to the questions emerging 
in connection with the codification of the new Civil Code. Following the consti-
tutional requirements of interpretation set up by the Constitutional Court, the 
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legislative has to take into account the constitutional right to equality and 
private autonomy, liberty (which is on the other side of the balance) when 
assessing the problem of discrimination. Hence it is fully possible to develop a 
different understanding of the principle of non-discrimination in public and 
private relations, what is more, it is hardly possible to say that it is exactly the 
same in these two relationships. Thereafter the legislative will determine the 
scope where the judiciary must be entitled to assess the individual cases, the 
acts of single private actors under pure constitutional standards. 
* * * 
This paper tried to offer a response as to whether the private law principles or 
common constitutional principles serve as a framework for the examination of 
the above issues. I argue that the present tendencies demand the "constitu-
tional" answer: the fight for the enforcement of equal human dignity must be 
reconciled with economic and social rationality. This is forced by the inherent 
development of law, the changing role of the constitutions. However, as far 
as it is possible the legislative should decide on the just and prescise balance 
between liberty and equali ty concerns and thus the traditional idea of 
"horizontal application of the Constitution" might loose voice. 
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Studies in Classical and Medieval Philology and Legal History. Hungarian Polis 
Studies 14. Debrecen, 2007. 313 pp. 
The joint volume of studies of Tamás Nótári, Associate Professor of Károli 
Gáspár University (Budapest) was published in 2007. The selection gathers 
twelve works published earlier, so it allows to study these papers together written 
in ten years and not easily available individually, and to become famil iar with 
the works of the author in a subtler form. The volume presents the studies in 
chronological order: most of them, as a mater of fact, cover subjects of Roman 
law and classical philology, the other thematic unit of the volume comprises 
four studies on medieval subjects. 
1) The Scales as the Symbol of Justice in the Iliad.1 The idiom of the scales 
of justice is well-known, its use is widely spread, Iustitia can be frequently 
seen with scales in her hand in d i f ferent representations. The scales as the 
symbol of justice and administration of justice appear in various places in 
Greek literature. In the Iliad one can encounter a scene presented in context, 
thus suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is pronouncing 
justice over the heroes by using a pair of scales. This paper will first clarifies 
the concept of law and justice as it appears in the Homeric epic; then, by the 
structural and comparative analysis of some lines of the weighing scene, 
decisive in the combat of Achilles and Hector, a few remarks are made on the 
origin and meaning of the concept of the scales of just ice.2 
2) Hesiod und die Anfänge der Rechtsphilosophie,3 The paper entitled 
Hesiod and the beginning of the philosophy of law highlights a few concepts 
instructive for legal history and philosophical analysis from excerpts of the 
main works of Hesiod, who lived at the turn of the 8 th and 7th B.C., Theogonia 
and Erga kai hemerai. The most valuable part of the study is the examination 
1
 Nótári: op. cit. 9 -20 . 
Cf. Nótári, T.: The Scales as the Symbol of Justice in the Iliad. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 47 (2006) 249 sqq. 
3
 Nótári: op. cit. 21^44. 
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of the occurrence and role of dike, one of the most diverse concepts of antique 
legal history in Homeric epics and Hesiod's Erga.4 
3) Numen and Numinousity-On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of 
Authority.5 The paper will examine various aspects of numen, one of the most 
important phenomena of Roman religion, its etymology, the institution of 
triumphus, a phenomenon that seems to be relevant from this point of view, 
and the function of fiamén Diaiis, one of the most numinous phenomena of 
Roman religion, then the concept of numen Augusti, which incorporates these 
elements of the religious sphere into the legitimation of power. Nótári 's study 
analyses the religious, political and public law aspects of the Roman concept 
of authority with exemplary thoroughness, magnificently separating the concepts 
fundamental regarding the subject but often causing difficulties in interpre-
tation: auctoritas, numen, genius and impérium f 
4) Summum ins summa iniuria-The Historical Background of a Legal 
Maxim.1 Cicero quotes this proverbium, widely spread as early as in the age of 
the Republic, which remained in use in his formulation until today: "summum 
ius summa iniuria ";8 i.e., the utmost enforcement of the law leads to the greatest 
injustice. From the maxims of legal logic as means of legal interpretation, in 
the present work Nótári made the proverb "summum ius summa iniuria" the 
object of our scrutiny, enumerating its occurences in antique literary sources, 
namely in Terence, Columella and then in Cicero. In this last formulation the 
meaning of the proverb became the most clearly crystallized. It signifies the 
excessive, malevolent legal practice in the course of interpretatio iuris, which 
plays off the letter of the law against its spirit. The Celsian sententia "ius est 
ars boni et aequi" formulates one of the most general, all-encompassing basic 
principles of interpretatio meant to offer protection against the too strictly 
interpreted and applied summum ius. Although jurists never clearly defined the 
concept of aequitas, it became a very important means of legal development as 
a thought emerging from the interaction of Jurisprudence and eloquence. By 
4
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Biirgergemcinschaft und Rechtsgedanke bei Hesiod. In: Németh, G.— 
Forisek, P. (ed.): Politai et Cives. Debrecen, 2006. 7 sqq.; Hesiod und die Anfänge der 
Rechtsphilosophie. Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös 
nominatae, Sectio Iuridica, 47 (2006) 341 sqq. 
5
 Nótári: op. cit. 45-74. 
6
 Nótári, T.: The Function of the Flamen Dialis in the Marriage Ceremony. Annates 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae. Sectio Iuridica, 
45 (2004) 157 sqq. On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta Juridicci 
Hungarica, 46 (2005) 95 sqq. 
7
 Nótári: op. cit. 75-96. 
8
 Cicero : De officiis 1, 33. 
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presenting the relevant loci from Erasmus of Rotterdam's Adagia as a typical 
example of the persistence of the paroemia "summum ins summa iniuria", the 
paper shows the way a proverb turning into regula iuris-apart f rom its direct 
legal application-became an integral part of today's legal common knowledge.' ' 
5) Die Lanze als Macht- und Eigentumssymbol im antiken Rom.w The 
present paper deals with the role of the hasta in the ceremony of the legis actio 
sacramento in rem. In ancient Rome the hasta was the weapon with which in 
the course of the f ights they could win loot, recognition, and hence power, it is 
no wonder that shortly it became the symbol of power. This is also shown by 
Verrius Festus's definition: "hasta summa armorum et imperii est",u and the 
reference to impérium, especially in connection with the spear, reminds one of 
its religious character, belonging to the sacred sphere. It is not by chance that 
the expression subhastatio means- the selling of loot, especially the selling of 
captives, obtained f rom the enemy through armed fight, and later meant any 
kind of auction in general.12 
6) Remarks on the Origin of the legis actio sacramento in remLegis 
actio sacramento in rem has belonged to the most debated issues of specialised 
literature on Roman Law up to the present day. Nótári 's study highlights the 
following aspects of this ceremony. The sacred character of legis actio procedure 
is proved by the almost neurotic adherence to the words to be recited, the same 
phenomenon is also exemplified by Pliny's account of the dedicatio of Ops 
Opifera ' s temple. Traces of private fight and arbitrary action are shown by the 
origins of the term vindicatio as well as by the rod used in the procedure 
instead of a spear. All the more so, as Gaius also explains this with the fact that 
what the Romans considered truly their own was the goods taken from the 
9
 Cf. Nótári, T.: De summo iure summaque iniuria apud Ciceronein. Vox Latina 43 
(2007) 346 sqq.; Summum lus Summa Iniuria-Comments on the Historical Background of 
a Legal Maxim of Interpretation. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 44 (2004) 301 sqq.; Comments 
on the Legal Maxim „Summum ius summa iniuria". Novy Sad, Serbia, 2006. 107 sqq.; 
Summum ius summa iniuria. Magyar Jog, 51 (2004) 385 sqq. 
10
 Nótári; op. cit. 97-128. 
11
 Fest. 55, 3. 
' Nótári T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco. Acta Facultatis Politico-
Iuridicae Universitatis Budapestiensis de Rolando Eotvos nominatae, 45 (2004) 133 sqq.; 
The Spear as the Symbol of Property and Power in Ancient Rome. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
48 (2007) 231 sqq.; Die Lanzensymbolik der legis actio sacramento in rem. Studia Iuris 
Caroliensia, 2 (2007) 135 sqq.; Die Lanze als Eigentums- und Machtsymbol in der legis 
actio sacramento in rem. In: Loi et droit dans le gouvernement des sociétés antiques. 
Résumés des communications. Catania, 2007. 68 sq. 
13
 Nótári: op. cit. 129-152. 
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enemy; i.e., obtained by fight. The structure of ius fetiale, which regulated the 
law of war and of peace in the archaic age, a typical example of the intertwin-
ing of peaceful and martial elements, and re rum repetitio as well as clarigatio 
show remarkable parallel with legis sacramento in rem.14 
7) Remarques sur le ius vitae necisque et le ius exponendi. '5 lus vitae ас 
necis, the penal authority of the pater familias over his (adult) children in 
potestate, was valid up to the 4 t hcentury A.D. It gave the father the right to kill 
even his own child, but the exercise of this right was restricted and kept within 
bounds. So the pater familias had to conduct proceed'mgs-iudicium domes-
ticum-when the consilium necessariorum exemined the case and gave the 
defendant any oportunity to answer the charge (cognita et audita causa). If the 
cr ime seemed to deserve capital punishment (iusta causa), the consilium 
decided aubout the guiltiness of the defendant by mayority. The verdict was 
binding for the pater familias. Ius exponendi, the power of the paterfamilias to 
expose a child, was valid until 374 A.D. There were two reasons why a new-
born baby could be exposed. One of these reasons has a religious motivation-
the procuratio prodigii-and it could not be strictly distinguished from killing a 
new-born child. In the other case the pater familias exposed the child, because 
he did not want to bring it up, but he did not intend to kill it. He counted on 
somebody to find the child, and adopt it. If the latter case came true, there was 
a legal question about the status libertatis of the child. The regulation of the 
status was quite different during the centuries, till emperor lustinian guaranteed 
almost every exposed and adopted child the freedom."1 
8) Comments on Bishop Virgil's Activity in Bavaria.17 Virgil, the bishop of 
Salzburg of Irish origin (749-784) opened a new chapter in the history of his 
episcopate: he compiled the earliest works of the historiography of Salzburg: 
the Gesta sancti Hrodberti confessons, the Libellas Virgilii and the Liber 
confraternitatum\ he had the Rupert Cathedral constructed, which was con-
secrated in 774; he extended the rights of the episcopate and that of the Saint 
Peter Monastery and he organised the mission among the Carantanians. This 
14
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Jog, vallás és retorika (Law, Religion and Rhetoric). Szeged, 2006. 
50 sqq.; Duellum sacrum-gondolatok a legis actio sacramento in rem eredete kapcsán. 
(Thoughts on the Origin of the legis actio sacramento inrem). Állam- és Jogtudomány, 47 
(2006) 87 sqq.; Comments on the Origin of the legis actio sacramento in rem. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 133 sqq. 
15
 Nótári: op. cit. 153-178. 
16
 Cf. Nótári, T.: De iure vitae necisque et exponendi. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 53 
(1998) 421 sqq.: Remarques sur le ius vitae necisque et le ius exponendi. Studia Iuris 
Caroliensia 1. 2006. 151 sqq. 
17
 Nótári: op. cit. 192-202. 
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paper deals with three aspects of the activity of Virgil, the abbot and bishop of 
Salzburg: the conflict between Bonifacius and Virgil; the determination of the 
date of Virgil 's ordaining; and the debates for the goods and rights of the Saint 
Peter Monastery and the episcopate of Salzburg, which were noted down by 
Virgil in the Libellus Virgilii 
9) Tasilo Ill's Dethronement-Remarks on an Early-Medieval Show Trial.19  
The creation of a unified empire by Charlemagne required quite a number of 
victims; one of them was Tasilo III, the last duke of the Agilolfing dynasty 
reigning in Bavaria for two centuries. The Frank monarch dethroned him not 
by means of a bloody military defeat but by a legal trial (now called show trial) 
in 788. The main charges brought against Tasilo was infidelitas, i.e., 
unfaithfulness to the liege lord besides harisliz, i.e., leaving the (royal) army 
without permission-though the latter was carried out a quarter of a century 
before the legal trial. The given work aims to enlighten the legal background 
of this rather opaque case by contouring the historical context. Nótári first 
considers Tasi lo 's reign and the historical background of the trial, then he 
investigates the Frank-Bavarian conflict and the sacramenta fidelitatis of 
Tasilo. In the end, after highlighting the question of infidelitas and of harisliz 
the author analyses the show trial itself.20 
10) The Trial of Methodius in the Mirror of the Conversio Bagoariorum 
et Carantanorum,21 This paper deals with the background of the activity of 
Methodius known as the Apostle of the Slavs and of his conflict with the 
Archbishopric of Salzburg and its diocesan bishops. At the Council of Regens-
burg held in the presence of Louis the German in 870, Adalwin, archbishop of 
Salzburg and his bishops passed a judgment on Methodius, a missionary f rom 
Byzantium, then papal legate and archbishop of Sirmium, since they deemed 
that by his missionary activity pursued in Pannónia Methodius infringed the 
jurisdiction of Salzburg exercised over this territory for seventy-five years, and 
after that they held him in captivity for two and a half years. It was this lawsuit 
regarding which the Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum was drafted 
18
 Cf. Nótári, T.: A salzburgi historiográfia kezdetei (Beginnings of the Historiography 
of Salzburg). Szeged, 2007; Források Salzburg kora középkori történetéből (Sources from 
the early-medieval history of Salzburg). Szeged, 2005; Gesta Hrodberti. In: Havas, L . -
Tegyey, E. (eds): Classica-Mediaevalia-Neolatina. Debrecen, 2006. 131 sqq. On Bishop 
Virgil 's Litigations in Bavaria. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 49 sqq. 
19
 Nótári: op. cit. 203-232. 
20
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Tassilo I l l ' s dethronement-contributions to an early-middle-age 
show trial. Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis. Sectio Iuridica et Politica, 23 (2005) 
65 sqq. 
21
 Nótári: op. cit. 233-282. 
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either as a bill of indictment or to legitimate the lawsuit subsequently, it cannot 
be clarified. The author first highlights the historical background of the 
conflict between Methodius and the bishops of Bavaria: he outlines the process 
of Christianization of Carantania, Avaria and Bulgaria. Then, the paper in-
vestigates the activity of Methodius in Pannónia and Moravia, and the reasons 
for the trial held in Regensburg which led to the most shameful captivity of 
Methodius.22 
11) Die Geschichte des Ingo bei Enea Silvio Piccolomini,23 The study describes 
the background of the history of Ingo in Enea Silvio Piccolomini 's work De 
Europa. Piccolomini, the later Pope Pius II (1458-1464) misinterpreted-like 
Iohannes Victoriensis- the description of the Carantanian mission in the 
Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Nótári analyses the process that led 
to the „creation" of the Carantanian duke, Ingo.24 
12) Portrait zweier ungarischer Mediävisten, Gyula Kristó und Samu 
Szádeczky Kardoss.25 The last work in the volume, a study that raises a monument 
to the memory of the internationally renowned scholars Samu Szádeczky-
Kardoss and Gyula Kristó is a worthy memorial by the former student Tamás 
Nótári to his masters not only with this obituary but perhaps with the whole 
volume.26 
Tamás Fedeles 
22
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Aetas 15 (2000) 93 sqq.; 
De Consultis Bulgarorum. Collegei, 6 (2002) 47 sqq.; Conversio Bagoariorum et 
Carantanorum-Document of an Early Medieval Show Trial. Publicationes Universitatis 
Miskolciensis. Sectio luridica et Politico, 25 (2007) 95 sqq. 
23
 Nótári: op. cit. 283-304. 
4
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Die Geschichte des Grafen Ingo bei Enea Silvio Piccolomini. In: 
Varietas Gentium-Communis Latinitas. XIII International Congress for Neo-Latin Studies. 
Budapest 2006. 96. 
25
 Nótári: op. cit. 305-313. 
26
 Cf. Nótári, T.: In memóriám Samuelis Szádeczky-Kurdoss piissimam. Vox Latina, 41 
(2005) 142 sq.; En memoire de Professeur Samuel Szádeczky-Kardoss. Acta Antiqua, 46 
(2006) 209 sqq.; Szádeczky-Kardoss Samu (1918-2004). Aetas, 20 (2005) 182 sqq.; In 
memóriám Kristó Gyula. Jogtörténeti Szemle, 19 (2004) 63 sq. 
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T A M Á S SÁRKÖZY* 
Post-Socialist "Primitive Accumulation of Capital" 
and the Law 
Abstract. The study deals with theoretical questions of the Hungarian privatization law. It 
clarifies the differences between the economic and legal concept of privatization, the various 
interpretations of privatization. The Hungarian privatization was the earliest and at the same 
time-after the German-the quickest completed privatization in the former socialist countries. It 
reviews the so-called spontaneous privatization between 1988-1990, and the privatization 
legislature of 1992 and 1995 as well. As a conclusion the study deals with the evaluation of 
the privatization law, and with the consequences of privatization with regards to social 
politics. 
Keywords: post-socialist privatization, management, business law, investment, foreign 
capital, AP. rule of law, market economy, competition, state property, national property, 
administrative modernization, accumulation of capital, EU business law 
1. A s p e c i f i c a r e a o f t h e l a w o f p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in C e n t r a l - E a s t e r n -
E u r o p e is c o n s t i t u t e d b y the law of privatisation, w h i c h q u a l i f i e s a s a n a n t i t h e s i s 
t o t h e l a w o f t h e e c o n o m i c e v o l u t i o n o f s o c i a l i s m , s c i l i c e t , t h e l a w o f n a t i o n a l i -
s a t i o n . It is a m e r e p r o v i s i o n a l a r e a o f l a w , s i n c e i t i s d i s p e n s a b l e i n m a t u r e 
c a p i t a l i s m , t h e r e f o r e , it w i l l g r a d u a l l y e r o d e f r o m H u n g a r i a n b u s i n e s s l a w . 
I n e c o n o m i c s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y , i n m a s s c o m m u n i c a -
t i o n , t h e t e r m o f p r i v a t i s a t i o n i s a p p l i e d i n a m u c h b r o a d e r s e n s e t h a n i t s 
H u n g a r i a n t e r m i s c i r c u m s c r i b e d u n d e r p o s i t i v e l a w . F o r i n s t a n c e , in A m e r i c a n 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e l i t e r a t u r e , p r i v a t i s a t i o n d e f i n e s t h e d e c r e a s e o f t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n 
o f t h e s t a t e i n t o e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s , t h e r e b y , a s a c o l l e c t i v e t e r m , it 
e n c o m p a s s e s l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n a n d d e r e g u l a t i o n . 1 W h e r e a s , in 
H u n g a r y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t h a d a c c r u e d f r o m t h e i r 
Professor of L a w , Corvinus Univers i ty of Budapes t , H - 1 0 9 3 Budapes t , F ő v á m tér 8. 
E -ma i l : amar i l l . f oga ra s i@un i -co rv inus .hu 
1
 See, e.g.. Savas , E. S.: Privatisation. The Key to Better Government. N e w Jersey, 
1987. ; T. Clarke, T . -P i t a l e s , C. (eds . ) : The Political Economy of Privatisation. L o n d o n -
N e w York, 1994.; Mihályi , P.: A magyar privatizáció krónikája 1989-1997 (A Chronicle 
of Hungar ian Pr iva t i sa t ion b e t w e e n 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 7 ) . B u d a p e s t , 1998. 
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own resources, the so-called crop investments of foreign capital and the evolution 
of the proprietary status of the members of co-operatives within cooperatives 
have been several t imes defined as privatisation. As a matter of course, these 
elements have contributed to the evolution of the "private" character of 
Hungarian society, but de jure, these do not qualify as privatisation. It is not 
privatisation in a narrower legal sense, either, when the state transfers assets 
generally for free to other forms of public property, e.g., to the property of 
regional and local governments, public bodies (e.g., the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences) or to the church (albeit, the latter transaction is also termed as 
reprivatisation, since a significant share of the property of the church had been 
nationalised during socialism). 
In terms of Hungarian positive law, privatisation implies the transfer of 
state-owned property to private property. Therefore, privatisation shall not 
encompass the transfer of assets that are not owned by the state, but by other 
public proprietor (e.g., local government) into private property. Finally, it does 
not constitute privatisation either, when the private proprietor does not acquire 
property, but e.g., rights of usufruct (so-called privatisation of rights of 
commons and functions, e.g., via concessions in case of state monopolies or 
via the so-called privatisational leasing). The term of private proprietor with 
respect to privatisation was positively defined under Para. (4) of Article 1 of 
Act 39 of 1995 on the Sale of State-Owned Venture Capital (hereinafter: AP). 
Nevertheless, we need to further narrow the legal concept of privatisation. 
Hungarian law pertaining to privatisation (from the outset, but as it is most 
completely incorporated under Act 39 of 1995, i.e., under AP) renders the 
concept of privatisation by circumscribing it as the sale of shares exclusively in 
state-owned associations (stocks, business shares in limited liability companies) 
to private proprietors via privatisation agreements. Other forms of the cessation 
of state-owned property, e.g., the alienation of real estates or art treasures 
under deeds of sale and selling off via liquidation procedures, etc. (so-called 
hidden or intangible privatisation)2 did not fall under the effect of AP. Scilicet, 
AP endeavoured to regulate exclusively the sale of business shares in state-
owned companies, that is, enterprises functioning in the form of joint-stock or 
limited liability companies. These were defined as the so-called venture capital 
of the state, which could or needed to be sold by the state pursuant to AP. 
Namely, this property could persist only provisionally as state property, since 
it needed to be privatised with the exception of the narrow scope of public 
utility companies, which were designed to persist as long-term state property 
:
 See, e.g., Szanyi, M.: Csőd, felszámolás, végelszámolás mint a privatizáció útja 
(Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Full Settlement As Ways of Privatisation). Budapest, 1998. 
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and to be transferred to the scope of government property after the completion 
of the process of privatisation. ' Further narrowing of the scope of privatisation 
consisted in the stipulation under AP that the transfer of assets free of charge 
shall not qualify as privatisation, either, but that could be effected only 
exceptionally pursuant to a statute. Privatisation shall be effected on grounds 
of a mixed and non-typical sales agreement concluded in compliance with the 
Sale of Goods Act, therefore, the conceptual element of privatisation agree-
ments is countervalue. Privatisation shall be generally implemented at real 
value in return for cash (therefore, Hungarian privatisation qualified as market 
privatisation as opposed to privatisation by coupons implemented in the 
great majority of former socialist states). However, concessional privatisation 
techniques, furthermore, services in kind instead of cash as equivalent (e.g., 
discharge via environmental protection) were alike admissible.4 
2. It is a frequent phrase that the underlying dynamics of privatisation in 
Hungary consisted in the intention of the increase of the income of the central 
budget and in the claim of company management to retain their positions and 
acquire property. This assumption, according to my opinion, reflects merely 
the surface. Namely, as opposed to that in Western-European countr ies , 
privatisation in Hungary and generally in the former socialist states equalled a 
privatisation entailed by political transformation in two senses of the term, 
since it both transformed the proprietary structure and it constituted the sine 
qua non of the functioning of civil states founded on the rule of law and of 
bourgeois market economies. 
1
 The distinction of the venture, i.e., business capital of the state from government 
property to be sold according to more rigorous sales rules did not ensue before 2008. See: 
Bencze, I.: A kincstári vagyon a jog tükrében. Számadás a talentumról (Government 
Property As Reflected by Law. An Account on Talents). Budapest, 1998. 28-30. 
4
 We can refer to e.g., property notes, then the issuance of employees' shares, the purchase 
of concessional shares by small investors, furthermore, the Existential-Credit Programme 
and the Employees Share Scheme (MRP). On the conceptual basis of concessional shares, 
see, Diczházi, В.: A népi részvényszocializmus vázlata (A Sketch of People's Share-
Socialism). Figyelő, 1988. 45, and Lukács, J.: A gazdaság demokratizálásának útja. A mun-
kavállalók részvénytulajdonlásáról a magyar gazdaságban (The Process of the Démocrati-
sation of Economy. On the Ownership of Shares by Employees in Hungarian Economy). 
Budapest, 1990. See further, Gidai, A.: Kedvezményes privatizációs technikák (Concessional 
Privatisation Techniques). Budapest, 1998. 
146 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
Thence, without the privatisation of the major part of state property 
a) the Hungarian state founded on the rule of law could not have evolved, 
since that would have been hindered by the persisting dual-nature of the 
state, the unity of the proprietary and executive powers inherited from 
socialism. Scilicet, what public authorities by reason of the democracy 
based on the multi-party system and the doctrine of the division of powers 
cannot implement, could have been enforced by the state as a proprietor via 
its power of discretion deriving from its right of ownership. It was the 
dissolution of the unity of the powers of the state as an executive authority and 
a proprietor that was essential and in this sense, it was equally indifferent 
what the scale of the revenues of the state deriving from privatisation was, 
or, what kind of background and professions the private persons acceding 
to power had had. 
b) Hungarian market economy based on competition could not have evolved, 
since the monolithic unity of state property, the overwhelming superior 
economic power of the state would have precluded the evolution and 
consolidation of real market processes, blocked free market competition, 
thereby, the state would have gained the upperhand of the private enter-
prises of its citizens in the market. 
Western-European privatisation in those states, where significant nationali-
sation had indeed ensued, that is, in Austria, Italy, France and England, was 
system-immanent privatisation, since state property anacronistic in the system 
of private property was reprivatised. These Western states could afford gradual 
privatisation under auspicious economic conditions, furthermore, a relatively 
meagre scale of property was concerned, for instance, 17 p.c. of the national 
property in case of Austria, which disposed of the highest extent of state property. 
Besides, privatisation per se could take place with application of the methods 
of the Stock Exchange, since state ownership concerned not the company, but 
the stock, therefore , neither company reorganisation, nor asset assessment or 
the elaboration of special privatisation law was necessary. Whereas, in Hungary, 
the overwhelming majority of national property needed to be privatised the 
sooner the bet ter with the initial absence of the methods of the Stock 
Exchange.5 En passant, by reason of our compliance with the Soviet model of 
5
 See, Korányi, T. G.: Privatizáció a tőzsdén keresztül (Privatisation via the Stock 
Exchange). Budapest, 2000. 
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nationalisation, state-owned companies6 had had to be artificially reorganised 
into business associations and only subsequently could they be privatised. 
With some exceptions, in former socialist states de jure privatisation, that is, 
the adoption of the associational structure, and social-economic privatisation, 
that is, the transfer of the shares of associations into private property were 
separated, furthermore, privatisation could not be effected via the available 
general instruments of the legal system, but a distinct and provisional area 
of law had to be elaborated and a distinct system of institutions was also 
incorporated into the state establishment for the purpose of the enforcement 
of privatisation entailed by the political transformation. Necessarily, privati-
sation took place in two stages and in the absence of a consolidated system of 
market relations, therefore, the available methods of property assessment were 
anomalous. According to my view, however, privatisation in Central-Eastern-
Europe was autotelic from a taxonomic point of view: for the purposes of the 
evolution of the civil state founded on the rule of law and of bourgeois market 
economy, privatisation was an "imperative", even if it was deemed detrimental 
f rom the point of view of short- or long-term economic policy.7 
We need to specify some relevant counter-arguments against privatisation. 
Privatisation should not be effected in a situation of economic crisis (the 
dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the loss of the 
Soviet market, a situation in which the bankruptcy of the central budget is 
anticipated, etc.). That is valid. Privatisation in Hungary did not dispose of a 
social-economic strategy, and as a matter of fact, we did not know what the 
object of and the value of the object of privatisation exactly was. That is valid. 
However, nor did other former socialist countries dispose of such a strategy, 
including the former GDR. Privatisation was launched without adequate 
6
 Two exceptions: The companies of the former GDR were transformed into joint-
stock companies and limited liability companies under the so-called Mantellgesetz of 1990, 
which prescribed them uniform capital stock and nominal capital. (See, Krüger, H. Н , -
Kühnel, M.-Thomas, S. (eds.): Transformationsprobleme in Ostdeutschland (Problems of 
the Transformation in East Germany). Opladen, 1990. Whereas, in the successor states of 
the former Yugoslavia, by reason of the system of corporate governance by employees, a 
three-graded reorganisational process was applied: social governance-state property-legal 
privatisation-economic privatisation. See, e.g., Büschenfeld, H.: Privatisierung, 'gesell-
schaftlichen Eigentums' in der Nachfolgerstaaten Jugoslawien (Privatisation and National 
Property in the Successor States of Former Yugoslavia). Osteuropa, 35 (1995) No. 3. 
7
 E.g., it is presumably reasonable that Béla Csikós Nagy describes several aspects of 
the privatisation entailed by the political transformation as detrimental from the point of 
view of economic policy. A XX. század magyar gazdaságpolitikája (Economic Policy in 
Hungary in the 20th Century). Budapest, 1996. 241-280. 
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economic, technical and personnel prerequisites, wherefore, an array of cases 
of abuse could occur in its process. That is also valid, but that was the smaller 
evil, since this way the economic change of regime sooner ensued in Hungary 
than in any other former socialist state with the exception of the former GDR, 
furthermore, we could also escape the road of state-capitalism, which emerged 
in the majority of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. En passant, 
privatisation in Hungary was by far more regulated than in the neighbouring 
states, and according to estimates, the scale of abuses was also much lower: we 
did not make it from planned economy back to clans.8 We may also argue that 
privatisation ought not to have been implemented as a dumping sale, since 
thereby, privatisation was marked by the features of a sellout and national 
assets were considerably devaluated. That is a matter of course, but we did 
not have an alternative and by way of the early launched privatisation, we 
markedly and initially left our former socialist rivals behind in the area of the 
import of capital.9 The early launch facilitated that massive privatisation in 
Hungary would be completed by 1996-1997, consequently, Hungarian economy 
became euro-conform, since the absolute predominance of private property 
was reified. "So f t " state property had been transformed into "hard" private 
property and the crucial process of the denationalisation of economy was 
completed.10 
8
 See, Stark, D.: Privatizáció Magyarországon. A tervtől a piachoz vagy a tervtől a 
klánig? (Privatisation in Hungary. From Planned Economy to Market Economy, or, from 
Planned Economy Back to Clans). Közgazdasági Szemle, 38 (1991) No. 9. It was primarily 
Mihály Tóth, who demonstrated that the majority of economic crime following the political 
transformation was committed via having recourse to state aid, which, as to its signi-
ficance, is followed by bankruptcy crime, whereas, explicit privatisational crime occurred 
relatively rarely. Nevertheless, public opinion takes an opposing viewpoint. Otherwise, 
simultaneously with drafting the Act on Business Associations, specific facts of the cases 
of economic crime were adopted in the Penal Code. See, Tóth, M: Piacgazdaság és a 
büntetőjog (Market Economy and Penal Law). Magyar Jog, 42 (1995) 641-646. 
4
 See, Diczházi, В.: A külföldi tőke szerepe a privatizációban (The Role of Foreign 
Capital in Privatisation). Budapest, 1997. Diczházi assesses this role basically in an 
affirmative manner, albeit, he naturally mentions the "colonising" investment of foreign 
capital with the exclusive objective of "market acquisition". Nonetheless, without foreign 
capital, our major companies would have gone bankrupt, which would have incurred an 
enormous scale of unemployment. In Hungary, restructuring the economy and moderni-
sation of the structure of products were based on foreign capital. Obviously, adverse and 
negative tendencies also manifested themselves, such as the emergence of the so-called 
hawk-capital, etc. 
10
 See, Karsai, G.: "Nem tudták, de tették" ("They Were not Aware of What They were 
Doing"), and Bager, G.: A magyar privatizáció a pénzügyi ellenőrzés szempontjából 
POST-SOCIALIST "PRIMITIVE A C C U M U L A T I O N OF C A P I T A L " AND T H E LAW 149 
We distributed and plundered public property, the heritage of workers and 
employees, some people would repeatedly assert. But that is glaring blunder. 
The Hungarian state had by no means possessed a venture capital of such an 
extent as that which was finally privatised. Unlawful state property, i.e., the 
confiscated fortunes of Duke Esterházy and Uncle Schwartz were privatised, 
the value of which must have rather diminished than increased during the 
system of planned economy. Namely, a considerable part of state assets at the 
end of the 1980s was non-working capital. En passant, national property has 
not disappeared, it transformed: state property transformed into private property. 
In my view, the assets of Peter Kovacs ' limited liability company also belong 
to the property of the nation, just as those of the former State Construction 
Company no. 43 did. The overwhelming majority of the assets deriving from 
foreign investment (with the exception of the dividend) also constitutes a part 
of the property of the nation, since foreign owners cannot transfer the hotel or 
the factory abroad, furthermore, they mostly employ Hungarian citizens, etc. 
As to its social aspects, the process of privatisation was apparently not 
"mirthful". Scilicet, the task seemed almost unfeasible, or, as the statement 
made by the Polish Lewandowski that became an adage assessed: unpossessed 
assets of unknown origin needed to be sold out to buyers, who were out of funds 
and who, by the way, did not want to purchase the stocks of losing state 
companies. State property needed to be erased at a time, when the supply was 
many times higher than the demand. Obviously, it was managed in a para-
mountly contradictory modus operandi, even if we disregard errors deriving 
from non-preparedness and ignorance." According to my estimates, privatisa-
(Privatisation in Hungary from the Viewpoint of Financial Control). Both studies were 
published in the volume: Állami vagyon - privatizáció - gazdasági rendszerváltás (State 
Property-Privatisation-Economic Change of Regime). Budapest, 2005. 4 7 - 5 0 and 75-79. 
For a summary, see. Kovács, A.-Bager, G.: Privatizáció Magyarországon (Privatisation in 
Hungary). 1-2, Budapest, 2004. Various economic assessments stated that the venture 
capital of the state in 1990 amounted to 2.400-2,500 million HUF, whereas, the number of 
the respective companies was 2000. Of course, no precise assessment of the assets was 
made. According to Ádám Török, the advance of Hungary in re transformation achieved at 
the beginning of the 1990s "could be attributed to more speedily implemented economic 
and legal reorganisation, to privatisation based on market relations that by large 
relinquished distribution techniques, to its favourable judgement in terms of international 
politics and to its auspicious geographical position." Gazdaság Kelet-Közép-Európában 
1990-2006 (Economy in Central-Eastern-Europe between 1990-2006). História, 29 
(2007) No. 4. 
11
 See further, Voszka, É.: A privatizáció tizenöt éve és jövője (One and a Half 
Decades and the Future of Privatisation), and Az Állami vagyon - privatizáció - gazdasági 
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tion in Hungary approached the opt imum attainable under the prevailing 
conditions up to a rate of three quarters, nevertheless, it must have offended 
the sense of justice of the society, since those who were in advantageous 
positions came off well. What must be recorded as the greatest achievement is 
that institutional privatisation could be completed so that we took second place 
subsequently to the Germans, thereby, we were past privatisation entailed by 
the political transformation.12 Following 1998, the issues under consideration 
related to privatisation in Hungary were already "bourgeois" issues, scilicet, 
we faced the following alternative: we either sustain a relatively powerful 
public sector with the decisive predominance of private property, like Austria 
and France, where besides public utility companies, the so-called strategic 
companies and associations that generate profit for the state coexist, or, we opt 
for the liberal way, which is characteristic of Scandinavia and the Benelux 
states, where merely the literally public utility companies are state-owned. In 
my view, the decision between the two approaches is dependant on the per-
formance of the state: if we are able to positively regulate, supervise and enforce 
compliance with the rules, conclude privatisation agreements safeguarded by 
adequate guarantees and de facto enforce these guarantees, then state property 
can be minimised, indeed. If, however, the regulation has loopholes, the 
agreements contain defaults and public administration can be corrupted, we 
will be better off with a more extensive state sector. This, however, is an issue 
of the actual economic policy, not of the change of regime.13 
rendszer\'áltás (State Property-Privatisation-Economic Change of Regime). Budapest, 
2005, 36-37. 
12
 János Kornai qualified privatisation too accelerated as early as in 1989 and 
challenged its undervalued implementation. See. Kornai, J.: Indulatos röpirat a gazdasági 
átmenet ügyében (A Vehement Pamphlet in the Matter of Economic Transition). Budapest, 
1989. He upheld his viewpoint in his volume of studies: Szocializmus, kapitalizmus, 
demokrácia és rendszerváltás (Socialism, Capitalism, Democracy and the Change of 
Regime). He advised against "shock-therapy via privatisation" and deemed the rate of 
transformation to be out of measure (77-78). As for my view, I don't share his opinion: I 
contend that privatisation needed to be accomplished and stable property relations needed 
to be established the sooner the better, which, as a matter of course, entailed economic and 
social sacrifices. 
13
 Foreign special literature generally considered privatisation in Hungary to be highly 
successful, whereas, in Hungary, it rather met criticism. Certainly, privatisation that meets 
general satisfaction is impossible, undoubtedly, there have been erroneous dicisions, e.g., 
the process of privatisation lacked environmental audit for a long time and aspects of 
competition policy were also disregarded. Nonetheless, privatisation averted massive 
unemployment and the great majority of privatised companies proved to be operative in the 
long-run. 
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3. The denationalisation of Hungarian economy with respect to the proprietary 
structure substituted for the primitive accumulation of capital, which had 
undergone in Western-Europe a couple of centuries before. A great proportion 
of the private companies of Hungarian new-capitalism needed to or iginate in 
state property, since otherwise they could not have been established. Privati-
sation was substantiated by Hungarian business law drafted parallelly, which 
guaranteed an operative legal f ramework for the termination of the dominance 
of state property and for the formation and consolidation of market economy 
based on competition and private property. The criticisms that the statutes 
pertaining to privatisation were not faultless and that the application of the 
pertinent law was severely inconsistent are well-founded, but on the one hand, 
this could not be otherwise, since we were not following a beaten track, on the 
other hand, these faults remained within tolerable limits in comparison with 
other former socialist states. The faults were inevitable, since we were dealing 
with unfamiliar legal techniques, improvisation was necessary, and generally, 
legal regulation was formulated without the necessary economic bases, in 
defiance of significant political resistance and social-economic tensions. In this 
status quo, according to my view, the primary factor was that institutional 
privatisation was relatively rapidly implemented within the available legal 
framework. With reference to the title of a famous Italian film: privatisation has 
been accomplished, i t 's time to forget about it. 
The most severe criticism vis-a-vis law-making pertaining to privatisation 
(mainly in re the phase encompassing 1988-1990) was that it substantiated "the 
salvage of power by communists", thereby, it thwarted a substantive political 
transformation. We will dwell upon that circumstantially later. Now we restrict 
ourselves to noting that interim sociological research conducted primarily by 
Tamás Kolosi and Erzsébet Szalai have elucidated that the top-level party-
leadership of the Kádár-regime and the party-workers hardly acquired any 
property via privatisation." However, it was principally the (40-50-year-old) 
younger technocracy of the twilight of the Kádár-era, crucially the high- and 
middle-level management of companies and the economic leadership of the 
state apparatus that did acquire property. They, while cooperating with foreign 
capital and relying on the actors of Hungarian small-scale industry, of private 
trade and on small ventures, could become capitalists or retain their positions 
in the management as well as accede to further management positions. 
Disregarding some leading figures of the Alliance of Young Communis ts , 
we could hardly mention explicit party-workers among Hungarian major 
14
 See, Szalai, E.: Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban 
(Economic Elite and Society in the New-Capitalism of Hungary). Budapest, 2001. 37-41. 
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entrepreneurs and top managers. Of couse, the stratum of these technocrats and 
managers belonged to the nomenclature of the Kádár-regime, so far as they 
were accidentally also party-members, or, if they were independent, filling 
their positions was dependant on the consent of the respective party-organ. 
Nevertheless, this is valid with respect to the great majority of the so-called 
bourgeois political elite of the era following 1990, as well. In case of a 
peaceful transition and an evolutionary change of regime, which marked the 
Hungarian transformation, it was almost inevitable that the stratum of younger 
technocrats and managers, which was acknowledged by the West, spoke foreign 
languages and was familiar with the sciences of Western business management 
and organisation, could the most exploit the potentials of privatisation. The 
respective individuals can be only vaguely considered post-communists by reason 
of the recollection of their past, they are de facto new-capitalists or new capitalist 
managers. As to my view, "the real winners" of privatisation in Hungary were 
firstly, the foreign capital, especially major multi-national companies, secondly, 
former Hungarian company-management and the technocrat bureaucracy 
consisting of the economic leaders of the socialist state, thirdly, small-scale 
entrepreneurs possessing some capital (small-scale industry, retailers, workteam 
associations, complementary workshops of agricultural cooperatives), however, 
by no means the party-bureaucracy of the Kádár-regime. Which, I assume, in 
case of an evolutionary (and non-revolutionary) change of regime, was a nearly 
logical consequence of the Kádár-era in re its so-called goulash communism 
and soft dictatorship. 
Could the transition have taken another t rack? Perhaps, we could have 
allocated company assets, stocks among people, which would have resulted in 
people ' s stock-socialism instead of capitalism. People arguing for that are not 
aware of the basic realities of international politics, world-economy or of 
Hungary.18 What we need to add on the basis of the research of György Matolcsy 
and Péter Mihályi1 6 is that contrary to fal lacies, the redistribution of state 
property was not principally implemented via privatisation and the application 
of the law concerning privatisation, but implicitly, via long-standing high 
15
 Sándor Kopátsy "contends" that state property should have been allocated among 
people. See, A magyar privatizáció stratégiája (The Strategy of Privatisation in Hungary). 
Central European Time, 1998. No. 6 - 7 . 45-53. Cf., A comprehensive essay on the 
potentials of "democratic privatisation": Mocsáry, J.: A dolgozói tulajdon Magyarországon. 
Múlt, jelen, jövő. A munkavállalói résztulajdon problémája (The Property of Employees in 
Hungary-Past, Present and Future-The Problem of the Employees' Share), Budapest, 
1998. 
16
 See, Matolcsy, Gy.: Emlékeim a privatizációról (My Recollections of Privatisation). 
Central European Time, 1998. No. 6 - 7 . 7-8. , and Mihályi: op. cit. 125-130. 
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inflation, import-liberalisation, exchange-rate policies, bankruptcy waves, etc. 
Privatisation f rom the outset, undoubtedly also as an aftermath of the communi-
cation of the media, had become "the black sheep" of the change of regime, the 
scapegoat originating in the unfair and unethical enrichment of some, which 
appalled masses of people. W e cannot assume that without privatisation we 
would have realised a form of capitalism that lacked rich people and capitalists. 
Observing the political conflicts that have increasingly unravelled fol low-
ing the mid- '90s and that the outraging passions related to the change of regime 
have not abated, but have led to scenes of civil war in Hungary, many basically 
contend that some strata of the society realised as late as the end of the 1990s 
that the broadly construed privatisation, which substituted the primitive 
accumulation of capital, had been accomplished and the new bourgeoisie had 
emerged, therefore, the structure of the social elite could be exclusively modified 
by the seizure of the acquired property of "winners". In Spain and Portugal, the 
change of regime, which fol lowed a fascist establishment structure, did not 
take the character of property acquisition, whereas, in fo rmer socialist states 
it did. Subsequently, "the losers" of the change of regime can merely acquire 
property by taking it away f rom "the winners". The consequentially emerging 
political slogan has been that we demand a new, real change of regime and 
need to square accounts finally with the post-communist elite that had salvaged 
its power. For some, redistribution would imply a dream come true, however, 
a change of regime in the property structure cannot be implemented and "bad 
capitalists" cannot be replaced for "good capitalists" within the system of 
capitalism every 20 years.17 Such a replacement can at most be effected by the 
market via its intangible instruments. 
4. Privatisation in Hungary commenced essentially spontaneously, since we 
were not swept into privatisation by a central decision of the state, but by tax-
remitting and organisational restructuring transactions of the managers of 
major companies and by the improvisational utilisation of the power-vacuums 
that gave way after such transactions. Namely, the idea of privatisation had not 
even emerged during the draf t ing of Act 6 of 1988 on Business Associations 
(hereinafter: ABA). 
The so-called spontaneous privatisation was received by inconceivably 
relentless criticism in Hungarian social science literature. According to Rudolf 
Tőkés, during the sett lement of political problems, the communist elite 
transformed state-owned companies into management-owned ones and by 
17
 See also, Kulcsár, К.: Az új politikai rendszer és a magyar valóság (The New 
Political System and Hungarian Reality). Budapest, 2006. 27. 
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exploiting defects in law, the inner circle of the managing elite fraudulently 
peculated via unfair profits the joint ventures established with the participation 
of Western investors. Concurrent business law facilitated the self-privatisation 
of state property, therefore, "artful vigilants" with appropriate relations could 
become billionaires.18 As Sándor Kopátsy formulates: "The policy, as a con-
sequence of which state property was consigned primarily to foreign ownership, 
so that at the same time an incredibly large domestic state-debt was generated 
and some have made revolting fortunes, while two-thirds of the population 
today live at a substantially lower standard and more hopelessly than they did 
in the final decade of the failed socialist regime, is to be considered a crime 
against the Hungarian society."14 According to Tamás Fricz, the elite of the 
former party-state and the members of its nomenclature enjoyed the benefits of 
spontaneous privatisation and therefore, "...the transition to market, or, if you 
please, capitalist relations had been implemented by the political and economic 
elite of the Kádár-regime in Hungary, wherefore, the economic leaders of state 
socialism became the managers of capitalist private property."2 0 
At the same time, as Éva Voszka claims, in our days it is unequivocal that 
facts contradict "the frustrated political charge that the nomenclature has 
salvaged i tself ' .2 1 Furthermore, Péter Mihályi expressly states that spontaneous 
privatisation is "the most deceptive term" for the description of privatisation in 
Hungary.22 Its principal purpose is the pursuit of a publicity campaign against 
non-fellow post-communists, the grudging lament of those left without fortune, 
which goes under the slogan: "my state property is just being misappropriated 
by others, unfortunately, not by me". However , as Árpád Kovács clearly 
demonstrated on the basis of the examinations of the State Audit Office, the 
decisive majori ty of the transactions related to privatisation in 1989-1990 had 
been lawful.23 
Nevertheless, we should observe the facts. Act 28 of 1987 permitted that 
expressly domestic legal entities, that is, state-owned companies established 
joint-stock companies or limited liability companies pursuant to the Commercial 
Code of 1875, whereas, the Ministry of Finance guaranteed quite significant 
18
 See, Tőkés, R.: A kialkudott forradalom (The Haggled Revolution). Budapest, 1998. 
345-384. 
19
 See, Kopátsy: A magyar privatizáció stratégiája, op. cit. 47. 
20
 See, Fricz, T.: Az árok két oldalán (On Opposite Sides of the Ditch). Budapest, 2006. 68. 
21
 See, Voszka, É.: Spontán privatizáció Magyarországon (Spontaneous Privatisation 
in Hungary). Budapest, 1998. 137. 
22
 Cf., Mihályi: op. cit. 98. 
23
 Cf., Kovács, Á.: Számvetés a számvetésről (An Account on Accounts). Kurtán, S . -
Sándor, P-Vass, L. (ed.): Magyarország évtizedkönyve. Budapest, 1998. 197. 
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profit tax-allowances for new commercial associations for three years under 
new taxation law. At the initiation of the management of Medicor and Ganz 
Danubius companies, the management of major companies launched the 
transformation of the factory units of the companies into associations and of 
these corporate centres into holdings for asset administration. Thereby, they 
did not intend to privatise these companies, but endeavoured partly to gain tax-
allowances in the interest of their liquidity and partly to modernise the internal 
organisational and operational mechanisms of the companies according to 
Western models. Therefore, this "internal reorganisation into associations" had 
ensued before the adoption of ABA (and since the Commercial Code of 1875 
stipulated more liberal rules than the future ABA, the management of major 
companies had positively endeavoured to take action before ABA took effect 
on 1st January, 1989 as the data of the Registry Court clearly demonstrate!). 
Besides, these transactions implied at most de jure privatisation, scilicet, they 
can be merely described as "pseudo-privatisation" as Mária Móra formulated 
as early as in 1991.24 
Before the spring of 1989, the management of major companies had 
essentially intended to rationalise, not to privatise, since financial regulations 
expressly motivated them to proceed so. Therefore, the transactions of 1987-
1988 can at most be assessed as the non-conscious preparation of privatisation, 
in substance, however, these had been financial-organisational routine opera-
tions.28 During the spring of 1989, when it could be anticipated that the political 
transformation was well within reach, the management of major companies 
united in the Hungarian Economic Chamber elaborated the conception of 
privatisation, the purpose of which consisted in the subjection of the established 
associations to "partial" privatisation. The scope of this partial privatisation 
encompassed: a) so much as possible, the involvement of foreign and professional 
minority investors, which could potentially effect capital increase, and thereby, 
the acquisition of surplus capital, b) clearance of the debts of the respective 
companies via the transfer of debts to the state in return for shares and via the 
conversion of bank liabilities to stocks, с) the nomination of the management 
of companies (and to a smaller extent of employees via employee stocks) to 
joint proprietors, d) the conveyance of "left-over" stocks to partner companies, 
24
 Cf.. Móra, M.: Az állami vállalatok (ál)privatizációja [The (Pseudo-)Privatisation of 
State-Owned Companies]. Közgazdasági Szende, 38 (1991) No. 6. 
25
 Cf., Mihályi, P.: A gazdaság államtalanítása 1988-1998 (The Denationalisation of 
Economy between 1988-1998). In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (ed.): Magyarország évtized-
könyve, op. cit. 164. 
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so that companies and banks assisted one another by cross shares in the 
implementation of privatisation. 
In essence, this conception drew on the system of the self-governance of 
companies introduced in the state sector in 1984. A contributor to the elabora-
tion of the conception, Ádám Angyal explicitly contended that in 1990, the 
state property in companies was at most 20 p.c, which was equivalent to the 
starting capital that the state allocated to companies upon the introduction of 
corporate governance. The so-called self-governing companies managed by 
boards of directors were de facto no longer state companies and the companies 
themselves needed to decide voluntarily on their transformation into associa-
tions and on privatisation. If privatisation did ensue, managers and employees 
were due proprietors' shares. The state could also privatise companies under 
so-called state-management, in which state property equalled at least 20 p.c., 
whereas, it could merely exercise supervision over the privatisation of self-
governing state companies via public authority instruments and could receive 
cca. 20 p.c. of the revenues deriving from privatisation. If we view this 
conception objectively, it by no means implied spontaneous privatisation within 
the scope of self-governing-self-managing state companies, but voluntary 
and decentralised privatisation based on the decision of the company 
reached in the spirit of corporate autonomy pursuant to State Company Act 
(Act 6 of 1977 as amended in 1984). 
Concurrently with the elaboration of this conception in 1989, the resourceful 
researchers of the Financial Research Share Company, mainly under the 
leadership of György Matolcsy, launched the so-called privatisation of non-
capital contribution and various company evacuation and redoubling trans-
actions.26 In many cases, these did not mean privatisation and promoted the 
foreclosure of the law pertaining to the privatisation of small businesses, 
nevertheless, by reason of the absurdities of capital assessment, they necessarily 
involved the possibility of abuse. Therefore, law-making needed to partly 
guarantee the state control over acts of partial privatisation (e.g., sales of real 
estates), partly draft the regulation of the reorganisation of state-owned 
companies into associations. 
The conception of the management of major companies was by that time 
opposed by the aligning ideologists of central economic management, such as 
The Office of Economic Planning, the financial portfolio, the central issueing 
bank and by reputed reform economists-in a peculiar manner, all of them-rew 
26
 György Matolcsy argued for voluntary company privatisation in several articles in 
1989-90. Cf., e.g., Matolcsy, Gy.: A spontán tulajdonreform védelmében (In Defence of 
Spontaneous Property Reform). Külgazdaság, 35 (1990) No. 3. 
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on the (Stalinist) political doctrine of the unified and indivisible state property. 
Actually, real f inancial reasons accounted for the intervention: the privatisated 
equivalent could not remain in the property of companies by reason of 
impending insolvency. Therefore, the self-privatisation of companies needed 
to be prevented. Nonetheless, as it was manifest in former documents of the 
Financial Research Institute, they had no actual conceptions either concerning 
the required manner of the reorganisation of state-owned companies into 
associations, or concerning the structure of state ownership to be established.27 
Besides, state-controlled privatisation, as the pertinent law of 1992 demon-
strates, could have been launched exclusively via the dissolution of corporate 
governance and management. However, the express declaration of this was 
shunned both by government commissioners entrusted with the task (István 
Tömpe and János Martonyi) and by their theoretical supporters (László Antal 
on the part of the Secretariat of Economic Policy of the Council of Ministers), 
György Surányi (under-secretary of state at the National Planning Office) and 
Lajos Bokros (Hungarian National Bank). Their disposition was prudent, since 
corporate governance had considerable social support."8 
In this situation, the leadership of the Ministry of Justice with the support of 
the concurrent Prime Minister, Miklós Németh decided that while maintaining 
the prevailing corporate governance and management, it would amend the 
State Company Act, so that the voluntary privatisation of state-owned companies 
dependant on the decision of the company would be permitted under increased 
state control within the purview of a unified, market-oriented Act on Reorgani-
sation. Thereby, law-making resigned the coercive transformation of companies 
(as Kálmán Kulcsár in his ministerial s tatement emphatically asserted: the 
pertinent law concerns reorganisation, not transformation), therefore, the 
decision on reorganisation at companies under state control was to be made by 
central organs of state administration, whereas, at self-governing and self-
managing companies, the decision on reorganisation lay with corporate organs. 
The respective statute also established a legal technique of t ransformation, 
which did not necessitate two-graded privatisation, since reorganisation could 
27
 Cf., Lengyel, L. (ed.): A tulajdon reformja (Property Reform). Pénzügykutató Rt., 
Budapest, 1988. Csillag, I. (ed.): A társasági törvény, a tulajdonreform és az átalakulás 
kérdései (The Act on Business Associations, Property Reform and Issues of the Trans-
formation). Budapest, 1988. 
2S
 We must note that the conception of corporate management started to gain ground in 
the Soviet Union at that time. See, Pethö, R.: Törvény a Szovjetunióban a dolgozói kol-
lektívákról (Law Pertaining to Employees' Collectives in the Soviet Union). Magyar Jog, 
34 (1987) No. 1. This also provided political support to the backers of corporate autonomy. 
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simultaneously constitute a process of privatisation. Therefore, the Act on 
Reorganisation was based on the maintenance of the former status quo. 
Furthermore, Act 13 of 1989 on Reorganisation (hereinafter: AR) established 
complicated distribution rules and intended to grant a share to each party. 
These rules were designed to be experimental by the law-maker (it prescribed a 
revision after two years), furthermore, it made the majori ty of rules optional, 
namely, it was facilitated that the state holding organ and the company agreed 
on different rules within a specific term. The modus vivendi is well-demonstrated 
by the regulations below: 
- the prerequisite of reorganisation was capital increase (outsider investors 
needed to increase the value of company assets at least by 20 p.c. or by 
100 million HUF, therefore, the involvement of outsider investors was 
required, so that pseudo-privatisation could be precluded), 
- 20 p.c. of the company assets calculated on the basis of the balance 
sheet belonged to the state (the state holding organisation), 
- so that the financial basis of local governments to be formed could be 
secured, on grounds of the location of the estate, the respective local 
council (following 1990, the local government) was due an associational 
share equivalent to the value of the inner settlement estates as listed in 
the company balance sheet (obviously, the full value was to be considered 
and not the value decreased by company liabilities, as the State Property 
Agency endeavoured to interpret it later in the interest of the increase of 
central state revenues), 
- the issuance of employees ' stocks for employees was obligatory at a 
value of up to 10 p.c. of the capital stock of the association, 
- the rest of the assets could be sold to outsider investors, so that 80 p.c. 
of the equivalent revenues were due to the state holding organ and 20 
p.c. could be retained by the company within the scope of assets beyond 
the capital stock (the so-called privatisational equivalent quota: PEQ), 
- the association share that could not be sold could be retained by the 
association as a so-called own share.29 
I dwelt on the above more circumstantially, because these amply demonstrate 
the desperate attempt of the law-maker to temper people 's moods in the spirit 
29
 Concerning the Act on Reorganisation, see, Sárközy, T.: Egy törvény védelmében I -
II. (In Defence of an Act: Parts 1-2). Figyelő, 1989. When I generalised the conception 
unfolding in AR, I was considering such a plural proprietary structure, in which not only 
the property of business associations, but also the self-managing property and settlement 
assets have a role. See, Sárközy, T.: A tulajdonreformról a társasági törvény után (On 
Property Reform Following the Act on Business Associations). Budapest, 1989. 
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of the principle of "live and let live", so that each party received a share. 
Nevertheless, by the spring and summer of 1989, people had the impulsion to 
come to grips, all of them wished to dispose of the whole of the property. 
Although, the emphasis on the technical features of AR indignified all, AR 
was not challenged by reason of the fact that it accomplished a covert property 
reform, on the contrary, it was impugned, since it did not implement the property 
reform, which would have favoured its critics. As Kálmán Kulcsár stated in the 
introduction of the act, the starting point of AR was the prevailing status quo 
and "it did not even by an inch increase the formerly guaranteed entitlements 
of companies to dispose of property" (but it did not reduce them, either). 
The attack against AR was led by Lajos Bokros on the part of the reform 
circles of the Hungarian Socialist Workers ' Party, who, whi le undimensionally 
exaggerated the problem, described spontaneous privatisation as a dead end of 
the complete change of regime. He further dared the absurd statement that "the 
elite of corporate and economic management" (?) and "the ambitious new elite" 
reached a modus vivendi on the acquisition of public property disregarding the 
majority of society,30 albeit, as György Szoboszlai correctly stated concerning 
the so-called decentralised privatisation, basically, the batt le between the "old" 
apparatus of economic management and the "old" corporate management was 
at issue,31 in which the bourgeois opposition got involved primarily by reason 
of the elections.32 
Nevertheless, political attack was unvariably directed against AR, albeit, 
beyond estate manipulations, 95 p.c. of the cases that presumably involved 
abuse occurred via the application of the Commercial Code or ABA. The mere 
protraction of the concurrent proceedings of the Registry Court did not allow 
for considerable pre-election abuses via the implementation of AR, which took 
effect on 1st July, 1989. Furthermore, by January 1990, pursuant to Acts 7 and 
8 of 1990, the State Property Agency, a special publ ic ly financed organ 
established for the management of state property as a Hungarian Treuhand was 
3
" See, Bokros, L.: Rendszerváltás vakvágányon (The Change of Regime on Tail Track). 
In: Kurtán, S.-Sándor, P . -Vass , L. (ed.): Magyarország politikai évkönyve. Budapest, 
1990. 72-78. 
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Law during the Change of Regime), in the collection of studies: Bayer, J . -Kovch, I. 
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Budapest, 2005. 24. 
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finally founded, furthermore, state control over acts of privatisation construed 
in a broader scope effected by corporate governance and management (such as 
estate transactions, contributions in kind, etc.) was also established (obligatory 
registration, authorisation and the right of veto, etc.). Albei t , certain partial 
elements failed, such as a market-based act on accountancy for the purposes of 
the assessment of assets, we can assert that by the spring of 1990, the institu-
tional system of voluntary, decentralised and state controlled privatisation 
based on corporate decisions had been established in Hungary, which, 
according to my opinion, would have been completely operative in Hungary 
within a few years. Assumably, Hungary would have been the only Central-
Eastern-European country (in other former socialist countries, in the absence 
of corporate autonomy f rom the outset, merely centralised, state-controlled 
privatisation could be implemented), in which by reason of the institutionali-
sation of corporate governance and management in the mid-1980s, such a fo rm 
of privatisation could have been accomplished, which would have been based 
on the primacy of voluntary and decentralised privatisation in case of medium-
and smaller-scale companies. Crucial companies of strategic importance, which 
were by all means or could have been controlled by state administration, would 
have been privatised by the state, whereas, the "self-privatisation" of small-
and medium-scale companies could have been subjected to proper legality 
control by the state. 
5. This solution was not implemented, which had several political and 
economic reasons. One of these was the inordinate defamation of decentralised 
privatisation based on corporate decisions by the mass media and public 
sentiment and its substantive identification with crime, abuse and communist 
salvage of power. The other reason was that the circle of the supporters of 
bourgeois parties that had got into power could be assigned to positions in the 
economic management merely via interventions by central state administra-
tion, which was unfeasible at companies, therefore, privatisation needed to be 
centralised by the state. Actually, privatisation based on corporate decisions 
did favour company management and the employees of more profitable 
companies with greater economic power vis-a-vis other strata of society, such 
as civil servants, retired or young people. 
Such a privilege of those in advantageous positions was unacceptable for a 
considerable part of the society , disregarding the fact, that decentralised 
privatisation would have precluded reprivatisation and infr inged the interests 
of "the losers" of socialist nationalisations. (It is another issue that compen-
sation finally did not occur, nevertheless, those concerned had not known that 
at that phase.) The apparatus of the organs of economic management also 
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appreciated their transfer from positions in "normal public administration" to 
much more yielding positions created at privatisational organs. 
On the other hand, corporate governance can function as an organic part of 
democratic socialism, nevertheless, it is inevitably anacronistic in a consistent 
capitalist system. Namely, corporate governance was simply nonsense for 
Western investors (this was even more manifest in Yugoslavia and its successor 
states). This corporate structure could accommodate only those professional 
investors that had had long-standing commercial-cooperational relations with 
the companies of the socialist states, whereas, it deterred financial investors. 
Major Western banks and multinational companies (and the adjacent gigantic 
audit-counselling concerns, major law firms) intended to negotiate with the 
state itself, but not with corporate management. Apparently, by reason of the 
enormous domestic and foreign state debts, Government did not intend to share 
the privatisational equivalent with any party, not in the least degree with 
corporate management, thereby, it demanded the complete revenue deriving 
from privatisation for itself. Such a disposition of the then Government was 
strongly supported by the International Monetary Fund and the Wor ld Bank. 
At the same time, decentralised privatisation described as spontaneous 
underwent de facto in such a small scale that if communists had based their 
power on that, the successor party could have hardly won the elections in 1994. 
Therefore, the communist salvage of power based on spontaneous privatisation 
is mere fiction. Unequivocal data supplied by György Matolcsy, Eva Voszka 
and Péter Mihályi show that at most 2 p.c. of the venture capital of the state 
that could be privatised was af fec ted by a legal form of privatisation based 
on company decisions (at cca. 150 companies).3 3 Mihályi fur ther adds that 
"considering their proportions, negative examples between 1988-1990 had 
been not more numerous than between 1990-1992 or in any subsequent three 
years' period."34 
Did abuses occur? Yes, they did, however, 
a) they were not committed on grounds of AR, 
b) it was ABA that substantiated the abuses, nevertheless, if A B A had not 
been in force, the number and scale of abuses would have been even greater 
pursuant to the Commercial Code of 1875. The majority of presumed abuses 
were associated with the privatisation of contributions in kind and company 
33
 See, Matolcsy, Gy.: Lábadozásunk évei (The Years of Our Convalescence). Buda-
pest, 1991. 227-229., Voszka, E.: Spontán privatizáció Magyarországon (Spontaneous 
Privatisation in Hungary). Budapest, 1998. 130-145., Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció 
krónikája, op. cit. 98-102. 
34
 Cf., Mihályi: A magyar privatizáció krónikája, op. cit. 100. 
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evacuation, not with general privatisation, but with those transactions affecting 
retail industry and catering trade companies concentrated in co-operatives that 
preceded Act 76 of 1990 on the Privatisation of Commercial, Service, Hotel 
and Catering Businesses [the so-called Act on Small (Pre-)Privatisation].35 
Another area of abuse was constituted by matters related to the assets of the 
Communist Party (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) and of the associated 
social organisations (such as the Alliance of Young Communists and the 
Alliance of Pioneers), which, however, were beyond the scope of legislation 
concerning privatisation by the state. (The issue of the assets of the Communist 
Party designated to be inherited by the Hungarian Socialist Party had been 
transferred to the political portfolio during the so-called Round-Table-Negotia-
tions, which had paved the way for the political transformation, therefore, it 
was not dealt with during the codification of business law.) 
As a matter of course, object ive assessments of the spontaneous (de-
centralised) privatisation were written as early as in the 1990s, as well. György 
Matolcsy, the under-secretary of state responsible for economic-policy under 
the Antall-Government formulated the followings: "Spontaneous privatisation 
belongs to the heritage of the Hungarian path. It is the logical product of self-
destruction and the result of a permissive policy in lieu of aggression. Its 
spontaneous character was rendered by the fact that it was the corporate 
management that initiated reorganisation and riddance from state property. Of 
course, this entailed the salvage of former positions, which was the specific 
way of escape. The real import of spontaneous privatisation consisted in the 
fact that it prepared real privatisation."36 According to Matolcsy, the minor 
amendments of former law effected by the Antall-Government in the summer 
of 1990 were designed to soothe the mood and temper of the new parties in 
Government: "Eventually, the amendments did not modify substantially the 
legal framework of privatisation. Although, they reinforced the state control of 
privatisation and guaranteed the state more powerfu l influence on privati-
sation, they did not rechannel former processes or obstruct former paths."37 A 
similarly objective assessment was rendered by Tibor Pongrácz, the political 
under-secretary of state of the Antall-Government (and the Chairman of the 
35
 The draft of the Act on Small (Pre-(Privatisation was ready in the autumn of 1989, 
but according to the demand of the parties in opposition, it was only adopted by 
Government presided by József Antall. In the meantime, the number of businesses to be 
privatised had decreased by several thousand, since the practical ones had taken action, 
before the act took effect. 
36
 See, Matolcsy, Lábadozásunk évei. op. cit. 27. 
37
 See, ibid. 103. 
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Board of Directors of the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company 
in 1997), albeit, he exaggerated the scale of spontaneous privatisation: "These 
statutes adopted in 1988 and 1989 . . . (ABA and A R , sic) ... did actually 
guarantee the most consequential prerequisite of bourgeois transformation, since 
they legitimised private enterprises and did not restrict foreign investment. 
Nevertheless, they did not provide for the protection of state property and no 
parallel law pertaining to the protection of assets related to privatisation was 
drafted." Pongrácz is correct, however, the time for parallel law-making was 
very limited. But we should follow the train of thought of Pongrácz: "There-
fore, the opposition assumed that the purposes of the pertinent statutes were 
the salvage of power, i.e., the conversion of political power into economic 
power. We allow that in the period of spontaneous privatisation many unethical 
and perhaps legally contestable cases occurred, therefore, we can rightly 
condemn it. Nonetheless, if we view the process in its completeness and from a 
historical perspective, we can aff i rm a great deal of it, since what already 
within the framework of the communist regime did commence were the 
establishment of private enterprises, the deconstruction of unprofi table and 
futureless state property and the irreversible conversion to real market 
economy... For the former elite that had abandoned its political and economic 
positions, such gaining ground by entrepreneurs, which ensued in many waves, 
opened up opportunities for escape and according to some experts , that 
explains why the former elite did not even consider violent intervention against 
the change of regime."38 
6. Subsequently to the free elections in the spring of 1990 and the formation 
of the centre-right Antall-Government, minor legal amendments were effected 
and for some time, the basically self-initiated decentralised privatisation of 
companies continued, although, governmental control was more powerful and 
the active involvement of the State Property Agency into privatisation also 
increased. Act 76 of 1990 on privatisation in commerce and catering trade (the 
so-called Act on Small (Pre-)Privatisation) was promulgated. For some time, 
under the changed political circumstances, the management of companies 
seemed to acknowledge the increase of the power of the State Property Agency 
and agreed on a modus vivendi with its leadership, according to which, Ferenc 
Mádl, a minister without a portfolio supervised privatisation, his deputy was 
János Martonyi (the former government commissioner of the Németh-Govern-
ment responsible for privatisation), whereas, the managing director of the State 
38
 Pongrácz, T.: Privatizáció és kárpótlás (Privatisation and Compensation). In: Magyar-
ország a XX. században (Hungary in the 20th Century), Vol. 3., Szekszárd, 1997. 678-682. 
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Property Agency was Lajos Csépi, a director of the former Price Control 
Authority. In this respect, Erzsébet Szalai notes correctly that the so-called 
Kupa-Programme actually acquiesced in decentralised privatisation.39 At the 
same time, Buyout by Corporate Management combined with the so-called 
Employees ' Share Scheme had a growing significance, the latter of which was 
politically supported by government parties, as well.4" Although, the so-called 
Government Theses titled "Property and Privatisation" written by Bertalan 
Diczházi and György Matolcsy in August, 1990 in principle objected to 
spontaneous privatisation and corporate governance, it reprehended privati-
sational "shock-therapy" and intended to provide a wide range of property for 
investors. According to the Theses , "the first wave" of privatisation would 
consist in active privatisation implemented by the State Property Agency, the 
second wave of privatisation would be launched by companies, whereas, the 
third wave would have been a peculiar take-over, when outsider investors could 
have contested the insider corporate management. Nevertheless, the latter 
alternative was not realised. Meanwhile, Act 76 of 1990 was being implemented 
and the considerable merits of the statute, disregarding all its contradictions, 
included that by cca. 1994, a lmost the entire segment of retail and catering 
trades had been transferred into private property and the majority was held by 
Hungarian individual proprietors, furthermore, the act had been implemented 
not by way of distribution, but in an open framework of market-based 
competition.41 Nevertheless, since the removal of former corporate manage-
ment had failed in the summer and autumn of 1990, a political decision was 
made in 1992 on the liquidation of corporate governance and management at 
state-owned companies, therefore, the coercive transformation of these companies 
was to be effected pursuant to Acts 53-54-55 of 1992. Furthermore, in 1992-
93, the financial empowerment of political supporters was an increasing 
endeavour, which manifested itself in Small Investment and Existential-Credit 
39
 See, Szalai, E.: Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban, 
op. cit. 79-80. Mihály Kupa as the Minister of Finance of the Antall-Government 
propagated this as a programme of economic-policy at the turn of 1990/1991. 
40
 See, Boda, D.-Neumann. L.: MRP és MBO a hazai privatizációban ("Employees' 
Share Scheme and Buyout by Corporate Management Programmes in Hungarian Privati-
sation"), Budapest, 1998. 69-81.; Karsai, J.: Management Buyout külföldön és itthon 
(Management Buyout in Hungary and Abroad). Külgazdaság, 37 (1993) No. 2.; Boda, D . -
Hovorka, J.-Neumann, L.: A munkavállalók, mint a privatizált vállalatok új tulajdonosai 
(Employees as New Proprietors of Privatised Companies). Közgazdasági Szemle, 41 (1994) 
1084-1096. 
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 See, Karsai, G.: A fogyasztási cikk kereskedelem privatizációja (Privatisation of the 
Retail of Consumer Goods), Budapest, 1993. 
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Programmes, etc. In 1992, a separate statute, Act 44 of 1992 on the Employees ' 
Share Scheme was enacted, which was based on the principles of the American 
ESOP Programme (Employees ' Stock Ownership Programme).42 
7. In 1992, three pertinent statutes were adopted, such as Act 53 of 1992 on 
the Management and Utilisation of Venture Capital to Be Retained in Long-
Term State Ownership, Act 54 of 1992 on the Sale, Utilisation and Protection 
of Provisionally State-Owned Assets and Act 55 of 1992 on the Promulgation 
of Acts 53 and 54 of 1992 and on Consequential Legal Amendments.43 
In this legal f ramework (the draft ing of which was supervised by Béla 
Bártfai), the basically new element was rendered under the act on venture 
capital to be retained in state property for a long term, within the purview of 
which, state-owned companies as institutions were dissolved via their reorgani-
sation into business associations and the persisting state-owned companies 
were also obligated to operate as business associations (the overwhelming 
majority of them as joint-stock companies and less than 10 p.c. as limited 
liability companies). Pursuant to the act, a market-conform management-system 
was applied at persisting state-owned companies, i.e., these business associations 
were subordinated to the State Holding Company (Limited by Shares). The 
State Holding Company functioned as the one-entity joint-stock company of 
Government. 
The underlying conception was the unlimited nature of the power of the 
state as a proprietor: Accordingly, state-owned companies are the objects of 
state property, therefore, they neither have rights, nor earning assets (in a 
departing manner f rom the former regulation) vis-a-vis the proprietor. These 
statutes generally refer to venture capital, never to companies, therefore, the 
guarantees of corporate governance and management and of autonomy 
established back in 1977 were eliminated. 
Neither the venture capital of the state was precisely defined, in the same 
manner, nor the scope of the companies to be retained in long-term state 
ownership were itemised, although, Article 2 of Act 53 of 1992 specified some 
42
 Concerning the Programme titled "Kisbefektetőket a tőzsdére mindenáron" ("Small 
Investors to the Stock Exchange at All Costs"), announced in 1992, see, Korányi: op. cit. 
46. On the programme of "stock purchase" free of charge by small investors (practically 
for free, via the utilisation of compensation vouchers), see, Vanicsek, M.: Elosztásos priva-
tizáció (Privatisation by Allocation). Budapest, 1998. 44-49. Concerning the Existential-
Credit Programme and subsidies for domestic smallholders, see, Gidai, A.: Kedvezményes 
privatizációs technikák (Techniques of Preferential Privatisation). Budapest, 1998. 63-66. 
43
 For commentaries on the acts, see, Sárközy, T. (ed.): Átalakulás és a privatizáció 
(Reorganisation and Privatisation). Budapest, 1994. 
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general features. On grounds of the statute, Government Decree no. 126 of 
1992 (VIII. 20.) and its Supplements itemised the respective companies, scilicet, 
a share of cca. 3 5 - 4 0 p.c. of the state-owned sector, including the so-called 
crucial companies of the state, the inner core. An endeavour of the State 
Holding Company (Limited by Shares) was to shun the limitations stipulated 
under ABA, according to the view of Jenő Czuczai , it intended to function as a 
corporation under public law {cf., the French model) , nonetheless, this collided 
with effective law, furthermore, the Constitutional Court under its Decision no. 
33/1993 (IV. 15.) AB also annulled the provisions of Act 53 that established 
44 
unnecessary exceptions. 
Law pertaining to privatisation adopted in 1992 maintained the State Property 
Agency as a central organ of privatisation. Corporate governance and manage-
ment was terminated at companies designed to be privatised, thereby, companies 
were subjected to coercive transformation into business associations. Never-
theless, privatisation was not incorporated into the process of reorganisation, 
as it had been in 1989, but reorganisation into an association ensued first, 
and only then was privatisation effected as a "sellout" by the State Property 
Agency: it sold the state-owned shares in business associations. 
Within the purview of the above-mentioned three statutes, all the companies 
falling under the effect of the Company Act of 1977 dissolved between 
1992-1995 with the exception of about 2 0 - 3 0 companies under liquidation 
or full settlement: state-owned companies were reorganised into associations. 
All this took place under state direction, and subsequently, privatisation was 
also subordinated exclusively to state decisions. The decisions on privatisation 
reached by the State Property Agency were only to a minor extent determined 
by normative conditions (neither had been Capital Policy Directives formulated 
except for one), in general, un i form solutions were applied and the absence 
of normative conditions were meant to be rectified by wide-scale competition 
procedures. Nevertheless, the further implementation of privatisation was 
basically and unvariably market-based, albeit, "preferential procedures" (such 
44
 Concerning the practice of privatisation between 1992-94, see, Czuczai, J.: A ma-
gyar privatizáció alulnézetből. Múltja, jelene, jövője (Javaslat egy új liberális gazdaság-
politikának megfelelő privatizációs jogi szervezeti-intézményei koncepcióra) [Privatisation 
in Hungary from the Bottom-View. Its Past-Present-Future (Proposal for a Legal Organi-
sational-Institutional Conception of Privatisation that Conforms to New Liberal Economic 
Policy)]. Budapest, 1994. 29-37. 
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as privatisational leasing as a new technique) were adopted at a g rowing 
extent.45 
The situation related to privatisation between 1992-1994 became both f rom 
political and economic points of view considerably strained. The reorgani-
sation of companies into business associations had established the sine qua non 
of privatisation, however, privatisation per se advanced very slowly. The 
actually valuable capital was possessed by the State Holding Company (Limited 
by Shares), the management of which (Count Pál Teleki and Szabolcs Szeke-
res), having returned from the USA, intended to operate their portfolio as a real 
monetary holding, which provoked the anger of populist radical politicians.46 
Nevertheless, populist programmes directed at "the support of little man" gave 
one after the other ground. The tasks of the implementation of massive privati-
sation, the sellout of the " inner core" (Péter Mihályi) and the conclusion of 
the process of institutional privatisation awaited the fu tu re socialist-liberal 
Government , which were substantiated by Act 39 of 1995, the so-called 
uniform act on privatisation. 
The draft of the uniform act on privatisation in line with a number of other 
drafts designed to promote the work of new Government had been formulated 
by 1993 in the Institute of Political and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences,47 and having been adjusted to the Government 
Programme, they were handed over by September, 1994 by the Codification 
Committee consisting of István Csillag, Gábor Komáromi and Tamás Sárközy 
to the Minister of Finance and to Ferenc Bartha, the respective government 
commissioner. The state administrative negotiations concerning the draft law 
and the parliamentary debate of the Bill took more than half a year by reason 
of prevailing political conflicts and the delay was also influenced by the 
replacement of Ministers of Finance, i.e., of Békési by Bokros and by the 
appointment of Tamás Suchmann to Minister of Privatisation. Eventually, the 
45
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Budapest, 1994. 
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basic structure and the basic principles of the draft law could be maintained, 
and in the spring of 1995, the uniform act on privatisation was adopted.18 
AP also created the uniform organisation for the implementation of privati-
sation, namely, in the form of a joint-stock close company, the Hungarian 
Privatisation and State Holding Company Limited by Shares was established 
(hereinafter: HPSHC). Although, unequivocal detachment from government 
property did not ensue at that time, either, A P align with the amendment of the 
Act of 1995 on the Budget considerably increased the scope of the assets to be 
privatised and simultaneously, the coersion towards privatisation. The primary 
mission of HPSHC was privatisation and its secondary task consisted in the 
administration of assets.4'' The scope of companies to be retained in long-term 
state ownership was already itemised under the act, their number decreased 
substantially. Other venture capital could merely "provisionally" fall under the 
category of state property, they were designated to be privatized "the sooner 
the better": the basic objective of AP was the acceleration of privatisation.10 
AP basically regulated market privatisation, which was to be implemented 
in return for cash, thereby, it intended to restrict preferential and "bogus" (István 
Csillag) privatisation to exceptional cases. In comparison with the law of 1992, 
AP considerably increased the constitutional guarantees of privatisation (e.g., 
via the prescription of privatisational memoranda) as well as the publicity and 
transparency of privatisation. Accordingly, the basic privatisational technique 
shall unvariably be the announcement of competitions, whereas, the method 
shall be the conclusion of an atypical deed of sale, i.e., a privatisation agree-
ment.51 
48
 See, Sárközy, T.: Küzdelem a privatizációs törvény körül (Struggles Concerning the 
Law of Privatisation). In: Kurtán, S.-Sándor. P-Vass , L. (ed.): Magyarország Politikai 
Évkönyve 1994-ről (The Political Yearbook of Hungary on 1994). Budapest, 1995. 194-
212. See further. Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció krónikája, op. cit. 199-224. For a 
detailed analysis of AP per se, see, Csillag I.-Komáromi, G.-Sárközy, T.: Kommentár az új 
privatizációs törvényhez (Commentary on the New Law Pertaining to Privatisation). 
Budapest, 1995. 
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The position of Government and HPSHC in the issue of privatisation was 
unvariably Janus-faced. That consisted in the followings: on the one hand, 
privatisation was an interest of the state, since revenues and results were 
indispensable for HPSHC, on the other hand, privatisation curtailed the power 
of the state and shortened the term of the sustainability of HPSHC. In the 
recent 17 years, the so-called privatisational jacket has undoubtedly and 
several times meant the life-belt of the budget policies of Governments. 
Nevertheless, in defiance of the above, the great majority of the state sector 
was privatised, the so-called strategic privatisation was accomplished between 
1995 and 1997. By 1998, thereby, the privatisation entailed by political trans-
formation was concluded,52 therefore, problems related to privatisation were 
for the time being removed from the basic agenda of economic policy. This 
fact was extremely appreciated in the accession process of Hungary to the EU, 
since we significantly preceded the neighbouring countries.53 
8. Pursuant to AP, which took e f fec t in June, 1995, the most eff ic ient phase 
of Hungarian privatisation in re sales ensued between the summers of 1995 
and 1996. As an irreversible process , the privatisation of the " inner core" of 
the state sector, i.e., of the so-called strategic companies took place in the 
fol lowing crucial areas: electric energy, gas and oil industry, mass media 
(radio, television), telecommunication and the bank sector. The most important 
element of this process is not the fact that a privatisational income exceeding 
450 billion HUF was produced in 1995, without which, however, the situation 
of the annual budget would have been critical and financial stabilisation could 
have hardly been achieved. What is considered more essential is that strategic 
privatisation also affecting national public utilities dispelled the political 
uncertainty prevailing in the West vis-a-vis Hungary, therefore , foreign 
investment was relaunched, the extent of which accreted to 16 billion USD by 
1997. Furthermore, the series of privatisations effected in 1995 and 1996 did 
really swung Hungarian privatisation over the impasse, therefore, by 1997, the 
Csillag, I.: Privatizációs szerződések (Privatisation Agreements). Gazdaság és Jog, 2 
(1995) No. 7. 
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expectation that institutional privatisation would be approaching its end was 
fulfilled. Private property attained a decisive majority in Hungary, thereby, the 
share of long-term state property in the entrepreneurial sector could be 
restricted by the millenium to an extent similar to that prevailing in Austria, 
Italy and France. This has also been brought forth by an increasing scale of 
privatisation effected by local governments in 1996-1997. 
According to my opinion, AP of 1995 (despite its deficiencies also criticised 
by us) had a paramount role in this internationally recognised result, which 
was also appreciated in the country report related to the accession of Hungary 
to the EU. On the basis of the norms set forth under the pertinent statutes of 
1992, which were basically focused on the processes of reorganisation, "strategic 
privatisation" would have been much more circumstantially implementable. 
According to my view, the criticisms that AP was mere skeleton law, some of 
its solutions were roughly drafted and allowed for multifarious constructions 
cannot be substantiated. Undubiously and mainly by reason of the numerous 
motions for its amendment, there were misformulated rules as well as unravelled 
provisions under the AP in the absence of practical experience, therefore, they 
required active contribution on the part of law-appliers (so-called directive 
norms). At the same time, in the majority of cases, the problems were properly 
solvable with the generally applied instruments of the interpretation of law 
assuming that the provisions were benevolently enforced. 
Of course, the privatisation of strategic major companies and banks between 
1995 and 1997 involved numerous contestable elements. Although, privatisation 
in principle ensued after several years ' preparation, its major part was low-
standard, the overpaid counsellors generally carried out quite slipshod work, 
the preparation of pertinent regulations (the amendments of acts pertaining to 
energy and gas supply and to price-formation by authorities, etc.) was also rather 
ad hoc and a number of legal objections can be made vis-a-vis the concluded 
agreements. Regrettably, issues were still unvariably over-politicised, the consid-
eration of political aspects was excessively emphatic, which resulted primarily 
f rom the composition of the management board of HPSHC. From the outset, 
the staff of HPSHC in view of its activity was over-dimensioned (it consisted 
of almost 500 employees) , its internal organisational structure was tangled 
and bureaucratic. The multiple-level system of decision-making was too 
protracted and involved lots of default possibilities. Fluctuation mainly at the 
management level of H P S H C was considerable between 1995-2005, the 
expertise of the apparatus was generally feeble, therefore , it was exposed to 
external counsellors. Thence, this apparatus was too expensive and inefficient. 
Nevertheless, this relatively feeble state apparatus of privatisation and 
poorly structured organisation did implement the progress of privatisation. 
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Succeeding the German privatisation completed by 1995, Hungary was the 
second socialist state, which, essentially within 10 years, could establish the 
proprietary structure marking the states of the EU, i.e., which is based on the 
decisive majority of private property, even if the process included ma jo r 
financial losses, contradictions, sordid social phenomena (albeit, the scale of 
these, according to my view, was substantially outstripped by those discernible 
in other former socialist states). First and foremost, we escaped the state-
capitalist path. Which, I assume, is a significant achievement in defiance of all 
well-founded criticisms. The anomalous unity of the roles of the state as public 
authority and proprietor ceased to exist in Hungary by the end of the 1990s 
owing to the completion of institutional privatisation, since the change of the 
proprietary structure of the economic regime had been accomplished, which was 
regarded as a common irreversible guarantee both of a multi-party parliamentary 
democratic system and of an economic order based on market competition. In 
this situation, on the one hand, the legal method of the conclusion of the 
former intermittent and massive privatisation needed to be elaborated, on the 
other hand, the new structural, economic and legal order of the utilisation of 
the persisting state property also needed to be legally regulated. 
Within the purview of the statutes of 1991-92, state property had been 
divided into "government" and "venture" capital, however, this distinction was 
never supported by refined principal grounds. Theoretically, government property 
can be essentially divided into two parts: on the one hand, the so-called public 
property in the strict sense of the phrase (roads, public places, rivers, lakes, 
etc., which are managed by the state with a view to the benefi t of the entire 
population of the country), on the other hand, the so-called fiscal capital of the 
state, which substantively constitutes the capital allocated to the budgetary 
organs of central state administration and local governments. The part of the 
venture capital of the state not designed to be privatised is essentially not 
constituted by "free" assets (e.g., real estates), but for the purposes of national 
economy, it is allocated to the associations, in which the state has a majori ty 
ownership, therefore, any regulation concerning these assets essentially implies 
the determination of the management system of these companies. The basic 
contradiction of the system established pursuant to Acts 53 and 54 of 1992 
(and sustained under AP of 1995) was that these statutes regulated venture 
capital to be retained in long-term state ownership, but upon the concrete 
determination of these assets (itemised under the Supplement to AP), they 
referred exclusively to companies . Therefore , upon the conclusion of institu-
tional privatisation, the capital to be retained in state proper ty permanently, 
scilicet, for a long term and stably, needed to be recircumscribed. However, 
that is an issue that basically determines the future economic policy of a 
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country, thereby, it may constitute a battleground for social democratic , 
Christian Democratic or liberal ideologies. 
9. Nevertheless, the conclusion of institutional privatisation was deferred by 
the Horn-Government to the post-election period, whereas, the Orbán-Govern-
ment in power between 1998-2002 privatised relatively little, what is more, 
renationalisation was also effected in a low scale. However, the socialist-liberal 
Governments following 2002 laid a renewed emphasis on the privatisation of 
the remains of state property that did not belong to government property. By 
2005, the law pertaining to the conclusion of institutional privatisation, the 
cessation of HPSHC and to the organisation of a state holding company 
(publicly financed institution or joint-venture company) had been drafted, never-
theless, there was a pertinent, fierce, three years ' controversy even within the 
coalition. Therefore, Act 116 of 2007 on the Conclusion of Institutional 
Privatisation And on a Single State Property Management Organisation took 
effect as late as on 1st January, 2008. Within the purview of this act, AP of 
2005 was annulled and the new organisational and operational order of the 
management of state property was determined. 
N.B., Hungarian experts had reached a consensus already at the end of the 
1990s that the scattered management of state property needed to be terminated. 
Therefore, by the early 2000s, the modern Hungarian fiscus, the Hungarian 
State Treasury had been established, which has managed the whole range of 
monetary assets of (the organs of) the Hungarian state deposited on the unified 
fiscal account. State debts are managed by the Government Debt Management 
Agency Private Company Limited by Shares. Nonetheless, the real assets of 
the state were scattered: H P S H C . the Treasury Property Directorate and the 
Ministries themselves also held state-owned real es ta tes and association 
shares. Therefore, the establishment of a single organisational and operational 
structure for the management of the real assets of the state was deemed 
reasonable. Nonetheless, a dispute emerged in re the organisational form of 
that trustee: 
a) In my view, a State Holding Organisation would have expediently 
functioned as a publicly f inanced institution, which, as a so-called Real State 
Treasury could have later united with the fiscus, 
b) According to the other standpoint, the Real State Treasury needed to be 
established as a joint-stock company for the purpose of the expedient utili-
sation of the remnants of state property. In this case, the unif ied management 
of property would not be governed by the more flexible rules pertaining to 
government property, which, however, is contestable f r o m a constitutional 
point of view. 
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Eventually, following long disputes and a veto by the Head of State, pursuant 
to Act 116 of 2007 the second standpoint was adopted and the Hungarian 
State Holding Company was established as of 1st January, 2008. This close 
company limited by shares and functioning as a one-entity business association 
of Government, is not subordinated to a Board of Directors or a Supervisory 
Board, but its management is accomplished by the State Holding Council 
consisting of seven members appointed by Government. This company limited 
by shares manages basically state property, but it is also entitled to its sale, as a 
matter of course, under safeguarding regulations. 
10. I contend that implied the final stage of the history of Hungarian privati-
sation. We may ponder, whether Hungarian privatisation was a sequence of 
successes. From institutional-taxonomic and macro-economic points of view 
and in re the final outcome, I assume the answer is by all means affirmative. 
Under extremely difficult social-economic and political conditions, the anomalous 
unity of the roles of the state as public authority and proprietor was de facto 
terminated and the proprietary structure based on the predominance of private 
property necessary for the sound functioning of modern market economy 
emerged. From a strategic point of view, subsequently to the conclusion of 
privatisation, the future Hungarian state will need to funct ion in a basically 
different manner from that it did formerly. The state as a proprietor frames a 
different economic policy f rom that of the state that establishes a regulatory 
f ramework, that can motivate and provide services. The altered task will 
necessarily and in return affect the organisational and operational mechanisms 
of the state. Thus, we must be facing a consequential r e fo rm in re s tate 
organisation and administrative modernisation. 
As to its manner of implementation, Hungarian privatisation was naturally 
not a sequence of successes, either, basically on objective grounds and f r o m 
the outset, it could not be. In such a profound economic crisis even the chance 
of optimal privatisation was precluded, assets of such a massive scale could 
not be so rapidly privatised at an adequate price. Furthermore, as a matter of 
course, object ive reasons were substantially supplemented by subjective 
flaws: unpreparedness, the absence of experience and of a long-term strategy of 
privatisation, the standard change of the "conception" concerning privatisation, 
economic and legal-technical defaults, detriments entailed by over-politici-
sation, etc. W e can also refer to the element that also had a role, namely, that 
capitalists (i.e., foreign investors) did not know socialist management (scilicet, 
they ignored socialist precedence), whereas, former socialists did not know 
capitalist management, scilicet, they could not conform to market economy. 
Therefore, we have undergone a long-standing process of learning and we 
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have learnt severe lessons during privatisation, indeed: in several cases, we 
could have imposed higher prices, we could have economised on expenditure, 
we could have elaborated more efficient and skillful privatisational processes 
and we could have applied more effect ive privatisational schemes. Finally, 
what does not entirely belong to the scope of subjective f laws: corruption and 
abuse could have been more efficiently foreclosed, even if we admit that in the 
majority of other former socialist states more scandals, corruption and criminality 
could be discerned than in Hungary, in which we can find scarce solace. 
What we can certainly set forth is that our nat ional property has not 
disappeared, it merely transformed during the process of privatisation. National 
property seems to have been lost only for those who identify national property 
with state property and do not recognise that the property of private enterprises 
and foreign investments in Hungary do become incorporated into our national 
property. The facts that G D P decreased in the first per iod of political trans-
formation and that significant unemployment occurred were basically not the 
consequences of privatisation (on the contrary, in my view, these would have 
emerged more stringently without privatisation), and in the long-run, privati-
sation per se actually facilitated the development of our economy. Finally, we 
could expatiate on the e lement of social justice. Without doubt, it could not be 
sufficiently guaranteed by way of privatisation, since individuals in auspicious 
circumstances and in powerfu l positions, individuals w h o realised their social 
capital (naturally, in many cases these persons belonged to the former state 
party, to the former state apparatus or company management) could surely 
acquire much more than others (we do not have precise sociological f igures) . 
However, no capitalist system has persisted so far, which would have been 
based on the property of the majority of the population (which is valid even in 
case of the most prosperous countries of the world). W h y should we suppose 
that this could have been achieved via a privatisational strategy in Hungary? 
Even the critics of privatisation acknowledge that "the winners" of privati-
sation constitute a "mere" 20 p.c. of the population, which as a proportion is 
not a bad achievement, in my view. Anyway, we are certainly not dealing with 
a history of privatisation, which has produced some hundreds of millionaire 
criminals and several millions of deprivated. This is also valid, even if real 
social considerations should have been more effectively enforced in various 
areas of economic policy. We must acknowledge that a peculiar fo rm of 
primitive accumulation of capital ensued (which derived f rom state property, 
since we did not possess other property) during an unexpected restructuring 
f rom "semi-social ism" into modern capital ism due to wor ld political (and not 
intrinsic) factors. Just l ike the English, German, Amer ican , etc. pr imi t ive 
accumulation of capital at the dawn of capitalism were ethically quite filthy 
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processes taking many decades, the accelerated process of the primitive 
accumulation of capital taking merely some years could exclusively undergo in 
an ethically contestable manner. (Its dimension is a moot point.) Nevertheless, 
the histrorically belated Hungarian system of new-capitalism having evolved 
by the millenium can eventually prove to be a liveable and habitable society 
(which is not a groundless expectation), the social dejection brought forth by 
the shock owing to restructuring may disappear and we may ascend towards 
"Europe", even if not the entire society, as some presumed, but at least a large 
segment of the society, mostly the younger generations. 
Naturally, the proprietary structure adequate for privatisation and market 
economy per se does not constitute a guarantee for social-economic success. 
This framework also allows for faulty economic policies and world economic 
processes may still destroy national economies. But our new proprietary structure 
is more viable fo r facing the challenges of modernisation and globalisation 
than our economy preceding privatisation was. Namely, in the future private 
enterprises will rival private enterprises, the possibility of easy acquisition 
f rom "soft" state-owned property has been precluded. We allow that several 
citizens may have acquired great fortunes in the course of privatisation by 
abusing their positions. Nevertheless, many already demonstrate the inability 
to hold their grounds in the market, thereby, they will relentlessly fail and the 
state or politics will not or will hardly be able to "subsidise" them. 
We still need time to compile an inventory of and to render a complete, 
scientific processing of Hungarian privatisation. As far as I am concerned, I 
would be inclined to qualify it as "optimistically impropitious". In the meantime, 
passions may also abate, the majori ty will recognise that not everybody can be 
a proprietor and that efficient work is more appreciated by private enterprises 
than by state-owned companies. 
As the above elucidate, Hungarian business law was an active contributor 
to Hungarian privatisation, which took 10 years, and I think it was capable of 
guaranteeing an operative legal framework for shaping market economy, 
partially by renewing itself. As a matter of course, there have been mistakes 
and errors both in law-making and the application of law. Nevertheless, by 
way of striving towards evolution, maintaining the long-standing elements, 
simultaneously modernising itself and conforming to the business law of the 
European Union, law-making could secure appropriate bases for the consolida-
tion of Hungarian private enterprises. 
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industry subsidy in case 173/73).' Yet, the question remains unfortunately 
open what can be considered as the general scheme of a tax system. It cannot 
be precluded that there are competing schemes to be found in one and the same 
tax system or that there are different schemes, to be seen as general, in different 
tax systems. 
Taxation policy and law is at ever time developed according to the changing 
needs of the public budget and fiscal policy in general. It is thus integral part 
of the economic and social policy a country can pursue in specific conditions. 
However, scholars may have ideas about a good professional quality of tax 
legislation. Then one can expect that a tax system has the following features: it is 
- neutral (including all the less biases); 
- regulated comprehensively (there is no or minimal interim legislation); 
- interconnected with (supported and completed by) private law; and 
- operating not only with vertical, but also with horizontal coordination 
(tax planning and the choice of tax regimes are possible). 
In the following, these features will be explained. Examples for (or against) 
the principles of a good tax system as depicted below will be delivered f rom 
the Hungarian legal practice. 
I. Theoretical considerations 
1. Neutrality in tax law 
(i) Ideal legal system and tax law 
Taxation cannot operate without legal regulation. Tax law is thus part of the 
law of a country. It can even appear in cross-border cases. It is thus reasonable 
to anticipate an ideal tax system as a tax law system, part of the legal system, 
whether in a purely internal or international (cross-border) context. The question 
of an ideal tax system is thus preceded by that of an ideal legal system. 
An ideal legal system can obviously be determined by making reference to 
meta-juridical values. Where a legal system is oriented to right moral and 
democratic political values, the legal system itself will tend to operate in an 
ideal way. Alternatively, one cannot be pleased to be confined to non-legal 
values while describing a legal system. It is also necessary that the legal system 
itself negotiate integrity and coherence. 
The law appears in the official gazette as statutory law. Moreover, it is part 
of an order of legal and non-legal conventions, being embedded in the traditions 
1
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of the legal profession. At the same t ime, the law is part of the off ic ia l life, 
being subject to the expectations of politically organized communities. This is 
the positive aspect of law, crucial in a society organized by means of instru-
mental rationality. Besides, the law is able to negotiate both legitimate inter-
ests and subjective rights in a network of recognized rights and duties. The law 
can eventually be substantiated by transcendental values. Examples for such an 
explanation can be delivered from Kelsen who referred to a basic hypothetical 
norm or f rom Rawls who introduced the notion of the so-called reflective 
equilibrium (to be achieved not only by bargaining, but also by reaching agree-
ment on noumenal values). The law can also be substantiated by natural law 
values, yet purely procedurally, dispensing with transcendent values. This way, 
one can arrive at the notion introduced by Fuller of the inner morality of law. 
One can see that the legal tradition can be delineated from bottom up by the 
layer of law directly influenced by political and ideological expectations and 
from top down by the high values of morality and human dignity. Any way, 
it is important that the law need be intact to a certain extent at least both 
from politics and morality. This independence is required in order to achieve 
consistency in the legal system and reach legal certainty. 
The law can be presented not only in a course of moving from the commu-
nities organized by law to those organized by non-juridical values. The law can 
be described by another movement as well: it appears as a means of organized 
coercion, as a system of the enforcement of the respect of legal norms (like in 
the system of purely positive law described by Kelsen). This is the catechistic 
aspect-actually the hard core-of law: law appears in the body of norms that 
can be acknowledged and observed by means of sound reason. The law also 
means, however, a system of the conditions in which the interpretation of law 
can be authentic (as suggested by Talcott Parsons). Law is thus not only a 
matter of norms. It is also a matter of process. It is manifested in the aspira-
tions to recognize and follow values inherent in the view on society of certain 
groups of people. Seeking for perfection is part of human life in the same way 
as being subjected to basic duties. This way, the law that appears in the body 
of norms tends to be manifested in the mind of the virtuous individual as well 
who will accept and fol low the values negotiated by law. The latter is the 
aretaic (virtue-based) aspect of law. 
As it can be seen, law can be delineated both in the trends of moving from 
positive to natural law and from the catechistic layer to the aretaic expression 
of law. Tax law can also be placed in the system of law as discussed above. It 
is integral part of the official life. It is crucial in a country to secure the collec-
tion of taxes and the administration of social justice. Taxation policy is normally 
subject to the fluctuation in the economic and budgetary policy. However , in a 
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well-established legal system, the tax system is based on professional logic and 
enjoys relative independence f rom outward considerations. The technical 
aspect of tax law suggests neutrality towards political preferences. 
Similarly, a good tax system can be identified not only by stressing inde-
pendence from politics. It is also important to try to go beyond the enforced 
application of the norms of tax law and start referring to virtues. It is not 
voluntary to pay taxes. Coercion is thus presupposed upon the application of 
tax law. However, normally an agreement can be reached nationwide or even 
internationally on how to distribute the public burden and benefits. 
It comes f rom the above that a good tax system tends get rid of the harmful 
effect of the abrupt changes in economic policy and of particular ideological 
considerations and move to professionalism and technicalities. Importantly, tax 
law need be regulated on a high level of proficiency. It cannot lack a well-
established normative basis. This is the means of achieving legal certainty in 
taxation and the effective protection of taxpayer rights. However, a good tax 
system relies not only on coercion, but also on the propensity of people for 
perfection, based on a broad agreement on how to administer social justice. 
From this perspective, it is not only coercion, but also virtues that can be 
referred to upon the administration of the liability to pay tax. 
(ii) Tax neutrality and its social environment 
The concept of tax neutrality can be determined according to Richard Epstein 
as follows: "The ideal of tax neutrality simply provides that the system of 
taxation, as far as possible, should preserve the relative priorities that individuals 
attach to various activities. The function of the state is to protect liberty and 
property. It is not to aid one group or another in skewing the uses to which 
individuals put their natural endowments."2 The approach Epstein has assumed 
can be criticized. In an egalitarian, market-based world, fiscal neutrality is 
presupposed by the consideration that equal starting chances need be secured 
in a social scale. The traditional idea of horizontal equity, defined as equal 
treatment of the equal, embodies a mistake, that is, to take pre-tax income, or 
consumption or wealth as the moral baseline and then try to formulate a 
standard of fairness, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel assert.2 Attention to 
the costs of rights leads us not only into problems of budgetary calculation, 
but also into basic philosophical issues of distributive justice and democratic 
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accountability. The basic question is what the relationship is between democracy 
and justice, be tween the principles of col lect ive decision-making and the 
norms of fairness because all that depends on collective contributions, Steven 
Holmes and Cass Sunstein argue.4 
As in a market economy taxation is a factor inadvertently to distort economic 
decisions, it is a bias per definition, compared to the idea of f ree trade and the 
freedom of contracting. A tax policy can be insufficient to the particular extent 
as well that the implementation of tax rules will result in side effects. E.g., tax 
expenditures do not only suggest reduction in tax base but also trigger differences 
to the debit of those who are not able to benefi t from tax expenditures. The 
alternative to a tax measure would be in this respect not to look for a better tax 
law measure but to seek to eliminate taxation as such. For this reason, there is 
no country where taxation pol icy could rely on a genuine normative basis, 
and so there is no room for discussing neutrality in taxation that would be 
explicated systematically. 
The tax policy ideal of neutrality can be approximated by means of the 
economic concept of income as drafted by Georg von Schanz, Robert Haig and 
Henry Simons. It is comprehensive and encompassing all income as the 
positive differential between the stocks of financial values as measured at two 
different points of time. Unfortunately, even this concept of income is fraught 
with inconsistencies to the extent that it is diff icult to reconcile the bundle of 
the rights of consumption with that of making savings. The same problem 
happens to the income generated periodically, compared to capital gains.3 
As it can be seen, tax policy is always f raught with inconsistencies due to 
the conflict between efficiency and equity considerations and because the 
concept of comprehensive income itself also suffers from inherent conflicts. 
Given the inner constraints on tax policy formulation, tax policy cannot be 
justified but on a basis exceeding the scope of taxation itself. Tax policy need 
be assessed in the broader context of the institutional order of property, 
entitlements to profits and distributive justice. 
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Where tax policy is subject to contradictions for objective reasons even in 
the time of economic prosperity, it is in a need of seeking for mitigation. It is 
public administration, or rather tax administration and tax law, which can be 
mentioned among the factors that can provide such mitigation. Good public 
administration can largely promote the easy enforcement of taxpayer rights. 
The efficiency-based standards of a market economy cannot be implemented 
without non-economic considerations. It is thus important to try to avoid 
falling into the trap what is called by Schumpeter as a Ricardian vice, that is, to 
pursue economic policy without taking into account the institutional environ-
ment.6 
In taxation policy, the issues of allocation and distribution need be distin-
guished from each other. The first question concerns the size of redistribution, 
the second one the way in which redistribution can take place. It is illusionary 
to think about a private economy that would be just as long is it is not subject 
to budgetary policy and that redistribution would suggest a bias f r o m a 
notional benchmark. One has to take into consideration7 that 
- it is reasonable to seek to achieve vertical equity (there are reasons for 
apportioning the cost of public expenditures unequally among those with unequal 
resources); 
- the term of public goods implies a social s tructure which need be 
balanced; and 
- the provision of a social minimum should be accomplished by transfer 
payments. 
Apparently, there is no market without state and there is no state without 
taxation.8 From this perspective, it is clear that neutrality in taxation can be 
legitimized on a high level of libertarian abstraction only, isolated f r o m its 
social environment. 
A search for tax policy options includes the paradox that a course of tax 
policy cannot be assessed taken by itself, or rather that a tax policy question 
cannot be expected to be answered but af ter having examined taxation within 
an institutional framework that goes beyond taxation itself. In considering the 
economic foundations of the social life, the first question that arises is that of 
property. Thus, the question can be raised what relationships are among people 
developed upon the acquisition and disposal of the single objects of nature. 
6
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The right to ownership can be derived from natural law, or even from the 
fundamental moral requirement that everyone has the right to follow a life 
worthy for a human being. This means in practice the right to get access to the 
minimum of social protection. What is expressed by the positive law-as 
property rights-suggests more and belongs to the realm of decisions motivated 
by ideologies. 
From the viewpoint of general economic policy, in addition to property and 
the private and public forms of the mechanisms of the appropriation of goods, 
one has to pay attention to the institutions of the centralization of social 
production and the redistribution of surplus value. They can be studied f rom 
the viewpoint of different theories. In an approach based on formal and immanent 
values, the review of specific historic circumstances is underestimated. In this 
respect the development of property is seen simply as an incidental question of 
"first occupation". So, the considerations of just ice and morality cannot be 
raised (like with Hume or Coase). In an approach established on formal and 
transcendental values (Kant), property is, even though isolated from specific 
historic circumstances, deemed to develop due to the noumenal will of universal 
nature that emerges over individual wills while generating norms. 
In an approach based on material and immanent values, the acquisition of 
property can be legitimized by means of a presumptive social contract (like 
with Rousseau) or by reference to the individual performance of work (Focke). 
In the former case, it is not possible to get rid of being compelled to maintain 
enforcement mechanisms of equality or rather direct and permanent state 
intervention. The frictions arising from these constraints can be mitigated, 
provided, however, that it is not directly goods that are distributed. Instead, 
distribution need be preceded by the preliminary choice of certain social insti-
tutions (i.e., rights or basic liberties like with Rawls). Individual appropriation 
can be interpreted in a social environment, al though not necessarily supported 
by positive rights. This is because the appropriation of natural objects is allegedly 
possible without the intervention of the law or the institutional system of the 
state. In an approach based on transcendental and material values, it is not only 
the person, ident ifying himself or herself by means of ethical or religious 
values, who can be highlighted, compared to individuals orientated merely by 
their financial interests. In modern times, the social practice susceptible to 
transcendental values can also be substantiated during the distinct processes 
of ethical discourses in the instance that those who observe a situation and 
those who are observed cooperate in determining the effective order of values 
relevant to individual cases. 
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2. The rule of law and legal certainty in taxation 
(i) The emerging notion of administrative law 
Tax administration is part of public administration. It is therefore a question 
of tax administration, in addition to the enforcement of the tax law vis-a-vis 
the taxpayer, of how to operate tax administration as an organization. Modern 
public administration is governed by the principles of openness, good gov-
ernance and legal certainty. The principle of openness suggests that public 
administration is expected to be open to democratic values and to support the 
participation of citizens in the management of public matters. The idea of good 
governance can be traced back to the requirement that public administration 
need be transparent. For tax law purposes, it is the principle of legal certainty, 
which is of particular relevance. The tax authority as an agency of public 
administration is bound to the law (subject to legality) while entering into a 
relationship with the taxpayer who m a y exercise in the procedure of tax 
administration the rights of a client. 
The above principles are generally applicable in western societies, even if 
differences can be developed in d i f ferent jurisdictions. In France, public 
administration is provided with prerogatives. This is f r o m which the rights of 
administrative agencies are emanated to exercise discretion. Discretion is still 
subject to legality. In Germany, administrative agencies are also a l lowed to 
exercise discretion. They are subject, however, to the requirement that the 
individual rights of citizens need be protected. In common law jurisdictions, 
public administration is traditionally not subject to legal regulation. However, 
the decisions of administrative agencies are subject to judicial review. These 
decisions will be assessed by courts in the light of due process rights.9 
Substantive administrative law was developed at the modern time when it 
became necessary to depart from normal civil law provisions in order to create 
a legal background for the state liability. This law has been evolved alongside 
with the reduction and precision of state immunity. Administrative law was 
developed in France as long as it was necessary to implement and specify in 
the practice of public administration the constitutional principle of the division 
of power into the branches of legislation, administration and the judiciary 
power. '" In fact, it was important to determine the conditions in which the 
9
 Harlow, C.: Global administrative law: The quest for principles and values. The 
European Journal of International Law, 17 (2006) 190-192. 
10
 Schwarze, J.: Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht; Entstehung und Entwicklung im 
Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden, 2005 (2. erweiterte Auflage; 1. 
Auflage in 1988), 97-98. 
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decisions of public authorities can be challenged before court. To this end, the 
courts of public administration were established with competences different 
f rom those of normal civil courts. The courts with the particular power of 
making the review of public authority decisions were in a need of a material of 
substantive administrative law. Substantive administrative law has thus been 
developed due to the distinction of the courts of public administration f rom 
civil court. In Germany, substantive administrative law has been the result of 
the specification of the principles of constitutional law with regard to the 
protection of subjective rights. More importantly, the law of public administra-
tion is designed to represent a kind of permanency compared to the political 
values, subject to fluctuation, that can appear in terms of constitutional law. 
In common law systems, public administration was not covered by a 
particular legal material for a long time due to the lack of the division of the 
legal system into the branches of civil and public law. The law was invoked by 
citizens before normal courts, depending on their claims, no matter whether of 
private or public law nature. By the time when the state has undertaken to 
assume responsibility for the administration of social welfare by the means of 
public law, the independent material of administrative law has also been 
developed. In North America, public administration was already in the early 
20th century expected to develop regulatory power (to exercise review over tax 
administration, securities exchanges, anti-trust, consumer protection, etc.). In 
the UK, the branch of administrative law has been developed much later. In 
America, the development of administrative law also received fresh impetus 
due to the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
missing in England." 
(ii) Rule of law and due process rights 
From a sociological point of view, the rule of law principle concerns the issue 
of the law and its social environment. In this respect, one can distinguish four 
types of relations between the legal system and its social environment: 
- undifferentiated (archaic) system; 
- subordinate (e.g., feudal) system; 
- autonomous system; and 
- partially independent system. 
The latter means procedural independence, that is, a case where the system 
is sufficiently insulated to permit independence in some spheres, but not so 
protected as to prevent adaptive responses to the needs of other sectors of the 
11
 Schwartz. В.: Administrative law. David L. Sills (ed.): International encyclopaedia 
of the social sciences, Vol. 1, Basingstoke, Hants, 1968. 79-80. 
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society.'" The law is thus functionally differentiated as a system, while preserving 
its ability for communication with its environment as a self-referential system. 
In this context , the principle of the rule of law can be interpreted as a kind of 
guarantee for the functional differentiation of the law as a subsystem of society. 
For the lawyer, it is more common to grasp the notion of the rule of law 
from the viewpoint of natural law rather than f r o m the perspective of 
sociological functionalism. An example for this natural law-based approach is 
delivered by Albert Dicey who holds: " W e mean ... that no man is punishable 
or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach 
of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of 
the land. In this sense, the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or 
discretionary powers of constraint";13 Quite similarly, the rule of law as 
"Rechtsstaat" means the following:14 
- independence of the law from politics; 
- a system that is based on the respect of human rights and liberties; and 
- being different f rom the political system, a kind of predictability and 
regularity. 
In fact, the rule of law does not have the same meaning, of course, in such 
countries as England and Germany, so much different f rom each other. In a 
traditional common law system, the rule of law negotiates a criterion according 
to which the legality of the decisions of public authorities can be measured 
with regard the protection of subjective rights. The legality of the claims 
established before the court can be assessed not to the (statutory) law that 
exists beforehand, like on the European continent, but it is compared to 
relevant legal rules and principles developed from case to case. 
In Hungary, legal rules can be declared as unconstitutional on the sole 
grounds that the rule of law principle is infr inged." This means 
- first that the rule of law is a meta-principle that is of significance for the 
purposes of the operation of the whole legal system; and 
12
 Mayhew, L.: II. The legal system. Sills, D. L. (ed.): International encyclopaedia of 
the social sciences, Vol. 9, Basingstoke, Hants, 1968. 61-62. 
13
 Long, N.: II. The administrative process. Sills, D. L. (ed.): International encyclo-
paedia of the social sciences, Vol. 1, Basingstoke, Hants, 1968. 68.; Dicey, A, V.: 
Introduction to the study of the law of the Constitution. London-New York, 1964 (1885; 
10th edition). 188. 
14
 Leibholz, G.: Der Rechtsstaat und die Freiheit des Individuums. Meyers enzyklo-
pädisches Lexikon, Band 19, Mannheim, 1977. 677. 
15
 Sólyom, L.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon (The origins of the 
constitutional judiciary activity in Hungary). Budapest, 2001. 706. 
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- secondly that it is not required to refer to particular legal rules in addition 
to the rule of law principle in order to enforce subjective rights. 
The notion of legal certainty is in the heart of the concept of the rule of 
law. It can be seen not simply as part of the rule of law. Instead, the principle 
of legal certainty can be considered as the particular manifestation of the rule 
of law principle, László Sólyom asserts (who was the first president of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court). 
The rule of law is guiding not only for the constitutional order in general, 
but also for the organization of public administration in particular. Even the 
democracy principle cannot be respected where the rule of law is not observed. 
The focus on due process rights triggers the appreciation of procedural issues. 
Substantive law problems have been all the more converted into procedural 
law issues (an example for this is in the tax law area to file for advance 
rulings). In common law jurisdictions, this is a normal development. On the 
European continent, proceduralization can be imputed to the general trend of 
development that distributive justice has been converted into procedural one 
in many instances. The respect of the due process principle has received 
particular impetus in Community law where the principle of legitimate 
expectation has been proliferated. 
Due process rights are incorporated into the Hungarian law of public 
administration by Section 4 (1) of the Public Administrative Procedure Act. 
They are formulated as the right to fair trial. Due process rights have been 
protected by the EC Court of Justice as well since the early time.16 They are 
recognised in a range of international law documents as well that can be 
enumerated as follows: 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rigths, Article 10;17 
- European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6;18 
- draft of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 41.1 9 
Due process and related rights emerge in the practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights in implementing ECHR in tax matters as well. Article 
1 (2) of Protocol No. 1 of ECHR on the protection of property cannot be applied 
to tax matters as such, being of public law nature. However, the question can 
16
 Early examples for the application of these principles are 222/84 Johnston, ECR 
1986. 1651.; 222/86 Heylens, European Court Reports, 1987. 4097. 
17
 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948. 
18
 European Court of Human Rights signed at Rome on 4 November 1950; Protocol 
No. 1, signed at Paris on 20 March 1952. 
19
 2000 OJ C364/01. 
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be raised whether tax legislation is consistent with the principles of legal 
certainty, proportionality and the duty to give reasons for the decisions of 
public administrative agencies. In the matters of tax administration, the usual 
issue that can appear before this court is, of course, Article 6 ECHR on fair 
treatment. However, it does not apply to tax administration. This is because the 
review of the decisions of tax authorities before courts is precluded from the 
application of Article 6. It can still apply exceptionally, that is, to the extent 
that the legal nature of the administrative procedure itself can be challenged. 
For example, it can apply to the question whether the administrative procedure 
at issue was too lengthy or the tax authority was not correct in applying 
sanctions. Article 14 ECHR on non-discrimination, Article 8 ECHR on the 
respect of privacy or Article 9 ECHR on the f reedom of conscience can also be 
20 
taken into account in tax matters. 
In common law systems, the public administration is expected to operate in 
accordance with the principle of due process (a principle of natural justice or 
fairness) which is a procedural guarantee for the legality in the operation of 
public administration. As the principle of due process means the higher criterion 
of legality according to which the administrative procedure can be assessed 
with regard to the protection of individual rights, there is no existing statutory 
law by which it would be preceded. Where the idea is to apply this principle in 
a civil law system, however, it can be problematic that one has to encounter 
the existing statutory law provisions which are not necessarily in accordance 
with the conclusion that can be made as a result of the application of the due 
process principle. 
The due process principle has been built recently in civil law systems, now 
as part of the relevant statutory law system. The problem cannot be avoided, 
however, that it would be required to explain why a universal rule, uttering the 
due process requirement, could take priority over particular legal rules which 
are otherwise valid. The due process principle can be placed smoothly in a 
common law system because such a legal system is open to outward values 
that can be digested and t ransformed into law f rom time to t ime. In contrast, 
a civil law system is not open to non-legal values. They cannot be integrated 
unless they will be made explicit law in a particular procedure of legislation. 
Similar problems of the application of a principle of natural justice can be 
realised where the true and fair view principle is applicable in the accounting 
law of a civil law system. Again, consistency problems between the valid 
particular legal rules and the higher-level principle seem to be inevitable. 
Baker, Ph.: Taxation and the European Convention on Human Rights. European 
Taxation, 40 (2000) 299. 
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In the light of openness, public administration has created new fora of 
democracy in terms of the so-called deliberative polyarchy.21 In the arena of 
European bureaucracy, a kind of public administration can be created which is 
directly established on deliberation and operates in a pluralistic political system. 
It promises to substitute deliberative techniques for the missing political 
consensus of Member States to create a genuine organization of the people's 
representation at a federal level. Under such circumstances, public admini-
stration implies the possibility of introducing procedures by means of which 
conflict-laden substantive matters can be handled. The comitology developed 
by Community institutions contributes to the development of the patterns of 
deliberative democracy.2 2 There is a line of European bureaucrats, and the 
representatives of professions and the organizations of interests safeguarding 
who can initiate communication with a view to achieving checks and balances 
even in the absence of political authorisation. 
The idea of good governance derives mainly f rom the liberal movement of 
the so-called New Public Management (NPM). It is comparable to the so-
called New Economy (e.g., networking industries, environmental protection, 
etc.) to the extent that it can be traced back in the same way to deregulation 
and privatization.21 The measures of public administration, and the interests 
associated with them, can be differentiated similarly to the requirement of 
unbundling relevant to competition law. The goal to be achieved is thus to 
prevent public administration from concentrating too much power of decision 
by differentiating the single forms of activities. As a result, the structure of 
activities will be more transparent and discretion can be replaced by the 
technically-minded, semi-automated forms of publ ic supervision. Notably, 
Communi ty institutions do not en joy universal authorisation. Instead, they 
may act, based on the specific conferment of power. In these circumstances, 
professional expertise is to be pooled both on the side of public and business 
administration. 
21
 Harlow: op. cit. 201. 
22
 Report from the Commission on the working of the Committees during 2001, COM 
(2002) 733 final. 
23
 Giuliano Amato and Laraine Laudati: The protection of public interests and 
regulation of economic activities. In: Snyder, F. (ed.): The Europeanisation of law: The 
legal effects of European integration. Oxford-Portland-Oregon, 2000. 142. 
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3. The interconnectedness of tax law with private law 
Acts of public administration are designed to trigger specific legal consequences 
to be associated with the facts of the past in particular forms. They are not 
necessarily regulated by the law of public administration (for example, the acts 
of the agencies of public administration as employers are covered by labour 
law). These acts are not always dispositions, that is, one-sided decisions of 
public agencies on the determination of rights and obligations (for example, the 
agencies of public administration can enter into agreements with private parties). 
It can be seen from these examples that the agencies of public administration 
cannot be intact f rom private law, which is applicable in normal circumstances 
to all pecuniary relations, no matter what the legal status of the affected person 
is. In tax law, the enforcement of the logic of civil law can be seen paradoxically 
very normal. Although tax law negotiates the liability to make payment to the 
state budget, it is the market players who are liable to pay tax. While observing 
tax law, they consider to optimize their structures of business in order to 
minimize the liability to pay tax, although within legal boundaries. 
Where it is doubtful if a legal institution is of public or private law nature, 
one can rely on a doctrine known in Germany according to which the obligation 
of public law cannot be recognised unless it is explicitly covered by statutory 
law.24 If not, it is the private law principles that are guiding. In a democratic 
political system, everything is free what is not prohibited. Furthermore, people 
are bound to the promises they made (pacta sunt servanda). One can argue: in 
the absence of positive public law provisions, public law cannot be enforced, 
and it is the civil law principles in the light of which the legal implications for 
particular cases can be assessed. Public law regulation is inadvertently subject 
to the guidance private law can provide. This is because it is not possible that 
public law is addressed to all details in a changing world. Then it is the private 
law principles of the respect of personality, property and contractual promises 
only that can be authoritative. Public agencies do not have the power to act 
unless they are explicitly authorised to do that in particular conditions. Based 
on the principle of subsidiarity, civil law considerations are the very basics of 
the conduct regulated by law. The agencies of public administration are bound 
to contractual obligations in the same way as private persons. They can be 
enforced by law even if it is burdensome for the public body. Democracy 
cannot operate but within the boundaries of the rule of law. 
~
4
 Verwaltungsrecht, Band 1, begründet von Hans J. Wolff, fortgeführt von Otto 
Bachof, neu bearbeitet von Rolf Stober, С. H. München, 1999, elfte, neubearb. Auflage, 
267. 
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In common law systems, the law has not been structured as clearly according 
to the different branches of private and public law as the case is in civil law 
systems. The question is therefore not reasonable if private law principles can 
serve as a background for the public administration to fill the gaps arising f rom 
the legal rules relevant to its operation. Albert Dicey is categorical in this 
respect: "in England ... the system of administrative law and the very principles 
on which it rests are in truth unknown.".25 The point to the rule of law is 
highlighted by Dicey2 6 not only in terms of the public administration subject to 
laws. The principle of the rule of law also implies 
- the unity of the legal system, and the exclusion of the possibility 
accordingly that a branch of administrative law could be distinguished; and 
- the statement that the constitution is nothing but the consequence of the 
application of private law, binding both to ordinary courts and the agents of the 
crown. 
It is noteworthy, however, that tort liability of the state is excluded due to 
the state immunity doctrine, and this is the case until the adoption of the 
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. The legal system as described by Dicey 
provides nevertheless room for the application of the "pacta sunt servanda" 
principle in a more ideal way than it can happen wherever else. 
Substantive law has been developed in England in correspondence with 
particular legal actions. For example, the decisions of public authorities could be 
challenged by claiming "orders of certiorari" (lodging objections to administrative 
decisions), "prohibition" or "mandamus" (claiming administrative inaction or 
action, respectively). These legal actions were different from those to be filed in 
the forms of "damages", "declarations" or "injunctions". Since 1978 the above 
distinction has lost its s ignif icance due to the unification of legal actions.27 It 
is useful, however , to remember them in order to get deeper understanding 
between the normal and special competences of courts in the matters of public 
administration. 
In France, it has been the standard already since the Blanco decision (T.C. 
8.2.1873. G.A. No. 1, S. 5.) , as held by the Tribunal des Confl i ts that the state 
liability need not be assessed according to the Code Civil, but according to the 
"règles spéciales qui varient suivant les besoins du service et la nécessité de 
concilier les droits de l'Etat avec les droits privés".28 Hence, it has been the 
practice that the matters of public administration are to be discussed by the 
25
 Schwarze: op. cit. 133.; Dicey: op. cit. 330. 
26
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special courts of public administration (recours administratif), and a resort to 
civil courts (recours contentieux) is in the matters of public administration 
exceptional. 
In Germany, there are special courts of public administration as well. 
However, they do not derive from the needs of the legal review of the decisions 
made by public administration, but rather from the need of implementing the 
constitutional principles. It is exceptional also in Germany that citizens have a 
resort to civil courts in the matters of public administration (this is the case, 
e.g., in the matters of expropriation). 
In Hungary, public law has been departed from private law in a similar way 
as in Germany. It is thus based on the distinction between the branches of 
substantive public and private law. Although there are no special courts of 
public administration in this country, one can find particular chambers of the 
normal courts specialising in the matters of public administration, and the Civil 
Procedure Act also contains particular rules applicable to the litigation between 
public authorities and citizens, challenging the decisions of public authorities. 
However, civil law has net been broken down into as many different branches 
as the case is in many other jurisdict ions on the European continent. In 
particular, no code or doctrine of commercial law or business law has been 
recognised in this country that would be different f rom civil law. This way of 
historical development may suggest more chances for the application of the 
civil law principles (prohibition of the abuse of law, theory of estoppel, etc.) 
even in the matters of public administration than in civil law systems which 
are more structured than the Hungarian one. Notably, the Hungarian Civil 
Code is applicable to financial relationships of anybody without limitation. No 
particular law can thus be ascertained according to which this universal effect 
of the Hungarian Civil Code would be constrained. 
In Italy, distinction between the competences of the courts of public 
administration and civil courts has also been recognised in the mat ters of 
public administration, and even supported by the well-established doctrine on 
the distinction between the matters related to the protection of legitimate 
interests (interessi legittimi) and subjective rights (diritti soggettivi). In the 
first case, it is normal that the courts of public administration are competent. In 
the second case, however, it is possible to get resort to civil courts.24 
Distinction between the competences of normal and special courts in the 
matters of public administration is problematic in general in modern legal 
systems. This is because it is difficult to reconcile such a distinction with the 
trend of development of the modern law that legal actions have been unified 
29
 Schwarze: op. cit. 128; Nigro, M.: Giustizia amministrativa. Bologna, 1983. 115-116. 
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(ubi remedium, ibi ius). However, the legal orders that exist out of the reach of 
the nation state may well rely on particular legal actions. For example, under 
Community law there are particular legal actions (in infringement procedures, 
annulment procedures, etc.). Also, the European Court of Human Rights can 
be mentioned which does not have competence in public matters with the 
exception of the cases where citizens are prevented f rom exercising their basic 
rights due to the disorder of public administration or legislation. 
In the Netherlands, public and private law have been clearly separated from 
each other already in the 19th century. The principle was also developed at the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries that public law was of complementary and 
exceptional nature, compared to private law which had universal effect . This is 
the pure expression of a "Vermutungstheorie". However, this theory has been 
given up in accordance with the development of the state responsibility for the 
administration of social welfare. Hence, currently the legal review of the 
decisions of public administration can purely be established on the rules of 
public administrative law. 
4. Vertical and horizontal coordination in tax law 
Law cannot be confined to what is applied by force, that is, by means of public 
coercion. Indeed, legal compliance is to be presupposed first in terms of vertical 
co-ordination where the nation state determines the way in which sacrifice 
need be made for the public. Law also suggests, however, functioning as a means 
of promoting bargaining. This is the aspect of horizontal co-ordination.30 
Law can be identified this way in the sense that consistency and coherence can 
be achieved in a functional system where the facts of particular cases are 
juridified due to the self-regulatory force of the parties involved in particular 
cases.31 
Law is indeterminate to the extent that the conduct of individuals cannot be 
necessarily imputed to the legal norm. Law cannot be understood simply by 
studying legal norms. It is also important to try to understand the individual 
conduct effectuated in compliance with law. It is then possible to turn back 
to the legal norm and try to explore its meaning. It occurs frequently that the 
schemes invented by companies (e.g., innovation in financial products, planning 
311
 Zürn, M.: Introduction: Law and compliance at different levels. In: Zürn, M . -
Joerges, Ch.: Law and governance in postnational Europe; Compliance beyond the nation-
state, Cambridge, 2005. 6. 
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hybrid entities, etc.) shed light on the problems of legal interpretation. Then 
the legislation is expected to react in the affirmative to the innovation achieved 
in legal practice. 
Tax law compliance cannot be reduced to the issue of vertical co-ordination. 
While on the surface tax law seems to be extremely categorical , in fact 
taxpayers enjoy much freedom in choosing the tax law status, depending on 
what is more beneficial for them. The specific tax law consequences can be 
traced back to the horizontal activity contracting parties show in their pre-tax 
life. Tax rules cannot be understood clearly, but f rom the perspective of the 
taxpayers' conduct, oriented to tax planning. The taxpayer conduct is a test of 
the enforcement of tax law. 
Tax legislation heavily relies on the economic policy considerations a 
government prefers in certain circumstances. Tax law can then be changed 
where there are alterations in economic policies. Tax law facts are actually 
emanated from the annual budget law. It is required, however, that the creation 
of the tax liability can be independent of the abrupt changes in budgetary 
policies. 
Election of tax regimes has been all the more frequent. For example, in 
accordance with the EC Merger Directive, taxpayers may elect to defer the 
taxation of the capital gains derived f rom the contribution of the appreciated 
branch of assets and liabilities, provided that no step-up will be made in the 
financial attributes like the acquisition price of tangible assets taken over from 
the branch (roll-over relief). In sophisticated tax systems, the election of a tax 
regime has been significant. The best example for this is the check-the-box 
rules in the US federal tax law.'" Taxpayers can thus elect in certain conditions 
whether they enter the system of company taxation or choose to be taxed at the 
level of shareholders. The introduction of such statutory election comes from 
the experience that statutory law is sometimes not flexible enough. The rigid 
categorical order of tax law provisions prevents taxpayers from achieving high 
compliance with tax law. 
Election can be hosted by a national tax system only where the legal culture 
implies the possibility of providing alternatives in legislation and legal rules of 
facilitating nature. In Hungary, it would be more than difficult, for example, to 
introduce a tax regime like the check-the-box-rules. This is because a 
corporate taxpayer is not identified according to the economic contents of the 
activities carried on. Instead, there is an exhaustive list of corporate tax payers 
who are identified by reference to their non-tax law status. It depends on the 
civil-law qualification whether an entity is subject to corporate taxation. This is 
32
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a practice that can be far from the reality of living business. A civil law associa-
tion, not subject to company tax, can be engaged in significant business while 
small companies are subject to company taxation, whether they like it or not. 
II. Hungarian issues 
1. Legality of the Hungarian tax administration procedure 
According to Section 4 (1) of Taxation Order Act, taxation means a procedure 
in which the taxes and subsidies payable by, or repayable to, taxpayers are 
managed in terms of the determination, collection, transfer or return, and audit 
of taxes by tax authorities. Taxation is covered by the Act on the Procedure of 
Public Administration unless a tax law, including the Taxation Order Act, 
provides otherwise [Section 5 (1) of Taxation Order Act], The Act on the 
Procedure of Public Administration is addressed to the procedure (or rather 
jurisdiction) of, and the services provided by, the agency of public administra-
tion. The procedure of the agency of public administration, different from the 
simple procedure of public administration, envisages the relationship to be 
established between the agency of public administration and the client (the 
private party to public administration) which is covered by law. This is a 
procedure, in which the agency of public administration explores the facts 
relevant to the legal qualification of the case brought before the agency, and at 
the end of which the public agency arrives at a formal decision. The procedure 
of public administration cannot be interpreted in Hungarian law as other than a 
procedure of an agency of public administration. The rights and obligations of 
both parties to the procedure of public administration are emanated precisely 
from this procedure of the agency of public administration. 
In contrast, in tax matters, a procedure of public administration other than a 
procedure of an agency of public administration cannot be precluded. Under 
Section 85 of Taxation Order Act - a procedure of tax administration can take 
place in which the tax authority (i) determines the taxpayer's rights and 
obligations, (ii) makes an audit of the performance of tax liabilities, and (iii) 
keeps records on the facts relevant to the tax liability. This is a procedure, 
different from a tax authority (agency of public administration) procedure. In 
the procedure of tax administration, not identical to a tax authority procedure, 
the tax authority deals with the matters enumerated as items from (ii) - (iii). In 
the tax authority procedure, the tax authority is responsible to deal with the 
matters enumerated as item (i). The tax authority procedure as regulated by 
Section 120 of Taxat ion Order Act covers the determination of the tax base, 
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the tax (advance tax) and the tax relief, if any, the right to receive subsidies 
and to get access to the return of taxes. A tax authority procedure usually 
appears as a result of the determination of the unpaid tax following the 
completion of a tax audit. The tax liability can also be determined by the tax 
authority in extraordinary cases or in terms of advance rulings. In addition, a 
tax authority procedure can imply the management of tax records. A tax 
authority procedure can normally be initiated "ex officio" where the tax authority 
decides for keeping tax records or the determination of the tax liability. The 
tax authority procedure can also start upon the taxpayer 's request . Then the 
tax authority decides for keeping tax records or for the reduction of the tax 
liability by equity reasons or for the reason of allowing the payment of tax in 
instalments. 
Where tax audits are conducted and tax records are handled in a simple 
procedure of tax administration, the taxpayer does not enjoy a higher level of 
legal protection, which would be granted to the taxpayer in a tax authority 
procedure only. This is because in the latter case the taxpayer is provided with 
the client's rights and duties and may challenge the tax authori ty 's decision 
arrived at the end of this procedure, first at a higher instance of tax administra-
tion, secondly, before a court. During a tax audit, and in the procedure where 
tax records are managed, the taxpayer cannot enjoy the status of a client. As a 
consequence, the taxpayer cannot meet the tax authority's formal decision that 
could otherwise be challenged at a higher instance. One can conclude there-
f r o m that the procedure of tax administration as regulated in terms of the tax 
audit and the management of tax records is subject not only to legal considera-
tions, but also to the considerations of efficiency. 
Apparently, tax authorities take decisions both in terms of the procedure of 
tax administration (e.g., during a tax audit) and of the tax authority procedure. 
In the first case, they may take important decisions, for example, while 
exploring the facts relevant to the tax liability. For example, the tax authority 
may decide for the application or non-application of certain means of evidence. 
The taxpayer, whether agrees or not on these measures, is not able by law to 
prevent the tax authority from taking such decisions. As a maximum, the 
taxpayer may make comments on the tax authority conduct in the proceedings 
at the end of the procedure of tax audit. In later stages of the tax dispute, both 
the higher-instance tax authority and the court heavily rely on the evidence 
produced by the tax authority during the audit, not still covered by a higher 
level of legal protection. At a later stage, the dispute between the tax authority 
and the taxpayer can hardly be solved as to whether the tax authority has 
observed its obligation plainly to explore the facts relevant to the tax liability 
or that the taxpayer 's conduct has been consistent with the obligation of good 
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cooperation with the tax authority. It would be easier to administer just ice in 
these matters if even the tax audit is subject to a tax authority procedure. One 
can realise that during a procedure of tax administration other than tax authority 
procedure, the measures taken by the tax authority are legally regulated as 
interim ones, even if they may be of high importance for the purposes of the 
final decision of the tax liability. 
Based on the above, one can criticise, for example, the provision of Section 
93 (1) of Taxation Order Act on the commencement of tax audit. The tax 
authority is by this provision not obliged to arrive at a formal decision of the 
commencement of tax audit. The tax authority is even not obliged by law to 
inform the taxpayer of the commencement of audit. This provision is not 
subject to criticism as to its contents. It is problematic, however, that the tax 
authority's right to take such a decision is not regulated by the Taxation Order 
Act precisely. It would be reasonable to provide in detail for the conditions in 
which the tax authority may take such a decision. 
In Hungarian law, the taxpayer is not allowed to initiate a dispute concerning 
the legality of the tax liability without making a tax return with zero tax 
liability. Failing to declare tax liability, the taxpayer is not able to get rid of the 
determination by the tax authority of the unpaid tax and the application by the 
tax authority of sanctions, associated with the unpaid tax. A solution for the 
problem would be either that the taxpayer could file a tax return with the 
reservation of the right to challenge the validity of the tax liability or that 
the taxpayer could opt out of self-assessment by asking the tax authority to 
determine the tax liability by a formal decision. None of these opportunities is 
currently available in Hungary for taxpayers, however. 
According to Section 124B of Taxation Order Act, the taxpayer may make 
self-audit by raising the only issue whether the legal basis for the tax liability 
as assessed is legal. Then the tax authority confines itself to dealing with this 
only issue. Where the tax authority does not agree on the taxpayer's standpoint 
as reflected in the tax return, decides for the unpaid tax. Then a tax authority 
procedure commences in which the taxpayer can challenge the tax authority 's 
standpoint even up to the instance of a court decision. Nevertheless, the 
taxpayer cannot avoid even in this case assuming the risk that the unpaid tax 
will be identified. 
Interim decisions may well affect the position held by the taxpayer, even if 
not eventually. Both the taxpayer and the tax authority may be engaged in 
taking interim measures.33 The taxpayer may not change the assessment of the 
33
 González, E.: The administrative procedure for determining tax liability. In: 
Amatucci, A. (ed.): International tax law. Alphen an den Rijn, 2006. 127. 
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tax liability but via a tax audit, decided not by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer 
may not change his or her decision taken as a result of a self-audit. The tax 
authority cannot change it decision either but in specific conditions as determined 
by law. The tax authority, realising that it deems to be necessary for any reason 
to change its decision, may make the amendment or revocation of its former 
decision within the conditions as determined by Section 135 (1) of Taxation 
Order Act. 
2. The example of Hungary for the interplay between tax law and civil law 
The Hungarian law on tax administration (Taxation Order Act) suggests more 
than regulating tax administration only. Similarly to the German law pattern of 
"Abgabenordnungsgesetz",34 it implies the general part of tax law, compared to 
the particular laws on single taxes. This general part implies the common legal 
rules on the facts of a tax law case (Tatbestand), that is, on the taxpayer, the 
taxable basis, the tax rate, the possible tax relief and the way of tax collection. 
The legal regulation of tax law-related facts is of importance even for 
constitutional purposes. For example, general tax law may provide for the 
prohibition of confiscation. The Hungarian general tax law as appears in terms 
of the Taxation Order Act is extended to the major principles of taxation. 
Placed into a block of provisions, these principles are appropriate for 
constituting a basis for the taxpayers ' rights, even if it does not contain a broad 
catalogue of taxpayer rights. 
The Taxation Order Act provides for that both taxpayers and the tax 
authority are bound to legal provisions. It also asserts the principle of legal 
certainty [Section 1 (2)1. The tax authority shall exercise its right of discretion 
within the boundaries of equity [Section 1 (6)j. It must not treat taxpayers in a 
discriminatory manner either [Section 1 (3)—(4)]. Both the tax authority and 
the taxpayer shall act in good faith [Section 1 (5)]. This implies the legal 
obligation that the parties to tax administration shall act in co-operation. This 
is similar to the contracting parties who shall by civil law act in co-operation 
as well. The Taxation Order Act prevents taxpayers from getting involved in 
tax avoidance, invoking two principles. First, simulated transactions must be 
disregarded for tax law purposes [Section 1 (7)]. This is designed to solve the 
conflict between the legal form the parties apply on the surface and the real 
legal form, which is concealed. Secondly, the legal form must be disregarded 
where it does not reflect the economic contents of certain transactions [Section 
2 (1)]. This is designed to solve the conflict between the legal form and the 
34
 Abgabenordnungsgesetz vom 29. August 1997 m. mehrf. Änd. 
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economic contents of the same transactions. The tax authority is free to arrive 
at the tax law qualification consistently with the economic contents, no matter 
what the civil law form as applied by parties suggests. The tax authority is 
obliged, however, to take into account both the civil law and tax law aspects of 
a tax avoidance case related to the problem of simulation. The tax law issue 
cannot thus be extricated from the civil law question of simulated contracts. 
Where taxpayers notify certain facts to the tax authority or disclose their 
particulars to the tax authority, they remain to be protected by civil law. The 
tax authority is thus obliged to keep the data communicated by taxpayers 
confidentially and manage them in accordance with the civil law protection of 
personality. Even the tax authority may claim by tax law the protection of 
personality. Section 55 (1) of Taxation Order Act provides for that the tax 
authority may before the public rebut the information the taxpayer has 
delivered and the tax authority thinks to be false and appropriate to shake the 
faith in the tax administration before the public. Another link of tax law to 
civil law is that the calculations used in accounting law can be relevant to the 
tax liability. Since commercial accounting is part of the civil law, broadly 
speaking, this is another piece of evidence for the close connection of tax law 
with civil law. 
Apparently, advance rulings-as a matter of bargaining-are managed in 
accordance with civil law standards. This is an example for the case where 
substantive law problems are converted into procedural ones. In this instance, 
public law prescriptions cease to operate and will be replaced by private law 
techniques of dispute resolution. Again, the fact that tax authority decisions 
can be challenged before civil courts suggests the interconnectedness of tax law 
with civil law. The significance of civil law as a background has been enhanced 
by the EU accession of Hungary to the extent that the malfunction of both the 
fiscal legislator and the tax authority can be sanctioned in terms of the 
compensation (or restitution) for damages, to be regulated by the Civil Code in 
Hungary. 
III. Summary and conclusions 
Taxation and tax law cannot exist without biases because taxation can be seen 
per definition as a set of biases. The question can only be posed if a tax system 
can rest on a sound normative basis with the possibly least interference 
with the decisions of market players, yet with enough allocation and just 
redistribution of the tax burden with regard to the protection of the poor. Even 
if the state pursuing its fiscal policy cannot be neutral, one can expect to enforce 
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the principle of equal treatment before the law. Besides, it must not apply means 
that are not absolutely necessary in order to achieve the legislative goals. State 
intervention need thus be in proportion to the objectives of the policy of 
redistribution or economic stabilization. Furthermore, the law of taxation is 
expected to show stability. Also, fiscal policy need rely on a system of tax 
administration that operates in accordance with the principles of openness, 
good governance and legal certainty. 
Furthermore, it is ideal if the legal regulation of the procedure of tax 
administration is fully fledged. In other words, it is not ideal where for example 
the process of tax audit is covered by interim legal measures only. The legal 
regulation of the tax liability need be comprehensive and cover all the processes 
of gathering tax information, identifying the tax liability and collection of 
taxes. 
Moreover, tax administration and administrative law are inadvertently in a 
need of being completed by private law. Civil law principles can be helpful to 
guide both taxpayers and tax authorities, for example where it is important to 
interpret what the proper way of exercising taxpayer rights means in specific 
circumstances. Where tax authorities are not explicitly authorised by statutory 
law to act, they must rely on the principles that are in accordance with the 
constitutional order. In a country with a market economy and a system of political 
democracy, competences need be established on the subsidiarity principle and 
legal obligations need eventually be assessed, based on the principle of "pacta 
sunt servanda". This means that the final criterion according to which even the 
actions of public administration can be assessed is whether it is reasonable for 
a public authority to act, and if so, whether it has observed any contractual 
obligations. Notably, in Hungary, there is no statutory law that would preclude 
the universal effect of the Civil Code, covering all the financial relations 
whether to be made between private persons or between private persons and 
the representative of the public. 
Finally, for the purposes of approximating an ideal tax system, the possibility 
of horizontal coordination must not be left out of consideration. Businesses 
have to encounter the problem that they have been internationalized while the 
legal and tax systems operate basically in isolation from each other. The nation 
state is not able longer to provide contracting parties entering international 
markets with sufficient legal munitions. These parties are then compelled to 
start negotiating a legal background (a set of the rules of game) on the basis of 
which they can find coherence and legal certainty. Under these circumstances, 
law can be understood all the more from the conduct of the parties who have 
followed legal rules and related norms. Objective law can then be explored in 
its entirety subsequently, f rom the study of the conduct of parties. In this 
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context, legal and tax planning and the choice of legal and tax regimes by 
parties have come to the forefront. Bargaining (e.g., advance ruling) has not 
been strange from tax law either. It is another example for alternatives in tax 
law that the tax liability can be determined in all the more instances depending 
on the taxpayer's choice. 
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1
 Gaius, Institutiones 4, 16. Si in rem agebatur, mobilia quidem et moventia, quae 
modo in ius afferri adducive possent, in iure vindicabantur ad hunc modum: qui vindicabat, 
festucam tenebat: deinde ipsam rem apprehendebat, velut hominem, et ita dicebat: HUNC 
EGO HOMINEM EX IURE QUIRIT1UM MEUM ESSE AIO SECUNDUM SUAM 
CAUSAM; SICUT DIXI, E C C E TIBI, VINDICTAM IMPOSUI, et simul homini festucam 
imponebat, adversarius eadem similiter dicebat : MITTITE A M B O HOMINEM. Illi 
mittebant. qui prior vindicaverat sic dicebat: POSTULO, ANNE DICAS, QUA EX CAUSA 
VINDICAVERIS? ille respondebat : IUS FECI , SICUT V I N D I C T A M IMPOSUI. Deinde 
qui prior vindicaverat, dicebat: Q U A N D O TU INIURIA VINDICAV1STI D AERIS 
S A C R A M E N T O TE P R O V O C O ; adversarius quoque dicebat similiter: ET E G O TE; aut 
si res in f ra mille asses erat, scilicet L asses sacramentum nominabant . deinde eadem 
sequebantur, quae cum in personam ageretur. Postea praetor secundum alterum eorum 
vindicias dicebat, id est interim aliquem possessorem constituebat, eumque iubebat praedes 
adversario dare litis et vindiciarum, id est rei et fructuum; alios autem praedes ipse praetor 
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above presented text. Aulus Gellius in Noctes Atticae2 wants to get an explanation 
for the origin and meaning of "ex iure manum consertum", an expression 
coming from the old legis actio claims, from a renowned grammaticus, who 
first refuses to answer the question since he deals with grammatica, Vergilius, 
Plautus and Ennius. In reply, Gellius remarks that it was exactly chapter eight 
of Ennius 's Annales where he found the phrase; in turn the grammaticus 
asserts that Ennius drew this expression not f rom legal but poetic language. 
The actual explanation follows after that.' Consequently, according to Gellius, 
manum conserere means grasping the object of dispute manually (manu 
prendere), which corresponds to Gaius 's phrase rem apprehendere; however, in 
view of its purpose it has definitely separated from that in the course of 
time.1 According to Gaius ' s locus, the assertion of "proper ty" or "stronger 
right to possess"5 by both parties through uttering the sentence "HUNC EGO 
HOM1NEM EX IURE QUIRITIUM MEUM ESSE AIO" refers to things present 
in iure and grasped manually. Thus, initially vindicatio-just as mancipatio6-was 
created for transactions involving chattels of greater value (i.e., slaves and 
draught animals) since the thought that rule over a single land can be exercised 
merely by placing a rod or hands on it would suppose considerable abstraction 
of generally accepted formalism, hardly reconciled with the way of thinking of 
ab utroque accipiebat sacramenti causa, quod id in publicum cedebat. Festuca autem 
utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusti dominii, quando iusto dominio ea maxime 
sua esse credebant, quae ex hostibus cepissent; unde in centumviralibus iudiciis hasta 
proponitur. 
2
 Gellius, Noctes Atticae 20, 10, 1-10. 
3
 Gellius, Noctes Atticae 20, 10, 7. sqq. "Manum conserere." Nam de qua re disceptatur 
in iure in re praesenti sive ager sive quid aliud est, cum adversario simul manu prendere et 
in ea re sollemnibus verbis vindicare, id est vindicia. Correptio manus in re atque in loco 
praesenti apud praetorem ex duodecim tabulis fiebat, in quibus ita scriptum est: 'si qui in 
iure manum conserunt.' Sed postquam praetores propagatis Italiae finibus datis iuris-
dictionibus negotiis occupati proficisci vindiciarum dicendarum causa ad longinquas res 
gravabantur, institutum est contra duodecim tabulas tacito consensu, ut litigantes non in 
iure apud praetorem manum consererent, sed 'ex iure manum consertum' vocarent, id est 
alter alterum ex iure ad conserendam manum in rem. de qua ageretur, vocaret atque 
profecti simul in agrum, de quo litigabatur. terrae aliquid ex eo, uti unam glebam, in ius in 
urbem ad praetorem deferrent et in ea gleba tamquam in toto agro vindicarent. 
4
 Käser, M.: Zur "legis actio sacramento in rem". Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte, 104 (1987) 57. 
5
 Käser, M.: Eigentum und Besitz im älteren römischen Recht. Weimar, 1956. 16. 
6
 Gaius, Institutiones 1, 119. 
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the archaic age.7 Therefore, the obligation that the object of dispute should be 
present before the magistratus applied to any and all things; and regarding the 
things that could be brought there without any difficulty this requirement 
continued to be in force without any changes.8 In the event of lands and things, 
or totality of things that could not be taken to comitium-according to Gellius, 
in order for the proceedings to comply with the provisions of the Twelve Table 
Law,9 which stipulated that the act of manum conserere had to be implemented 
in iure, i.e., before the law-both the magistratus and the parties to the dispute 
went to the land in order to implement vindicatio there by which the given land 
became ius, i.e., venue of jurisdiction. As the power of Rome was extended, 
the burden on the magistratus increased, and so it was no longer possible to 
apply the above procedure; therefore, a new solution was looked for. 
Contrary to the provision of the Twelve Table Law, through tacitus 
consensus the act of manum conserere was no longer implemented in iure; 
instead, to this end the parties called each other from before the law.1" The 
party claiming the thing (the latter plaintiff) called the owner of the thing (the 
later defendant) f rom the comitium to the place where the object of dispute lay; 
the parties went there together, and took a piece of the thing, then brought it to 
Rome before the magistratus where vindicatio described by Gaius was carried 
out as if the entire land had stood before the law. (Gaius is silent about the 
procedure of manum conserere since the narration of legis actio lawsuits 
provides a historical outlook for those who study iurisprudentia, and not an 
antiquarian who carries out research like Gellius.)" So the ritual of manum 
conserere was applied only in the case of certain objects of dispute as it were 
to prepare vindicatio. The reference made to praetor in Gell ius 's text with 
respect to the time of the Twelve Table Law is, of course, anachronism.12 The 
territory of the State of Rome, the ager Romanus antiquus did not go beyond a 
five-six mile strip of land surrounding the pomerium on the left bank of the 
Tiberis;13 this strip was extended to ten miles only through the occupation of 
I
 Thür, G.: Vindicatio und deductio im frührömischen Grundstückstreit. Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, 94 (1977) 296. 
8
 Käser: op. cit. 1987. 57. 
9
 Leges XII tabularum 6, 5/a SI (QUI) IN IURE MANUM CONSERUNT. 
10
 Cf. Cicero, M. T.: De oratore. Cambridge, 1959-1968. 1, 10, 4: Epistulae ad 
familiares 7, 13, 2; Epistulae ad Atticum 15, 7. 
II
 Käser: op. cit. 1987. 59. 
12
 Wieacker, F: Die XII Tafeln in ihrem Jahrhundert. Les origines de la république 
Romaine. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, 13 (1968) 303. sqq. 
13
 Thür: op. cit. 1977. 298. 
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Fidenae in 426;14 it is probable that merely this increase in territory made it 
necessary to create the procedure of ex iure mamim consertum vocare instead 
of in iure manum conserere,15 
The development described by Gellius perfectly corresponds to the changes 
in the procedure described in Pro Murena, implemented in iure; likewise they 
can be brought into harmony with the ritual of vindicatio presented by Gaius, if 
the sentences bequeathed by Cicero are interpreted as the preparatory procedure 
of the actual vindicatio.16 Accordingly, for picking up a lump of earth, that is, 
to implement manum conserere the assistance of the magistratus was no 
longer required since he could set out from the assumption that the witnesses 
present when the act was carried out17 would report during the proceedings any 
irregularity that might have occurred. By that the land no longer represented ius, 
venue of jurisdiction.18 Now manum conserere was used in the meaning of 
vindicias sumere", in the sense of vindicatio,14 i.e., grasping the object of dispute 
by the parties in the form of manum conserere and bringing it before the law. 
Just as the magistratus made his job easier, the parties did the same provided 
that an agreement was reached between them regarding the issue; if they 
wanted to bring an action regarding a definite land, they brought a lump of 
earth from the land needed later for vindicatio, and at the instruction of the 
magistratus they only pretended to leave from before the law.2" 
II. The overt insistence on text of legis actio sacramento is widely known 
since-as Gaius himself stressed i t -one who misquoted a single word of the text 
lost the lawsuit.21 In Roman thinking faith in the impact of spoken words 
14
 Alföldi, A.: Hasta - Summa Imperii. The Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in 
Rome. American Journal of Archeology, 63 ( 1959) 304. 
15
 Thür: op. cit. 1977. 298. 
16
 Käser: op. cit. 1987. 63. 
17
 Festus, De verborum significatione 394. Superstites testes praesentes significat. 
Cuius rei testimonium est, quod superstitibus praesentibus i, inter quos controversia est, 
vindicias sumere iubentur. 
18
 Kaser: op. cit. 1987. 64. 
14
 Festus, De verborum significatione 516. Vindiciae appellantur res eae, de quibus 
controversia est. De quo verbo Cincius sic ait: 'Vindiciae olim dicebantur illae, quae ex 
fundo emptae in ius adlatac crant.' At Ser. Sulpicius vindiciam esse ait qua de re controversia 
est, ab eo quod vindicatur. ... XII: 'Si vindiciam falsam tulit, si velit is ... tor arbitras tris 
dato, eorum arbitrio fructus duplione damnum decidito.' 
20
 Thür: op. cit. 1977. 298. 
71
 Gaius, Insitutiones 4, 11. Actiones ... ideo quia ipsarum legum verbis accomodatae 
erant et ideo inmutabiles proinde atque leges obseervabantur; unde eum qui de vitibus succisi 
ita egisset, ut in actione vites nominaret, responsum est rem perdidisse, cum debuisset 
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constituting reality bore high significance.22 "The reason for that was the 
Romans ' unshakeable faith in the numinous force of uttered words; it is our 
firm belief that all things considered existence is identical with the existence 
uttered, complete reality is no other than reality cast into words. "23 
Regarding the origin of the word fatum several Roman authors can be 
quoted. Varro believes the term fatum comes from the fact that the Parcae 
determine the lifespan of infants by stating their decision;24 which is confirmed 
by Fronto who asserts that destiny is called fatum after the spoken word. This 
recognition of Antique people that fatum derives from the verb for, fari, fatus 
sum has been confirmed by modern linguistics.25 The commentary written by 
Servius on Vergilius's Aeneis helps to go into deeper analysis by asserting that 
fatum is participium, and denotes what the gods have said;26 consequently, the 
term itself means divine word, divine decision (Götterspruch).21 On the other 
hand, there is a goddess called Fata: on the territory of Lavinium three altar 
inscriptions f rom the 4 , h-3 r d c. B.C. were found which prove the cult of the 
Goddess Fata;28 her name is Neuna (Nona), which is known from several literary 
sources. Here, Gellius quotes Varro and Caesellius Vindex, who describes the 
name of the Parcae, and, on the grounds of Livius Andronicus's quotation f rom 
the Odysseia, the coming of a day foretold by Morta.24 The Parca Morta/Maurtia 
named by Caesellius Vindex is also known from the inscription from Lavinium;3 0 
arbores nominare eo quod lex XII tabularum ... generaliter de arboribus succisis loqueretur; 
30. Sed istae omnes legis actiones paulatim in odium venerum, namque ex nimia subtilitate 
veterum qui tunc iura condiderunt eo res perducta est, ut vel qui minimum errasset litem 
perderet. 
22
 Käser, M.: Das altrömische ius. Göttingen, 1949. 309. sqq. 
"
3
 Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Reden und Schweigen. Römische Religion bei Plinius maior. 
München, 1972. 312; Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe 
(Introduction to the History of Roman Religion and Myth). Budapest, 1995. 207. 
24
 Varro, De lingua Latina 6.52. Ab hoc ... fari, tempóra quod tum pueris constituant 
Parcae fando, dictum fatum et res fatales. 
~
5
 Walde, A.-Hofmann, J. В.: Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. Heidelberg, 
1954. I. 463. sqq. 
2(
' Servius, Commentarius in Verg. Aen. 2, 54. Modo participium est, hoc est, quae dii 
loquuntur. 
"
7
 Pötscher, W.: Das römische Fatum - Begriff und Verwendung. In: Pötscher, W.: 
Hellas und Rom. Hildesheim, 1988.490. 
28
 Vetter 1953. I. 322. 1. Neuna. Fata; 2. Neuna. Dono; 3. Parca Martia/Dono. 
"''Gellius, Noctes Atticae 3, 16, 10. Parca ... Nona et Décima a partus tempestivi 
tempore; 11. Tria nomina Parcarum sunt Nona, Decuma, Morta et versum hinc Livii ponit 
ex Odysseia: quando dies adveniet, quem profata est Morta? 
30
 Latte, K.: Römische Religionsgeschichte. München, 1967. 53. 
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the question arises if the goddess Fata can be called Parca; more specifically: if 
we are talking abut the same goddess when referring Fata and Parca?31 Nona is 
named Fata on the inscriptions, and Parca by literary sources; Morta is referred 
to as Parca both on inscriptions and in literary sources. On the other hand, 
the fragment f rom Livius Andronicus talks about Maurtia with Fata being as 
it were her interpreter; that is, her scope of activity is fari. Through Gell ius it 
is known f rom Varro that the name of Parca comes f rom the word " p a r t u s " 
by changing one sound thereof,3 2 so her name was originally Parica; that is, 
she was adored as the goddess of delivery, birth. Parca, however, can be also 
Morta/Maurtia; consequently, she is in close relation with death, which is 
highly stressed for a goddess of delivery and birth when a child is born dead; 
but the sources reveal that Morta/Maurtia can stand beside goddess Fata as an 
interpreter, which is not much surprising when considering Fata's relation to 
fatum, whose meanings include: death, destruction, perishing. 
In Greek fai th the Moirai measured out mortals ' moira, portion of l ife; 
and since they followed up human life, they were active at birth too. Roman 
thinking split this function into two; goddesses carried out tasks related to 
birth as Parcae, they made decisions over human fate as Fatae; while the 
Greek Moirai united both aspects in themselves, Roman rel igion-using the 
methodology known from the creation of the image of Sondergötter?i-expressed 
these two functions through two goddesses (Parca and Fata); the difference 
between them is based only on shift of emphasis since, as the comparison of 
the three inscriptions and the literary sources has revealed, the Parca is at the 
same time Fata, and the Fata is at the same time Parca,34 depending on which 
numen of which aspect comes to the front.35 
It is a fact that both the word fatum, the divine word and Fata, the goddess 
who has spoken come f rom the verb fari\ their form with their suff ix is 
participium perfectum. In classic Latin this form usually denotes passive voice, 
except for deponens verbs; on the other hand, for certain verbs with form and 
denotation in the active voice grammar books define participium perfec tum 
31
 Pötscher: op. cit. 1988. 487. 
3
" Gellius, Noctes Atticae 3, 16, 10. Nam Parca, inquit, inmutata una littera a partu 
nominata. 
33
 Usener, H.: Götternamen. Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung. 
Bonn. 1896. 75. 
34
 Pötscher, W.: Person-Bereichdenken und Personifikation. Literaturwissenschaftliche 
Jahrbücher, 19 (1978) 481. Dh. dass die Parca auch Fata und die Fata auch Parca ist (oder 
sein kann). 
35
 Cf. Pötscher. W.: Vergil und die göttlichen Mächte - Aspekte seiner Weltanschau-
ung. Hildesheim-New York, 1977. 33. sqq. 
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as denot ing active voice (although this form, as shown above, is primarily 
passive). Even without exploring the roots of the problem in the history of 
language it is unambiguously clear that participium perfectum in ancient Indo-
German language was exempt f rom diathesis,36 it could be used either in 
active, or passive voice, or in intransitive meaning. For deponens verbs, which 
include fari, active is the primary meaning but passive is also allowed.37 The 
relation between fatum and Fata does not seem to be an accident; what is 
more, it is quite probable that what they manifest is the active and passive 
aspects of the same uniform experience;38 fatum is the divine word, Fata is the 
result of the activity of the goddess who utters this word. The act of fari is 
possessed by each god who utters a given divine decision;39 in line with this 
interpretation, Isidorus Hispalensis also calls everything that the gods tell and 
Iuppiter says fatum.10 Therefore, fatum is the giving of the divine decision 
uttered; fari was not limited to Fataere, or to Parcaere; fatum can be given, for 
example, by Iuppiter,41 Iuno,42 Apollo43 and gods in general.44 
It was not by accident that the concepts of the Romans formed of destiny, 
fate were so strongly attached to the uttered divine word's force to create 
reality; they identified human existence with the formulation of existence, 
casting existence into words; this fundamental experience may bring closer to 
understanding the Roman thinking ex asse. 
III. In his account Plinius maior describes that Ops Opifera 's Temple was 
consecrated by pontifex maximus Metellus, but due to his difficulties in 
speaking fluently he was compelled to suffer for months until he was able to 
utter the words of the dedication Sometime between 123 B.C. and 104 B.C. 
another, the fourth temple was raised for goddess Ops in Rome- i t cannot be 
36
 Brugmann, K.: Griechische Grammatik. München, 1913. 535. 
37
 Vö. Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae 2, 379, 11. 
38
 Pötscher: op. cit. 1978. 490. 
34
 Cicero, De fato 30. si ita fatum erit; Livius, Ab Urbe condita 25, 12, 6. mihi ita 
Iuppiter fatus est; Vergilius, Aeneis 10, 621. cui rex aetherii breviter sic fatur Olympi. 
411
 Isidorus, Etymologiae 8, 11, 90. Fatum dicunt esse, quidquid dii fantur, quidquid 
Iuppiter fatur. 
41
 Vergilius, Aeneis 4, 612. si ... necesse est, et sic fata Iovis poscunt. 
42
 Vergilius, Aeneis 7, 294. fata lunonis iniquae. 
43
 Accius, Tragoediae 481. veter fatorum terminus sic iusserat. 
44
 Vergilius, Aeneies 2, 54. et si fata deum si mens non laeva fuisset. 
43
 Plinius, Naturalis história 11, 174. Metellum pontificem adeo inexplanatae (sc. 
linguae) fuisse accipimus, ut multis mensibus tortus credatur, dum mediatur in dedicanda 
aede Opi Opiferae dicere. 
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excluded but seems not much probable that her temple on the Capitolium was 
restored-and it was pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus who 
had to consecrate this temple, of whose career no more is known for sure than 
that he fulfilled the office of the high priest in 114 B.C.4'1 Plinius's text gives 
an account of Metel lus 's difficulties in using language, which does not seem to 
have any historical significance, but in terms of religion it turns the attention to 
a cardinal point of Roman religio; specifically, the requirement of "the pre-
determined, accurate form, exact order of the utterance of the words to be 
spoken".41 Complete physical health was in Rome-as in several other religions-a 
prerequisite for fulfilling priestly functions,42 which seems all the less surprising 
since this requirement held both with respect to sacrificial animals,49 and the 
official participants of sacrifices.50 
The question may arise how come that Metellus acted as pontifex maximus; 
all the more, as he was the only pontifex who had some physical disability 
f rom birth as sources reveal. (Albeit, tradition maintains the memory of another 
pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus, who fulfilled this office between 243 
B.C. and 221 B.C., and who got blind after having been elected, as he saved 
the Palladium guaranteeing the existence of Rome from Vesta' temple during a 
fire, which was not allowed to be seen by anybody, including the pontifex 
maximus.51 After he had got blind, being scrupulously precise in complying 
with religious requirements, and elected dictator seventeen years after he had 
been alleged to got blind, this high priest52 did not resign; because-as rhetoric 
controversiae reveal5 3-a man with physical handicaps was not permitted to 
become pontifex, but in case of accidents that occurred when he had already 
fulfilled the office he was not obliged to resign. 4 It is, however, highly probable 
that the narrative on pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus's blindness is 
nothing else but rendering the myth of Caeculus, the ancestor of the gens 
46
 Wissowa, G.: Religion unci Kultus der Römer. München, 1912. 203; Latte: op. cit. 73. 
47
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 71. 
48
 Wissowa: op. cit. 491. 
44
 Seneca, Controversiae 4, 2. Sacerdos non integri corporis quasi mali ominis res 
vitanda est. Hoc etiam in victimis notatur, quanto magis in sacerdotibus? 
50
 Plinius, Naturalis história 7, 105. (Sc. M. Sergius Silus) in praetura sacris arceretur a 
collegis ut debilis. 
51
 Plinius, Naturalis história 7, 139. 
52
 Valerius Maximus 8, 13, 2. Metellus ... pontifex maximus tutelam caeremoniarum 
per duo et XX annos neque ore in votis nuncupandis haesitante neque in sacrificiis 
faciendis tremula manu gessit. 
33
 Seneca, Controversiae 4, 2. 
54
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 72. 
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Caecilia, coming f rom Vulcanus and found next to the public hearth dedicated 
to Vesta as a historical fact.55) L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus becoming 
pontifeX maximus might have been made possible partly by the growing 
rationality of the age, on the one hand; as a result of this rationality certain 
religious requirements were no longer seriously observed, or they tried to 
evade them in some form or other;56 and by the fact that most of the texts to be 
spoken by Roman priests were pre-determined, and so could be learned by 
heart even by the pontifex afflicted with inherent speech difficulty through 
lengthy and tiring exercise;57 as a matter of fact, this would not have been 
possible in a religion based on spontaneous sacred speech, free preaching and 
prophetic prayer.58 
The text of the dedicatio most probably contained the name of goddess 
Ops Opifera, which must have posed a double challenge to pontifex maximus 
with his difficulties in speaking fluently (inexplanata lingua): to utter an 
alliterating name was certainly not an easy task for a man with speech difficulties 
and perhaps stuttering; furthermore, it was exactly during the dedicatio that the 
accurate naming of the goddess was highly important since Ops Opifera 
belonged to the deities of sowing.59 The significance of the goddess Ops was 
never doubtful to the Romans fo r - a s her name shows6(J-it was attached to 
richness; more exactly, to the richness of the produce; in other words, Ops 
incorporated the rich yield of the arable land, manifested the helping aspect of 
the mother earth;61 as a matter of fact, in line with the inclination to go into 
details inherent in Roman religion various forms of manifestation of the soil 
were distinguished, so the soil was adored in general as Tellus, in its aspect 
enhancing life as Ceres, and in its capacity to produce crop as Ops.62 
Roman religion, however, divided the aspects of Ops into further parts, as it 
was customary for it to assign so-called Sondergottheiten to the chronologically 
succeeding elements of various events and actions.63 On 25 August, they held 
the festivity of Ops Consiva, i.e., of the goddess who "has carried out 
gathering of the crop"; and two days earlier, on 23 August, the festivity of Ops 
55
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 74. 
5<
' See Latte: op. cit. 276. 
57
 Latte: op. cit. 198. 392; Wissowa: op. cit. 397; Dumézil, G.: La religion romaine 
archaïque. Paris, 1973. 53. sqq. 
58
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 77. 
59
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 78. 
60
 Walde-Hofmann: op. cit. II. 205. sq. 
61
 Radke, G.: Die Götter Altitaliens. Munster, 1965. 238. sqq. 
62
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 76. 
63
 Latte: op. cit. 51. sqq.; Radke: op. cit. 23. sqq. 
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Opifera was celebrated,64 f rom which it can be unambiguously deduced that 
the name Ops Opifera-i ts second part is connected with the verb "ferre"-
should be interpreted as the goddess65 "bringing abundance of heavy crop".be 
On that same day, 23 August, they celebrated Volcanalia, and its logical 
connection with the festivity of Ops Opifera becomes clear when considering 
that it is wheat not collected yet in pitfalls that is the most exposed to fire, and 
is in need of Ops Opifera 's resolute protection against Vulcanus.67 Today it is 
no longer possible to explore in every detail why the Romans thought it was 
especially dangerous to call the deities of sowing by their names; however, it 
indicates the importance of the goddess Ops that in the course of searching for 
the secret guardian deity of Rome-this name was not known by the public just 
to prevent evocatio by the enemy-Ops has also arisen as a deity who might 
have fulfilled this function.68 
The findings summed here clearly show that the validity of dedicatio as an 
integral institution of ius sacrum was inseparably attached to the exact utterance 
and proper order of the words to be spoken; as a parallel this phenomenon 
makes it more definite that legis actio sacramento in rem was strongly focused 
on the text. 
IV. A peculiar interpretation of prodigium provides an interesting parallel with 
the reality creating function of the spoken word. First, a brief examination of the 
significance of prodigium will be given. The Romans called the accustomed 
order, peaceful state of the world pax de(or)um, which meant the gods' 
peaceful relation to humans; and if this order was upset, it was always 
deducible to the gods ' stepping out of this peaceful state.6" The breakdown 
of the cosmic order, that is, any extraordinary, new event was considered 
prodigium.70 The etymology of the word is dubious-in Walde-Hofmann ' s inter-
pretation prodigium derives f rom the compound "prod-aio"\ consequently, 
prodigium means foretelling, or pointing ahead. This interpretation does not 
seem satisfying because prodigium was a term that always had to be inter-
64
 Radke: op. cit. 239. 
65
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 77. 
66
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 79. 
67
 Latte: op. cit. 73. 129; Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 79. 
68
 Maerobius, Saturnalia 3, 9, 3^4. Deum in cuius tutela urbs Roma est ... ignotum alii 
Iovem crediderunt, alii Lunam, sunt qui Ageronam, ... alii autem quorum fides mihi videtur 
firmior Opem Consivam esse dixerunt. 
69
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 61. 
70Zintzen, C.: Prodigium. In: Ziegler, K. et. al (ed,.): Der Kleine Pauly. München, 
1979. IV. 1151. 
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preted, and that is why in Rome they always used the help of pontifices, libri 
Sibyllini or haruspices to carry out this task, since prodigium itself does not 
state anything; apparently another interpretation is more proper that asserts that 
the word derives f r o m the compound "prod-agere", so prodigium means the 
process of moving ahead; accordingly, prodigium is nothing else than the act 
when "breaking through this shell, transcendental forces hiding behind the 
surface come forth and become manifest".71 
Among the forms of interpretation of prodigium Plinius maior discusses the 
fol lowing case at a highlighted point: when laying the foundations of the 
Capitolium the Romans found a human head on the Tarpeius Hill; they sent 
delegates to the most famous oracle of Etruria, Olenus Calenus, who tried to 
transpose the prodigium with fortunate significance to his own people. In front 
his feet he drew the image of the temple with his cane and said: "So you say 
so, Romans? This is where Iuppiter Optimus Maximus's temple will be, we 
found the head here?" The oracle's son warned the delegates about his father 's 
t r ick-if they had given improper answer, the prediction would have passed on 
Etruria: "We do not say that the head was found exactly here but in Rome", 
replied the delegates.72 In his account Plinius refers to the concordant evidence 
in the Annales, and research has established that he took the description from 
Valerius Antias, who used Piso and Fabius Pictor as sources;73 accordingly, this 
legend had existed as early as the 3rd c. B.C.74 The author does not intend to 
analyse the symbolism of the head in detail, just notes that the durability of 
buildings (the Capitolium was the symbol the city of Rome and so the empire 
itself) was meant to be ensured by people living in Europe since the Neolithic 
age through the ritual of walling up live persons. As certain versions of the text 
report not only on a human head but a healthy human body, it can be made 
probable that the story intended to refer to such a ritual.75 The oracle wanted to 
rob fatum from Rome, and pointed at the outlined layout, and tried to convince 
71
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 62. 
72
 Plinius, Naturalis história 28, 15. Cum in Tarpeio fodientes delubro fundamenta 
caput humánum invenissent, missis ob id ad se legatis Etruriae celeberrimus vates Olenus 
Calenus, praeclarum id fortunatumque cernens, interrogatione in suam gentem transferre 
temptavit, scipione determinata prius templi imagine in solo ante se: 'Hoc ergo dicitis, 
Romani? hic templum Iovis optimi maxumi futurum est, hie caput invenimus?' Constan-
tissima Annalium adfirmatione, transiturum fuisse fatum in Etruriam, ni praemoniti a filio 
vatis legati respondissent: 'Non plane hic, sed Romane inventum caput dicimus.' 
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 Münzer, F.: Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius. Berlin. 1897. 
149. 
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the Romans to say that the head had been found at the oracle's feet, on the land 
of Etruria. If the Romans had made such a statement, the impacts of the 
prodigium would have been produced on the Etruscans; the head would have 
stayed in Rome but not the fatum related to it. 
So human word in Roman thinking had magical impact creating and 
changing reality; in this respect it is enough to think of the statements made on 
fatum,76 In our present way of thinking, we would of course interpret the oracle' 
words interpreting the prodigium in terms of sense and not word for word; the 
people of the age of the legend, however, did not do so. "The reason for that 
was the Romans' unshake able faith in the numinous force of uttered words; it 
is our firm belief that all things considered existence is identical with the 
existence uttered, complete reality is no other than reality cast into words. "11 
V. Among the norms of table eight of the Twelve Table Law containing 
criminal law rules several original provisions can be found that are in close 
connection with verbality: "QUI MALUM CARMEN INCANTASSIT... ",78 
and related to it there is a norm that imposes capital punishment on those 
who conjure up carmen reviling others.79 The law also provides for those 
who enchant and allure others ' crop to come to them: " Q U I FRUGES 
EXCANTASSIT" "NEVE ALIEN AM SEGETEM PELLEXER1S"81 With this 
latter source it is possible to connect the remark of Servius's commentary on 
Vergilius,82 and with the loci 1/a. and 8/a. Plinius maior ' s thought.83 It was not 
by accident that the author of this paper quoted the relevant paragraph in 
Naturalis história, because Plinius compares the relevant provisions of the 
76
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 308. sqq. 
77
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 312; 1995. 207. 
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 Leges XII tabularum 8, 1/a. 
79
 Leges XII tabularum 8, 1/b (Cicero, De re publica 4, 10, 12.) Nostrae XII tabulae, 
cum perpaucas res capite sanxissent, in his hanc quoque sanciendam putaverunt: si quis 
occentavisset sive carmen condidisset, quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri. 
80
 Leges XII tabularum 8, 8/a. 
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 Leges XII tabularum 8, 8/b. 
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 Servius, Commentarius in Verg. Aen. 8, 99. Atque satas alio vidi traducere messes. 
Magicis quibusdam artibus hoc fiebat, unde est in XII tabulis: neve - pellexeris. 
83
 Plinius, Naturalis história 28, 18. Quid? Non et legum ipsarum in XII tabulis verba 
sunt: Qui fruges excantassit. et alibi: Qui malum carmen incantassit? Verrius Flaccus 
auctores ponit, quibus credat in oppugnationibus ante omnia solitum a Romanis sacerdotibus 
evocari deum cuius in tutela id oppidum esset, promittique illi eundem aut ampliorem apud 
Romanos cultum. Et durât in pontificum disciplina id sacrum, constatque ideo occultatum 
in cuius dei tutela Roma esset, ne qui hostium simili modo agerent. 
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Twelve Table Law with the ritual regarding which his source, Verrius Flaccus 
names several authors: in the siege of a town the Roman priests first of all 
"evoked" the god (this is the so-called evocatio) under whose patronage the 
given town stood, since in Rome they promised the same or greater cult to the 
god; furthermore, this ceremony had survived in the pontifices' science, and 
that is why they kept the name of the god in secret under whose patronage 
Rome stood to avoid that the enemy should act the same way.84 To have better 
understanding of these provisions of the Twelve Table Law, it is worth making 
some remarks concerning the locus regarding evocatio. 
With respect to evocatio the text contains two unambiguous statements: on 
the one hand, the ceremony of evocatio; on the other hand, its practice that had 
existed-in theory-until his own age, i.e., the 1st c. This latter statement on the 
survival of the custom might be the author 's own thought and does not go back 
to the auctores referred to above by him;1*3 at the same time, it cannot be 
excluded that Plinius simply took over Verrius's statement without any critical 
note or comment.8 '1 Even if presuming that the comment on the survival of the 
ritual was indeed Plinius 's own assertion, it does not necessarily mean that he 
himself were allowed to inspect pontifical writings, much rather he might have 
supposed-relying on what he read in Verrius-that it had not changed until his 
age.87 Plinius did not disclose the text of the ceremony, but it can be found in 
Macrobius, who described in concreto carmen evocationis applied to Carthago.88 
Concerning evocatio Plinius speaks about oppidum-the ceremony of evocatio 
could be used against a town, i.e., urbs, founded by complying with sacred 
rituals similarly to Rome,84 but as sources reveal it could be used against 
oppida too; the term "solitum" seems to imply that evocatio occurred much 
more often in the course of Roman history than the specific cases supported by 
documentary evidence imply.'"1 Furthermore, the author clearly states that the 
ceremony of evocatio was performed by sacerdotes, contrary to the ritual of 
devotio urbis which fell in the competence of the dictator, or the imperátori 
84
 About ius fetiale see Fusinato, G.: Dei feziali e del diritto feziale. Maeerata, 1884; 
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While in Roman beliefs evocatio-bemg carmen addressed to a deity having 
a specifically determined personality-prepared the destruction of the enemy's 
town as a religious act, devotio urbis did that as consecratio addressed to 
magical, that is, impersonal forces of the underworld;42 most frequently aimed 
against the town already deprived of its guardian deities.9 ' The carmen of 
devotio urbis is also known f rom Macrobius.94 At the same time, it is not 
possible to set up unambiguously a nulla devotio sine evocatione95 thesis since 
devotio was frequently applied without evocatio-as the latter could be carried 
out only regarding urbes-here Macrobius intended to set a logical sequence 
only, rather than determine a cogens norm of ius sacrum. The source cited also 
states that to avoid evocatio carried out by the enemy they kept the identity of 
the deity who protected Rome in secret. It is in line with Plinius's statements, 
which can be read in Macrobius4 '1 and Servius,97 albeit, regarding the issue if 
their content corresponds to the facts contradictory views are entertained in the 
literature because the name of the guardian deity is unknown; some experts 
brand the ideas about it pure fiction or relatively late borrowing from the 
East;98 however, others dismissing this standpoint of supercriticism suppose 
that it was not to support the ritual of evocatio that the sources created a secret 
deity for Rome but it was the thinking of people of the age-which accepted the 
notion that enemies ' towns could be destructed though evocatio-that deemed it 
necessary to keep Rome 's guardian deity 's name in secret in order to protect it 
against possible evocatio carried out by enemies.99 
Rome's other (secret) name-nomen alterum-is referred to by Plinius maior 
also at other points;100 the "nisi" inserted by Mommsen, held quite uncertain in 
Wagenvoort 1956. 31. sqq.; cf. Cicero, De domo sua 128. ...ut imperátor agros de 
hostibus captos consecraret. 
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inherited texts, affects the core of the content of the source,"" which might 
make it probable that the secret name of the city of Rome was permitted to be 
uttered solely in secret ceremonies. This assumption, i.e., Mommsen 's addition, 
is basically in confl ict with and made unnecessary by the image of the 
goddess since she was portrayed both with covered eyes and sealed mouth to 
indicate complete silence that referred to her name, and with/by the sources 
that confirm that this secret name was not permitted to be uttered even in 
religious ceremonies.102 On the grounds of the above it seems logical to ignore 
the insertion "nisi" when reviewing the text. The source contains three data: 
first, the existence of the secret name of the city of Rome; secondly, that it was 
betrayed by Valerius Soranus and the betrayer was punished-Plinius traces this 
information back to Varro-thirdly, the cult of goddess Angerona; the latter is 
taken by the author from Verrius; the second and third fact will be touched on 
only to the extent that they are related to the controversial issue of nomen 
alterum.m The existence of the secret name of the city of Rome can be 
supported from several points of view: dismissing the standpoint of hypercrticism, 
as in the case of evocatio, until the contrary has been proved, the ritual of 
devotio urbis can be accepted as an element actually used and constituting an 
integral part of Roman religion. Regarding secret names, research has explored 
several parallels between the names of persons, tribes and towns, whose secrecy 
in each case was rooted in the belief in the possibility of abusing the name 
through magical means, and it was meant to protect the bearer of the name 
against such abuse.104 
(The phrase "dicere arcanis caeremoniarum nefas habetur" raises the 
question which nominativus the expression arcanis caeremoniarum can be 
deduced to: to the peculiar genitivus partitivus arcanae caeremoniarum, or to 
arcana caeremoniarum, where the genitivus allows interpretation either as 
explicativus, or possessivus or partitivus. That is, does Plinius mean totally 
secret ceremonies by it, or only rituals that had parts including secret elements 
but their entirety was performed in public. Whichever interpretation is accepted, 
it seems certain that the ceremony, or ceremonies mentioned by Plinius was/were 
somehow connected with the secret name of Rome and the prohibition to utter 
it.) Although Plinius does not specify here what ceremony he meant, there is 
1111
 Corpus Insciptionum Latinarum I. 409. 
102
 Servius, Commentarius in Verg. Aen. 1, 277. Urbis ... verum nomen nemo vel in 
sacris enuntiat. Georg. 1, 498. Verum nomen eius numinis ... sacrorum lege prohibetur. 
103
 About nomen alterum see Plinius, Naturalis história 2, 15; 2, 37; 3, 2; 4, 28; 5, 115; 
16, 48; 21, 52; 23, 35. 
104
 Wissowa: op. cit. 69. 
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only one ritual known considered indeed strictly secret that was so closely 
related to the secret name of the city as evocatio to the secret guardian deities 
of the city, and that is devotio urbis. In a similar spirit Macrobius comments 
upon the issue."15 Just as Macrobius somewhat mingles the ceremonies of 
evocatio and devotio urbis, Plinius does not clearly separate the two rituals 
from one another either; it must have been the essential secrecy of both cases 
that made the author to draw parallel with the portrayal of goddess Angerona, 
which is involved in the text definitely as the symbol of silent secrecy without 
making it possible to determine clearly whose secret the goddess preserves. 
Returning to the quoted loci of the Twelve Table Law, it does not seem 
unnecessary to recall what meanings the term carmen carries when occurring 
in the sources. The term carmen can have very different meanings: work song,106 
children' song, game rhyme,107 love song,108 satirical poem, funny song,109 legend, 
sentence,110 magical rhyme, healing song,1" cultic song, prayer,112 prophecy,113 
song on the deceased, ancestors,114 ancient law,115 entering into an alliance, 
declaration of war and military oath ." 6 On the grounds of this ranking it is 
possible to accept the interpretation that the relevant provision of the Twelve 
Table117 imposed capital punishment on those using abusive songs ; " 8 in 
other of the case "fruges excantassit" and "segetem pellexerit" are properly 
103
 Macrobius, Saturnalia 3, 9, 5-6. 9. Ipsius vero urbis nomen etiam doctissimis 
ignoratum est, caventibus Romanis, ne quod saepe adversus urbes hostium fecisse se 
noverant, idem ipsi quoque hostili evocatione paterentur, si tutelae suae nomen divulgaretur. 
Sed videndum, ne, quod non nulli male aestimaverunt, nos quoque confundat opinantes 
uno carmine et evocari ex aliqua urbe deos, et ipsam devotam fieri civitatem. ... Urbes 
vero ... sic devoventur iam numinibus evocatis. 
106
 Tibullus 2, 6, 21-26: Vergilius, Georgica 1, 287-294. 
107
 Porphyrio, Commentarius in Hor. Epist. 1, 1, 62; in Hor. ars 417. 
108
 Horatius, Satirae 1, 5, 14-21. 
"" Suetonius. Divus Iulius 49. 51; Horatius, Epistulae 2, 1, 139-155; Augustinus. De 
civitate Dei 2, 9. 
II
 Gellius, Noctes Atticae 4, 9, 1-2; Isidoras, Etymologiae 6, 8, 12. 
I I I
 Varro, De lingua Latina 6, 21; Plinius, Naturalis história 28, 2, 29; 28, 2. 10. 17-18. 
112
 Quintiiianus, Institutio oratoria 1, 6, 40; Varro, De lingua Latina 7, 27; Cato, De 
agricultura 141. 1-3; Macrobius, Saturnalia 3, 9, 6. 
113
 Festus, De significatione verborum 325; Livius, Ab Urbe condita 25, 12, 2 -14 . 
114
 Cicero, Brutus 19. 75. 
115
 Gellius, Noctes Atticae 20, 1, 42-49. 
116
 Livius, Ab Urbe condita 1, 24, 4-9; 1, 32, 5-14. 
117
 Leges XII tabularum 8, 1/b 
118
 Cicero, De re publica 4, 10, 12; Cf. Porphyrio, Commentarius in Hor. Sat. 2, 1, 82. 
Lege XII tabulis cautum erat, ne quis in quemquam maledicum carmen scriberet. 
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cases 1 ' 4 the law uses the term carmen in the sense of magical rhyme. The 
facts highlighted by another locus in Plinius;120 this source adduces to the three 
goddesses of harvesting grain without naming two of them (Seia, Segesta), and 
refers to the third one asserting that it is prohibited to utter her name in a 
house, or in any roofed place (sub tecto). It is known from other parallel loci 
that the third goddess bore the name Tutilina.121 Most probably what we have 
here is a permanent triad of goddesses. The function of the first two goddesses 
is quite clear: Seia protects the seed sown and resting in the soil, and Segesta 
protects grain ripening, still standing, which seems to be confirmed by the 
etymology of the two names.122 In the examination of Tutilina's name and role 
it is most fortunate to set out f rom the analytical approach quite typical of 
Roman religion by which it splits certain processes of life into the minutest 
units, and assigns each phase of these actions or events to the powers of a 
particular Sondergotf23 by naming a Usener, individual deity specially allocated 
to them.124 
This triad undoubtedly belongs to the phases of the ripening of grain, and it 
logically comes f rom that that having knowledge of the roles of the first and 
second Sondergöttin the role of the third one can be determined; specifically, it 
is the task of harvesting grain, and bringing it to the barn, and guarding it 
there. This is in harmony with Augustinus's statement taken over from Varro,125 
which asserts that naming Tutilina in a closed space-just as naming the other 
two goddess presumably elsewhere, on the meadow which ripens grain-could 
be connected with the fact that uttering the name was identical with evoking 
the given numen. Naming the deity-which was in a certain aspect identical 
with the material reality represented by it according to the peculiarly Greek-
Roman Person-Bereichdenkeni2b-mighl make it possible to commit abuse with 
119
 Leges XII tabularum 8, 1/a; 8/a; 8/b 
120
 Plinius, Naturalis história 18, 8. Hos enim deos tum maxime noverant, Seiamque a 
serendo, Segestam a segetibus appellabant, quarum simulacra in circo videmus ... tertiam 
ex his nominare sub tecto religio est. 
121
 Varro, De lingua Latina 5, 163; Macrobis, Saturnalia I, 16, 8; Augustinus, De 
civitate Dei 4, 8; Tertullianus, De spectaculis 8, 3. 
122
 Latte: op. cit. 51. Der etymologische Zusammenhang mit semen, bzw. seges, dürfte 
für die ersten sicher sein. 
123
 Usener, H.: Götternamen. Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung. 
Bonn, 1896. 75. 
124
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1972. 81; Latte: op. cit. 50. 
123
 Augustinus, De civitate Dei 4, 8. Frumentis vero collectis atque reconditis ... deam 
Tutilinam praeposuerunt. 
126
 Pötscher: op. cit. 1978. 229. 
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the grain protected by it; so, for example, enchanting sowing to come to 
someone else 's land, or charming the already harvested grain to come to 
someone else's building. The independent existence of deities assigned to each 
phase of the life cycle of the grain shows that their names were not absolutely 
taboo, instead they were tabooed only under certain circumstances and at 
certain places since only then and there did they produce their impact. As a 
matter of fact, it is not possible to separate strictly and systematically the 
religious and the magical approaches regarding these phenomenon of Antique 
beliefs for naming the deity implies religious, and the excantatio performed by 
it magical motifs, presumably the co-existence of the two approaches should 
be reckoned with here too just as in the case of evocatio and devotio urbis. 
Conclusion. What consequences can be drawn with regard to the subject of the 
investigation of this paper? The words of the vindicatio of legis actio 
sacramento in rem developed for real estate properties were called carmen also 
by Cicero.127 Setting out from the numerous meanings of the word carmen the 
words of legis actio sacramento in rem were qualified as a text with legal 
content of sacred-magical, numinous-nature.1"8 The relation of the Romans to 
sacred texts, or spoken words is determined by Köves-Zulauf as follows: 
"Roman religion is the religion of... discipline, anxiety, suppression, and not 
of relieved relaxation as the Greek. ... That is where, one might say, the 
neurotic insistence on speech of the Roman religion comes from. "I24 
'"
7
 Cicero, Pro Murena 26. 
12R
 See also the distinction in Greek religion between hiereys and arétér: arétér -
precator, sacerdos, qui pro populo precatur deos ... Homerus, Ilias 1,11. 94. 5, 78; hiereys -
sacerdos unius e diis, qui certo fungitur munere ... Homerus, Ilias 1, 23. (Eberling, H.: 
Lexicon Homericum 1-11. Hildesheim, 1963. I. 172. 585.) See also Muth, R.: Einführung in 
die griechische und römische Religion. Darmstadt, 1988. 70. 
129
 Köves-Zulauf: op. cit. 1995. 249. 
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Law Commission (hereinafter: ILC) adopted a quasi-treaty text3 designated as 
ILC's Draft Articles on the issue of state responsibility.4 It is the very general 
and legally non-binding character of ILC's Draft Articles (regarding that these 
articles have not yet been materialised in the form of a convention or any inter-
national legal document) that accounts for the fact that in research work, ILC's 
Draft Articles have been ignored, nevertheless, we should take them into 
account as a communis opinio doctorum and as a summary containing the 
main theoretical concepts of state responsibility, which need to manifest 
themselves either in international customary law or in international state 
practices, or, in both of these. Thus, it is deemed essential that the provisions 
of the ILC's Draft Articles are surveyed and analysed in view of the concerned 
legal area parallelly to nuclear legal conventions, on the one hand, if the 
regulation of issues of state responsibility and liability lacks instruments of 
nuclear law, or, on the other hand, the governing regulation would not be able 
to encompass all relevant aspects of the aforementioned responsibility and 
liability under the framework of nuclear law. 
In general, the ILC adopted the traditional state-to-state approach3 irrespec-
tive of the increasingly emerging question of the responsibility of non-state 
actors, such as terrorist groups and individuals. A key question in this respect 
is whether under international law a state is responsible for damages or injuries 
incurred to another state and, if so, to what extent it bears international respon-
1
 As for the proof of this phrase, ILC annexed lengthy and comprehensive commentaries 
and the draft had been made in the dominant working style of the ILC, so these articles 
"had the look and feel of a treaty." See Caron, D.: The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: 
The Paradoxical Relationship Between Lorm and Authority, American Journal of Inter-
national Law 96 (2002), 861-862. But the draft does not recommend to the General 
Assembly that the articles be considered for adoption as a treaty. See ibid. On the 
theoretical approaches of its form, see ibid. 862-866. The Resolution 56/83 (December 12, 
2001) adopted by the General Assembly commends the articles to the "attention of Govern-
ments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action." See Point 3 of the GA Res. 56/83. 
4
 About the draft, see particularly Crawford, I.: The International Law Commission's 
Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge, 2002. 
381. Following the ILC's Draft Articles, a diplomatic conference has not been convened by 
the UN General Assembly to create a treaty on the basis of the ILC 's Draft Articles. That 
was the reason for being legally non-binding instrument. At this stage, it shall have been 
emphasized that the ILC's Draft Articles exclusively uses the term 'responsibility' or 
'responsible' even if the use of 'liability' or 'liable' would be expedient in such cases for 
avoiding the possible problems arising from this legally non-precise usage. 
5
 Cf. Weiss, E. В.: Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first Century. American 
Journal of International Law 96 (2002), 798. 
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sibility for its actions.6 Generally, under public international law, if an act of 
any state has been wilfully and maliciously committed, or that act would has 
been committed in a gravely negligent manner and implies a breach of an inter-
national obligation, these facts (causal relation between cause and the result of 
a conduct imputable to the state as damage or harm7) would entail that state 
responsibility obtains, therefore, compensation and reparations shall supervene 
pursuant to the legal regulation of state liability.8 So, firstly, the term and 
meaning of state responsibility shall be distinguished from state liability by 
means of exact concept-formation in the general area of international law ( lex 
generalis) and specifically, under nuclear law ( lex specialis). 
The codification process conducted by ILC was frequently self-contradic-
tory by reason of the departing legal thinking of the five rapporteurs, scilicet, 
their different conceptions deriving from their diverse backgrounds as to state 
establishments and legal systems. Therefore, in the domain of the problematic 
distinction to be made between state responsibility and liability debates often 
flared up, which basically influenced the fundamental approach of this subject-
matter (see, particularly Riphagen's thoughts concerning this dilemma ). The 
final draft unambiguously contains only rules concerning state responsibility 
because of the "s ta te ' s responsibility for internationally wrongful acts" phrase, 
which means that the draft precluded the possibility of raising liability-issues 
upon the interpretation of the articles, since it used the phrase of "wrongful 
act". The term of "responsibility" postulates the wrongful act of a state,"1 while 
the term of "liability" for injuries is attached to lawful acts. For this reason, it 
is generally accepted that the codification of state liability would have been the 
subject of a separate ILC work. 
See Jubbari-Gharabagh, M.: Type of State Responsibility for Environmental Matters 
in International Law. Revue juridique Thémis (1999) 63. 
7
 See Article 2 of the Draft Articles. 
8
 As an international customary norm, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
stated „it is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form." See Chorzów Factory Judgment, No. 
8 (1927) 21. 
9
 See Bodansky-Crook: op. cit. 778. 
1U
 ILC's Draft Articles state a logical equation: conduct not in conformity with an 
international obligation and attributable to a state equals an internationally wrongful act 
resulting in state responsibility. See Bodansky-Crook: op. cit. 782. Cf. Article 12 of the 
ILC's Draft Articles. 
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Another cardinal problem is also deemed of considerable importance. Ago 
distinguished "secondary" rules from "primary" rules of obligation." This 
scheme was taken over by Crawford apart from the fact that ILC had not 
decided to emphasize the primary rules, furthermore, it declared that "state 
responsibility should be dealt with within the purview of secondary rules. "I2 
1. State Responsibility in General 
The international responsibility of a state manifests an 'objective' character, 
"in the absence of any specific requirement of a mental element in terms of 
primary obligation, it is only the act of a State that matters, independently of 
any intention" - pursuant to the ILC.13 
The exact distinction between the notions of responsibility and liability 
implies two different approaches to the same problem.14 In the following, for 
the purpose of the differentiation of the dual meaning by means of a semantic 
overview,15 the terms of responsibility and liability must be clearly circumscribed. 
Nevertheless, these terms are sometimes applied without discretion to questions 
of liability or responsibility in manners, which indicate that the occurrence of 
damages or losses is not a sufficient or even a necessary basis for respon-
sibility.16 
According to the strict viewpoint of international law, however, liability 
and responsibility obtains, when a breach of an obligation laid down under 
11
 Secondary rules determine the legal consequences arising out of failure to perform 
obligations set forth in the primary rules. Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 
New York, 1 (1974) 5. 
12
 Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. United Nations, New York, 1 
(2001) 106. 
13
 Cf. ibid. 249. 
14
 But the traditional principles of state responsibility could merge with the concept of 
state liability, particularly in instances such as ultra-hazardous activities where states must 
meet such a strict standard of care that for all practical purposes they will be responsible 
(and so. liable) for any activity leading to harm. Cf. Hunter, D. -Sommer , J . -Vaughan, S.: 
United Nations Environment Programme. Concepts and Principles of International Law: 
An Introduction. New York, 1994. 
15
 Cf. Horbach, N.: The Confusion about State Responsibility and Liability, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 4 (1991) 47-74. English and German-opposed to the French 
(responsabilité) and Hungarian (felelősség)-language draw a distinctive word-form between 
the two notions (responsibil i ty and liability-Haftung and Verantwortlichkeit). 
16
 See Fourth Report on State responsibility. Para. 30. 
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international law has occurred, which per se does not need to involve the 
requirement of the element of either negligence or malice.17 
As for the standpoint of ILC, as it is manifest in the legally non-binding 
draft in the abstract, every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the 
international responsibility of that state (according to Article 1 of ILC's Draft 
Articles). On the other hand, the term of "state liability" does not necessitate 
that the facts of the case of an internationally wrongful act of a state obtains. 
Subsequently, every act of a specif ic state, regardless of its possible legal 
grounds, can effectuate the liability of the state irrespective of the fact whether it 
has caused transboundary damages.18 
The international responsibility of a state implies its duty to make reparations 
for the damages, which result f rom a failure to comply with its international 
obligations-as it was everlastingly drafted in the 1930 Hague Conference on 
State Responsibility (and has prevailed thence). The term 'responsibility' was 
based upon the general rule of international law that states are legally 
accountable for breaching international obligations imposed on them. Former 
determination refers to the so-called 'primary obligation' under international 
law, which is formulated under Article 1 of ILC's Draft Articles as follows: 
"Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international 
responsibility of the state. "[9 
Consequently, the rules of state responsibility stipulate and determine whether 
international obligations have been breached,20 moreover, an internationally 
17
 In the early literature, Hardy regarded that fault-based liability had been always 
required in opposition to the argumentation that state had automatically incurred respon-
sibility for whatever it had been done, so it appeared preferable to say that liability is in all 
cases to be determined by international law - or rather according to the legal literature of 
the 50 's and 60's. Cf. Hardy, M.: International Protection against Nuclear Risks. Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 10 (1961) 755. 
IR
 As for de la Fayette's position, she thought that 'responsibility' is to prevent damage 
(to take care of control of a person, thing, installation, activity), while 'liability' almost 
exclusively concentrates for compensating the victims (obligation to repair the damage or 
to compensate the innocent victim). See de la Fayette, L.: Towards a New Regime of State 
Responsibility for Nuclear Activities. Nuclear Law Bulletinc 50 (1992) 21. 
19
 As for the imperative conditions of 'internationally wrongful act', cf. Article 2 of the 
Draft Articles. 
20
 Breach of an international obligation is defined as "an act (...) not in conformity with 
what is required (...) by that obligation"-as the ILC's Draft Articles state. See Crawford: op. 
cit. Note 1, Article 12. The breach of an international obligation entails two types of legal 
consequences. Firstly, it creates new obligations for the breaching state, principally, duties 
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wrongful act entailing state responsibility through the breach of an obligation 
has to be followed by sanctions (such as restitution, reparation, compensation, 
therefore, as to the ensuant consequences, no relevant difference between the 
notions of responsibility and liability obtains). 
Traditional principles of state responsibility may merge with state liability 
that arises from lawful acts, particularly in instances such as ultra-hazardous 
activities, in the case of which states need to proceed with such a strict 
standard of care that for all practical purposes they will be "responsible" for 
any activity leading to (transboundary) harm.21 
2. State Responsibility in the Area of Nuclear Law 
Under international law, states are responsible for damages arising f rom the 
nuclear installations operating under their authority or control, because the 
absolute liable operator2 2 does not funct ion independently of governmental 
control.23 
Generally, as it has been expressly pointed in the foregoing out, the concept 
of responsibility in both branches of nuclear law and of environmental law 
derives from unlawful acts, principally from an intentional international breach 
of obligation. So, the applicability of the term of 'state responsibility' requires 
the effective breach of obligation by states, whereupon a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency occurs and the damages and losses are ascertainably 
the results of breaching obligations (direct causality is necessary between the 
breach, as a cause and the damage, as an effect). As an outcome of this 
statement, state responsibility shall entail an obligation for the wrongdoing 
state to make full reparation24 for the internationally wrongful act in the form 
of restitution,25 compensation2 6 and satisfaction.27 
of cessation and non-repetition (cf. Article 30 of the ILC's Draft Articles) and secondly, a 
duty to make full reparation (cf. Article 31 of the ILC's Draft Articles). 
21
 See Hunter, D.-Sommer, J.-Vaughan, S.: Concepts aiul Principles of International 
Law: An Introduction. New York, 1996. 
2
" The notion of 'operator' incorporates the licensee or other designated or recognized 
entity. The duty of designation or recognition is within the competence of the national 
government or the legislator body. 
23
 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 18. 
24
 Cf. Article 31 of the ILC's Draft Articles. 
25
 Cf. ibid. Article 35. 
26
 Cf. ibid. Article 36. 
27
 Cf. ibid. Article 37. 
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Article 34 of ILC ' s Draft Articles reads as follows: 
"Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act 
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either 
singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this 
(Reparation for injury under Chapter II—the author) Chapter. "28 
In the area of nuclear law, the issue of state responsibility for nuclear 
damages and for breaching obligations remains in the background compared to 
the concept of state liability. Its reasons are multifarious. 
Firstly, nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies with transboundary 
effects are not direct consequences of breaching obligations committed 
intentionally by states on the whole (e.g., 1986 Chernobyl disaster). 
Secondly, in addition to the previous paragraph, the damages and losses 
including the loss of human life and huge amounts of damages prevent the 
states from breaching obligations framed by international instruments. As a 
rule, the financial consequences (determined under conventions and other 
instruments) of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency caused by a state 
by breaching an obligation are severe for states. It is also for that reason that 
the relevance of state responsibility falls behind the relevance of state liability, 
when the cause of contingent damages is a lawful act as a rule. 
Thirdly, ' l iability' is classified (fault-based, strict or absolute, exclusive, 
vicarious, residual, etc.) with regard to the extent of the negligence of a state 
that effected damages. In the case of state responsibility, similar distinction 
cannot be made, since a state either committed or did not commit an inter-
nationally wrongful act that substantiate claims for reparation. In the latter 
case, the state shall not be responsible for its action. 
Finally, while 'liability' is circumscribed within a refined system defined at 
an international level (such as the Paris and Vienna Conventions on liability, 
etc.), the circumscription of 'responsibility' has been accomplished in a scattered 
manner in various separate international instruments. These instruments will be 
discussed in the following. 
But it could be far from easy to hold another state effectively responsible for a breach 
of a norm of international (environmental) law. Consequently, the injured state has the 
burden of proof that the responsible state has breached an international obligation. 
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2.1. The appearance of the term of 'state responsibility' under several 
significant documents of nuclear law 
The international community followed the evolution of the concept of and rules 
pertaining to 'state responsibility' within the area of nuclear law for a long time. 
Nevertheless, no document of the special sub-systems within the f ramework of 
nuclear law contains a specific and legally binding regulation of the special 
nuclear (and general) responsibility of states that distinguishes cases of respon-
sibility from these of liability. 
In general, we need to point out that in the area of nuclear law the state has 
primary responsibility for emergency preparedness in the event when radio-
active materials are not under the control of the entity in charge, but, for 
example, they disappear or are abandoned in the state illicitly. 
The tragedy at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986 motivated the 
entire international nuclear community to provide for guarantees that countries 
would be well prepared in the future to manage (by means of the establishment 
of standard emergency preparedness and post-emergency management 
programmes) the physical, psychological and financial consequences of severe 
nuclear accidents. Therefore, it was the Chernobyl accident of 1986 that 
aroused the international community and the legislative organs, hence the 
regulation process, which also encompassed the definition of the concept of 
state responsibility in re the horrific transboundary effects of that "milestone 
accident", uniformly commenced. It was recognised that civil responsibility 
(liability) per se cannot prevent or remedy the humanitarian and environmental 
consequences of nuclear damages.29 
The first signs of this change in the approach were the reconsideration and 
revision of the effective legal framework, mainly in the area of liability, which 
we will discuss later. Other impulses also referred to the necessity of the adoption 
of new regulations in specific areas that were highlighted by the mournful 
experiences of the Chernobyl accident.30 The new regulations were designated 
24
 Pursuant to Xue Hanqin's opinion, the effect of the Chernobyl accident was the 
discrepancy between theory and practice that raised several questions, e.g. what kind of 
responsibility a state should bear under international law to prevent and remedy damage 
caused to other states. On further questions with attributed relevance by Hanqin, cf. Hanqin, X.: 
Transboundary Damage in International Law. Cambridge, 2003. 2. 
30
 Strictly speaking, these intentions were not the very first endeavours occurred within 
international and national level. Following the 1979 Three Mile Islands accident, there was 
a need to create a framework for reporting and mutual assistance in nuclear accidents. But 
the real breakthrough had been practically succeeded after 1986 Chernobyl accident. Cf. 
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to remedy the defects in significant rules pertaining to the areas noticeably 
concerned in the accident.3 ' 
The appearance of the term of 'state responsibili ty ' (in the concerned 
conventions under nuclear law discussed thereinafter) indicates that the respective 
obligations of states deriving from the conventions were defined with respect 
to their differing character. 
2.1.1. The concept of state responsibility under the Convention of 1986 on 
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and under the Convention of 1986 on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 
These instruments were adopted in response to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, 
so that they required the contracting states to notify early and immediately the 
potentially affected states and IAEA about the accident, which needs to be 
followed by assistance on the part of the installation state or of the responsible 
state. The new global recognition of nuclear danger (an accident somewhere is 
an accident everywhere) motivated the states to establish obligations under two 
separate conventions concerning prompt and necessary arrangements in the 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. 
Upon the consideration of these documents , it can be clearly stated that 
the problem of state responsibility is crucial in their scope of application. The 
requirements of notification and assistance are primarily not typical issues of 
liability, however, these dual obligations have de facto relevance in re re-
sponsibility under nuclear law. Actually, damages and losses may arise f rom 
the breach of the obligations of notification32 and assistance, 3 which shall 
ElBaradei, M.-Nwogugu, E.-Rames, J.: International Law and Nuclear Energy: Overview 
of the legal framework. IAEA Bulletin 37 (1995) 16-25. 
31
 Cf. Schwartz, J.: Emergency Preparedness and Response: Compensating Victims of 
a Nuclear Accident. Journal of Hazardous Materials 111 (2004) 89. 
32
 Article 2 of the Early Notification Convention establishes the obligation in respect of 
the notification and information. According to the Article 2, in the event of a nuclear 
accident, the state referred to in that article shall forthwith notify, directly or though the 
IAEA, those States which are or may be physically affected and the Agency of the nuclear 
accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate. 
Furthermore, it promptly provides the states, directly or through the IAEA, and the IAEA 
with such available information relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences in 
the states. 
33
 Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Assistance Convention provides general provisions 
(no legal obligations) for states to cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention to facilitate prompt assistance in the 
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establish the responsibility and liability of the respective state for compensa-
tion to victims of another state, in which damages and losses are unambiguous 
consequences of the failure to comply with the dual aforementioned obliga-
tions (as an issue of liability). On the other hand, we need to emphasise the 
issue of responsibility in the scope of the following argumentation. 
The obligation of notification under the Early Notification Convention is 
irrespective of the damages and losses caused by the accident or emergency in 
the event of the omission of notification. Thus, a breach of an obligation (or 
obligations) on the part of a state can be established, if the facts of the case of 
an omission (regardless of its cause, such as unintentional negligence or inten-
tional character) obtain, therefore, that act shall qualify as a wrongful and 
intentional act of a state, which shall entail the international responsibility of 
a state. In that case, other aftermaths, such as damages, financial consequences 
and pecuniary losses, which are essential for the establishment of liability, have 
been disregarded. 
Merely one requirement may tinge the notification obligation, which 
further defines the applicability of the responsibility of a state, namely, the 
information to be provided pursuant to Article 2 shall contain determined data 
as concurrently available to the notifying state.34 
As for the Assistance Convention, the main provisions and conditions are akin 
to the rules delineated above in the discussion of the relevant rules of the Early 
Notification Convention. The definition of state responsibility is designated to 
provide an international framework for the comprehensive direction, control, co-
ordination and supervision of the assistance35 and for the promotion of prompt 
assistance by states and IAEA in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency. 
However, the Assistance Convention clearly differs f rom the Early Notifi-
cation Convent ion, so far as Articles 1 and 2 of the Assis tance Convention 
substantiate no legal obligation, since the objective of the Assistance Convention 
is merely the establishment of a framework for the facilitation of the provision 
of assistance by a state to another state (which accounts for a iack of state 
responsibility in re concrete, specific assistance mechanisms). Therefore, the 
Assistance Convention is a lso a f ramework agreement designed to establish 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to 
protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases. 
34
 On the detailed enumeration, cf. Article 5 of Early Notification Convention. 
35
 Cf. Article 3 (a) of the Assistance Convention. 
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a general basis fo r mutual assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency. 
As opposed to the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Conven-
tion applies the term of 'responsibility'. It expressly stipulates that the direction 
and control of assistance are the duties (the relevant responsibility) of the state 
concerned, since in the absence of that rule, the international responsibility of a 
state could not be established. 
2.1.2. The concept of state responsibility under the Convention of 1994 
on Nuclear Safety 
The Convention of 1994 is considerably general so far as the issue of respon-
sibility is concerned. In accordance with its purpose, its provisions are neither 
peremptory, nor sanctioning, but typically incentive (quoting the reviews under 
its effect), which may complicate and supersede the regulation of issues related 
to responsibility. For that reason, issues of the responsibility of states are 
closely and strictly attached to the breach of basic obligations regulated under 
Articles 4 and 5. 
As opposed to the missing conception of state responsibility, the concept of 
the responsibility of the license holder is defined under the Convention, so that 
the unambiguous duty of the license holder is established, since it has primary 
responsibility for the safety of the nuclear installation under Article 9. 
As Paragraph 2 of Article 21 stipulates: 
"If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the 
responsibility rests with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over 
the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste. " 
Accordingly, states have subsidiary responsibility overshadowed by the 
primary responsibility of the license holder. Such a definition of the responsibility 
of states has been influenced by the general attitude of states supported by the 
following rule: "whoever was responsible for the generation of the waste should 
bear the responsibility for its disposal." 
Therefore, 'responsibility' under nuclear law is construed as a relevant, but 
subsidiary attribute of the state. Relevant, because during the previous decades, 
states have recognized that they bear responsibility at an international level 
and have concluded international agreements on supplementary compensation, 
if the means of the operator are exhausted. 
The primary elements underlying state responsibility have been principally 
codified in the area of international environmental law related to transboundary 
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damages caused by states. In my view, and let me refer to the subject-matter of 
the present study, the damages deriving from the breach of a concrete 
instrument of environmental law and the injurious effects of nuclear accidents 
or radiological emergency correlate. Strictly speaking, the same criteria prevail 
in both areas. 
Generally, for the establishment of the responsibility of a state, four basic 
elements need to be available. Thus, if the following criteria are uniformly 
attained in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency causing 
damages and losses, the state shall be responsible for their transboundary 
effects, which supervene in the territory of another state. All of the following 
criteria should be construed in line with the general rules of public inter-
national law and with the legally non-binding rules of ILC ' s Draft Articles. 
Criterion T. Transboundary environmental damages or losses must result 
f rom a violation of international (nuclear) legal instruments.3 6 The damages 
or losses must be direct consequences of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency. Accordingly, the causality between the accident or emergency (cause) 
and the damages or losses (effect) can be established. External influences are 
not admitted to interfere so that the responsibility of a state can be applicable. 
Criterion 2: A state is responsible both for its respective activities and for 
the activities of private corporations or individuals under its authority or control. 
Thus, even if a state is not polluting directly, the state can still be held 
responsible for the failure to stop or control pollution by other entities. 
According to this rule, states may be held responsible for the failure to enact or 
enforce the necessary environmental law, to terminate dangerous activities, or, 
to sanction violations. 
Criterion 3: No just ifying circumstances are admitted, such as consent by 
the affected state or an intervening cause, such as an act of God (vis major or 
force majeure). That criterion is not so relevant under nuclear law, because of 
the extreme contingency of damages, so the affectedness of a state in whose 
territory the transboundary effects appear is a considerably rare status quo (and 
that kind of affliction is scarcely ever intentional).37 
Criterion 4: Damages must be "significant", which may entail serious problems 
of proof and quantification. In the area of nuclear law, damages may affect 
individuals, property and the environment in several states. Damages caused by 
radiation may not be immediately and easily recognised. Furthermore, even at 
16
 Cf. the provisions of Article 1 of the ILC's Draft Articles. See further Crawford: op. 
cit. 77-80. 
37
 Cf. the provisions of Article 10, Article 16-18, Article 20 and Article 23 of the ILC 
Draft Articles. See further Crawford: op. cit. 1 16-120, 148-158, 163-165 and 170-173. 
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nuclear power plants, at which the highest safety standard has been guaranteed, 
the occurrence of nuclear and radiological accidents cannot be completely 
excluded. That constitutes the unique feature of transboundary effects caused 
by nuclear accidents or radiological emergency. 
The term 'state responsibility' appears in a significant but subsidiary way 
within the nuclear scope. Significant, because in the previous decades, states 
have recognized that they carry responsibility at international level too, and 
have also concluded international agreements on supplementary compensation 
if the means of the operator are exhausted.38 
3. State Liability in a General Context 
The term of 'liability' is applied in cases where damage or loss was incurred as 
a result of an activity that had been conducted neither in breach of an inter-
national obligation, nor in breach of the states' due diligence obligations (lawful 
act that involves risks and transboundary damage34). ILC's Draft Articles 
clarify the uncertainties persisting in connection with the existence of a breach 
of an international obligation. Article 12 reads as follows: 
"There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act 
of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character. " 
As ILC's codification work clearly demonstrates, a State can be liable even 
for acts that are perfectly lawful, but in the event of injurious consequences, 
they can entail liability.4" As opposed to State responsibility, which arises 
exclusively from acts prohibited by international law, the facts of the matter of 
the international liability of a State may arise f rom both lawful and unlawful 
acts. 
The main distinctive characteristics, which are markedly separated in 
pursuance of the delimitation of the concept and content of these regimes, 
consist in the followings: 
w
 See Pelzer, N.: Modernizing the International Regime Governing Nuclear Third 
Party Liability. Montpellier, 2007. 10. 
34
 The ILC's activities and the Draft Articles within this field published under the title 
of "International liability for injurious consequences arising from out of acts not 
prohibited by international law". 
40
 Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. New York, 1980. 246. 
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a) In a general context, the term of 'responsibility' encompasses the omission 
of acts that cause damage attributable to a State under international law 
and these acts (or omissions) constitute severe breaches of obligations. 
b) State liability entails adequate compensation for damage suffered by 
victims (liability for pecuniary compensation obtains, even if inadequate 
resources for compensation are available at the operator's disposal). 
Rules of State liability for harmful and transboundary consequences of 
e.g. nuclear activities are construed in a broad scope in comparison with 
the restricted field of State responsibility. 
Accordingly, rules of liability for acts not prohibited by international law 
are irrespective of whether the activity was faulty or lawful, they emphasise 
the harm, rather than the conduct. 
4. State Liability in the Area of Nuclear Law 
In a general scope, pursuant to various documents of international law including 
Conventions, State liability establishes a legal relationship between the State 
as perpetrator of the internationally wrongful act and the injured State(s). 
During the debates and the legislation process within the framework of the 
Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly in the 1990s, several possible 
options were dealt with in the work of the Committee based upon the idea that 
liability ensues from significant transboundary harm and gives rise to liability 
for reparation.41 It was generally acknowledged that the residual liability of the 
State was essential in situations in which the primarily liable operators did not 
have sufficient financial resources to provide adequate compensation to the 
victims of injuries caused by transboundary damages.4 2 The range of various 
classes of liability specified in the Committee 's position was different from the 
customary classification of the fault-based, strict, exclusive liability in 
pertinent Conventions and legal history. Absolute liability and the channelled 
liability of (a) State(s) were extinguished, since they were only applicable in 
the regime of civil liability, where exclusively the operator was responsible 
for activities causing transboundary effects, including nuclear accidents or 
radiological emergency for the duration of the operator 's control over those 
41
 See International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited By International Law. at http://www.un.org/law/1990-1999/. 
42
 See James Baxters position from the Sixth Committee, Press Release GA/L/2871 
20th Meeting (PM) 20 October 1995. 7. 
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activities.43 According to the objectives of ILC, residual (subsidiary) and joint 
or multiple liability shall govern the regime in which States compensate victims 
not satisfied by the operator (after the exploitation of the insufficient subsidiary 
compensation fund) on the basis that the State concerned has failed to meet its 
obligations and a causal relation between that failure and the damage caused 
obtains.44 
Providing compensation for victims on a residual basis was considered, 
since States are deemed liable to remedy the defects of a civil liability regime 
according to the specific restrictions related to the tiers of compensation. The 
required compensation should be raised from public funds, when the claim 
for damages resulting in the operator 's liability would not be covered by the 
available amount for the ensuant damages and losses, therefore, the requirement 
of compensation would not be met. When the liability of the operator had been 
legally exclusive and absolute, the real and effective guarantees to pay compen-
sation for damages were missing from legal instruments related to the operator 's 
liability within the regime of civil liability. In response to that problem and 
contradiction prevailing formerly, the concept of State liability was formulated. 
In the scope of the basic principles of liability related to nuclear energy, the 
explicit expression of State liability has not been formulated. Nevertheless, 
relevant steps have been taken to f rame the liability of States within the scope 
of obligations. E.g., the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention was adopted 
for the admission of the provision of supplementary compensation f rom public 
funds. This measure exceeded the scope of the regulation of civil liability and 
foreshadowed further support and compensation to be secured by States. 
Consequently, it can easily supervene that a State is not legally liable for the 
damage, but as opposed to this unambiguous fact, it has the duty to 
compensate the victims through its public funds and resources regardless of the 
fact whether it carried out activities that could cause damages. At that time, the 
term of 'State liability' was not introduced during the discussions, which 
impeded the appearance and evolution of this notion. 
Nevertheless, during the previous decades (especially in the 1990s) a change 
of approach supervened, since the term of 'State liability' was incorporated into 
pivotal provisions of the Conventions. The 1997 Vienna Convention and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation were the sequels of the 
recognition that in the event of nuclear accidents and radiological emergency 
43
 Cf. International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited By International Law. at http://www.un.org/law/1990-1999/. 
44
 See in details Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1994, Vol. II. 155— 
158. 
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international State liability obtains, furthermore, it was frequently alluded to in 
the context of the international civil liability regime.45 
Finally, the last relevant amendment related to the liability regime based 
upon the Paris and Vienna Conventions was adopted in 2004. The Contracting 
Parties signed the Amending Protocols in order to ensure that the Paris Conven-
tion was more in accordance with the Conventions amended or adopted in 
1997 under the auspices of the IAEA. The main objective of the 1997 Protocol 
to Amend the Vienna Convention was the intention of the provision of more 
compensation to more victims in the event of a nuclear accident with a graver 
effect than the one as conceptualised in the original and later amended regime. 
Thereby, the mechanism and the procedure were still in effect, but the defini-
tion, the measures and the requirements of effectiveness changed (including 
the amount of compensation), which were the most serious steps taken as to 
purposes, which was to provide the world communi ty with the opportunity to 
deal legal liability and compensation for nuclear damage through a free-
standing global regime. 
4.1. Role and relevance of die Price-Anderson Act in the field of nuclear 
energy 
The epoch-making Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (hereinafter: 
Price-Anderson Act or Act) constitutes federal law in the United States (passed 
in 1957 by the Congress pursuant to Chapter 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
amended several times, last time in 2005 for a 25-year-period), which has been 
governing liability issues in re non-military nuclear facilities in the territory of 
the United States. 
This national (federal), legally binding law (the first comprehensive nuclear 
liability law in the world adopted by domestic legislation) preceded later 
Conventions46 on nuclear liability and was declared47 to have promoted the 
establishment of a unique private insurance scheme4 8 and the indemnity of the 
U.S. Government (that demonstrates the dichotomy of civil and State liability) 
45
 Cf. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage-Explanatory Texts. 
IAEA International Law Series No. 3, Vienna, 2007. 18. 
46
 Cf. The so-called "grandfather clause" in the Article 2 of the Annex attached to the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
47
 As to proof of this statement, see the U.S. Supreme Court 's conclusions in the case 
of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
48
 See in details Quattrocchi, J.: Nuclear Liability Insurance in the United States: An 
Insurer's Perspectives. In: Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability. Budapest, 1999. 383-398. 
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in order to compensate the persons who had been injured in nuclear accidents 
within or outside the United States. 
American literature on law almost uniformly state that this norm aimed to 
create the so-called vicarious liability of the State (the indemnity of the U.S. 
Government for nuclear liability parallelled by the system of private insurance), 
whilst pursuant to the Act, in the event of a major accident, all nuclear 
facilities would be required to contribute, irrespective of the place where the 
accident occurred. If certain operators would decline to contribute, the State 
would intervene to ensure that financial resources would be made available.49 
On the score of the Act, its purpose is to provide coverage for "anyone liable" 
and for "any legal liability arising out of or resulting f rom a nuclear incident", 
but the burden of proof lies with the claimant.50 The Congress of the United 
States supported the idea that an international fund will be set up with the 
exclusive objective of compensation for transboundary damages and losses.51 
The Act based on an insurance scheme (not fault-based as within system of 
the Common Law) establishes a system in which the payment of 10 billion 
USD shall be subject to the liability of the industries (operator) as opposed to 
the basic civil liability approach. Any claims exceeding the limit of 10 billion 
USD shall be covered by the U.S. federal Government, specifically, by the 
Energy Department (accordingly, vicarious liability f igures as a type of State 
liability).52 In the event of a nuclear accident causing damages in excess of the 
limits of the Act, the U.S. Congress shall take further actions, e.g., insurance of 
appropriate funds. U.S. nuclear companies, nuclear industries are relieved of 
any liability beyond the limit of the amount of indemnity for any nuclear 
accident, including radiation or radioactive releases, regardless of fault or 
cause and causality. 
By the adoption of the Price-Anderson Act with the annexed amendments, 
the U.S. Congress encouraged private participation (private insurance companies, 
operators) in the field of nuclear energy, while it also provided compensation 
from public funds (Federal, State liability). 
If we accept the aforesaid opinion on the initially and basically challenged, 
controversial, dual-faced mechanism, the Price-Anderson Act could serve as a 
model for the endeavours of regulation not only on a national, but also on an 
44
 See Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability... op. cit. 220. 
" This is the so-called "omnibus" feature of the U.S. system based upon Price-Anderson 
Act what is often referred to as "economic channelling of liability" instead of the term 
"legal channelling". 
71
 See Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability... op. cit. 221. 
52
 Cf. ibid. 252-253. 
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international level. But this dual-faced mechanism has not completely attained 
its purpose, because of the unwillingness of taking federal financial measures, 
consequently, the traditional civil liability regime has persisted and prevailed. 
De la Fayette pointed out the contradictory situation: "although, the U.S. is a 
strong opponent of State liability for transboundary nuclear damage, its nuclear 
liability law, scilicet, the Price-Anderson Act is based upon a State liability 
regime."53 Nevertheless, the legislator 's pursuit per se to construe the Act does 
not necessarily verify the fact that the Act intended to establish and introduce 
the term and doctrine of State liability. 
4.2. The Pre-Chernobyl-period, the 1986 Chernobyl accident and its 
consequences in the nuclear liability regime 
Preceding 1986, no real experience of a nuclear accident with relevant trans-
boundary effects was available to urge the States to consider (or reconsider) 
the relevant issues of responsibility regimes in the examined field. In the 
1960s, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a draft multilateral agreement on 
emergency assistance, but this initiative was deemed to be unfeasible. It must be 
mentioned that at that time neither the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter: Paris Convention), nor 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (here-
inafter: 1963 Vienna Convention) was in effect.5 4 Thus, before 1968 (when the 
Paris Convention entered into force) no relevant multilateral instrument 
governing problems of nuclear law obtained with special regard to the issues 
of responsibility and liability. 
The Paris Convention was the first international instrument dealing with 
nuclear (third party) liability involving exclusively Western states within the 
framework of the OECD. Whereas, the Vienna Convention was open for 
accession by all States, but worldwide adherence was not achieved (it is a 
thought-provoking fact that its entry into force took 14 years, although, only 5 
ratifications were required). 
Subsequently to the entry into force of both the Paris Convention and the 
Vienna Convention, a nuclear accident intrigued the attention of the inter-
national community. After the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, 
USA (without human victims) the intention to cooperate on an international 
53
 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 24. 
54
 The Paris Convention entered into force in 1 April 1968, while the 196.3 Vienna 
Convention entered into force in 12 November 1977. 
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level remarkably increased,55 but no significant breakthrough (in comparison 
with the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl accident) ensued. 
As a matter of fact, it was the 1986 Chernobyl accident with its trans-
boundary consequences56 that highlighted most of the defects in law in the 
concurrent effective international instruments and therefore alerted the inter-
national community to finally arrive at an understanding of the need to reinforce 
the international framework of regulations, so that the consequences of nuclear 
accidents via timely and adequate compensation could be mitigated. 
The Chernobyl disaster demonstrated the fact that a nuclear accident may 
cause unprecedented damage of an extreme dimension, that damage may be 
caused in regions far beyond the territory of the installation State and that in 
addition to inevitable transboundary damage to individuals, property and to the 
environment irrespective of borders, to the member States of the Paris and the 
Vienna Conventions, as well. Owing to the well-known fact that the former 
Soviet Union (the installation State) was not a Party to either of the respective 
Conventions, the issues of due reparation mechanisms in line with issues of 
responsibility and/or liability were disregarded. Nonetheless, it has to be 
mentioned that both liability regimes set the upper limit of the operator 's 
liability at 5 million USD, thus, in case we assume that the Soviet Union would 
have been a Party to either of the liability regimes, the contingent amount of 
compensation would have been insignificant, bearing the considerable value of 
harmful transboundary effects in mind. 
The awakening of international concern (as a result of the aftermaths of the 
Chernobyl accident) within the framework of the IAEA and other organisa-
tions foreshadowed the impending reform of the nuclear liability regime. Two 
issues were raised promptly after the Chernobyl disaster: firstly, the requirement 
of the wide international recognition of the nuclear liability regime, secondly, 
55
 On the purposes arising after the Three Mile Island accident, see Rautenbach, J . -
Tonhauser, W.-Wetherall, A.: Overview of the International Legal Framework Governing 
the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy-Some Practical Steps. In: International 
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. Paris, 2006. 7-36. 
The accident had serious detrimental effects upon human health, property and the 
natural environment and damage was suffered in several neighbouring countries and in 
some cases, far beyond. See Schwartz, J.: International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: 
The Response to Chernobyl. In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, 
op. cit. 37. 
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the imperative to make the regime adequate to cope with the transboundary 
consequences of a grave nuclear accident.57 
Finally, after the Chernobyl accident, the requirement of the provision of 
supplementary funding at an international level aroused renewed concern. At 
that time, it was deemed imperative to establish a new international instrument 
of State liability for transboundary damage, which complemented civil liability 
Conventions and provided a framework for a comprehensive nuclear liability 
58 
regime." 
4.3. State liability vs. civil liability 
From a highly general viewpoint, State liability consists in a liability for 
damages caused to another State according to international law, while civil 
liability implies the liability of a natural or legal entity for damages caused to 
another natural or legal entity on grounds of national law. 
The concerned regimes basically converge, since 'State liability' arises from 
transboundary effects, which create inter-states legal relations, in which the 
rules pursuant to special, supplementary principles and provisions differ from 
the rules of civil liability regimes based upon the distinction between State and 
civil liability. For instance, civil liability regimes are divided into separate 
branches pursuant to the classification of liability, whereas, within the scope of 
(residual) State liability, similar classification is considered to be redundant (en 
passant, the so-called vicarious liability could be mentioned in re State 
liability). 
This can be substantiated by the role of public international law within the 
domain State liability, as opposed to the role of the civil law regime in the 
domain of civil liability. While civil law, as a rule, distinguishes various forms 
of liability (the classification derives from the character of civil law), public 
international law establishes merely two categories (responsibility and liability, 
in the regimes of which no further divisions obtain, since even this separation 
is ambiguous). 
The problem in 1961 consisted in answering the question of "who shall 
bear the loss in the event of harm", which was fundamental to all questions of 
responsibility. On a national level four entities could be made accountable: the 
manufacturer or supplier, the operator, the State and members of the general 
' Cf. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage-Explanatory Texts. 
IAEA International Law Series No. 3, Vienna, 2007. 17. 
58
 See ibid. 62. 
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public who incurred the injury.59 Currently, international legal instruments almost 
exclusively set out from the generally accepted approach of the operator 's 
absolute liability (civil liability) pursuant to effective nuclear liability Conventions, 
which regulate liability in respect of third parties under international law, since 
the regulation is conceptually analogous to liability for activities involving 
increased danger under national laws of States.60 
However, a f ter the 1986 Chernobyl accident, it was indisputable that the 
civil liability regime was seriously deficient and needed rectification and that 
States needed to make a public commitment to nuclear safety including the 
prevention of accidents and the mitigation of consequences.61 The system of 
civil liability abounded in fundamental flaws, therefore framing a new Conven-
tion on State responsibility for nuclear activities was inevitable, with special 
regard to safety, accident prevention and response to emergency. 
The fundamental underlying idea of the subsequent regulatory work derived 
f rom the general recognition that exclusively sufficient financial resources 
made available for the State could ensure the compensation of victims of an 
accident of such a scale.''2 Although, law-making was committed to the 
aforementioned recognition, the final outcome of the debates consisted in the 
rejection of an express State liability regime, instead, the civil liability regime 
was reinforced via resources f rom the States, which were channelled to public 
funds.6 3 That mechanism underlay the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (see, Paragraph 2 of Article 7 
of the Protocol) but, of course, that step could not even mean the express 
acceptance of the term of 'State liability' in lieu of the prevalent civil liability. 
The objective of ensuring compensation f r o m the resources of States (in re 
the residual amount that could not be covered by the operator's limited amount) 
is formulated under Compensation Conventions (see, Amendments of the 1963 
Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention and the 1997 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation). That also implies the expectation 
of the submission of uniform claims based on the so-called three compensation 
tiers (mainly in the context of 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, see, 
59
 Cf. Hardy: ibid. 747. 
60
 See Lamm, V.: The Reform of the Nuclear Liability Regime. Acta Juridica Hungarica 
40(1999), 173. 
61
 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 7. 
62
 Cf. Lamm: op. cit. 174. 
63
 See ibid. 
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Paragraph b) of Article 3 ) . ы Nevertheless, the three-level mechanism discussed 
hereinafter (with special regard to the third tier) does not invoke the term of 
'State l iabil i ty ' , but it is considered as a first step taken in the direction of 
the process aiming to restrict the opera tor ' s absolute liability and to simulta-
neously increase the role of state liability. 
4.4. The concept of liability under the regime of the Paris Convention ( 'Paris 
regime ') 
In the event a nuclear accident supervenes in the territory of a State Party to 
the Paris Convention and damage or loss is unanimously caused in another 
State, which is also a Party to Paris Convention, the provisions of the Paris 
Convention will be applicable. 
According to Articles 3, 4 and 5, the Paris Convention establishes the 
maximum liability of the operator irrespective of the commission of an error, 
the liability for compensation shall be covered by insurance or other financial 
security, while "no other person shall be liable for damage caused by a 
nuclear incident" as Article 6 provides. Subsequently, the term of State liability 
has been excluded from its domain, therefore, the Paris Convention should be 
ignored in our discussion by reason of the establishment of the operator 's 
liability in the general scope of the Convention (entirely civil liability regime). 
As to proof of this characterization, liability under the Paris Convention is 
channelled to the operator of the specific nuclear installation, with no regard 
to whether causality obtains between the cause as the operator 's fault and the 
damage. So that these strict and financially effective rules pertaining to the 
operator's liability are counterbalanced, the focal and substantial provisions of 
the liability regime stipulate time limitation for the submission of claims and 
limitation of the amount of liability, which narrow the scope of the absolute 
liability of the operator. 
Within the purview of the Paris Convention, the rudimentary purpose was 
the ensure that in the event of a nuclear accident in a State, adequate compen-
sation shall be made available for victims in the Installation State as well as in 
affected States. That mechanism does by no means demonstrate the tangible 
duty or obligation of States, however, States have assumed responsibility to 
establish an adequate legal regime (in accord with the norms of international 
64
 Cf. Dussart-Desart, R.: The Reform of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, and of the Brussels Supplementary Convention: an Overview 
of the Main Features of the Modernisation of the Two Conventions. In: International 
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, op. cit. 21,21, 30. 
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law) by means of the stipulation of the availability of compensation for victims 
residing within and outside the territory of the Installation State. 
The Paris Convention per se does not contain provisions from which the 
later codif ied conception of State liability could be generated. 
4.4.1. The Brussels Supplementary Convention 
The Paris Convention that stipulated the operator's absolute liability has been 
amended three times (by Protocols adopted in 1964,65 198266 and 20046 7), but 
the Parties had realised already before the first amending Protocol that the 
system of civil liability cannot be rectified via a mere revision of the effective 
nuclear liability law.68 
As a result of the effor ts to make the amounts of compensation for liability 
of operators proportionate to the scale of the consequences of nuclear incidents, 
many of the members of the Paris Convention adopted the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention, an international instrument that funct ions in full 
compliance with the Paris Convention via securing public funds for the 
compensation of victims, in case the amounts determined and claimed under 
the latter instrument are insufficient. Thus, within the purview of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention, State liability is incorporated into the liability regime 
governed by the Paris Convention, because the Signatories of the Brussels Sup-
plementary Convention64 recognised that the liability of the operator limited in 
time and the amount of compensation under the Paris Convention would not be 
adequate. 
The pivotal novelty of this instrument is the tier-based funding mechanism, 
which supplements the operator's absolute legal liability with financial measures 
based on external resources, which entails the liability of the State(s) to 
guarantee the availability of these resources. This system operates as follows: 
a) The first tier determines the operator 's maximum financial liability, so 
that compensation claims are covered by insurance or other financial 
security according to the operator ' s limited compensation amount. 
b) The second tier requires the Installation State, in the territory of which 
the operator of the concerned nuclear power plant is situated, to make 
public funds available under national law. Thus, at the level of the second 
65
 I960 Convention and the 1964 Protocol entered into force on 1 April 1968. 
66
 The 1982 Protocol entered into force on 7 October 1988. 
67
 The 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force. 
68
 Cf. de la Fayette: op. cit. 7. 
69
 Signed by 13 states bound by the Paris Convention (16 states). 
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tier under an unlimited legal liability regime, the amount of compen-
sation supplied by the operator will be supplemented by public funds 
secured by the Contracting Party. 
с) The third tier draws on international public funds made available by the 
States pursuant to Para, b) of Article 3 and Article 12 of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention. The three-tier mechanism imposes absolute 
legal liability on the operator, which means that no demonstration of a 
fault or negligence is necessary, therefore, no instrument concerns the 
exclusive liability of States in the scope of nuclear law, but exclusive 
jurisdiction is granted to courts of the Installation State. 
Hence, under the Paris-Brussels system, if the amount of the operator's 
liability does not cover all the damage or the amount at the operator 's disposal 
is not sufficient for the ful l-scale compensation as a consequence of the 
absolute liability of the operator, firstly, the Installation State, secondly, all 
the Contracting Parties contribute certain amounts up to a fixed limit according 
to the three-tier compensation scheme, nevertheless, the insurance or the 
financial security of the operator has prior obligations.70 
4.5. The concept of State liability under the regime of the Vienna 
Convention ('Vienna regime') 
As far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, the conceptual basis governing 
the Vienna and Paris Conventions is identical,71 since the fundamental and 
crucial principles coincide. As to the framework of these liability Conventions, 
both are based on four central pillars, namely, on the absolute liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation (Article IV), on channelling exclusive 
liability (Article II), on the limitation of liability in amount and time (Articles 
V and VI) and on the establishment of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts 
of the Installation State (Articles XI and XII). 
70
 Cf. Dussart-Desart: op. cit. 14. 
71
 After 1986 Chernobyl accident, there had been adopted a Joint Protocol Relating to 
the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, in 1988, relating to 
the Paris and Vienna Conventions for the sake of establishing "a link between the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention by mutually extending the benefit of the special 
regime of civil liability for nuclear damage set forth under each Convention and to 
eliminate conflicts arising from the simultaneous applications of both Conventions to a 
nuclear incident. " See the Preamble of the Joint Protocol. 
THE CONCEPTS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN NUCLEAR LAW 245 
4.5.1. The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna and 
Paris Conventions on Liability for Nuclear Damage 
In view of the problems deriving from the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the gaps in 
the regulation became manifest. It was generally accepted by the Contracting 
Parties either to the Paris or to the Vienna Convention that an urgent revision 
of the instruments of nuclear liability was imperative. Several States submitted 
proposals for framing a new Convention on State liability for damage arising 
from nuclear incidents, but the clarification of the relationship between civil 
and state liability was thwarted by some States that refused to assume 
responsibility for transboundary harm caused by nuclear facilities under their 
jurisdiction or control.72 
Consequently, the Paris and Vienna Conventions were designed to be 
linked by a de lege ferenda instrument, which uniformly formulated the legal 
regime of nuclear liability,73 however, upon the actual adoption of the 1988 
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris 
Conventions, the doctrine of de lege lata was applied. 
The Joint Protocol, which is based upon the operator's absolute liability in 
a similar manner to the liability Conventions forming the basis of the Joint 
Protocol, links the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (encompassing 
both Conventions, so as to create a rectified liability regime) for the purpose of 
ensuring that the benefits of one Convention were extended to the Part ies to 
the other Convention. Moreover, the problems arising f rom the differences 
between the two regimes were designed to be solved according to the Preamble 
of the Joint Protocol. As the final clause of the Preamble spells out, 
"The Contracting Parties desirous to establish a link between the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention by mutually extending the benefit of 
the special regime of civil liability for nuclear damage set forth under each 
Convention and to eliminate conflicts arising from the simultaneous 
applications of both Conventions to a nuclear incident. " 
Accordingly, the possible conflict arising from the simultaneous applications 
of these Conventions implied no longer a problem pursuant to Articles II and 
72
 Cf. de la Fayette: op. cit. 8. 
73
 Recognizing the fact, that "the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention are 
similar in substance and that no State is at present a Party to both Conventions", as it reads 
in the Preamble. 
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III of the Joint Protocol.74 Under Article II: "The operator of a nuclear 
installation situated in the territory of a Party to the Vienna Convention shall 
be liable in accordance with that Convention for nuclear damage suffered in 
the territory of a Party to both the Paris Convention and this Protocol", and 
vice versa mutatis mutandis. Consequently, the Parties to the Paris Convention 
and to the Joint Protocol are no longer regarded as non-member States within 
the purview of the Vienna Convention, furthermore, they are mutually 
regarded as Contracting Parties, whenever the operative provisions of either 
Convention are applicable and both Parties may claim compensation, if the 
States affected by the incident are Parties to the Joint Protocol. 
Therefore, the Joint Protocol provides the legal basis for eliminating the 
difficulties and impediments arising from the two distinct legal regimes and 
can extinguish the contradictions between the effects of the two liability 
Conventions. 
4.5.2. The 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
While the Paris Convention was adopted as the first instrument that incorporated 
elements of the nuclear liability of States (the 1963 Brussels Supplementary 
Convention and the Paris Convention entered into force in the same year), it 
persisted as an operative instrument with an increasing number of acceding 
States, since its amendments followed the changing circumstances. The Vienna 
regime, scilicet, the Vienna Convention, however, entered into force 14 years 
after its formulation, which entailed prospective anomalies by reason of the 
long interval between its codification and taking effect. This fact and the 
relatively low number of Parties to the Vienna Convention prompted the 
international community to amend the Vienna Convention, in order to respond 
the technological developments achieved by that time and to eliminate the 
deficiencies of regulation emerging mainly af ter the Chernobyl disaster. 
After the signature of the 1988 Joint Protocol (in 1988), the IAEA Working 
Group was set up (in 1989 for the purposes of the examination and revision of 
the civil liability regimes) simultaneously with the IAEA Standing Committee 
on Liability for Nuclear Damage with the comprehensive mandate to revise the 
74
 According to the Article III of the loint Protocol: ,.either the Vienna Convention or 
the Paris Convention shall apply to a nuclear incident to the exclusion of the other." On 
the number of remaining differences between the two conventions, cf. von Busekist, О.: A 
Bridge Between Two Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: the loint 
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. 
In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, op. cit. 131. 
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regime of international liability for nuclear damage, including international civil 
liability, international State liability and the relationship between international 
civil and State liability.73 
In 1997, the large majority of States (although, its membership is considerably 
restricted) adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage (hereinafter: Protocol).76 International initiatives 
designated to supplement and revise the Vienna Convention in a broader scope 
aimed to attain three main objectives: as the requirement of more compensa-
tion for damage (cf., Para. 2 of Article 2 extended the content of nuclear damage, 
which was one of the most desired novelty), more money to compensate victims 
(the redefinition of nuclear damage ref lected the intention to secure ful l 
compensation for victims), of more people entitled to compensation (due to the 
revised concept of nuclear damage, more entities can claim compensation for 
the injuries and damages caused by nuclear incidents).77 
The other milestone revision by the Protocol setting the possible limit of 
the operator's liability at not less than 300 million SDRs (Paragraph 1 of Art icle 
7), but not less than 150 million SDRs provided that in excess of that amount 
and up to at least 300 million SDRs public funds shall be made available by 
that state to compensate nuclear damage (unambiguously, the exceeding of the 
traditional approach of strict civil liability represented by e.g. the Vienna 
Convention). 
Similarly, the Protocol revised the provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
the time limit for submission of claims for nuclear damage; 30 years from the 
date of the nuclear incident for compensation for loss of life and personal 
injury, while the time limit concerning the other types of damages remained 
unamanded (10 years from the date of the nuclear incident).78 
Since the Vienna regime was substantially revised in 1997, the problematic 
anomalies no longer influenced the behaviour of states in the intentional non-
attendance f rom this regime. Thus, future prospects on the basis of the newly 
formulated Vienna regime as amended by the Protocol held out the promise to 
manage to settle the controversial questions. 
75
 Cf. Lamm: op. cit. 170. 
7h
 On general remarks and contributions as well as differences of the Protocol, during 
the phase of regulation in line with Vienna Convention, see further Lamm: op. cit. 172— 
175. 
1
 See in details Schwartz: International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law... 46-57. 
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 Article 8 Para. 1. 
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4.5.3. The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage 
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (herein-
after CSC) had been adopted in 1997 under the auspices of the IAEA (chiefly 
due to the eff icacious support of the Uni ted States), simultaneously with the 
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention (discussed above).74 Albeit, the C S C -
not yet in fo r ce - i s freestanding8 0 with respect to other liability conventions, 
according to its Article XVIII Paragraph 1 , firstly an instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval shall be accepted only from a State which is a Party to 
either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention, or secondly, f r o m a 
State which declares that its national law complies with the provisions of the 
Annex to this Convention. 
The CSC oversteps the generally accepted priority relating to the exclusive 
and absolute liability of the operator by means of providing for addit ional 
compensation out of international public funds in excess of the operator ' s 
liability limit amount.8 ' Adopting the CSC, a state must bind oneself to enact 
laws for guaranteeing the availability of compensation amounts as a result of 
transboundary damages caused by states to be a contracting party to the CSC 
and if the installation state would establish international public funds (with about 
600 million SDRs of which 150 million SDRs shall be reserved exclusively for 
transboundary damages).82 
The CSC regulates, similarly to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, 
the tier-based system, with the difference that the first (private insurance) and 
second (member countries contribution) tier of compensation have been 
established by the CSC (Article III), whi le the CSC does not govern the 
distribution of the third tier. 
The provisions of CSC incorporated into Article 5 of the Annex serve a 
double purpose. On the one hand, they ensure the availability of state funds for 
compensation of nuclear damage (pursuant to the mechanism written in the 
previous paragraph), which is to the benefit of victims. On the other hand, CSC 
74
 On the CSC in details, see McRae, В.: The Compensation Convention: Path to a 
Global Regime for Dealing with Legal Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, op. cit. 187-200. 
8
" On its relevance, see ibid. 188. 
81
 While the CSC is consistent with the basic principles of nuclear liability law set forth 
in the Paris and Vienna regime in consideration with the keystone regulation system 
(channelling liability to the operator, imposing absolute liability, granting exclusive juris-
diction, limiting liability in amount and in time) of them. 
82
 See further McRae: op. cit. 191-193. 
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protects the operator against ruinous claims, as well. This so-called principle of 
congruence between liability and coverage is one of the internationally agreed 
pillars of nuclear liability law 8 ' in which the primary liability of operator and 
subsidiary liability of state have been appeared. The adoption of CSC has been 
motivated by the recognition of the essential importance of the measures 
provided in the liability conventions as well as in national legislation on 
compensation for nuclear damage consistent with the principles of the liability 
conventions (cf. Preamble of the CSC). 
Recognizing the fact, if a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency 
occurs in the territory of a CSC member state causing transboundary damages 
and losses, and the amount of damages exceeds the limit amount of the absolute 
responsible operator, the claims for damages shall have been compensated 
f rom international public funds ensured by the CSC member state. So, the 
liability of the installation state is subsidiary as a consequence of the absolute 
liability of the operator that extends to provide for the exceeding amount 
exclusively irrespective of the fault or negligence to be attributable to the state 
and without dealing the possible liable state manner. In this case, the state's 
duty for compensation is, as a matter of fact, absolute but not under the 
provisions of the CSC, furthermore not exclusive and not full-scale (for the 
reason that the fund provides for amounts to compensate damages exceeding 
the maximum liability amount and the limited time period of the operator 's 
liability) as it has been basically determined in Article 15. 
4.6. Attempts relating to codify the rules on state liability (with special regard 
to the concepts of state liability in the nuclear field) 
In the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of the ILC's activities related to elabora-
tion of the notion of state responsibility by giving its expression to establish 
a new topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out 
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,84 and furthermore, in the Pre-
liminary Report on that theme prepared to 1985, the ILC divided the topic of 
83
 Pelzer, N.: International Pooling of Operators' Funds: An Option to Increase the 
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability. Discussion Paper for the IAEA 
1NLEX Group Meeting on 21-22 June 2007. 2. 
84
 See Yearbook of International Law Commission. New York, 1985. 1-143. 
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liability into the issues of the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous 
activities, and of liability for injurious consequences.85 
The 1985 Preliminary Report of the ILC found that "past trends demonstrate 
that states have been held liable for injuries caused to other states and their 
nationals as a result of activities occurring within their territorial jurisdiction or 
under their control."86 According to the same Paragraph, the concept of 
absolute and strict liability of operators (license holders) based upon the most 
instruments dealing with nuclear liability issues (especially Paris and Vienna 
Convention), had been damaged due to a pivotal provision of the Preliminary 
Report which reads as follows: "even treaties imposing liability on the operators 
of activities have not in all cases exempted states f rom liability."87 
Seeing that, several multilateral conventions impose certain responsibilities 
upon the state in order to ensure that the liable operators abide by the conven-
tions containing relative rules. And, if a state fails to do that required activity, 
it is held liable for the injuries the operator causes. This kind of channelling 
method transforming operator 's liability to residual liability of states serves as 
a basis for recognizing and promoting the concept of state liability. 
Two years later, ILC published its Third Report (Second Report prepared to 
1986) on the aforementioned subject taking serious steps towards a compre-
hensive liability regime by means of defining the term 'liability' but without 
the explicit usage of term 'state liability'. No phrase of 'state liability' occurs in 
the text of the Report pointing ahead the subsidiary role of that in comparison 
with the primary private (civil as operator or license holder) liability. 
Also, for that reason the IAEA Board of Governors decided to set up the 
Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage in 1990. It was expressly 
requested to consider international liability for nuclear damage, including inter-
national civil liability, international state liability and the relationship between 
international civil and state liability. 
The work on regulating state liability has soon concentrated on the one hand, 
on the revision of the Vienna Convention and, on the other hand, on the establish-
ment of a system of supplementary funding. At least, no general agreement has 
been accepted on the basis of the Commit tee 's work, especially in view of 
regulation concerning state liability regime. During the discussions on the 
85
 Cf. Rao, S. P.: First report on the legal regime for allocation of loss in case of 
transboundary harms arising out of hazardous activities. UN Doc. A/CN.4/532 (21 March 
2003) Para. 33. 
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 See Yearbook of International Law Commission, op. cit. 94. 
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coherency between state and civil liability, several options were considered 
by the Commission for the sake of giving rise to some form of reparation. 
Until 1997, within the scope of nuclear liability regime, two main instruments 
had governed the liability regulation operating under the auspices of the IAEA 
(Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages) and OECD (Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy) that 
involved the complexity of liability rules with the problem of the separate 
(Paris and Vienna) mechanisms incorporated into the conventions dealing with 
the similar questions but in significantly different level. Furthermore, the state 
participation is different in the relation of the two conventions, because Paris 
Convention had been signed by a group of states of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, whereas the Vienna Convention was 
intended to regulate the related issues on a worldwide scale.88 
As opposed to the general acceptance of the operator's absolute liability, 
similarly to the Paris and Vienna Convention combined by the provisions of 
the Joint Protocol, the commitment required from the states to create public 
funds is considered to be a special form of the appearance of the term 'state 
liability'. But this term has not been incorporated into the expressed scope of 
the CSC because it lays the rules on compensation mechanisms down, in which 
making clear, that this instrument deals only with civil liability,89 so the concept 
of state liability has been unambiguously excluded from the text of the CSC. 
Conclusion 
After the 1986 Chernobyl accident, scilicet, when the international community 
recognised that there was no effective (State) liability legal regime, attempts 
were made mainly within the scope of the competent body, namely, in the 
work of the IAEA. Nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies with 
transboundary effects causing increasingly serious damages reassessed the 
(almost exclusively civil) liability regime of that time. 
The Vienna Convention imposes the obligation on the Installation State of 
guaranteeing compensation for victims that suffered nuclear damages due to 
nuclear accidents "which have been established against the operator by providing 
the necessary funds to the extent that the yield of insurance or other financial 
security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, but not in excess of the limit" 
(Paras. 1-2 of Article 9 of the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention). 
88
 See Lamm: op. cit. 170. 
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 Cf. Article 15 of the CSC. 
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Thereby, the ensuant transboundary effects of nuclear accidents demanded 
the review of nuclear law with special regard to the experiences that occurred 
in 1986 and to the fact of the inadequate regulation of liability (and/or 
responsibility). In the period after Chernobyl, it became unambiguous that a 
civil liability system (the Paris and Vienna regimes) based upon the primary 
liability of the operator cannot be maintained in itself by reason of the high 
amount of damages to be paid for the victims of an accident or emergency 
involving transboundary effects. 
The purpose of the subsequent regulation has been to eliminate these 
problems by means of establishing public funds, extending limitation periods, 
clarifying the main rules concerning issues of jurisdiction, etc. These objectives 
have been manifest in initiatives aimed at amending and reconceptualising the 
system of the Vienna Convention, which as an intention has been realised and 
are available as legal instruments in force or as drafts.90 
Nevertheless, with reference to the prospective regulation, we have to 
observe de la Fayette's apt remark, which reads as follows: "some States are 
willing to pay, but unwilling to admit they are liable to pay. "9I 
40
 Julia Schwartz offers a survey of these instruments, cf. Schwartz: International 
Nuclear Third Party Liability Law... op. cit. 
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C S A B A V A R G A * 
Law and its Doctrinal Study 
( On Legal Dogmatics) 
Abslract. A theoretically motivated reasoning leaving its mark on legal dogmatics producing 
some derivative through a methodical process, the doctrinal study of law is a parasite 
contingent upon the law in force. For it converts law positedly built by consecutive structuring 
of words into some sort of a uniform conceptual system. Therefore it is an authored product 
mostly in a historical chain. Its novelty is lending logicality to what is inadvertent itself. As a 
reconstruction providing logically added meaning to a subject not carrying this itself, it too is 
contingent with by chance variations competing amongst themselves. Its goal is to establish 
consequentiality for deductive derivations in order to guarantee certainty in/of the law. 
Consequently, in arrangements without conceptualization there is no dogmatics either. In 
European history, the continental tradition has retraced ius to lex for the law to be embodied by 
posited texts. Dogmatics is a ineta-structure logified upon them. 
Keywords: interpretive context; meta-system; second reality; law as language & as logic; 
conceptualization & systematization; Civil Law / Common Law; rules / principles 
1. L e g a l D o g m a t i c s in a S c i e n c e - t h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e 
T h e d o c t r i n a l s t u d y o f l a w is not a s c i e n t i f i c f i e ld o n i t s o w n - i s no t a d i s c i p l i n e 
i n e i t h e r a c a d e m i c s e n s e - , r a the r it i s a p u r s u i t , a n d t h e p r o d u c t t h e r e o f as its 
f o r m u l a t i o n . 
O n e c a n h a r d l y f i n d a m o r e e x a c t i n g p r o c l a m a t i o n o f the v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of l a w t h a n tha t g i v e n o f t h e var ie ty o f t h e " l a n g u a g e s o f l a w " 
m o r e t h a n ha l f a c e n t u r y a g o by the f a t h e r of ou r f r i e n d J e r z y W r ó b l e w s k i ( w h o 
p a s s e d o n f i f t e e n y e a r s a g o ) , w h o - s i m i l a r l y to his s o n - w a s a l so a p r o f e s s o r of 
l a w . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s l t h e r e is, on t h e o n e hand , the l a w , a n d on the o t h e r h a n d , 
t h e application of law, a n d in b e t w e e n t h e m one f i n d s t h e doctrinal study of 
law a n d jurisprudence, w i t h the i r r e s p e c t i v e l a n g u a g e s . In o t h e r w o r d s , we 
Scientific Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
H - 1 2 5 0 Budapest, P.O. Box 25; Professor, Director of the Institute for Legal Philosophy 
of the Catholic Lniversity of Hungary, H - 1 4 2 8 Budapest 8, P.O. Box 6. 
E-mail: varga@jog.mta.hu 
1
 Wróblewski, H. В.: Jezyk prawny i prawniczy. Kraków, 1948. 184. 
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have the law in books, the stuff of desiderata with normativity derived from its 
valid positivation, and we have also the law in action composed of series of 
deductions based on the former in form of actual decisions to convert positive 
rules into practical reality, within the social understanding of the law's final 
ordering force in society. Or, the latter as the fulfilment of an expectation is 
therefore also reality while it keeps on to represent a kind of normativity as 
well , able to exert normative e f fec t s indirectly. Within the domain of law, 
logically speaking there is nothing other between and above these than mere 
words (speech-acts) used to represent and operate them in a discourse treating 
and processing them, which fo rms a meta-system by reformulating them at a 
higher systemic level. In fact, the very goal of carrying this discourse is exactly 
this meta-system: to discover and to construct-within a dogmatic approach-
contents believed to be hidden behind the authoritatively manifested nominal 
fo rms of the law; contents which can be construed as organized into a coherent 
system by the tools of linguistic-logical analysis. Or, the goal of such a focus on 
building some scientific re-representation is to identify "essential" correlations 
in the law's verbal manifestation of authority, f rom its phenomenal expression 
taken as an empirically experiencable (and therefore scientifically reconstruable) 
aggregate of facts. 
It is important to realize that the law and its application are here understood 
to be two distinct components that either complement or compe te with one 
another , albeit to study the law without simultaneously studying its application 
could at best be relevant as a within itself contrasted partial analytical investiga-
tion covering only particular issues (e.g. in order to analyze the applied law 
f r o m the perspective of criteria native to positive law, or in order to allow for 
the formulation of dogmatics built exclusively on the positive law). Apart from 
that, in every other case the two need to be investigated as parts of one single 
and integrated unit, since the parallel existence of two separate dogmatics-that 
of written law & that of jurisprudence-would at the least be simply without 
reason. 
Accordingly, the doctrinal s tudy of law cannot be a scientific field on its 
own. It too is, instead, practical action itself. It is a part, extension, completion, 
and augmentation of the praxis which, almost singularly in the world, t reats-
art if icial ly-whatever given textual form of the law as the embodiment of the 
law itself, by inducing whatever legal [»«] f rom the posited texture of the law 
[lex], thereby treating the latter as the starting point of all departures and 
theoretical developments, i.e. all reflexive intellectual exercise in law. When 
students of law, aware of the fal l ible nature of any textual form, are setting off 
to produce linguistic-logical projections on (while the systemic reinterpretation 
o f ) such texts-and by doing so they inevitably also carry out a critical analysis 
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thereof, increase the rigorousness of the in-built presuppositions, resolve latent 
contradictions, fill in the obvious gaps, and decode the meaning of (or, properly 
speaking, gives professional meaning to) their terms and concepts along the 
line of a uniform logic, and then produce a coherent logical system based on 
and as an ultimate result of all of t h e s e - , they play a role in the development 
of law, in its timely completion. When doing so, the scholar does work that 
naturally could in fact have been done by those having drafted the law (since 
the desire for and expectation of j u s t such a finalization could already be 
detected as early as in the compilation of 15lh century European customary 
law, similarly to other compilations akin to Werbőczy 's Tripartitum,2 in order 
to then-starting with the large codification work dated to the French Code 
c/viZ-eventually reach its perfect form hardly surpassed to this day); all of this, 
however, did not and can in fact not render unnecessary the subsequent 
integration of the refining feedback (repeatedly, as conditions and practices do 
change incessantly) by those demanding cultivators of theorized praxis who 
undertake this doctrinal system-building as authors. For it is to be remembered 
that not one single attempt at it is logically necessary but is al ternative and 
concurrent, i.e. displaying a certain (practice-boundly theorized) opt imum at the 
most. 
Most of our large operational systems (our factories, bridges, hydroelectric 
power generating plants, similarly to our computer-based capacities) have once 
been designed by scientific talents, nevertheless, their related products are not 
the stuff of science, rather, at the most these are purely practical applications 
borne out of the marriage of science and certain results of various other forms 
of human understanding. So not even the doctrinal study of law does "cognitively 
recognize", instead it gives a more sophisticated, linguistically-logically 
organized, thus higher-level form to a formal manifestation, which otherwise 
bears meaning just in and as bound to its given arbitrary appearance. Conse-
quently, no results of dogmatics can be verified or falsified. We must make our 
surroundings habitable, we must cleanse our things, and it is a sign of careful 
practice and good practicality as well if we organize our beads and buttons 
according to some principle. Furthermore, while we are busy at work we may 
come to gain some deep understanding; however with all of th is -e i ther at the 
time of the process itself or at a later revisiting of the issue-we do not advance 
the knowledge itself, instead we merely reduce the incidental nature or 
somewhat increase the utility of our things by our act of creating order via 
organization. 
Cf. as an entry in <http://en.wikipcdia.org/wiki/Istv%C3%A1n_Werb%C5%91czy>, 
and Bak, J. M.-Banyó, P.-Rady, M. (eds.): The "Tripartitum". Budapest, 2005. 473. 
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Thus, the cultivation of legal dogmatics is a practical step in the direction 
of the positivism's geometrical law-ideal, which goes past the mere positing of 
law, which in all of its attempted fo rms remains contingent. Occasionally, of 
course, it can be increasingly t ight , but it canno t reach such a degree of 
correlation, equivalency and systemic coherence that would by its very nature 
exclude the possibility of other ( reconstruct ions. 3 
As soon as this attempt at refining the system by way of internal clarification 
reaches a certain depth, it could in fact require further breaking-down which can 
either manifest itself at the level of the whole of the legal system, or distributed 
among the various branches of law. Nevertheless, we are well advised to 
remember that as soon as we elevate our attention from the level of a given 
branch of law (which is tied together by a singular set of professional specifica-
t ions) to the level of the entire legal system (which is comprised of the units 
of the branches, and which is rather more randomized in nature), we are 
proportionally less likely to encounter the systemic self-discipline that could 
be characteristic of the lower levels, and as a result we are left with fewer and 
fewer items that would be (otherwise) required for the comprehensive and 
methodical development of a systemic conceptual re-construction of the law.4 
3
 For the immanent limits of axiomatism in law cf., by the author, 'A kódex mint 
rendszer (A kódex rendszer-jellege és rendszerkénti felfogásának lehetetlensége)' (Code as 
system (Its systemic nature and the unfeasibility of its understanding as a system)] Állam-
és Jogtudomány XVI (1973) 268-299 and 'Heuristic Value of the Axiomatic Model in 
Law' , forthcoming in Jakob, R.-Philipps, L.-Schweighofer, E.-Varga, Cs. (eds.): Rechts-
theorieband in memóriám Ilmar Tammelo. Münster, 2008. 
4
 We can only introduce this as a distant analogy: an attempt to repeat the axiomatic 
founding and deductibility-expectation, which was thought to have been achieved in 
individual branches of science (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.)-spellbound by the allure 
of "unified science"—, in hope of reaching a supposed final founding that would unify (by 
bringing to a common denominator) the paradigms of all the various branches of science, 
has already led to a disappointing failure, since human science itself in its fallible human 
manifestation has eventually proven to be contingent. 
Similarly, it is theoretically possible to attempt to establish a final doctrinal assessment 
of the various stylistic ideals that may have characterized a certain art form in different 
historical periods, but to do so in a general sense, and in the broader context of perhaps 
differing styles, and even more so, with regard to different branches of art, seems like an 
unreasonable effort in the long run. 
For their first classical syntheses, cf. Neurath, О. (ed.): International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science. Chicago, 1938. and Wölfflin, H.: Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Das 
Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst. München, 1915. 255, respectively. 
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2. The Process of Advancing Conceptualization 
Consequently, when we conceptualize available linguistic material-to be treated 
with semantics and logics-according to some legal systemicity, we are in fact 
creating some taxonomic locus/loci comprised of what is/are essentially 
random word/s, which is/are used for lack of a better way of communication. 
However, this way of forming taxonomic units itself is potentially in a constant 
change and flux, since the matter of what and where (at which level) will end 
up becoming a demarcating item (i.e. a taxonomic identifier) is contingent on-
among other things-a certain internal dynamic, and is dependent on a certain 
fluctuation; and the issue of what will function in quality of exactly what will 
have only been defined by the entire contexture of the system (e.g. the mere 
functionality of what can serve as rule or principle, or the way in which the same 
words used in different branches can indeed have differing meanings).5 Similarly, 
it is the whole system that is at potential stake as a result of conceptual division, 
classification, categorization, hierarchization, in result of mental operations. Yet, 
it is not the case that simply words turn into concepts6 and are then manipulated 
further within some logical chain; what is at the heart of the matter is rather that 
all these can serve as building blocks of and foundations for a mem-system, the 
properties of which will have been defined through their integration into this 
mem-system. Furthermore, it is such a mem-system which is the tighter the 
more contingent; hence, it could potentially be different (differently executed 
and construed) based on the same posited material underneath it. 
It is certainly an overly simplified approach if we imagine a vision of 
bipolar existence, where on the one end there is the "stuff of language"-clothed 
in its given form at any given t ime- , and on the other end, legal dogmatics, 
as a sort of dressing up of the previous in the cloak of "legal taxonomy". In 
reality, however, they can be pictured as flowing waves that are always 
5
 Cf., by the author: Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality. Relativity, and 
Interdependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context, Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 43 (2002) 219-232 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/r27863g 
6u01q777u/fulltext.pdf> as well as in La structure des systèmes juridiques [Collection 
des rapports, XVIe Congrès de l'Académie internationale de droit comparé, Brisbane 2002] 
dir. О. Moréteau & J. Vanderlinden. Bruxelles, 2003. 291-300. 
6
 This is what I have already attempted to show when stating that the concept of 'rule' 
is common to all arrangements in Western law, while the concept of 'norm' is specific only 
to the Continent. Cf., by the author: Rule and/or Norm, or the Conceptualisibility and 
Logifiability of Law. In: Schweighofer, E.-Liebwald, D.-Angeneder, S.-Menzel, T. (eds.): 
Effizienz von e-Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Stuttgart-München-Hannover et. al. 
2005. 58-65. 
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posit ioned at oppos ing phases of some sort of a 'vision of exis tence ' . As 
soon as we have " law", its very first analytical understanding brings about the 
sprouting of some sort of "dogmatics"; and as soon as this understanding is 
transposed into the dogmatic realm, its very first practical application will in 
turn also contribute to having a richer legal quality. Consequently, whatever 
advancement is exhibi ted, the g iven law and its dogmatic counterpart prove 
to be mutually preconditioned. When making choices in the presence of 
alternatives, choosing according to preferences, siding with one of several 
differing (competing) conceptualizations, and opting for one technical procedure 
over another, it a lways increases the contingency of the given doctrinal variant; 
while, by the same token, the broader contexts of policy efforts directed at law 
or of social order-ideals manifested in law may also re-posit dogmatic arrange-
ments at a higher taxonomic place. 
Nevertheless, this counteracting wave-like dynamic formed between the law 
and its dogmatics not only acts as a constantly relativising force, which makes 
law dependent on dogmatics and vice versa, but it also prevents the formation of 
such a static state, where there could be any reasonable discussion of systemic 
immutability, a f ixed state of constancy, or even any ultimate linguistical-
logical equivalency. Therefore, we can only address the systemic nature of the 
actual state or its tightness, in which the major strands and sidetracks of the 
act of system-creation-regardless of whether we speak of logical or linguistic 
correlation (deduction or any act of connection: assignment or co-ordinat ion)-
can, theoretically, be reconstituted by other components in a new order, as a 
result of any actual (formal or hermeneutical) change occurring at either the 
" top" or the "bottom" of the original operational chain. Regardless of what great 
strides Continental law (the rule-set of which is made normative also through 
its dogmatics while reestablished as a sphere of interrelated norms) has made 
toward distancing itself from the traditions of classic Roman law (which was 
developed further by way of the classic Anglo-Saxon law doctrine in its own 
manner), it is, nevertheless, subject to change with respect to its dogmatics, 
initiated by whatever new challenge, or newly manifested factor rising out of 
the application of law (or any force of theoretical nature having an effect on the 
application of law), and this change can lead to reorganization of the dogmatic 
structure of Continental law. Somewhat this is similar to how in Anglo-Saxon 
case-law the method of distinguishing can result in the réévaluation, or reinter-
pretation of the message that can be deciphered from any newly presented 
particular case, more precisely, the judge 's rendering of the law ("by declaring 
what the law is") is always condit ional on the case-specific evaluation of 
prior decisions, when the actual adjudicative assessment of facts may alter the 
message presented by precedents. 
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C o n s e q u e n t l y , d o g m a t i c s , on t h e o n e hand ( a n d as such, at t h e s a m e t ime, 
w e c a n s ta te that d o g m a t i c s r e m a i n s d o g m a t i c s so long as a n d b e c a u s e it) 
ca r r i e s t he p romise o f completeness, a n d on the o t h e r hand , is a l w a y s transient 
in n a t u r e , because at a n y given t i m e it is merely in the state of development. 
D o g m a t i c s has an i n a l i e n a b l e dual n a t u r e , r e g a r d l e s s of the fac t t h a t w e ei ther 
d e d u c e i ts ex i s t ence f r o m the not ion t h a t "we m u s t m a k e a d e c i s i o n tha t results 
in a c t i o n , and in o u r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g we c a n n o t r e ly on c e r t a i n t y " , 7 or we 
a s c r i b e it an a l l eged ly c o m p l e t e d s y s t e m i c qual i ty d e r i v e d f r o m i ts b e i n g (as it 
is) t he e x c l u s i v e f o r m of the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of l a w - o n e that t h e r e f o r e (for all 
intents and purposes) is an ax iomat ica l ly establ ished g iven , as it is s i m p l y posited 
tha t w a y - w h i l e b e i n g c o g n i z a n t o f t h e bruta l f a c t that the s a m e e x c l u s i v e 
f o r m t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e law has b e e n n o r m a t i v e l y pos i t ed a n d t h e r e b y a lso 
m a t e r i a l i z e d is a r b i t r a r y ; and t h u s e v e n t u a l l y w e d o r e c o g n i z e j u s t in its 
r a n d o m a n d fa l l ib le c h a r a c t e r a h y p o t h e t i z e d s y s t e m i c qual i ty , w h i c h at the 
s a m e t i m e may r e q u i r e e x p o u n d i n g , c l a r i f i c a t i o n , a n d the p roces s o f mak ing it 
expl ic i t . 8 Rega rd le s s of wha tever e x t e n t its s t ructure is concep tua l ly c o m p l e t e d , 
in r e l a t i on to m e e t i n g spec i f ic p r a c t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s it still m a n i f e s t s itself in 
casua l a n s w e r s ; and th i s t oo do t h e r e f o r e mean t h a t - s i m i l a r l y to E n g l i s h l aw- i t 
7
 Szabó, M.: Ars Iuris A jogdogmatika alapjai |The foundations of legal dogmatics], 
Miskolc, 2005. 18. 
8
 And this is the essence of the long debated Hungarian doctrine of the "invisible 
constitution" as well: it postulates an undefined dogmatics, as if it were something floating 
above the text of the posited constitution, and as such as something that the Constitutional 
Court relies on in its decision making, when it passes down rulings without sufficient 
normative basis (i.e. in absence of a specific constitutional rule). Cf., by the author, 'Legal 
Renovation through Constitutional Judiciary? ' in Sadakata, M. (ed.): Hungary's Legal 
Assistance Experiences in the Age of Globalization. Nagoya, 2006. 287-312 as well as 
'Creeping Renovation of Law through Constitutional Judiciary?' in his Transition? To 
Rule of Law? Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 117-160. In this sense the doctrine of the "invisible constitution" is 
a retrospective substitute justification, and is not a prospective product borne out of the 
progress demonstrated by the functioning of the Constitutional Court: and this is exactly 
why the practice of relying on these virtual rules quickly died off as soon as the 
Constitutional Court disassociated itself f rom the ambitions of its first, founding president, 
and thus distanced itself f rom the concept that its primary role would be to expand the 
constitution in a latent but active manner, yet without appropriate mandate. Consequently, 
the claim that this "invisible constitution" too is part of the "hierarchy of the sources of the 
law", as "a possible (and since held by the Constitutional Court: binding) interpretation of 
the Constitution" Jakab, A.: A magyar jogrendszer szerkezete [The structure of the Hungarian 
legal system], Miskolc, 2005. 99-100 and <http://www.unimiskolc.hu/~wwwdeak/dolg_ 
ja .pdf>- i s fundamentally misleading when observed from this perspective. 
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only serves up examples, from the outset foregoing the expectation of exhaustive 
comprehensiveness. (It can only be explained as an example of our human 
fallibility that when acting, we believe our response to be comprehensively 
completed, while its completeness is merely a given, dependent on whatever 
we have in our imagination about normality, about what we expect to occur 
and therefore whatever we deem ought to be subject to regulation.4) To put it 
differently, it is of an open texture, since-as stated earlier, when discussing 
culture "'-it carries the potential that "it could have been otherwise as well", 
even if it happens not yet or already not to become something else. By the same 
token, however-and this is the other pole of the dogmatics ' dual nature-at any 
given time it claims to be finite and final (self-closing) in its given state, as i f -
although probably it may reopen the very next day-i t were to live on unchanged 
forever as the very stuff of eternity. 
Finally, there is yet another factor in the systemicity of legal dogmatics. 
Namely, even its relative permanence is just a matter of reconstruction, a 
function of the chosen perspective. Perhaps one may find fixed structural 
points in a system carrying the promise of remaining unchanged over time only 
provided that we identify the root of permanence in its logical nature, as a 
systemic axiom. However, once- just as with theologies constructed on revela-
tions, which are the models for the doctrinal study of l aw" -we start searching 
for decoding, understanding, or giving meaning(s) behind the authoritativity 
imposed by the holy text (the dogmat ics of which, although, still may appear 
in a logically constructed conceptualized form, nevertheless, already in a 
hermeneutic context, thus, all in all, in the culturally predetermined duality 
comprised by the historical permanence of the physical nature of its signs and 
9
 As methodic precursor of the American "Law and Literature" movement. White, J. 
В.: The Legal Imagination Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression. Boston-
Toronto, 1973. 986. was only to reinvent the quasi ontological significance of "legal 
imagination", which had already represented-for Schmitt, С.: Gesetz und Urteil. Berlin, 
1912. 129-the genuine borderline (never either improved or surpassed by Kelsen) within 
which juridicity might at all be conceived. Cf., by the author: 'Change of Paradigms in 
Legal Reconstruction (Carl Schmitt and the Temptation to Finally Reach a Synthesis)' in 
Wahlgren, P. (ed.): Perspectives on Jurisprudence Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup. 
Stockholm, 2005. [= Scandinavian Studies in Law 48]. 517-529 and Rivista internazionale di 
Filosofia del Diritto. LXXXI (2004) 691-707. 
10
 Karácsony, A.: A jog mint kulturális jelenség [Law as a cultural phenomenon]. 
Jogelméleti Szemle, 2002/4 <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/karacsonyl l.html>. 
11
 Cf., e.g., Kraft, J.: Über das methodische Verhältnis der Jurisprudenz zur Theologie. 
Revue internationale de la théorie du droit 3 (1928-29) 52-56 and On the Methodical 
Relationship between Jurisprudence and Theology. Law and Critique 4 (1993) 117-123. 
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the historically bound and self-fixingly varying nature of their meanings),12 we 
must recognize that w e are faced with a progressive chain of development. 
This is merely to recapture the world of the acting man which he had previously 
positioned in the past to be beyond his personal sphere of influence-of course 
without having more or a different influence over the end result of the process 
(due to having been elevated to being the subject from the position of being 
just a mere reference), than the amount he had previously believed (at least 
according to his subjective perception) to have had. 
However, if in fact every newly evolved state of the law does indeed 
(theoretically speaking) reorganize the doctrinal study of law-i.e. if law and its 
doctrinal study are in constant interaction and are therefore moving following a 
wave-like pattern with relation to one another, and thus constantly providing 
each other with new impetuses-, it can also be supposed that legal policy has 
a similar relationship of accompaniment with dogmatics. This is so because the 
latter is not an independent acting factor: it only demonstrates the extent and 
direction to which law in action is established, planned, harmonized, and co-
ordinated in either legislation or the application of law." Well, even in this 
respect the doctrinal study of law does not herald creative novelty, neither does 
it exhibit an independent character, since all the while the effort to render the 
conceptual base and systemic potentialities as uniform and coherent as possible 
still happens in this very same sphere and is taking place in this context. 
3. Ideality v. Practicality in Legal Systemicity 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider, what is the exact status of those 
sets of meanings which are suggested by those kinds of differentiations, 
according to which-for example-"the thinking governing the doctrinal study 
of law is limited not by rules of positive law as 'dogmas' , rather by those 
12
 Cf., by the author: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law 
in Moreso, J. J. (ed.): Legal Theory / Teória del derecho Legal Positivism and Conceptual 
Analysis / Postivismo jur ídico y análisis conceptual: Proceedings of the 22nd IVR World 
Congress Granada, 2005, I, Stuttgart, 2007. 181-193 [ARSP Beiheft 106] and in 
<http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/PDF%20files/IA/IA%20-%20Hungary.pdf> as well as 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 4 6 (2005) 177-197 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
f4q29175h0174rl l/fulltext.pdf>. 
13
 Cf., by the author: 'Towards an Autonomous Legal Policy ?' [abstract] in [23rd World 
IVR Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy] Law and Legal Cultures in the 
21s' Century: Diversity and Unity Working Groups Abstracts. Kraków, 2007. I l l and 
<www.law.uj.edu.pl/ivr2007/Abstracts_WG.pdf>. 
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background category sets which may have affected the shaping of these rules 
in the process of their formation".14 I guess the very heart of this matter is that 
on an analytical level we first distinguish two different kinds of intellectual 
representations and subsequently we discern an effect/result-type primacy, or 
temporal priority between them. 
If we understand something, this understanding can only stem from the 
fact that we already possess the ability to intellectually conquer the subject of 
our theoretical investigation by the means of categorization and classification, 
i.e. by way of comparing it to something already decoded and thereby subjected to 
relative identification and differentiation. Or, on the one hand we have the 
intellectual facultas to do processing, and on the other we are in possession of 
the results of prior processing (as experimentum). Consequently, we have 
already a certain degree of routinized (and to a great extent also confirmed) 
practice, following which this comparatio can be carried out sufficiently. It 
would, however, not be meaningful to identify either pole or section as an 
absolute starting point, thereby attributing primacy or priority to any of them,15 
s ince-as far as it can at all be meaningful to establish such differentiation 
once a given degree of complexity has been reached-we cannot think more 
of the process than one developing in native reciprocity and necessary 
complementarity, becoming increasingly more complex in its potential. There-
fore, there is no factor that would prevent the linguistic manifestation of such 
'background category sets' to-coincidentally-correspond exactly to the way 
those 'rules of positive law' are posited verbally. At the same time it is obvious 
that any act of drafting new regulation rests on an existing doctrinal assumption, 
and in most cases it will carry the potential of integration of the new 
(conceptually split or divided) doctrinal relations into the systemic structure of 
the existing scheme. 
There are always theoretical possibilities, but the law does not and cannot 
have an idealistically perfect, f inished, and closed system, due to the fact that 
law itself is practical action, a response given to particular challenges, and 
thereby a model creation achieved by way of normatively ascribing prospective 
targets to retrospective fundaments. When the wise men of early modern times 
were contemplating the comprehensive description of the world in terms of 
natural laws, they could posit the presumptive existence of a "mathematical 
14
 Szabó: Ars Iuris... ob. cit. 155 [the emphasis is by Cs. V.]. 
15
 In contrast with the view of Hayek, F. A.: The Primacy of the Abstract [ 1968] in his 
New Studies In Philosophy. Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London-Henley, 
1978. 35^49, attributing primacy to the ability of abstraction-versus concrete observation-
in his debating on cognition. 
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value" within the system as something that would necessarily fol low from their 
having comprehensively discovered the nature of economic processes. However, 
as they quickly recognized it as well, no large degree of comprehension is 
realistic, due to the ever changing disposition of the infinite number of players 
and further relevant factors involved, which is to render the system too complex 
for the human faculties of comprehension to have a sufficient match.16 While 
they did in fact accept the task of trying to realize some sort of an ideal, yet 
they also accepted the foreseeably inevitable defeat in their effor t to directly 
realize it. Therefore, although we may indeed have ideals, but only ones that 
are necessarily bound as constrained by the presence of finite objectives and 
surrounded by adequate practical conditions. For we can hardly do more at any 
given instance than gravitate toward the next challenge in trying to meet it, thus 
attempting to give meaning to our presence here on this planet. 
4. Conceptualization, Systematization, Dogmatization 
The Roman law's reception sprouting mostly f rom Italian seeds and spreading 
over the course of centuries led to the development of two fundamentals on 
the European continent, and the tracing of the ideal of ius back to lex was to 
implicitly contain both. 
First and foremost, whatever the legislator has posited constitutes law itself, 
comprehensively, exhaustively, and with exclusivity. This is the common 
mental core relied on originally when the European doctrine on the sources of 
law started to develop, in terms of which the legislative act of positing a law 
is to be treated as the source of the law. In ontic terms, for the continental 
tradition law is manifested with and by this; and from a gnoseological 
perspective this provides the start ing point for all inquiries into law. It is in 
this that the idea exclusive to the Continental l aw ' s applicatio iuris is born: 
law is something artificially established as physically perceptible, objectified, 
discreetly separate entity, valid on its own, which, when applied, is transformed 
to be of utility for a derivative product prepared by the judge for adjudicating-
as a synthetic construct-on a statement of fact.17 This being in vivid contrast 
16
 Or, all this complexity is cognizable only for God-as opinioned both by Molina, L. de: 
De iustitia et iure. Cuenca, 1593 and Lugo, J. de: Disputationum de iustitia et iure. Lyon, 
1642. See Hayek: The Primacy of the Abstract. . . op. cit. 28, note 5. 
17
 It follows directly form this that the concept of Tatbestand [the statement of those 
facts that constitute a case in law] has been included in the conceptual set of Continental 
law-and only of Continental law-with due cause in due time. The so-called conclusion of 
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with the Anglo-Saxon model, which (in contrast with the late republican and 
imperial periods) having derived inspiration from Roman models older still, is 
only capable of capturing the presence of law in the case-by-case actualization 
of the ideal of justice through the j u d g e ' s decision itself, "declaring" the search 
to find a posteriori the dikaion-the most fitting, fair and just resolution in the 
given individual situation-to have culminated in attainment. 
Secondly, the continental tradition perceives in law a message that has already 
reached a certain level of generality, a set of experiences of prior decisions which 
have been captured in the form of regolas, which-if objectif ied-can govern, 
make uniform, and guide into preestablishedly foreseeable and predictable 
channels any procedure carried out in the name of the law. Accordingly, law is 
a pattern of future decisions formulated in generality. All this in contrast 
with the Anglo-Saxon perception, which does not discern more in what is 
manifested as law than a particular case-specific and exemplary manifestation, 
which-if we or anyone else were to have perceived the case at hand differently 
from the way the presiding judge saw it-just as well could have been different. 
Thus, continental Rechtssetzung a lways constructs against the force of some 
sort of vacuum, because wherever création du droit enters with legis latio, 
there law appears in place of what had previously been empty space-al l this in 
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon mentality, where even the feasible professionali-
zation of law-making and its conversion into industrial-scale production does 
not result in any completion of "the law" (with senses of finality, roundedness 
or fulfillment), rather at best it only exemplifies: it merely sheds (recalls, 
manifests) an exemplary and rather commendable light on a smaller portion of 
what is presumed to have ever existed as law behind it, through the occasional 
judicial act of eventually naming it.18 
The conceptualization of l aw- tha t is, the elaboration and treatment of 
linguistic elements describing legal relations in sets of concepts as components 
fact is a product of legal dogmatics: a logically constructed complementary pair of the 
norm concept, which allows the schematization mounted on a syllogistic conclusion-set 
off from the act of Rechtssetzung [création du droit, e tc . | - in the operation called 
Rechtsanwendung [application du droit, etc.]. 
18
 For instance, according to Oliver Wendell Holmes, generalization means reduction. 
On his turn. Justice BRANDBIS had concluded therefrom that "The process of inclusion and 
exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with its first enunciation. The 
rule as announced must be tentative. For the many and varying facts to which it will be 
applied cannot be foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law." 
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236. Cf. also Cardozo, B. N.: Law and 
Literature [1925] in his Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses. New York, 
1931. 8 and 15. 
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of logically erected constructs, organized into some coherently arranged overall 
set to build up its systemicity-v/i\\ be achieved in such an understanding of the 
law as exhaustively embodied by its posited generality, and as the outcome of 
mental operations with texts of the law itself in its reconstruction at a meta-
level which is intellectually erected upon it. Well, the doctrinal study of law 
can be characterized as system of interrelations mentally deconstructed f rom 
the primary manifestat ions of the law, that is, as a secondary meta-level 
fortified by its own comprehensive systemic construct built upon the primary 
text core.19 It follows directly therefrom that legal dogmatics only formed, 
could have formed, and does in fact form where the law manifests itself in 
form of textual objectification; consequently all procedures carried out in the 
name of law have to be based on formal linguistic-logical operations of text-
processing. Wherever the current ideal of law and order spreads beyond the 
mere (formal) quality of text-conformity-either due simply to the actual lack 
of such textuality (as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition), or because the text, in 
addition to its own self-referential finality, sets the prerequisite additional 
requirement of a personal ethical conviction in sync with or directed at the 
fulfilment of given values, sourced from the transcendental power having 
revealed the text itself (as in classic Jewish or Islamic law)2 0- , there is (and can 
be) no legal dogmatics. The thought of legal dogmatics is simply alien to the 
ordo-ideal and operational principles of such classicm non-systemic arrange-
ments. As the Common Law has for long established it, guidance derived f rom 
relatable precedents (properly speaking, f rom their judicial evaluation) is 
dependent on the singularity of particular cases; and the model cases used as 
examples for referencing represent a set of unrelated unique circumstances, 
among which nothing would necessarily tie them together in a formal way, so 
there is no logical connection between them either.21 (Characteristically enough, it 
was the English approach to logic-as opposed to its German understanding-
which made it obvious that logic itself is not the study of entities, occurrences, 
or any other capacities taken in their by chance aggregate, rather it is the 
inquiry into relations that are said to prevail exclusively within the one same 
system amongst its theorized elements, accepted as potentially arguable as proven 
19
 Cf. Pokol, В.: Jogbölcseleti vizsgálódások [Legal-philosophical inquiries], Budapest, 
1998. 44. 
20
 Cf. Varga: Legal Traditions? op. cit. passim. 
21
 Ibid. 
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or valid in order to test their infrasystemic coherence, i.e. consequentiality to 
the exclusion of latent contradictions.22) 
This is why the doctrinal study of law is a characteristically continental 
product of Middle Ages and early Modern Times in Europe. It formed as a 
result of how, starting from 15lh century Bologna, our ancestors received Roman 
law according to the contemporaneous scientific ideal and the consequentialism 
in their order-ideal . This essentially axiomatic ideal of order following the 
methodology of geometry and mathematics was continuously cultivated for 
centuries, leading to the formation of such a solid secondary tear in scientific 
analytical work (providing the law with a self-referential framework for 
interpretation) built around (and above) the actual primary tear of the law, 
which in the early Modern Times, when the law codification of nation-states 
(as an act of reestablishing national unity) was done with an attempt to link 
specifically the law, as well as its application and scholarly processing, back 
to the exegesis of those posited codes of national laws. Well , at that time juris-
prudence itself was proposed for a model of dogmatics, Begriffsjurisprudenz or 
conceptual jurisprudence, containing both its own genesis and actual self-
realization within itself as in a sort of "conceptual heaven" [ B e g r i f f s h i m m e l ] , 
complete and sufficient in and of itself. The building of its conceptual 
framework is done by a new branch of scholarship: Rechtslehre, which if 
(and when) having reached whatever level of systemic self-formulation was 
attainable, can then naturally go on to attempt to do an investigation into the 
branches as well.23 
22
 Cf., by the author: Az ellentmondás természete [The nature of contradictions, 1989]. 
In his Útkeresés. Kísérletek - kéziratban [Searching for a path: unpublished essays], Buda-
pest, 2001. 138-139. 
23
 The concept of Rechts\lehre is derivative of iuris\prudentia, presuming transforma-
tion by scholars, whereby law, the conceptual phenomenon, turns into scholarship, with a 
concept-set created according to some scientific ideal. On its turn, the doctrinal study of 
law is derivative of the law posited: it is mem-order thereof. 
Scholarship disposes of its own procedure of verification/falsification, freed of inter-
ventions. In contrast, the doctrinal study of law is parasitic a form. As a higher level 
reformulation of the law with implements of logic and the requirements of systemization, it 
takes into account the law's contexture as well, and as a re/7e.r-phenomenon in a meta-
reconstruction of the law, it is reformulated continuously in harmony with all finite 
(mentally fixed) states of the law. 
If it is true that by one fell stroke of the legislator's pen, whole libraries are vulnerable 
to be rendered out-of-date [as formulated by von Kirchmann. J. H. in his Die Wertlosigkeit 
der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Heidelberg, 1848 striking the peak of legal positivism: 
,J)rei Worte des Gesetzgebers, und ganze Bibliotheken werden zur Makulatur"]-as recently 
happened with Quebec's Code civil, when shortly after its enormous doctrinal processing 
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We need not simply reiterate that wherever law is posited in a continental 
sense, this involves the parallel birth and reciprocal coexistence of its doctrinal 
study, but moreover we need to point as far as claiming that in our arrange-
ments dogmatics provides the interpretive context of and for the law posited. 
By the way, this automatically renders the question illogical whether or not 
dogmatics itself may have any mandatory force. Obviously, it has none. Yet 
one still may not step forward with radically new legal understandings in hope 
of success, expecting far more than flat rejection. (Our life follows this tradition. 
Its understanding and following in practice secure our life the necessary b o u n d s -
like river banks hold the f low of water-; even our freedom is contextualized by 
it, directing our actions into ready-made or self-reforming channels. In contrast 
with the Anglo-Saxon mentality, which guarantees the sense of constancy in an 
ever-evolving world, without any superstructure erected. In law, the latter 
rather achieves consistency directly, by way of relying on the cross-referential 
use of judicial discourse in argumentation and justification.) 
Moreover, although it is one single given corpus of the laws upon which a 
dogmatics is elevated, doctrinal studies continuously develop in time with 
competing strands (directions or variations) according to authors. In choosing 
amongst concurrent variants one may naturally use whatever criteria (including 
the one used to rank scientific explanations), the final criterion is however always 
provided by willful decision within the canon of institutional discipline,24 
harmonizing restitutive conservatism and the renewal's practical intents. 
had finally been completed spanning a period of some 150 years [Brierley, J.-E. C . -
Macdonald, R. A. (ed.): Quebec Civil Law. Toronto, 1993. 728), it rapidly became 
obsolete with the enactment of a new code replacing it-, then this can only target legal 
dogmatics, even if cultivated under the aegis of and by means of scholarship, just as this 
mostly happened with countries (in the 19lh century exegetic nations-centered upswing) that 
had already completed their law codification process. 
"
4
 For instance, the disciplinary entitlements of the Teaching Church, including the 
option to declare anyone a heretic and the institution of censorship as well; or, in a special 
area of law, those preference-orders that are non-official but are definitely to be taken into 
consideration, and which are to function in both basic examinations and higher level court 
procedures in countries rich in literature comprised of competing works in the doctrinal 
study of law (especially Germany). 
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We spoke above of the manifestation of law being posited in general, because 
this is the pattern in continental Europe to become-slowly but systematically-
the foundation for law to be manifested as sets of rules. To be rule-based is 
one of the feasible directions of development, rather self-evident by the way, 
knowing, f rom the past, the developmental trends of scientia in general and of 
theologia in particular, knowing logical reasoning based on systemic conceptual 
constructs, and knowing how much idealized the use of axiomatic patterns was 
in history. 
Being rule-based, however, has never been exclusive, although to this day 
it persistently remains the basic form of posited law. The circumstance that 
principle-based and individual equity-based methods of decision making appear 
to be competing directions in our time, is jus t a sign of tactics (in a historical 
context then: signaling the trend of daily battles) of a struggle for supremacy, 
i.e. how to achieve primacy; since it activates an already available potential 
in order to use it for constructing while de-constructing, according to those 
desiderata within its reach. Its elements had been known since the earliest of 
ancient times: reference to values, clauses marking community contents of common 
good and interest and public safety, adjudicat ion according to consequence 
or derived f rom undefinedly flexible legal concepts. This new development 
working to loosen the positivity of law (as signaled by the worldwide effect of 
Dworkin25) is nevertheless almost completely irrelevant f rom the point of view 
of dogmatics. 
Because as soon as law is fundamental ly rule-based, even competing 
perspectives signal the existence of rules, or the presence of the mandate to 
apply given rules in given situations. Moreover, even the integration of such 
competing perspectives into the underlying system is mostly mediated by the 
construction of critical gaps of rules-only to develop their own mediatory 
forms, f rom being case-specific (and therefore incidental and feeble) to 
gradually becoming defined as quasi-rules themselves. Consequently, even the 
logic behind their dogmatics has no other target than to advance their own 
genuine or quasi rule-set to a higher developmental level in this way (Rule Set, 
converted into Rule Set2, and thereby creating a construct valid for use in 
whatever given present t ime). Or, all their verbal attacking or mode of 
phrasing aims to form a canon diversifying Rule Set2 from Rule Set b but in the 
25
 See in particular Dworkin, R. M.: Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political 
Philosophy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 1-37. 
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perspective of some Rule Setx (the targeted-albeit always temporary-result of 
such tactical procedures). 
Accordingly, the dogmatics of current mainstreams is exactly neither of a 
new type nor one offering alternatives. It is perhaps its radical style reminiscent 
of battle alarm that makes it at first glance unusual (just as the truly brutal ad 
hominem arguments of Engels or Lenin26 did not change philosophizing at 
their time, at most they signaled its instrumentalised use as an available tool of 
class-struggle). Since it remains a common element that in law the termini of 
decisions are eventually determined by the law itself-e\en if the law does not 
define anything further in specification. Unless-in terms of procedural op t ions-
it turns to the alternative of appointing an outside f o r u m of arbitration, it 
does not even turn over the territory to other materialities (homogeneities) 
contrasted to its own "distinctively legal"27 one. Even its potentially undefined 
nature is no other than that of the determined undetermined [bestimmte 
Unbestimmtheit] described by Lukács,28 the filling with content of which on the 
terrain of law is given as an exclusive power to the j u d g e appointed to the 
case, and paired with appropriate discretion. Therefore, without the false 
construct of some mechanicity, we cannot even claim a chance that "a legal 
regulation would be filled with content by non-legal rules of another social 
sphere".29 
6. Correlation between Legal Cultures and Legal Theories 
Our experiences have g rown exponentially in the past half century, and 
especially in the last quarter century. Our theoretical legal thinking has by now 
gone away beyond the boundaries of the previously deeply entrenched posi-
tivist legal thought, and now-founded by the philosophy and methodology of 
sciences, substantiated by comparative historical, anthropological and sociological 
investigations, enhanced in problem-sensitivity, with a particular emphasis 
given on differentiation between separation and concurrence of ontological 
and epistemological aspects- i t is ready to fully understand what it could 
already perceive in germs (of more intuition and hesitation than of scientific 
6
 Cf. Szabó, S.: A lenini stílus a gyakorlatban [Practice of the Leninist style]. Korunk, 
1960. 375-382. 
27
 Cf. Selznick, Ph.: The Sociology of Law. In: Sills, D. L. (ed.): International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 9. New York, 1968. 51 et seq. 
28
 Lukács, G.: Ästhetik I. Berlin, 1963. 720. 
29
 Pokol, В.: Jogelmélet [Legal theory], Budapest, 2005. 31. 
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categoricity) in the literary products of the debate between formalism and anti-
formalism back in the 1960's.3" 
An internal reorganization has occurred among the modes of legal reasoning 
and argumentation in the process of competing for the position of getting 
accepted as canon, so that the ruling of the l aw ' s territory could be reallocated 
via the reassignment of leading positions. In order for this to happen, new legal 
policies, ideals and ideologies, as well as professional world views (in the 
sense of juristische Weltbilden) were formulated, which can, naturally, one day 
in the future end up consolidating into (temporarily come to a rest as) a new 
legal world view, which will be a new balance, establishing a new professional 
deontology, replacing (or, to be sure, at least sublating) past normativism.31 
What is constantly implied by the above is the outcome that the chances 
of a theoretical-methodological reconsideration (once formula ted by Chaïm 
Perelman and Michel Villey upon the stand of anti-formalism in argumentation) 
are steadily growing and so does the chance of reaching a more complex answer 
in hermeneutics. A new element is the English-American consciousness, which 
for the first time in history responds to the call to investigate the feasible 
connections among law, language, and logic; and in its haste to quickly come 
to possess this construct and in the midst of its focus on wanting to rule over 
the practical development of law, it has started systematic e f for t s at integrating 
into its working legal system a mass of new methodological options. While its 
law is "f loat ing" and practically disappears into a mist,32 its legal professionals 
have been put in the position of a gladiator and are left to rely solely on the 
awareness of the solid methodical nature of their procedures. 
Our globalization has caused our theories to converge, yet our law has failed 
to follow suit. The excitingly complex methodology which is crusted onto 
the core of a still remarkably non-conceptualized English-American legal 
corpus of a merely denotative function has slowly started to dissolve the body 
of Continental law, which has for centuries been extremely conceptualized 
and enclosed by the walls of an axiomatic systemic discipline. And what is an 
unusual cultural intermixture and interflow produced by a comedy of errors 
"'For an overview, cf. Horovitz, J.: Law and Logic. A Critical Account of Legal 
Argument. New York-Wien, 1972. 213. 
11
 Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 
and What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around the 
Topic of 'The Judicial Establishment of Facts'. In: Atienza, M.-Pattaro, E.-Schulte, M . -
Topornin, B.-Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift 
für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003. 657-676. 
32
 Cf. Varga: Legal Traditions? op. cit. passim. 
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from a comparatist 's perspective observing from a point far off in the distance, 
is in this very context a remarkably likable and almost ideal study target for a 
thinker using cognitive mechanisms geared toward a methodic and paradigmatic 
reconstructive approach. All this is now given added importance-beyond the 
currently forming global-village d imens ion-by the issue of the convergence 
trend, present within the increasingly homogenized legal domains currently 
fought for in our unifying Europe, with former diverging traditions turned into 
interaction between Civil Law and Common Law, as observed in part in their 
daily interfacing and in part in their common foundations, their functioning 
and increasingly more conscious cultivation, on common platforms, fora and 
discourses. 
7. Theoretical and Socio-philosophical Perspectives 
It appears that the understanding reached in the Hegelian "cunning of reason"3 3 
(which suspects both a conscious and an unaware force at work in the shaping 
of the world, expressed by the Marxian paradox in that "they do not know it 
but they do it"34) has been serving as one of the explanatory principles of the 
development of science. 
We know from linguistics that specialized languages making use of jargons 
even on the most homogenized fields are rooted in general language usage, and 
wherever they reach a boundary they borrow from the latter. Despi te the 
theoretical universality and self-sufficient validity of its logical-mathematical 
toolset, the effor t to construct the pure and unified language of sc ience has 
failed.35 As mentioned already,36 linguistically speaking law is law, not 
reducible to anything other, so it cannot be substituted with any other statement 
concerning the law. Consequently, anything built on the law is at a meta-level 
in relation to it. But as also concluded then, parallel to the law (that can be 
referenced with ultimate validity) three further law-related homogeneities are 
built on everyday heterogeneity through complicated and uninterruptible 
(inseparable) interrelations as to their respective languages: 
33
 "List of Vernunft" in Hegel, G. W. F.: Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Section II 
(2), § 36 in <http://www.marxists.Org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history3.htm#036>. 
34
 "Sie wissen es nicht, aber sie tun es" in Marx, K.: Das Kapital I in Marx & Engels 
Werke. 23. 88. 
35
 See, e.g., 'Frege, G.' in <http://plato,stanford.edu/entries/frege/> and the reference to 
unified science in note 4. 
36
 Wróblewski: op. cit. 
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ordinary language 
language of law language of the practice of law 
language of the doctrinal study of law language of the science of law 
ordinary language 
Relative to the law, the practice of law is at a meta-level similarly to how it 
works in validity references, while it is also an ascertainable fact that the 
authoritative practicing of the law is capable of overwriting that what it claims 
only to apply. The doctrinal study of law is in a similar position, and the 
science of l aw-so to speak-observes all this f r o m a distance. All of these four 
components, on the one hand, exert effects on one another, while on the other 
hand, all they are floating in the medium of ordinary language as stimulating it 
and stimulated by it at the same time. 
Well, if it is true that on the foundation stretching from ordinary language 
to the language of jurisprudence there are four, partly and relatively separated 
(because constantly self-rehomogenizing) levels of meia-systems, then-even 
if this is valid only for an intellectual reconstruction in language-based 
symbolization-this allows the suggestion of some sorts of differ ing "modes of 
existence" of the legal phenomenon with "socio-ontological differences" as 
systemic counterparts.37 
1 have long entertained the thought of proposing the existence of competing 
components of law.38 And voilà, here we are faced with the l aw ' s intimidating 
complexity, hard ly supportable social weight , and the total web of inter-
mediaries3" of being legally disciplined and socially standardized, which are 
continuously reproduced and managed by largely separated blocks in the sector 
3
 E.g., Schulz-Schaeffer, I.: Rechtsdogmatik als Gegenstand der Rechtssoziologie. 
Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 25 (2004) 141-174-recognizes (p. 141) that "Established 
rules of interpreting the codified law have their part in constituting the social reality of 
law-provided that they are observed by the courts." 
38
 Cf., by the author: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold Pospisil and the 
Comparative Study of Legal Cultures. In: Law in East and West On the Occasion of the 
30lh Anniversary of the Institute of Comparative Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, 1988. 
265-285 and 'Law ' , or 'More or Less Legal'? Acta Juridica Hungarica, 34 (1992) 139-
146 as well as his Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, op. cit., para. 6.1. For 
another attempt, see Pokol, В.: The Concept of Law. The Multi-layered Legal System. 
Budapest, 2001. 152. 
39
 'Vermittlung' in George Lukács ' posthumous The Ontology of Social Being. Cf., 
f rom the author: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985. 193, 
especially para. 5.1.3, 107 et seq. 
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assigned to law by the division of labor within society. Well, some keenly exact 
sensitive conclusions40 resulting f rom considerations just surfaced allow the 
possibility for the law 's socio-ontology to further develop its foundations, 
known from Lukács and Niklas Luhmann, among others. 
What are exactly legal professionals doing in a complex society when 
receiving a large heap of texts in order to be used as a basis of referencing in 
their practical decision making? What kind of understanding legal professionals 
form when with f i rmly established doctrinal understanding in the background, 
they define meanings able to be presented as premises of decisions made 
according to their particular hierarchy-expectations and practical testing? 
It is to be known that sectors separated (though working together) in the 
social division of labor while also separated f rom one another (though working 
together) are to produce and incessantly reproduce a framework of under-
standing, which despite forming from the incidentals of everyday practice, 
nevertheless is to reflect determinations manifest in it, creating such a web 
which is although not independent of all active forces in the given sphere but 
as a concentrate of them it too steps forward as an intermediary medium, and 
as such will to a great extent become independent of all the particular 
definitions. Furthermore, it will step forward as such a factor-a second reality-
produced by man based on hierarchical structures originally imbedded in 
reality, which has a distinct chance to effectively direct the law 's understand-
ing into its proper artificial channels and preestablished groupings. And this 
way-making use of fundamental ly educational and socialization-generating 
instruments-i t can finally manufacture a certain practical sense of human 
security (in all sectors being disciplined and standardized) out of something 
that had in and of itself ever been a silent sign: out of language used by law, 
out of the way language conveys law in given forms. 
Or, so far we have talked about dogmatics as the contextualizing grouping 
of the further definition of the intellectual environment of one possible determina-
tion of legal mediation, which is positivation. Thus we have contemplated the 
411
 To quote but one example: "all particular areas of action (practices) have a correlative 
verbal activity attached, through which an efficiently practice-oriented communication can 
take place among participants. The key to this is the conceptual set of language rendering 
the interrelation prevailing between signs and meanings in language to accord to mental 
correlations corresponding to those modes of action which are relevant to the said practice. 
In this very sense all social practices have such a conceptual system which may quite 
reasonably be termed dogmatics." Bódig, M.: Jogdogmatika és jogtudomány [Legal 
dogmatics and legal science] and A jogdogmatika tág és szűk fogalma [The large and 
narrow notions of legal dogmatics]. In Szabó, M. (ed.): Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet [Legal 
dogmatics and legal theory], Miskolc, 2007. 32-33, respectively 255-256. 
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issue f rom a single perspective, on the path of the chances of the formally 
posited law's further formalization. Therefore we must be cognizant that when 
doing so, we are giving preference to analytical requirements, and are quite a 
long distance away f rom gaining an understanding of the law's social aspects, 
of the nature of its truly sociological existence, and even farther away from 
being able to get insight into law's mystery in its true complexity. 
What really takes place here is hardly other than us projecting, distanced by 
materializing (as alienated into reified objectivities)-and thereby transferring 
into the fetishized role of a pseudo-deity or substitute sense of security-that 
which is in fact us ourselves. Instead of the autopoietic reliability of human 
practice self-reproducing at a societal level, we transpose our desire for safety 
into conceptualized constructs, into logic and taxonomy, and with this ultimately, 
in a metaphysical dimension. Thereby we can hardly go beyond what has 
already been described by Frank as a psychoanalytical projection," fulfilling 
the needs of our most human and therefore quite ineradicable innate atavism 
that will transpose our want for authority in a fa ther complex into the en-
chantment by artificial creatures we are stressed at incessantly and instantly 
producing. This, even if considered in the sense of scientific reconstruction to 
be the démystification of an idol, is at the same time, however-and exactly in its 
own duality4 :-a necessity. This is exactly the reason why law was at all formed, 
since exactly such and similar kinds of reasons led to humanity constructing 
so called second nature to surround itself with, exemplified, among others, by 
doctrines.43 
41
 Cf. Frank. J.: Law and the Modern Mind. New York, 1963. 404. 
4 :
 Referring here to the deeply socio-philosophical debates regarding what the role and 
the genuine ontological status of ideologies are. 
43
 A research carried out thanks to and within the Project K62382 financed by the 
Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. 
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international law. Whether and how much international terrorism constitutes a new (legal) 
threat and whether the current system of international law is appropriate to respond to 
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the UN Security Council [1373 (2001) and 1540(2004)] imposing general-abstract legal 
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member States of the UN. That is to say, for the first t ime, the Security Counci l assumed 
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 See, e.g.: He i sbou rg , F.: The w a r agains t terror ism a n d the t r ans fo rma t ion of the world 
order : a European v i e w . In: Emerson , M . - B e c h e r , K. (eds . ) : The war against terrorism and 
the transformation of the world order. Brusse l s , 2002 . 
Fo r a b road o v e r v i e w see: K o v á c s , P.: T h e U n i t e d Nat ions in t he f igh t against 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m . Sectio Juridica et Politico Miskolc, T o m u s X X I / 2 . 4 2 1 - 4 3 4 ; 
276 KÁROLY VÉGH 
take into account the individual responses of States-recognizing a (somewhat 
odd) case of the right of States to self-defence; the collective responses of 
regional and universal international organisations-including the invoking of 
Article V of the North-atlantic Treaty by NATO and the several resolutions 
adopted by the UN Security Council. 
Examining Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),3 one of the first, and 
perhaps most significant resolutions of the Security Council in response to the 
attacks, most of the authors accentuate the substantive measures to combat 
terrorist financing. Apart from those substantive measures, there is another, 
perhaps less conspicuous, aspect not strictly linked to the previous one, that 
undoubtedly constitutes a novelty in the practice of the Security Council, or-as 
Paul C. Szasz noted-where the Security Council obviously "broke new ground".4 
For the first time since its establishment, the Security Council imposed 
abstract legal obligations on all the member States. Therefore, f rom another 
point of view, the real novelty by the Security Council in Resolution 1373, is, 
that it acts unbound by a specific situation or conflict (though, the political 
backgrounds were and are obvious) and establishes general legal obligations 
on States for the future. This, according to most of the authors on the topic, 
constitutes an international legislative action, i.e. the Security Council, on its 
own initiative, makes new international legal norms binding on all States, 
irrespective their consent. 
However, the enactment of 'legislative measures' by the Security Council 
did not remain an exceptional action desired by a particular moment, whereas 
in 2004, Resolution 1540 (2004)s again imposed general legal obligations on 
States, at that time, concerning the fight against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Moreover, the latter resolution goes further into the domain 
of State sovereignty, insofar as it imposes a detailed obligation for States to 
enact domestic laws and administrative measures, which may directly concern 
the rights of natural or legal persons in their own countries. Although their 
subjects are different, there is a clear relationship between the resolutions; 
Resolution 1540 (2004) can obviously be deemed as a continuation of a process 
Jimeno-Bulnes, M.: After September 11th: the fight against terrorism in national and 
European law. Substantive and procedural rules: some examples. European Law Journal, 
10 (2004) 235. 
3
 S/RES/1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 
September 2001. 
4
 Szasz, P. C.: The Security Council starts legislating. American Journal of Inter-
national Law, 96 (2002) 901. 
5
 S/RES/1540 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 
April 2004. 
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begun with Resolution 1373 (2001), broadening the Security Council's instruments 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, however, there is only an 
indirect reference to the previous resolution. Instead, as a much broader, but 
more meaningful background, Resolution 1540 (2004) refers back to an earlier 
statement (and not resolution!) of the Security Council, adopted at the meeting 
on 31 January 1992 held "at the level of Heads of State and Government".6 
The importance of this reference lies within that this statement is today commonly 
known as the promulgation of the Security Council's aim to enhance and broaden 
its own responsibility and powers in order to meet the new challenges of the post-
cold war era. Beside that, as an equally important element, the referred statement 
is the first manifestation of the broad interpretation of international security.7 
Consequently, the 'legislative measures' taken, albeit novels in the practice 
of the Security Council, are obviously not without any antecedents; therefore, 
further examples also cannot be excluded. However, it shall be added that the 
referred statement cannot be seen as a precedent in the legal but only in the 
political sense. 
There may be as many arguments pro, as contra a legislative power of the 
Security Council. But, is the absence of an expressed prohibition on legislation 
a convincing argument in itself, or is it essential to provide at least an implied 
attribution of powers? Inasmuch as the UN Charter is constantly claimed to be 
a "living instrument",8 the answer cannot be given properly without examining 
the legal influence of the subsequent practice of the Security Council and the 
position of the member States. After all, if the questions on the details can 
somehow be answered, the general issue may, however, remain: is the legislative 
power of the Security Council compatible with its proper role, or, more 
6
 S/23500, 31 January 1992, Note by the President of the Security Council. 
1
 " [ . . . ] The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and 
security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate 
bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters. [ . . . ]" Ibid., 
perational para. 10. 
8
 See also: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, International Court of Justice, Case 
concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, ICJ Reports, 1998. 80. [Hereinafter referred to 
as 'Lockerbie Case']. Professor Thomas M. Franck's opinion on the UN Charter as a 
"living tree", cited in: Malone, D. M.: The Security Council in the post-cold war era: A 
study in the creative interpretation of the UN Charter. New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics, 35 (2003) 487. 
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broadly, with the constitutional order of the United Nations? Can it transfer 
itself from an essentially political organ to the position of a law-making body? 
I. The Meaning of 'Legislation' for the Purpose of the Study 
One shall see that eventually the essence of the problem concerning the 
contents of a legislative power does lie within the interpretation of the term 
'legislation'; however, admitting that this is not simply a semantic question. 
On the one hand, the broad interpretation of the notion, proceeding from 
the specific nature of the international legal system, considers legislation as 
equal with general law-making processes. From that perspective, the two terms 
are deemed synonyms, both referring to the adoption and enactment of any new 
norm or rule of international law. Hence, legislation receives a new, independent 
meaning in the international plane, only applicable within that system. 
On the other hand, the narrow interpretation, through an analogy with 
domestic legal theory, treats legislation as a unique form of the general law-
making processes beside treaty-making and the creation of customary inter-
national law. While in the broad interpretation rules enacted through legislative 
processes become general sources of international law, as those in Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ, in the narrow interpretation, legislative acts become 
sui generis sources of international law. 
For the purposes of the present study, legislation shall mean the adoption 
of binding resolutions by international organizations with general-abstract 
subject-matter and addressees (regarding member States; irrespective their 
consent), setting out legal obligations for a defined or undefined future period 
of time. As the necessity or validity of two further elements may be disputed, I do 
not include the requirements of an expressed authorization in the constituting 
treaty and a clear-cut determination of procedural rules. 
II. A Legislative Power of the Security Council? - Pros and Cons in a 
Critical Analysis 
In the international literature concerning the legislative powers of the Security 
Council, there are several opinions and arguments both pro and contra the 
existence of such powers. Among them there are views e.g. that the Council 
lacks the expressed power for legislation and there are also opinions for the 
opposite; others argue that the Council may have at least an implied legislative 
power, while others bring up the unsuitability of the Council for acting as a 
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legislature. Moreover, there are also authors arguing that a legislative power of 
the Council would impair the basic principles of international law. 
Most of these views can be originated in the general attitudes regarding the 
role and functions of the Security Council. 
1. Absence of an Expressed Prohibition v. a Need for an Expressed 
Authorization 
The core problem of this section might be tersely formulated in two questions. 
Firstly, is there a need for an expressed attribution of legislative powers in the 
Charter as a prerequisite of legitimacy? Secondly, can the terms concerning 
the Security Counci l ' s general or specif ic powers be interpreted plausibly in 
a way to include a legislative power? Authors are utterly divided on these 
questions. On the one hand, there are some, considering a legislative power 
for the Council almost as self-evident, however, one shall be cautious in this 
regard; the notion of ' legislation' of ten has a quite different meaning in their 
context.9 
According to the first question, namely the requirement of an expressed 
attribution of power, one core aspect has been presented by Krzysztof Skubi-
szewski, by stating that: 
the organization must have an explicit and unequivocal treaty authorisation 
in order to have the competence to enact law for States by virtue of its 
resolutions. The power to make law for States cannot be founded on any 
doctrine of implicit or implied powers.1 0 
The main reason behind it must be that-following from the horizontal 
character of the international community and sovereignty-States may only be 
bound by general international legal norms if previously they consented to be 
bound. As pointed out by the PCIJ in the SS. Lotus case: 
4
 See e.g., P. Hulsroj, P.: The legal function of the Security Council. Chinese Journal 
of International Law, 1 (2002)59. 
"' Skubiszewski also notes in his study that the adoption of internal law of international 
organisations may be based on implied powers. Skubiszewski, K.: A new source of the law 
of nations: resolutions of international organisations. Recueil d'études de droit inter-
national - En hommage à Paul Guggenheim, Genève, 1968. 510. 
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The rules of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will ... 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed." 
Consequently, member States of an organization may only be bound by 
legislative acts of the organization if they have previously given their consent 
to be bound, i.e. the member States have expressly attributed legislative 
powers to the organization. 
The specific requirement that legislative powers shall be explicitly granted 
has the primary role as a safeguard against uncontrolled and perhaps too far-
fetched powers of an organization in matters seriously penetrating into the 
sovereignty of its member States. 
On the other hand, there m a y be found voices, arguing that general, or, 
moreover, also implied powers of an international organization can serve the 
basis of legislative powers. In my view, basing an organization's legislative 
powers solely on the argument that it is necessary for the fulfilment of the 
purposes and functions of the organization would be too far-fetched and lack 
legal certainty. Therefore, it is inevitable to f ind expressed provisions in the 
constituting document of the organization as a legal basis for legislative powers. 
At that point , we may turn to the second question, as to whether the 
expressed powers of the Security Council include the power to legislate. It 
must be noted in advance that the text of the Charter does not refer explicitly to 
the terms 'legislation', ' law-making' or 'legal norm' in relation to the powers of 
the Council. However, this per se does not necessarily exclude to existence of 
legislative p o w e r s . " It must a lso be added that, undoubtedly, the Council has 
the power to adopt binding measures for the member States. To begin with, 
there are several opinions-including that of the ICJ13-that the Security Council 
11
 The Case concerning the SS. Lotus, (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, Judgement of 7 Sept. 1927, PCIJ Ser. A. No. 10. [Hereafter: Lotus case]. 
12
 As a contrast, it might be of interest that the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community in its Article 249 expressly empowers the institutions of the organisation to 
adopt specific acts which are commonly understood as legal acts. However, this analogy 
shall be used carefully, because the EC and the UN are of entirely different nature concern-
ing their purpose and functions, and concerning the aim and effect of their acts. The 
different nature of the two legal systems is also noted in the Opinion 1/91 EEA-I of the 
ECJ, [1991] ECR 1-6079. [„The Community treaties established a new legal order for the 
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals."] 
1
 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), 1С J Reports, 1971. 52. 
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has the power to adopt binding decisions under its general powers set out in 
Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter. Accepting that the Council possesses 
general powers to enact binding decisions for the maintenance of international 
peace and security-without the restrictions in Chapter VII-there cannot be seen 
any objection to expand the Council 's powers in order to cover legislation. 
However, this rather extensive interpretation would contradict the limitation in 
Article 2(7) and, more importantly, it might validly be seen too far-fetched and 
general to form the basis of legislative powers. Beside that, assuming a general 
power of the Security Council to adopt binding (also legislative) decisions 
would render the restrictions in Article 39 superfluous. In my opinion, Article 25 
cannot be interpreted to include the power of the Council to adopt legislative 
acts. Nevertheless, the specific powers of the Council under Chapter VII leave 
open a much broader space for valid interpretation. Concerning the first part of 
that specific question, namely, whether Article 39 of the UN Charter can be 
interpreted in a way to include the power of general-abstract determinations, a 
core argument may be the fact that the powers of the Council at that point have 
been left open intentionally. Applying Article 39 one may choose between the 
interpretation stating that determinations shall always be applied concerning 
one particular si tuationы and the interpretation allowing a wider discretion for 
the Council.15 
Following f rom the proactive or preventive nature of the notion ' threat to 
the peace ' and the lack of any reference suggesting the limitation of such 
determination (aside the general constraints on the powers of the Council), it 
cannot be stated validly that the Council would be bound to a particular 
situation. Consequently, there is a clear and plausible interpretation of Article 39 
to include the power to make general determinations if required by the situation. 
The second part of that particular question is whether measures to be adopted 
under Article 41 may also include general-abstract obligations applying equally 
for all member States. Here, one shall take a side whether those measures are 
essentially sanctions with one or more explicit target State or they can be 
generally enforcement measures not necessarily restricted to the form of 
sanctions but including all non-military measures the Council deems necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. Neither the non-
14
 For this aspect see Happold, M.: Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 
Constitution of the United Nations, Leyden Journal of International Law, 16 (2003) 599. 
15
 For this opinion see e.g., Sossai, M.: UNSC Res. 1373 (2001) and International 
Law-making: A Transformation in the Nature of the Legal Obligations for the Fight 
against Terrorism? Florence, 2004. 4 - 5 , <www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/Sossai.PDF> 
(visited on 19 August 2005). 
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exhaustive list provided in Article 41 nor the context of the Article suggest this 
kind of limitation, however the terms in the Article 41 are generally interpreted 
as 'enforcement measures ' , that is to say, binding, moreover, 'coercive' acts, 
even against the will of the member States, eventually applying equally to them. 
In that regard, in my view, the concept of ' coerc ive measures' may be seen 
as measures binding upon member States even against their will. In a more 
strict interpretation, coercive measures shall directly indicate possible counter-
measures in cases of non-compliance. It is true, that the two adopted legislative 
resolutions do not directly indicate such countermeasures. However, it does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility for the Council to adopt legislative measures 
which may indicate further sanctions if States fail to comply. 
Consequently, it can plausibly be argued that there is not any expressed or 
implied limitation in the text of the Charter to strictly devoid the Council from 
the possibility and power to enact legislative measures. Beside that, the relevant 
provisions of the Charter do allow eventually a 'wide ' interpretation of the 
Counci l ' s powers to include the possibility to legislate.16 At this point, these 
determinations are nonetheless not conclusive in themselves pro a legislative 
power of the Council . On the other hand, they do indicate that the text of the 
Charter may be open for such interpretation and that legislative powers of the 
Council could eventually find their basis in specific expressed provisions of 
the Charter. 
2. The Possible Intentions of the Founders-Power by Necessary Implication 
The possible intentions of the founders of an international organization expressed 
in the travaux préparatoires and the doctrine of implied powers are by now 
generally accepted and applied not only as subsidiary but also as supplementary 
means of interpretation of specific powers of the organization. 
It has been argued by many authors that it was not in the mind of the 
founders to create a world government with extremely wide powers, and, more 
specifically, with the power to legislate.17 The text of the travaux préparatoires 
l f iThis view may be discovered in the statements in Dekker, I. F.-Wessel, R.: 
Governance by international organizations: rethinking the normative force of international 
decisions. In: Dekker, I. F.-Werncr, W. G. (eds.): Governance and international legal 
theory. Leiden, 2004. 227. For this opinion see also Fassbender. В.: The United Nations 
Charter as constitution of the international community. Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, 36 (1998) 574. 
17
 On the possible characterizations of the UN see Ross, A.: Constitution of the United 
Nations-Analysis of structure and function. Copenhagen, 1950. 189-200. Wright, Q.: 
International law and the United Nations. Bombay, 1960. 7. 
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concerning the powers of the Council, albeit comprehensive, cannot be deemed 
conclusive or supportive at all cases, for instance at the determination of the 
notions used in Article 39. There was an extensive deba te on the speci f ic 
powers and their extension at the San Francisco conference, however, one line 
of argument can be seen undoubtedly; the founders had in mind an essentially 
effective and capable organization with all the necessary powers for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
Regarding the specific powers, especially a possible legislative power of 
the Council, one particularly interesting point shall be mentioned: 
Numerous amendments were proposed . . . . All of them referred to the 
powers of the Security Council as compared with, and in relation to, the 
powers of the General Assembly. The need of determining with greater 
precision the functions and powers of the Security Council was stressed in 
many proposed amendments. Some other propositions may be briefly stated 
as follows: 
(d) That the Security Council should not establish or modify principles 
or rules of law;18 
This particular proposal-among many others-was defeated during the negotia-
tions in Committee III/l . The refusal of this proposal may, however, still be 
interpreted at least in two different ways. On the one hand, it may mean that 
the founders did not find it important to add an explicit provision concerning 
such limitation, considering it as evidently inherent in the expressed provisions. 
On the other hand, especially in the context of the proposal, the founders did 
not want to establish that particular limitation on the powers of the Council . 
This interpretation may be underpinned by the fact that point (c) in the list of 
the proposals, stating "[t]hat the powers of the Security Council should be 
reduced" was also defeated. Consequently, following the principle of 'negat io 
negationis est licitas', the defeat of a proposed limitation logically implies the 
acceptance of the positive power, i.e. in this case the power to legislate. Beside 
that, it cannot be argued plausibly that the text of the travaux préparatoires 
would in any way imply the restriction of the Council's powers either concerning 
the determinations in Article 39 or the nature of measures in Article 41. It can 
rather be seen that all possible specific restrictions on the powers of the 
Council were removed for the sake of efficiency, leaving only one explicit 
limitation, namely the obligation to comply with the 'purposes and principles 
18
 UNCIO Docs., Vol. XI., 556. [Emphasis added.] 
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of the United Nations'. Therefore , the text of the preparatory works tends to 
support the view in favorem a possible legislative power of the Security 
Council. 
Other means of interpretation-with growing importance-may be the appli-
cation of the doctrine of implied powers. However, some preliminary remarks 
shall be added concerning the scope and content of implied powers. To begin 
with, even the exact scope of this power is subject of constant debate. In the 
view of the supporters of a broader interpretation, as set out in the Reparation 
for Injuries opinion of the ICJ , the standard of review shall be the necessity 
of the power in relation to the duties of the organization. Nevertheless, this 
opinion was essentially aimed to describe the nature of the powers of the UN, 
but may also be applied for the organs of the UN. On the other hand, according 
to the restrictive interpretation, presented in Judge Hackworth 's dissenting 
opinion to the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, "implied powers f low 
from a grant of expressed powers , and are limited to those that are 'necessary' 
to the exercise of powers expressly granted".14 The primary difference between 
the two interpretations lies within the standard itself, i.e. what shall be the 
exercise of that specific power necessary for. In order to establish a legitimate 
basis, the possible power of the Council to legislate shall be subject to both tests. 
Another important e lement is that implied powers shall be 'founded on 
powers attributed to the organization at its creation ;20 implied powers cannot 
be the result of practical development of the organization's competences. 
Analysing the possible legislative powers of the Council in the light of implied 
powers, the first question shall be, whether legislative powers are 'necessary' 
or 'essential' for the Council to fulfil its duties under the Charter. On the one 
hand, the Counci l has been vested with extremely wide discretion and powers 
in order to ful f i l its primary responsibility, i.e. the maintenance of international 
peace and security. As seen above, it includes the adoption of binding resolutions, 
making determinations and applying non-military or mil i tary measures if it 
deems necessary. Therefore, it might be argued that the expressed powers of 
the Council cover all the necessary means the Council needs to fulfil its tasks. 
On the other hand, this opinion has been contradicted, fo r instance, by the 
emergence and general acceptance concerning the rather implied power of the 
Council to organize and execute peace-keeping operations.21 Practically, it 
" Reparation for Injuries case, dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth, ICJ Reports, 
1949. 174, at 198. 
20
 Schermers, H. G.-Blokker, N.: InternationaI Institutional Law. Leiden, 2003. 176. 
" 'See e.g., Certain Expenses opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962. 151. Khan, R.: Implied 
powers of the United Nations. Delhi, 1970.41. 
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always depends on the requirements of a problem the Security Council has to 
face, whether its expressed powers provide all the necessary and essential 
means. If a particular issue raises the question for the Council to use means not 
explicitly provided, it shall have the power to apply other, more efficient and 
necessary means. When the Council adopted Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 
1540 (2004), it did not choose the abstract fo rm incidentally; in the light of the 
challenges raised by the spread and danger of international terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, its expressed 
powers did not seem sufficient enough to meet those challenges. In that case, it 
may plausibly be argued, therefore, that the exercise of legislative powers by 
the Council were at that t ime necessary for the fulfi lment of its duties. 
Nevertheless, it shall be added that it is upon the Council to determine its o w n 
means, namely what measures it deems 'necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security ' ; however, a lso taking into account the l imits 
set by the Charter itself. 
An additional question shall be raised at that point concerning the broad and 
narrow interpretation of the standard, namely the need for express provision as 
basis of implied powers. Prima facie it may be argued that Articles 39 and 
41 contain these expressed powers, however, this assumption needs fu r the r 
clarification. The possible legislative powers of the Council shall be deemed 
necessary to exercise its powers to adopt non-military measures 'to give e f fec t 
to its decisions' (it deems necessary) to 'maintain or restore international peace 
and security' . Here, it is uneasy to find fur ther arguments pro or contra, the 
choice of aspects largely depends on one 's attitude towards the extension of 
the powers of the Council. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, if the 
challenges raised by a particular security concern can only be met by adopting 
general-abstract decisions being the most proper means to 'maintain or restore 
international peace and security' , the Council shall have the power to legislate 
in order to exercise its powers in Article 41. The reason behind the similarity 
between the arguments made concerning both the broad and narrow inter-
pretation must lie within the fact that the general purposes and functions of the 
UN are practically identical with the primary powers of the Security Council . 
It cannot be deemed too far-fetched to argue for a possible implied power of 
the Council to legislate, based upon the classic qualifications of the implied 
powers doctrine. However, I still uphold the view that the general powers or 
the purposes and principles of the organization do not necessarily provide 
sufficient legitimacy for the Council 's legislative actions. Therefore, in the 
application of both possible expressed and implied powers, specific provisions 
(containing specific, relevant powers) are to be shown in order to form a potential 
legal basis for legislative acts. In that regard, only the strict interpretation of 
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the doctrine of implied powers may be acceptable prima facie as the basis of 
further examinations. 
As it can be seen, the doctrine of implied powers may also be applied in 
connection with the establishment of legislative powers for the Council; how-
ever, this argument shall be used extremely carefully in order to avoid unlikely 
conclusions and vague legitimacy. I fu l ly agree with those views requiring 
specific expressed powers as a legal basis for legislative acts, however, space 
shall be left for the organ concerned to fu l f i l its duties under those provisions. 
In that regard, latent powers shall also be taken into account. 
3. The 'Subsequent Practice' of the Security Council and the Ex Post Facto 
Observance by Member States 
The use of subsequent practice as means of interpretation and at the same time 
as an argument pro or contra the existence of specific powers has further 
implications. Its independent application relates to the concept of ' assumed 
powers'. As the ICJ stated in its Certain Expenses opinion: 
when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fu l f i lment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organi-
zation.22 
On the other hand, subsequent practice m a y also supplement an argument pro 
implied or even inherent powers supporting the legitimisation of certain powers. 
However, in my opinion, in both cases the value of subsequent practice in that 
meaning largely depends on the attitude of the member States, namely the ex 
post facto observance or acceptance of the existence of such powers.23 
However, it shall a lso be added, that there are certain differences and 
ambiguities concerning the exact influence and weight of State acceptance. In 
our case, the subsequent practice of the U N Security Council shall be examined 
both pro- and retrospectively. On the o n e hand, it shall be analysed how 
determinant is the practice of the Counci l before its legislative acts on the 
scope of its powers; on the other hand, it shall also be treated, whether and 
how an emerging practice of the Council may contribute to the legitimization 
of its powers. The primary conclusion that may be drawn from the practice of 
22
 Certain Expenses opinion. Ibid. 168. 
23
 For this opinion see also Amerasinghe, C. F.: Principles of the institutional law of 
international organizations. 2ml ed., Cambridge, 2005. 49. 
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the Council , especially in the post-Cold War period is the clear effort to expand 
its own capabilities and powers. Starting from the often-cited political state-
ment in 1992 by the Heads of State in the Council, the Security Counci l never 
disguised its goals to adapt itself to the new challenges, eventually through the 
re-interpretation of fundamental concepts. This expansion of powers, obviously, 
may be best seen in the development of the Council ' s Chapter VII powers.2 4 
It shall be noted at this point, that in these cases the Security Council 
generally attempted to base its motion on expressed provisions and specific 
powers granted by the UN Charter. Consequently, the Council 's practice was 
and is by and large understood as the interpretation of its specific powers , and, 
at the same time, the filling in the lacunae in the text of the Charter. In my 
opinion, it is only the minority of the cases when it may be argued that, through 
its practice, the Council rather expanded and supplemented its expressed or 
implied powers. Beside that, it may also be subject of debate, whether and how 
much the Council 's post-Cold War practice was and is an expansion of its 
powers and not the exploitation of them, originally attributed to it but prevented 
by the political environment to be used for a long period of time. Therefore, 
concerning our case, the practice of the Council prior its legislative acts can 
only be interpreted properly as an evidence for further possibili t ies and 
capabilities and cannot be seen as determinative regarding the scope of the 
Security Council 's existing powers. In my view, taking the Council ' s previous 
practice as a standard is only plausible in the permissive and not the restrictive 
meaning. Taking a specific example, the fact that the Security Council referred 
so far to specific cases concerning the determination of a 'threat to the peace' 
does not in any way prevent it to refer to general threats in the future , if it is 
compatible with the text of the Charter and is necessary for the restoration or 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
The second part of the question refers to the legal value and legitimacy of 
the subsequent legislative practice by the Security Council; the examination of 
the ex post facto observance by the member States bears an essential importance 
in this regard. However, it shall be determined in advance, which factors 
generally characterize the legal value of subsequent practice. A description and 
test may be found in the ICJ's Namibia opinion: 
the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period 
supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken 
by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members , have 
consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice [...]. This procedure 
: J
 For a proper and comprehensive overview see Malone: op. cit. 
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followed by the Security Council , which has continued unchanged [...], has 
been generally accepted by Members of the United Nations and evidences a 
general practice oftliat Organization,25 
However, this test and its standards shall be applied carefully, because 
there is a significant difference between the practices the Court referred to and 
a possible legislative practice. In the latter case, the terms 'long period' and 
'continued unchanged ' practice shall be interpreted differently, considering 
that the adoption of legislative acts is not a procedural question but rather a 
substantive one. In my view, therefore, it shall not be required of all or the 
majori ty of the Security Council resolutions to be legislative, especially 
considering the extensive discretional power of the Council in choosing its 
own measures. Consequently, in that specific case, already a few examples 
may contribute to the existence of a practice by the Council; however, a 
general acceptance in this case would be much more difficult to prove. To see 
whether a supposed practice by the Council should be considered in itself as 
the basis of interpreting the Charter in order to include a (legislative) power, or 
there may be found other arguments underpinning this interpretation, we shall 
refer to C.F. Amerasinghe, according to whom in the former case a longer period 
of time, (i.e. several cases of legislative activity) and extensive coherency is 
required for a stable legitimacy.26 
As pointed out above, the legitimacy of the Security Council 's practice and 
especially of a legislative practice essentially depends on the acceptance and 
observance by the member States. The attitude of the member States may be 
best shown from their statements and practical reactions or protests before, 
during and after the adoption of the resolutions in question. Regarding the first 
act, namely Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), neither the procedure 
prior the adoption of the resolution, nor the adoption procedure itself implies 
much debate. The resolution was adopted after a quite short discussion, with 
unanimity within the Council.27 Another additional element may be the compliance 
with the provisions of the resolution. As pointed out above, Resolution 1373 
(2001) established a so-called Counter-Terrorism Committee in order to 
coordinate and organize the efforts of the member States under the resolution. 
The attitude of the member States may be seen f r o m the fact that: 
23
 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences... op. cit. ICJ Reports, 1971. 22. 
2i
' Amerasinghe: op. cit. 51. 
"
7
 However, some may argue that there have been essentially political and not legal 
considerations behind this unanimity, triggered by the general sympathy after the 11 
September attacks. 
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191 states submitted first round reports called for by the resolution, self-
assessments on implementation of Resolution 1373.28 
On the other hand, the case of Resolution 1540 (2004) shows a somewhat 
different approach. To begin with, prior the actual adoption there was about a 
half a year of informal and formal consultations, involving some f i f ty member 
States of the UN. As it may be seen f rom the records of two open meetings, the 
opinions of the member States concerning a possible legislative funct ion of the 
Security Council were in many aspects entirely different.24 There were opinions 
expressly or at least implicitly recognizing a possible legislative power and 
function of the Security Council, and views expressly opposing it. However, 
not all the contributing member States have expressly addressed this question. '0 
On one hand, for example, expressly accepting and supporting a legislative 
function of the Council, the representative of Switzerland stated: 
It is acceptable for the Security Council to assume such a legislative role 
only in exceptional circumstances and in response to an urgent need.31 
Others presented a much more neutral point of view, however, still, at least 
implicitly accepting such a function, for example, the representative of South 
Africa, by stating that: 
The current draft resolution imposes obligations on United Nations Member 
States and attempts to legislate on behalf of States by prescribing the nature 
and type of measures that will have to be implemented by States. ... South 
Africa believes that the draft resolution could have far-reaching legal and 
practical implications for Member States,32 
28
 For an overview on the work of the CTC see Rosand, E.: Security Council resolution 
1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the fight against terrorism, American Journal 
of International Law, 97 (2003) 337. 
For the records of the meetings see UN Doc. S/PV. 4950. Record of the Security 
Council 's 4950th meeting, Thursday, 22 April 2004, 9.50 a.m., New York, and UN Doc. 
S/PV. 4965. Record of the Security Council 's 4956th meeting, Wednesday, 28 April 2004, 
12.45 p.m., New York. 
30
 For an overview see Lavalle, R.: A novel, if awkward exercise in international law-
making: Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Netherlands International Law Review, 
51 (2004) 425. 
31
 UN Doc. S/PV.4950. Record of the Security Council's 4950th meeting, Thursday, 22 
April 2004, 9.50 a.m., op. cit. 28. 
32
 Ibid. 22. 
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On the other side, there were also several opinions to be found, which 
could not accept a legislative power for the Security Council. As, for example, 
the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated: 
The United Nations Charter entrusts the Security Council with the huge 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, but it does not confer 
authority on the Council to act as a global legislature imposing obligations on 
States without their participation in the process. The draft resolution, in its 
present form, is a clear manifestation of the Counci l ' s departure from its 
Charter-based mandate.3 3 
As it can be seen, the adoption of legislative acts by the Security Council 
was not at all accompanied by unanimous support and acceptance; however, 
the proportions of the different opinions may have further implications. From 
the fifty-one States making a statement during the open meetings, some ten 
made an expressly opposing view against the legislative function of the Council, 
while other States either did not mention that aspect of the resolution, or accepted 
generally the urgent need and necessity to adopt the measure in question, or 
even, supported expressly a limited power of the Council to eventually adopt 
legislative acts.34 In my view, this proportion reflects a qualified majority of 
the views supporting or at least accepting (in the meaning of 'not opposing') 
such a function by the Council. It must be added that the supporting opinions 
also contained references that the Council should only apply its powers in 
exceptional cases when there is an existing and serious threat and there are 
gaps in the relevant international legal regulations and it is necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security to act immediately. In some 
arguments, it was also added that preferably the widest majority of the member-
ship is to be involved in the adoption of such measures, in order to ensure its 
general legitimacy. In the end, this resolution was also adopted by unanimity. 
After the debate, one may still argue the value of member State acceptance, 
which is probably substantial. Therefore, fur ther examples and debates are 
needed to formulate a general conclusion on the attitude of the member States; 
so far it may only be observed that the first reactions of the States may be seen 
as supportive, as long as the legislative pract ice of the Council remains 
exceptional. 
33
 Ibid. 32. 
34
 The determination whether an opinion is supporting or opposing, reflects the 
interpretation of the author of this study. 
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4. The Unsuitability of the Security Council-as a Political Organ-
to Legislate 
According to Judge Schwebel ' s dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case: 
The Security Council is a political organ which acts fo r political reasons. It 
may take legal considerations into account but, unl ike a court, it is not 
bound to apply them.35 
In the view of some authors, and even member States of the UN, the essen-
tially political character of the Security Council as an organ makes it legally 
and constitutionally unsuitable to adopt legislative m e a s u r e s . ь There are 
arguments that the Council is generally unbound by law, consequently, it 
cannot guarantee the rule of law in its legislative function. Beside that, its lack 
of representativity and the democratic deficit of its decision-making procedure 
are also brought up against its possible legislative funct ion. However, in my 
opinion, there are several deficiencies of these arguments. To begin with, the 
qualification of the Security Council as a political organ is generally under-
stood and mentioned in relation to the International Court of Justice as a 
judicial organ. Referring back to Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion, even 
his determination is based on the comparison of the Counci l and the Court. 
Therefore, when arguing that the Council is essentially a political organ, it 
shall be interpreted in the meaning that the Council is not suited to act as a 
court, but it does not necessarily excludes its possible capability to act as a 
legislature. Beside that, as Judge Schwebel pointed out, the Council has the 
power and the capability to 'take legal considerations into account' which may 
also mean that in specific cases the Council is capable to comply with the 
principle of rule of law, which may be interpreted as an evidence pro its very 
wide discretional powers regarding the elements of its decision-making. 
The other part of its argument, namely that the Council is unbound by legal 
considerations in its decision-making, in my opinion, is rather connected with 
the problem of the lack of judicial review and the wide margin of the Council 
in making its determinations, but it does not necessarily eliminate its possible 
legislative power per se. Perhaps a more important aspect of the problem is 
35
 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports, 1986. 90. 
[Hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua case.) 
36
 See e.g., Happold: op. cit.; E.g., Pakistan's view prior the adoption of SC/RES/1540 
(2004), op. cit. 
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that, despite its alleged lack of representativity, the Security Council is the 
primary organ within the UN empowered to adopt binding decisions for the 
member States. The primary role of the Council is to lead the organization in 
the field of international peace and security, and to make all the necessary 
measures for its restoration or maintenance. 
Summing up, in my opinion, based on its political nature per se, it cannot 
be stated that the Security Council may not adopt legislative acts; nevertheless, 
its practice may have constitutional and democratic deficiencies. 
5. Incompatibility with the Basic Principles of International Law 
During the open meetings before the adoption of Security Council Resolution 
1540 (2004), the representative of Japan, nevertheless generally accepting a 
possible legislative function of the Council, made an observation, which 
actually can be used as a counter-argument or an element of it: 
In adopting a binding Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, the Security Council assumes a lawmaking function. 
The Security Council should, therefore, be cautious not to undermine the 
stability of the international legal framework .37 
At the same meeting, the representative of Cuba, generally opposing a 
legislative power of the Council , stated that: 
Several elements of this initiative do not correspond to the basic principles 
contained in the United Nat ions Charter and recognized in international 
law that prohibit interference in the internal affairs of States and the use or 
the threat of the use of f o r ce against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State.38 
Another aspect of the same counter-argument may be found in Matthew 
Happold's study: 
Once the Security Council starts imposing general and temporally undefined 
obligations on states, it is usurping a role that states have reserved for 
37
 UN Doc. S/PV. 4950, 28. op. cit. 
38
 UN Doc. S/PV. 4950, 30. op. cit. 
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themselves. Moreover, given its composition and procedures, it is do ing so 
in a way that erodes the principle of sovereign equality?4 
Regarding one of the main arguments, namely the prohibition of the inter-
ference with the domestic jurisdiction of the states, it can be stated that Art icle 
2(7) of the UN Charter expressly allows the organization and its organs to inter-
fere with the domain reservé of its m e m b e r States, by adopting b ind ing 
resolutions for them. 
The other argument, concerning the violation of the principle of sovereign 
equality of States, needs further examination. An important element of this 
principle may be formulated that the source of obligations and rights of States 
in the international plane shall be based upon their will and consent. Here again , 
this rule may have general application, however , there are certain exceptions 
on the level of individual States. To begin with, a State may be bound by ius 
cogens norms of international law by the fact that it became a member of the 
international community. In general, a State is also bound by customary inter-
national law, even against its will, except the very narrow case of 'persistent 
objection'. 
In the specific case of decisions of international organization, this consent 
is implied within the accession to the constituent treaty of the organization. On 
the other hand, the fact that the Security Counci l as an organ with 15 members 
may adopt binding decisions for the whole organization is generally accepted 
among the member States as well as among international lawyers as a legitimate 
restriction of sovereign equality. Consequently, the question is not whether or 
not the Council may interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of its m e m b e r 
States or whether it may adopt binding decisions for the whole membership 
under the general international law but whether or not the Council may adopt 
general legislative measures. The answer to this question may be affirmative if 
the UN Charter (expressly or implicitly) attributes to it legislative powers. 
It is true that: 
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are 
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of inter-
national law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to 
which they are parties.4" 
39
 Happold: op. cit. 1373. 610. 
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 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
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Nevertheless, there must be a governing principle among these obligations; based 
upon to the lex specialis derogat legis generalis principle. If the constituent 
treaty, namely the UN Charter attributes certain powers to the Organization 
which are not granted (or regulated) by general international law, the Organi-
zation shall have the power as long as it does not violate peremptory norms of 
international law. " However, as proven by the case of other international organiz-
ations (especially by the example of the European Community) , at tr ibuting 
legislative powers to an international organization per se does not in any way 
violate ius cogens. 
Conclusions 
In the end, the essential question still remains: is the Security Council empow-
ered to adopt legislative measures? The question is not in any way as simple as 
it seems at a first glance. It is also far more than a semantic question concerning 
the contents of the notion of 'legislation'; however, a different interpretation of 
the term may shorten many parts of the discussion. The underlying problem, 
namely the uncertainty concerning the parameters of a legitimate and generally 
accepted power , leaves an extremely wide margin of appreciation for the inter-
preters. The text of the UN Charter may be interpreted in many ways: f rom the 
aspect of State sovereignty and also from the aspect of the efficiency of the 
Organization. In my interpretation, it cannot be concluded that the provisions 
of the Charter exclude a possible legislative power of the Council. The Security 
Council has the power to adopt binding resolutions for the member States of 
the UN. Whether those shall refer to a specif ic situation or general "threats to 
the peace" m a y also form the basis of such acts, may also be disputed. 
On the other hand, the Charter and the travaux préparatoires do not underpin 
a restrictive interpretation-this has been p roven in the study. It is also of vital 
importance for a legitimate legislative funct ion of the Council that member 
States accept and observe it, at least implicitly. Eventually it is the States that 
shall determine rules of international l aw- the i r consent is a prerequisite. This 
view does not necessarily impair with the existence of a legislative power of 
the Security Council because the consent of the member States may be found 
in their acceptance of the UN Charter and their views expressed during the 
adoption of the legislative acts in question. It is also up to the States to set up 
the limitations on the legislative powers of the Council. The sign of this 
41
 This principle also follows from the law of treaties, as regulated by Article 53 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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tendency may be seen in their statements referring to existing gaps in inter-
national law. 
Whether or not a legislative power would be beneficial for the international 
community, is, however, not a legal quest ion and may only be proved by a 
longer term of exercised practice. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the 
elaboration or exploitation of a legislative power by the Security Council will 
definitely change the quality of measures within the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. 
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Jakobinus Hall, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
The co-operation between the Graduate School of Law of the Nagoya University 
and the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences goes 
back to 2003. Since that t ime there was extended research co-operation mostly 
on experience of the respective transitions to the rule of law, on the one hand, 
and there were regularly held Japanese-Hungarian seminars either in Nagoya 
or in Budapest on a variety of timely legal issues, including also constitu-
tionality and justice problems raised by those processes of transition, on the other. 
These seminars were contributed to and attended by not only Japanese and 
Hungarian researchers but experts coming from other countries in Asia and 
Europe as well. The professional interest in these seminars was enhanced so as 
to transform them into genuine nation-wide workshops in the hosting country.1 
On its turn, the output of the co-operation itself in two considerable volumes of 
proceedings published so far became similarly an achievement standing for 
itself.2 
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In the spring of 2007 the Institute for Legal Studies had the honour to host an 
international seminar on "Comparative Aspects of Civil Litigation" in Budapest. 
The Editors of Acta Juridica Hungarica are pleased to present the revised 
and shortened version of all the seven presentations made at the seminar. 
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Arbitration as a Transnational Business Dispute 
Resolution 
I. Introduction 
In our globally expanding and closely integrating cross-borderline business 
activities legal disputes are one of their indispensable costs. They are inevitably 
of transnational nature, and should be resolved by an internationally fair and 
reliable system of dispute resolution. For business men they should be a costly 
performed and economically reasonable dispute resolution system. 
Resolution by litigation before state courts has been, generally speaking, 
one of the traditional and typical resolution systems especially for domestic 
business disputes. Of course, litigation is always burdensome and requires 
sometimes severe expenses . But as to transnational business litigation, there 
are different kinds of difficulties. Generally, being in its nature, it shows some 
national bias based on the forum jurisdiction. Civil procedures and justice 
systems in every respective nation accompany some kinds of burden especially 
to the foreign party: They have to expect many difficulties due to the unfamiliar 
foreign proceedings and face foreseeable as well as unexpected expenses, 
which would not be necessary for their domestic litigation.1 Sometimes they 
need lawyers for their own and foreign lawyers admitted in the jurisdiction for 
the advocates of the foreign litigation. 
Obstacles of litigation in foreign courts should be avoided, as far as possible, 
for reasonable business activities. Risks and other potential difficulties with 
foreign litigation should be calculated in advance and minimized. By well 
established contractual relationships future disputes could be minimized. For 
avoiding such diff icult ies or future uncertainties, reasonable business men 
Professor of Law, Nagoya University, Japan. 
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 For reducing such costs or obstacles of transnational civil procedure there are some 
trials to realize the harmonization of civil procedures in the respective nation. One 
ambitious experiment is a joint project of ALI and Unidroit, see ALl/Unidroit, Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure, Cambridge 2005. 
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should establish substantially clear and undoubted agreements. However, disputes 
cannot be avoided only by such substantial agreements. For taking precautions 
against such legal risks by litigation, they have to provide some schemes for 
avoiding litigation before state courts to resolve their future potential disputes. 
One of the well known methods for avoiding future litigation before national, 
especially foreign, courts has been to choose a dispute resolution by arbitration. 
Especially in transnational business transactions, arbitration is regarded as a 
favorite way for resolving disputes. Today, according to German literature, 
over 80 percent of transnational contracts include arbitration agreements.2 
II. Successful March of International Arbitration? 
The popularity of arbitration in transnational contractual relationships, especially 
in the Western business world, has been referred to some internationally 
common elements. Arbitration, particularly the transnational aspect, has been 
regarded as one of the well established and successful resolution systems. 
Following points could be pointed out as reasons for such success of inter-
national arbitration: One is the successful worldwide acceptance of the New 
York Convention of 1958 for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitra-
tion awards. Today over 130 nat ions have ratified this Convent ion, and it is 
said that this Convention was one of the most successful multi-national 
conventions. But its real funct ions or effectiveness, especially efficiencies by 
enforcement of a foreign arbitration award, depend on the nat ional system of 
enforcement, and are not proved. The second point is the UNCITRAL-Model 
Law of Arbitration of 1985. Many countries1 have accepted fundamental ideas 
of the Model Law, and they have changed, totally or partly, their national law 
according to it. Approximation of national legislations of arbitration law has 
been realized by amendment or new legislation of national law of arbitration 
based on this Model Law. But such legislation was only one of the first steps 
for realizing a feasible system of international arbitration. National law of 
arbitration regulates mostly certain fundamental treatment of agreements of 
arbitration, appointment procedure of arbitrators, its procedure before arbitrators, 
arbitral awards and some procedure before state courts to agree its enforcement 
and the way to contest against arbitral awards. Law of arbitration is a frame-
2
 See Schwab, K.-H.-Walter, G.: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. 7. Aufl. München. 2005, 345. 
1
 Hungary legislated according to this Model Law, as to historical background and 
political decision, see Kengyel, M.: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Ungarn. Zeitschrift für 
Zivilprozess International (3) 1998. 378. 
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work for the actual performance of arbitration. It can be applied, if arbitration 
will be really performed in the jurisdiction. Functions of national law depend 
only on the choice, whether business men choose the forum as a place of 
arbitration. Substantial functions or achievements of arbitration depend on the 
real choice of the jurisdiction by parties as an arbitral place for potential 
disputes. The third element is successful activities of well established organiza-
tions or institutions for international arbitration. In the field of international 
arbitration there are a number of well established and well known institutions 
of international arbitration. Most of them have a long history of tradition and 
achievements. Arbitration could be performed as a f o r m of ad hoc style, too. 
But the institutions play a more important role in the transnational business 
world. Between such institutions there exists competition. Most of them are 
proud and advertise their own merits. Even so, it is not easy to understand the 
real meaning of their activities for most normal business men when choosing 
one of them for their dispute resolution. 
III. Some Considerations on Arbitration as a Private Dispute Resolution 
1. Arbitration is a private dispute resolution system based mainly on the 
arbitration agreement between private parties. They can and will choose arbitra-
tion as a part of their business activities in advance, already on the occasion 
of their establishment of contractual relationships. O n e of the most typical 
results of an arbitration agreement is, as agreed in most jurisdictions, to avoid 
litigation before the state court. Some well considered reasons must be decisive 
for choosing it. In much literature some merits of arbitration have been pointed 
out. Here I will point out a few aspects. 
Confidentiality must be one of the aspects. Disputes open to public between 
contractual parties must be strange for them and should be avoided. 
Further for their business activities such disputes could not be profi table. 
Special knowledge of arbitrators should be considered. It is common that arbi-
trators should be chosen especially based on the aspect of the special nature 
of disputes. In our modern transaction professional and technical knowledge 
for understanding the real core issues of disputes and adequate ways for 
resolving their disputes are required. It is necessary f o r the parties to have 
information of the ability of candidates of their arbitrators. 
2. As a reasonable business activity, cost performance of the dispute resolution 
is one of the most important issues in the business world. The decision whether 
the arbitration should be chosen as a device of a fu ture dispute resolution 
should be considered f rom the view point of such business aspects. In case of 
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litigation before a state court, the court procedure should be decided and 
decisively depends on the fo rum legal system. Parties can choose the forum, 
but not the procedure itself. T h e y cannot choose judges for their case. They 
can be specialized on the legal problems of the forum state, but mostly they do 
not have the necessary special knowledge on the specific mat ters of the case. 
On the contrary, if arbitration will been chosen, parties can choose a specialized 
person of the specif ic field as the i r arbitrator; their procedure can be tailored 
to the case or other requirements of them. They can choose the place of 
arbitration by which they can choose the arbitration law applied on the case, 
too. Language problems cannot be disregarded. They can be calculated not 
only from purely judicial aspects, but from business aspects, too. 
3. For accelerating a more popular use of international arbitration, it is neces-
sary to be informed widely about the real phases of transnational arbitration. 
Sometimes there can be seen some anxieties on arbitration because of its 
decisive nature to avoid other possibilities for resolving their disputes and no 
possibilities of appeal in case of litigation. Especially because of the confiden-
tiality of arbitration real achievements of most international arbitration are not 
predictable. A lack of such information provides parties who are frequent or 
experienced users of the institute with a profitable position. 
4. Establishing amiable institutes or organizations of arbitration should be 
the next step for encouraging arbitration in a country. Compared with some 
leading states, Japan had not been regarded as an encouraging country for 
arbitration. Japan accepted the German system of Civil Procedure and there 
were some provisions which were almost complete translations of the 
German Code. For over 130 yea r s this had not been changed. In 2003 a new 
Code of Arbitration was promulgated and the next year it was enforced. It 
accepted generally the UNCITRAL Model Law and it is composed as a 
uniform law for domestic and international arbitration. Like in Germany, Japanese 
lawmakers wanted to establish an internationally attractive legal system of 
arbitration. For that purpose it was necessary as a first s tep to establish 
arbitration law with an internationally admissible and feasible system of 
arbitration. Arbitration is regarded as an important part of ADR which is 
encouraged in our recent total re form of the Judicial System. 
As to Japanese international commercial arbitration, J C A A , the Japan 
Commercial Arbitration Association, is one of the main institutes. But the case 
number annually filed with the institute has been averagely 10, and remains at 
a low level. For a long time, w e discussed the reasons of such inactive and 
unpopular international arbitration. Many aspects had been pointed out. One 
was attributed to our archaic law of arbitration at that time. It was changed by 
the new code of arbitration. But there can be observed no sign of improvement 
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of this situation. It must be based on a more profound reason: The lack or 
insufficiency of international lawyers with the ability of international arbitrators. 
IV. Successful Function of International Arbitration 
1. As already mentioned, litigation abroad brings unexpected risks and difficul-
ties. Such risks should be surely endured by most big world business entities. 
But for normal business entities it could be hard to accept such difficulties. To 
create a feasible dispute resolution system for them, establishing adequate 
systems or institutions of arbitration must be one of the urgent tasks to realize in 
the globally expanding market society. 
Establishing an attractive and cost performed system of international commer-
cial arbitration should be profitable and encourage most business entities in 
our globally expanding business world. To accelerate attractiveness as place of 
international arbitration and to establish an attractive organization for interna-
tional arbitration there is international competition as the next step of a harmo-
nized legislation of arbitration law in many countries. 
2. Attractiveness of arbitration should be based on and established by mainly 
a high ability of arbitrators. Differently qualified arbitrators are one of the most 
important prerequisite for establishing an arbitration organization. Well trained 
arbitrators with different nationalities and different special knowledge should 
be organized. For business men who want to use the organization as an institu-
tional arbitration, it is one of the most important elements to find reliable arbitrators. 
Arbitration based on the private agreements between parties. Neutralities from 
state interferences are one of the indispensable aspects of international arbitration. 
State courts should keep restricted position to the arbitration proceedings. In this 
respect there are some difficulties to regulate arbitration proceedings as a uniform 
system of domestic and international arbitration. Especially for international 
arbitration the restrictive position of state courts or o ther organizations must be 
respected. Autonomy of the business world for encouraging and establishing a 
feasible arbitration scheme and a sufficient number of qualified international 
lawyers is urgently required. In Japan we are now trying to change our legal 
system totally and we established a new education system of lawyers. But 
there is no way for supplying international lawyers. To realize an adequate 
dispute resolution system in our globally expanding market society arbitration 
is one of the reasonable ways, but there remain many problems to be resolved. 
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Recent Developments in Hungarian Civil Procedure 
1. Introduction 
The Code of Civil Procedure of 1911 was one of the greatest achievements of 
Hungarian codification in the 20th century. The value of this statement is not 
diminished by the fact that our procedure had German and Austrian roots. 
Sándor Plósz, the creator of this f ield of law drew on the German and Austrian 
codes with a very fortunate and steady hand. The first Code of Civil Procedure 
of the 20th century was in force f rom 1915 to 1952, and during this period it 
had to be modified only once, namely in the early 1930s when the wave of 
bankruptcies fol lowing the economic crisis necessitated the acceleration of 
civil actions. 
The second model of our civil procedure in the 20th century, the Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1952 in its original form intended to imitate the Soviet-
Russian Code of 1923. For this reason among others, the institution of "people's" 
assessors and the participation of public prosecutors were introduced, the 
obligatory representation by lawyers had been eliminated, the first instance 
procedures were unified, the review appeals were discontinued and a one-level 
legal remedy system had been developed with the possibility of protest on legal 
grounds. 
The Code of Civil Procedure contained many "socialist" elements: The most 
important one was the change in the principle of party control. T h e law divided 
control over the scope and nature of the proceedings between the parties, the 
court, and the public prosecutor. As a result of this, the conventional right of 
disposal became illusory in practice because all the procedural acts of the 
parties felt under the control of the court and the public prosecutor. 
Contrary to the principle of party control's socialist transcript, the principle 
of adversary hearing had not been implemented in a completely socialist way 
in Hungarian civil procedure. The socialist idea on civil procedure, in which it 
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is the parties' duty to disclose all relevant facts and the power of the court to 
take the initiative ex officio in discovering the true facts of the case is mixed 
up with the spirit of the Code of Plósz. As a result of this, Hungarian civil 
procedure had been protected even in the 1950s from the application of the 
principle of judicial investigation. 
The Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure of 1952 was characterised by the 
active role of the judiciary as initiator, which contained the formal conduct of 
proceedings and made the judge ' s duty to clarify the facts . As a result of the ex 
officio automatism characterising each phase of the process, the parties were 
left little freedom of disposition over the course of the proceedings. The summon-
ing, the service of process, the deadline fixing, and trial dates took place ex 
officio; the party was allowed to request the extension of the deadline only. 
The preparation for the trial and the conduct of the trial, the most important 
element of the conduct of proceedings, also formed part of the tasks of the court. 
The four decades of socialist civil procedure cannot be defined as a uniform 
period: In Hungary at the beginning of the 1970s, the situation was suitable for 
reducing the dominance of the judge and the public prosecutor. T h e third 
amendment to the Code on Civil Procedure (Act XXVI of 1972) restricted the 
possibility of the initiation of a court action or intervention by public prose-
cutors. It also took steps to increase the weight and responsibility of the parties 
in the legal action, for the sake of improving the efficiency of the procedure. 
Subsequent modifications of the socialist Code of Civil Procedure could 
not repeat the success of the third amendment to the Code. Between 1973 and 
1979 hardly any provisions of law were made concerning civil procedure. The 
reasons for the decade's last relevant modification were not procedural but 
organizational ones. 
In the second half of the 1980s, one more unsuccessful attempt at codifica-
tion was made. The most important goal of this was the further simplification 
and acceleration of procedures. The concept of 1988 did not want to change 
relationship between the court and the parties, and it did not plan to renew the 
content of the socialist principles of disposition and hearing. The last socialist 
concept silently passed away in the whirl of the political transformation. 
2. Renewal of Hungarian Civil Procedure after the Democratic 
Transformation 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court played a determining role in the re-
establishment of rule of law. One of the most significant decisions of the 
Constitutional Court relating to civil procedure was Dec. 9/1992 (I. 30) AB, 
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in which the institution of protest on legal grounds were declared unconstitu-
tional and the rules were annulled. It was laid down as a fact that a protest on 
legal grounds was contrary to the rule of law, to the institution of legal force, 
and to the parties ' right of control over their disputes. 
The first amendment after the democratic transformation had as one of its 
primary purposes to substitute the protest on legal grounds annulled by the 
Constitutional Cour t and rules that were outdated or contrary to international 
conventions. The first amendment after the democratic transformation-in spite 
of the preliminary expectations-did not re-establish the remedy at (the?) third 
instance, which was abolished in 1951. This caused disappointment among the 
judiciary and in legal literature. 
In the mid 1990's, the judicial government took the first steps for a fur ther 
modification. T h e direct cause of this act was the considerable protraction of 
civil actions which already quer ied the functionali ty of jurisdiction. T h e 
acceleration of the procedure became the mos t important intention of the 
legislature. The new modification was aimed to change relations between the 
court and the part ies in some important questions. 
One of the greatest achievements of the 1995 reform amendment was the 
reformulation of the principle of party control. After the collapse of socialism, 
the principle of party control (which had embodied the ideology of the system) 
also became meaningless since private property, market economy, and constitu-
tionality all required respect fo r private au tonomy. Five years had to pass 
a f t e r the democratic transformation for the genuine content of the principle of 
disposition to be re-established on the basis of the decisions of the Consti-
tutional Court and later on the basis of the 1995 modification of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
The 1995 amendment, in accordance wi th Dec. 1/1994 (I. 7) AB, has 
maintained the general entitlement of the prosecutor to commence actions in 
cases where the entitled parties are unable to protect their r ights for any reason. 
According to the point of view of the Constitutional Court, this restriction on the 
constitutional right of autonomy is an unavoidable restriction and corresponds 
Art. 51(3) of the Constitution; according to which , protecting and ensuring the 
constitutional public order, r ights, and legal interests of citizens (and their 
organizations) is also the task of the public prosecutor 's off ice. 
The 1995 amendment set the principle of adversary hearing on a new basis. 
According to the new rule, the court may order the taking of evidence ex of f ic io 
only when the law allows it, whereupon the proving of the facts required to 
decide the act ion is solely the task of the parties. The modification of art. 
164(2) drastically restricted the possibility of ordering evidence officially to 
the number of cases defined by the Act, by which it wanted to ensure the 
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absolute effectiveness of the adversary hearing. By this solution, the legislature 
did not return to the moderate regulation (the principle of mixed adversary 
hearing) applied by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1911, but to the model 
applied by liberal civil procedure in the 19th century. Apart f r o m the fact that 
the pure principle of adversary hearing does not have historical roots in Central 
Europe, the 1995 amendment also proved to be inconsistent as it maintained 
the court ' s obligation to endeavour to find out the truth stated in art. 3(1). 
3. The Influence of Hungarian Judicial Reform on the Code of Civil 
Procedure 
The large judicial reform scheduled for the end of the 1990s, made it necessary 
to modi fy the Code of Civil Procedure. The most important provisions of 
Act LXXII of 1997 did not come into force immediately because of the delay 
in the setting-up of the regional courts of appeals. In spite of this, the 1997 
amendment is considered to be significant regulation because, by the intro-
duction of the idea of disputes involving a small amount ( less than H U F 
200 000), it s implified both appeals and reviews, it restricted the possibility 
of appeals in administrative proceedings, and re-regulated labour disputes (arts 
349-359) . 
The reform of the judicial organization, which broke down in 1998, was 
given a fresh start by Act CX of 1999. This amendment practically finished 
the change of model started at the beginning of the 1990s, re-formulated the 
principles of civil proceedings, and the purpose of the action. Forty seven 
years after the Code of Civil Procedure came into force, the legislature gave up 
the aim of ensuring the decision of civil legal disputes on the basis of truth. At 
the same time it released the court from the obligation to endeavour to find out 
the truth in civil actions. The new objective that replaced the jus t resolution of 
legal disputes, in harmony with the requirement of a fair trial laid down by Art. 
6 of the ECHR, wishes to guarantee the impartial decision of legal disputes. 
The guarantee of this is the fact that the court has to proceed in accordance 
with the re-formulated principles of civil procedure. 
Among the significant innovations, it should be mentioned that the 1999 
amendment fixed numerous deadlines binding on all courts. For example art. 
125(1) prescribed that the court has to take steps to fix a date for the hearing 
not later than within 30 days af ter the statement of claim is received by the 
court, and according to art. 125(3) the date of hearing shall be fixed in such a 
way that it could be held in four months. 
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4. In search of the 'Lost Truth' 
The 1999 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure produced little reaction in 
legal literature even though the elimination of the concept of truth f rom arts. 1 
and 3 of the Code was one of the most important modifications since the coming 
into force of the Code. This step of the legislature was not unexpected, how-
ever, since the 1995 amendment restricting the possibility of ordering evidence 
officially anticipated the change strengthening the role of proof. (The apathy of 
the judiciary may be explained by the frequent modifications, since the time of 
the democratic transformation, that did not concern civil procedure only.) 
The former judge István Nóvák was the first one w h o came to the conclu-
sion that our civil procedure will surely resist to the shock caused by the lack 
of truth. 
Tamás Földesi defended the 'lost truth' . There is a close connection between 
truth and justice, which can be expressed in a simplified way by the fact that a just 
judgement can generally be based on true statements, proved facts, or facts at least 
verified with a high probability. Földesi suggested reinstating provisions 
concerning truth in the course of further modifications of civil procedure. 
As for ourselves, we do not oppose the declarative re-appearance of the 
concept of truth in civil procedure, and so it is expected by the majority of the 
judiciary and by the public seeking just ice. We share the view of the great 
Austrian jurist, Franz Klein that legal action without truth is a 'rattling mill 
running with no loads'. However, we consider it more important that a future 
new Code of Civil Procedure should define the object ive of proof more 
specifically than the present one. 
5. 'Dimming' of the Role of the Judge 
Another substantial part of the change of model between 1995 und 2000 was 
the dimming of the role of the Judge. 
The 1999 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure put even more emphasis 
on the principle of disposition by the re-formulation of the fundamental 
principles of the Code, by the modification of the existing provisions, and by 
the establishment of new rules. The modif ied art. 3(1) lays down the exclusive 
right of the party interested in the dispute to institute legal proceedings, which 
right can only be restricted by law. Article 3(2) declares that the court, unless 
provision is made to the contrary, is bound by the petitions and declarations 
submitted by the parties, and extends the application of the principle of 
disposition to the parties ' control over the whole proceeding. Thus, the Code 
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makes it clear now that the parties are the 'masters of the case ' , they determine 
the subject-matter of the proceedings and so the procedural scope of action of 
the court. At the same time, the court is bound to prevent any procedural action 
of the parties and their representatives which is contrary to the requirement of 
good faith in the exercise of rights (art. 8). As a consequence, the parties' right 
to disposition is not unlimited; it may only prevail within the framework of 
another principle: The exercise of rights in good faith. 
Everybody agreed that the judge had to be relieved from unnecessary 
burdens, so the 'hyperactivity' of the socialist era had to be changed with a 
different role for judges . The modifications between 1995 and 1999 seemed to 
find this new role in the contemplative judge. In conformity with this, 
supplying facts in proceedings became solely the task of the parties and the 
modification did not allow the ordering of proof officially-contrary e.g. to the 
1911 Code of Civil Procedure-not even for practical purposes, because it 
would restrict the right of the parties to self-determination. 
It should be noted that the reduction of judicial power took place in the 
former socialist countries at a time when: In the common law legal system, the 
idea of judicial "case management" had evolved, which-by contrast-endeav-
oured to move judges out of their traditional passive roles (e.g. Civil Justice 
Act of 1990). This phenomenon may rightly be characterised as the convergence 
of procedural models from both directions. Development is aimed to balance 
judicial power and modern cooperation between the parties and the court. 
Seeing this procedure, we can observe this third change of the model of 
our civil procedure within a century with some anxiety. In the mid 1950s, 
mechanical and uncritical acceptance of Soviet legal institutions replaced the 
German-Austrian orientation of values. Nowadays we are approaching a-part ly-
outdated-English-American model of civil procedure. Even besides the 
fulfilment of duties of legal harmonization, enough ground is left for the Code 
of Civil Procedure, which should be filled with legal institution based on 
Hungarian procedural traditions rather than with the development of a newer 
model of litigation. The j u d g e ' s role in civil litigation does not have to be re-
invented since it was defined precisely by Géza Magyary nearly a century ago: 
'It must be up to the parties whether they want legal defence or not but it must 
not depend on them how the proceedings are conducted or how long they last ' . 
At the end of my presentation I would like to give a brief summary of the 
actual state of Hungarian Civil Procedure Law. 
There had been no significant amendments since 1999. The attempt to 
reform the regulation of the review appeal of 2002 has failed. The judicial 
government issues, each year, new proposals which are regularly refused by 
the legal practice and literature. The economic crisis that Hungary is facing 
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now is not favourable for the reform either. Due to lack of funds , the recently 
adopted law on legal aid cannot be applied yet. The introduction of electronic 
proceedings are hindered by the insufficient equipment of the courts. We can 
only hope that after the reform of the Hungarian Civil Code , a new Civil 
Procedure Code will finally be on agenda. 
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Some Special Features of Swedish Civil Procedure 
Introduction 
The current Swedish Code of Procedure, Rättegängsbalken,1 was adopted in 
1942 and came into force on 1 January 1948, following decades of investiga-
tion and preparation.2 It replaced the corresponding part of the Swedish law-
book of 1734 with main changes inter alia in 1849, 1901 and 1915. 
The then new Code was described, at least in Sweden, as being very 
modern for its time. And it is still in use, 60 years later, by and large with few 
structural changes. ' It is applicable for criminal as well as civil procedure. 
The court system 
The court system in which this Swedish Code of Procedure is generally 
applied, consists in principle of two types of courts, the ordinary courts and 
the administrative courts. In addition, there are some special courts as the 
Patent Court and the Labour Court . There are no special juveni le courts or 
family courts, no small claims courts, no justices of the peace and no investi-
gative judges. The Code is directly applicable only in the ordinary courts. 
The ordinary courts deal with criminal cases and civil cases, family cases 
included, while the main bulk of the cases in the administrative courts are 
taxation cases. 
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There are three levels of courts in the ordinary as well as the administrative 
court system.4 All ordinary court cases start in principle at the first level. Thus, 
there is no rule that civil cases regarding a huge sum of money nor a criminal 
case concerning a serious crime should start at the second level. 
The courts at the third level, the Supreme Court, Hőgs ta domstolen, and the 
Supreme Administrative Court, Regeringsrätten, are in principle only to 
establish precedents. When appealing f rom the second level, a party first has to 
get review permission, and review is in principle only permitted, and strictly 
so, if there is a matter of interesting principle involved and it is likely that the 
court will come in a position to rule on that principle, this ruling not being 
likely disturbed by changed testimonies or other matters of fact. 
Criminal cases and civil cases concerning family matters are in principle 
judged by one or more professional judges together with lay judges at the first 
and second level, but only by professional judges at the third level. Other civil 
cases are always judged only by professional judges at all three levels of the 
judicial system. 
The procedure 
The procedure is strictly adversarial, not investigative. Thus, the case should 
be presented to the court by the two parties and the court has to judge on what 
is presented, nothing else. A prosecutor is in principle the plaintiff in a criminal 
case with the victim as a possible co-plaintiff. 
The procedure is described as based on three main principles, three central 
pillars, „oralness", „immediateness" and „concentration". These principles are 
interlinked and somewhat overlapping each other. They imply that the case, 
whether a criminal or a civil one, should be presented orally during one time 
wise concentrated trial with immediate access for the court to all relevant 
material, and with the judgment delivered in close connection with the trial. 
Previously, prior to 1948, it was al lowed and c o m m o n to present written 
party and witness statements, on which, inter alia, the court should base its 
judgement. Now, the judgement should be based on one, concentrated trial— 
what is then and there orally presented to the court. 
4
 Sweden, with an area for instance somewhat 20% smaller than that of France and 
somewhat 20% larger than that of Japan and with a population of some 9 million 
inhabitants, has 53 ordinary and 23 administrave first instance courts and six ordinary and 
four administrative appellate courts. 
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These principles are moreover closely connected with the evidence rules. 
The prevailing rule is now the principle of free evaluation of the evidence.5 
There are no binding rules as prior to 1948, when for instance two witnesses in 
principle equalled full proof and one witness equalled half proof, the other half 
possibly being filled with circumstantial evidence of various kinds. 
There are no exclusionary rules as in the USA. If, for instance, the police 
has acquired evidence in an unlawful way, then that evidence will not be 
excluded for that reason. The unlawfulness by the police will be dealt with 
separately as a matter of police error, not a matter in the proceedings in 
quest ion. 
There are no rules against hearsay as in anglo-sachsian legal tradition. The 
court should indeed try to get access to a witness in person, but would 
nevertheless accept hearsay as such, if the hearing of the witness in person is 
not reasonably possible. Naturally, the court has to take into account the 
hearsay nature, when assessing the value of such evidence. Likewise, children 
could per se be heard as a witness, the value of the testimony naturally having 
to be assessed with due regard to the child's maturity etc. It is another matter, 
that a child might not be heard out of respect to the best of the child and that a 
child could not be heard under oath. 
The principle of concentration calls for a two-stage system at the first 
instance level. Due preparation is needed to hold a concentrated trial. There-
fore, there is a preparatory phase of the trial and a main hearing phase-in 
criminal and civil cases alike, however rather different in form, when it comes 
to the preparatory phase. 
In criminal cases, the preparatory phase takes place mainly outside the 
court under the leadership of the prosecutor together with the police and with 
possible influence of the defense. 
In civil cases on the other hand, the preparation is undertaken in court 
under the neutral leadership of the responsible judge without the participation 
of any lay judges. It could be in writing, but normally there is one or more oral 
hearings. The aim is to clarify all factual and legal issues as well as available 
and needed evidence, making it possible to have a concentrated oral main 
hearing, soon followed by a judgement.6 
This all does not mean that the Swedish system as now described functions 
altogether well. This goes especially for other civil cases than family cases. 
They may take a lot of time before a final outcome of the case is achieved, if 
handled according to the principal rules. Therefore, large commercial firms 
5
 Chapt. 35 art. 1. 
6
 Chapt. 42 art. 6 sect. 2. 
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often find it useful to insert into their contracts a provision that a dispute 
should be dealt with via arbitration and not via the ordinary court system. The 
primary reason is normally speed but business secrecy and the possibility to 
choose qualified and experienced judges could also be of importance. 
Judicial mediation 
The matter of speed to come to a final decision is important also to parties, 
where an arbitration clause is not applicable. Already the first instance 
preparation of a case could take a lot of time, and it might then be difficult to 
find a suitable main hearing time. The court, however, is seldom solely 
responsible for delays in these regards. The parties themselves and their lawyers 
might in various ways contribute to slow speed. And the appeal possibilities 
naturally contributes substantially to a final say in a case taking its time. 
Consequently, an alternative way is widely used. The Swedish Code of 
Procedure envisages the possibility for the court in consultation with the 
parties to assign an outside mediator, medlare,7 to try to achieve a friendly 
settlement in civil cases.8 Whether successful or not, such a mediator is to be 
paid by the parties in due course. The possibility to assign such an outside 
mediator is, however, extremely seldom used. The alternative is instead the 
first instance judge mediating in his or her own cases. 
This approach is most commonly used in Sweden. In fact, according to the 
Code, the judge is obliged to try to achieve a friendly settlement, if it appears 
appropriate considering the nature of the case and the situation in general." 
Consequently, the judge will in most civil cases, at some or more points during 
the procedure, explore the possibilities to achieve such a friendly settlement. 
He or she will try to inspire and help the parties to agree. The exercise of his or 
her impartiality and experience will contribute to the opening or re-opening 
and fostering of a dialogue between the parties, and the judge will in many 
cases be successful in his or her efforts. In fact, the Swedish court system 
would probably collaps, had not quite a number of disputes at the first instance 
level been settled by the parties under the guidance of a mediating judge. The 
7
 Chapt. 42, art. 17, sect. 2. 
8
 Here and in the following, 
than family cases. 
9
 Chapt. 42, art. 17, sect. 1. 
the term „civil cases" will only refer to other civil cases 
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advantages are substantial, not only to the court and the court system but also 
to the parties and to society at large. 
Various techniques seem to be used by mediating judges, some perhaps 
less professionally commendable than others. 
It seems to occur that the mediation process sometimes more or less come 
to resemble old-fashioned horse-trading. The judge might for instance start the 
preparatory phase by suggesting that the part ies should simply split 5 0 - 5 0 or 
might come up with such a suggestion after a while, without a c loser 
assessment of the legal and factual situation at hand. The method might work, 
either by the parties directly accepting the suggestion or by the suggestion 
initiating a dialogue leading to an agreement. Criticism against the method is 
often countered by the argument that no real objections could be made, if the 
parties do not object and they come to a speedy agreement. 
Another method, which might work, is the judge's tipping the parties off at 
some stage of the proceedings concerning his or her opinion on the outcome of 
a judgement, giving the parties the possibility to base a settlement on this tip. 
One might question why a seemingly winning party would agree to a settle-
ment in such a situation. However, a number of reasons are conceivable, not 
the least the avoiding of an appeal with its delays and its risks for another view 
on the case by the appellate court. A considerable and obvious risk with this 
method is the judge not being able to deal further with the case, should the 
parties not settle the case, based on his or her tip. Another obvious deficiency 
is the judge, when stating his or her opinion, naturally not being able to 
consider the case as a whole, witnesses not being heard etc, and the parties 
thereby not really being on the safe side concerning the actual outcome of a 
judgement. 
A third method, fairly recently introduced in Sweden, allegedly inspired by 
the way cases are often handled in the USA, calls for the judge to ask a 
colleague to discuss the settlement possibility with the parties in a somewhat 
more informal way. This colleague might for instance talk with each party 
separately and thereby inter alia being able to explore and discuss the real 
settlement limits of each party without these limits becoming known to the 
other party. The method obviously calls for great skill on the side of such a 
mediator in order to keep the trust of both parties and not to be seen as being 
partial in any regard. A draw-back from a resource point of view is also the 
engagement of a second judge in the case. 
A fourth method combines efforts to prepare the case for a main hearing 
with efforts to reach a settlement. As stated above, it is the duty of the judge 
during the preparatory phase to clarify the standpoint of the parties on all legal 
and factual issues in order for the case to be swiftly and correctly dealt with 
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during the main hearing.10 By way of asking clarifying questions, the judge 
will make the parties aware of the various weaknesses of their respective 
position, whether regarding for instance the interpretation of a precedent or the 
evaluation of a witness. The weaknesses will then eventually „stick out as a sore 
thumb", to quote a most experienced and respected civil case judge of southern 
Sweden," making each party inclined to seriously consider the advantages of 
„getting some instead of loosing all", to quote the same judge. 
In all mediation, it is naturally useful for the judge to be prepared to 
highlight the applicable advantages of a settlement and the disadvantages of 
a continued court case. This is facilitated by the judge be ing aware of a case 
not being first and foremost an interesting legal problem but rather a conflict 
between the parties, typically solved by themselves, and often being better 
solved by the judge helping the parties to a settlement than by him or her 
providing a judgement , subject to appeal as well as possible enforcement 
problems. 
It is also facilitated by the understanding that a court case is very of ten 
derived f rom carelessness on the side of each party. Both parties have often 
been at fault in one way or another. Since a judgement, due to the nature of the 
legal order, often results in one party winning and the other one loosing, one 
could reasonable state that, in a general perspective, a settlement is more fair 
in such situations. 
Successful mediation is further facilitated by the judge ' s accepting the fact 
that very few, not to say almost no cases cannot be settled by the help of a 
skillful judge. This is for instance relevant even regarding legally quite clear 
cases, where a friendly settlement could of ten be in the interest also of the 
presumably winning side. This side might inter alia appreciate getting some 
money immediately as compared to more money much later or even no money 
at all in the end, the other party at that time being without any assets at all. 
Here is not the place to enumerate all possible good arguments for a 
friendly settlement such as avoiding loss, continued business relations, more 
profitable t ime-use etc nor all specific techniques available to the mediating 
judge to help the parties to a settlement. It might not be out of place, though, to 
add some concluding remarks. 
When mediating, timing is essential, i.e. not to start agreement talks until 
the situation is „ripe" and the parties have become disposed to consider a 
settlement. It is further useful , if the conditions of the settlement include that 
they should be fulfilled before the court dismisses the case, i e that for instance 
10
 Chapt. 42 art. 6 sect. 2 (see above). 
11
 Chief Judge Anders Arvidsson, Klippan. 
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an agreed amount of money is actually paid. It is also useful, if the conditions 
of the settlement are taken down in writing, preferrably in only a couple of 
clear sentences. And it is finally useful , if a settlement explicitly implies all 
loose ends between the parties being tied up and nothing left to further dispute. 
Such a settlement equals a binding contract, which will neither be successfully 
appealed or otherwise further contested in court nor in need of a confirming 
court decree. 
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The Tendency of the Recent Reforms of the Japanese Code 
of Civil Procedure 
1. Introduction 
Twelve years ago the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure was thoroughly 
reformed. These modifications concerned in particular four sectors, namely the 
provisions concerning the procedure to organise the points at issue (preparation 
of the hearing), the gathering of evidence, the restriction of appeal and the small 
pecuniary claims procedure. Statistics show that these reforms have considerably 
accelerated proceedings in Japan (in 1994: 10.1 months; in 2003: 8.3 months; 
in 2004: 8.2 months).1 
However, difficulties remain. Certain procedures like those on medical 
practitioners' liability, on cases concerning building disputes or on intellectual 
property are still very time-consuming. In these procedures especially the 
investigation of the facts of the case often takes a lot of time. Frequently a first 
instance procedure is only terminated after three or four years. The reason for this 
length of time is that the points at issue are normally difficult and complicated 
and that the judge , lacking of expertise, needs more time than would usually be 
necessary. The judge has the possibility to call for an expert ' s opinion by 
means of a clarifying order to enable him to understand the problems of fact. 
Nevertheless, this kind of an expert ' s opinion implies no little charge for the 
parties. This is why in Japan judges seldom use this option before taking 
evidence. 
After the re form of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the government, 
pressurised by the economy, has submitted a large reform of the judicial system. 
These propositions have been realised little by little since. They emphasise in 
particular the necessity of accelerating the procedures. For this purpose the law 
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 Sato-Takeshita-Inoue: Justiz-Reform. Shihoseido Kaikaku, 2002. 42; Onose-Takechi: 
Die reformierte Zivilprozessordnung. 2003. Kaisei Minjisoshoho, 2003. 2004. 7. 
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concerning the promotion of procedure was adopted in 2004. According to its 
provisions, all aforementioned complicated procedures of first instance are 
to be decided within two years. For this, a reform of certain provisions of the 
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure was indispensable. Therefore the Japanese 
Code of Civil Procedure was again reformed also in 2003 and the amendment 
has come into effect since 1.1.2004. The main points that have been changed 
concerned the concentration of competence for intellectual property cases, the 
assistance of experts who are to complete the judge ' s knowledge when organ-
ising the technical points at issue and the introduction of a special instrument 
concerning the taking of evidence before filing the action. In the following, I 
would like to briefly present these modifications. 
2. Concentration of competence in cases of intellectual property 
A suit with respect to patent, utility model, right to utilize circuit arrange-
ment (Integrated Circuits) or copyright on computer programs lies within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tokyo District Court and the Osaka District Court 
[ § 6 ( 1 ) Japanese Code of Civil Procedure], The competence of appeal cases is 
concentrated at the Tokyo High Court [§ 6 (2) JCCP], This provision has been 
introduced by the amendment of 2003. Before, these courts had concurrent 
jurisdiction. 
As these proceedings require expert knowledge in the scientific field, 
qualified judges with large practical experience are needed to allow a correct 
and speedy procedure.2 The district courts of Tokyo and Osaka are particularly 
suitable for these cases as many similar cases have been pending at these 
courts and therefore specialised sections in these courts already exist. Since the 
amendment of 2003 these sections have adopted the role of a patent court and 
the average period of investigation has been shortened considerably. Concern-
ing the law of registered designs, trademarks and copyrights on other creations 
but computer programs these sections have a concurrent jurisdiction (§ 6a 
JCCP). Little after these specialised sections of the two district courts, in 2005 
an independent specialised court for intellectual property has been established 
as an appeal court at the Tokyo High Court. Thus, a special judicial system for 
these cases has been developed. All of this shows the high priority which the 
Japanese government attributes to these affairs. The main reason for this strong 
interest in a well organised, efficient intellectual property law is the lack of 
2
 Sato-Takeshita-Inoue: op. cit. 60ff, Onose-Takechi: op. cit. 62ff. 
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raw material in Japan wherefore intellectual property provides an important 
basis for economic activity in Japan. 
3. The institution of an expert 
The reform of the system of civil justice was intended to cope with the growth 
of disputes which demanded expertise. As a part of this reform, the amending 
law of 2003 had introduced provisions on the assistance of an expert during the 
procedure into the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure. It was intended to halve 
the investigation period of disputes with technical difficulties.3 
As economy and society advance and grow more complicated, the compre-
hension of the facts of a case becomes more and more demanding and delays 
the procedure. Expertise is needed in this kind of lawsuits to understand the facts 
of a case completely. The assistance of an expert of the matter completes the 
j udge ' s knowledge with further professional competence. Good examples for 
technically demanding procedures are the disputes on medical practitioners' 
liability, building disputes or processes concerning intellectual property. However, 
a common procedure like a sales contract may also raise difficult technical 
questions and turn into a challenging procedure, e.g. if a defect of a computer 's 
software is concerned. In this kind of lawsuit it is very difficult to properly 
understand the parties' allegations without profound knowledge of the technical 
matter. A lengthy investigation period is often the consequence. For example, 
in disputes on medical practitioners' liability in 2003, the investigation period 
took an average 30.4 months. Compared to the average investigation period of 
common civil cases of 8.2 months, the investigation period of these medical 
practitioners' liability disputes is very long. 
Therefore, the Reform Commission of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure 
recommended instituting the assistance of an expert to amend the situation. 
His/her mission was to help the judges understand the allegations and evidence 
more easily and correctly. The technical procedure would be accelerated by 
an easier organisation of the points at issue and a better understanding of 
documents or testimony. The establishment of the technical expert was 
accompanied by discussions about a possible loss of transparency of the 
procedure as the parties-not knowing what the exper t ' s suggestion had been-
would lose the possibility to file an objection, and therefore also lose the 
guarantee of their right of a fair hearing. Despite these and further concerns the 
expert ' s role was established. 
3
 Sato-Takeshita-Inoue: op. cit. 41. 
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If the judge wants to use this new instrument for the investigation of the 
facts of the case, he/she can summon one or several technical experts by court 
order to help him/her clarify the contents of the allegations or the documents of 
the procedure f§ 92a (1) JCCP1. On this, the judge must hear the parties. 
Moreover, the expert 's statement must be made in a written or during the 
hearing in an oral form [§ 92a (1) JCCP]. Under the same rules, the judge may 
also apply the institution of the technical expert during the taking of evidence 
[§ 92a (2) JCCP]. The technical expert may directly ask questions during the 
hearing of witnesses, of the parties and of other experts. If the parties negotiate 
a court settlement, the judge can ask for the expert ' s assistance in order to hear 
his technical estimation of the matter [§ 92a (3) JCCP], The parties ' consent to 
this is mandatory. As court settlement is a mutual agreement, based upon the 
intention of the parties, their intention has to be respected throughout the 
negotiations for a court settlement. The technical expert 's advice may be 
helpful to determine the subject matter of the court settlement. 
The technical expert is nominated as a public servant by the Supreme 
Court. In order to guarantee an equal standard of the technical experts in the 
whole country, not every court, but only the Supreme Court is entitled to 
nominate the technical experts. As the expert plays a very important role for 
the parties, the provisions on the exclusion of or the objection to a member of 
the court apply to him/her [§ 92e (1) JCCP], On demand of both parties, the 
court must reverse its order which appoints a certain expert (§ 92c JCCP). 
4. The usability of investigators' statements 
In the courts of Tokyo and Osaka, in-court specialists are employed as a kind 
of investigators, e.g. patent attorneys for procedures concerning intellectual 
property (§ 92g JCCP). Unlike the technical experts these are only in-court 
subsidiary organs. Considering the guarantee of the right of a fair hearing, the 
JCCP describes clearly their role in procedure. These investigators are only 
established for cases that concern intellectual property law. If the judge wants 
to require the presence of such an investigator, he/she does not have to ask for 
the parties' consent. It is a question of role assignment during the process. The 
court expects these investigators to provide general knowledge whereas the 
technical experts are to provide highly specialised skills. The court can decide 
at its own discretion how to include these persons in the process. It is not 
difficult to decide whether or not to include an investigator in the process. The 
court can already ask for his/her participation in the process if this seems of only 
little value. The investigator may directly ask questions during the hearing of 
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witnesses, of the parties and of other experts [§ 92g (2) JCCP] or give an opinion 
[§ 92g (4) JCCP], He/she may also assist the negotiations for a court settle-
ment because of his/her technical knowledge with further opinions [§ 92g (4) 
JCCP], The involvement of the paralegals aims at an accelerated dispute 
resolution by party agreement. The provisions on the exclusion of or the objection 
to a member of the court apply also to the investigators, as their funct ion 
requires impartiality and neutrality as well (§ 92h JCCP). 
5. Improvement of the expert ' s opinion 
Prior to the reform the question of the expert ' s conception was solved according 
to the provisions on hearing of witnesses, namely those on cross examinations. 
This frequently caused inconveniences for the experts as the party aggrieved 
by the exper t ' s opinion of ten asked the expert inappropriate questions during 
the contents clarification. This occurred in particular in procedures on medical 
practitioners' liability. It therefore became difficult to find experts, because many 
competent experts refused to accept court assignments after their aggravating 
experiences through impolite questions at cross examinations. To improve this 
situation, an amendment of the provisions on the quest ioning of experts was 
absolutely essential. Since the amendment [§ 215 (2) JCCP] no cross examina-
tion is applied for the questioning of experts and judges pose their questions first. 
This means, it does not follow the provisions on hearing of witnesses anymore, 
but it is s imple questioning (§ 215a JCCP). In this way inappropriate questions 
are expected to be avoided. 
6. The gathering of evidence before lodgement of a complaint 
If it is possible to gather evidence before the lodgement of a complaint, the 
plaintiff can often estimate whether he/she can win the process or not. It is 
probable that he/she might abstain from fi l ing the claim if he/she believes that 
he/she will lose the process. This would also be advantageous for the adversary 
who otherwise would have to supply evidence. Notwithstanding the cases in 
which the plaintiff refrains f rom filing the action after the gathering of evidence, 
it is more probable that both parties will agree to a settlement if they know 
their chances of winning the process. Should the plaintiff really file the action, 
the organisation of the points at issue can be concluded early due to the prior 
gathering of evidence. This would accelerate the process further. Consequently, 
it is considered best to gather evidence before the lodgement of a complaint in 
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order to avoid unsuccessful claims and encourage a speedy procedure. How-
ever, the gathering of evidence before the lodgement of a complaint implicates 
certain problems that have to be resolved, such as how to oblige the adversary 
party to provide information without a claim to be entitled. Which sanction can 
be imposed if the adversary does not satisfy the request for information? Isn ' t 
there a risk of malpractice? Should the adversary who is not legally represented 
bear the negative consequences if he/she answers too widely or in an un-
favourable way for his/her own position? These and many other questions are 
aroused by the gathering of evidence before the lodgement of a complaint. 
The possibilities of malpractice were strongly discussed during the elabora-
tion of the reform. The new provisions on the gathering of evidence before the 
lodgement of the complaint were formulated to avoid any malpractice. The 
amending law stipulates an application of the existing legal device of the 
parties' interrogatories (§ 163 JCCP, a kind of written interrogatories) already 
before the action is filed, although this usually requires the pendency of the 
complaint (§ 132a JCCP). The amendment adds a few provisions to avoid an 
abuse, e.g. a ban on investigation concerning secrets of the adversary's or third 
person's private life, if answering the question might imply social disadvantages 
for the adversary or the third person [§ 132a (1) No. 2 JCCP] or a ban on 
investigation concerning business secrets [§ 132a (1) No. 3 JCCP1. 
The second important point which has been discussed was of more theo-
retical nature: It concerns the legal basis for the duty to reply. Before the 
lodgement of a complaint there is usually no procedural relationship between 
the parties. Why should one party be authorized to demand information before 
the action is filed? The Japanese answer to this question is the following: Who-
ever wants to benefit from this instrument must first announce the future lawsuit 
in writing. This written announcement must contain the main points of the 
intended claim and describe the subject matter of the dispute. In this respect, 
the written announcement replaces the written complaint. Through it the 
adversary f inds out what kind of lawsuit the announcing party plans to file. 
After the announcement the action must be filed within 4 months. This means 
that there is a delay of 4 months for the gathering of evidence after the announce-
ment. The legislator seems to consider the announcement as the beginning of 
some kind of pendency. Further scientific debate will be necessary to decide 
whether this is true. 
Apart from the investigations of the parties, the facts of the case can also be 
clarified by court orders like a request for transmission or for further investiga-
tion. Possible transmission objects are as follows: medical record of an injured, 
inspection transcript of a traffic accident, documents on securities or com-
modities transactions, etc; the results of these measures can be exploited as 
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documentary evidence. The examination of the actual condition by a bailiff 
can also be ordered; its results can be exploited [§ 132c (1) No. 1, 2, 4. JCCP], 
The adversary is committed to give the requested information. However, 
having answered the request, he/she on his/her part can claim an investigation 
of the relevant fact. 
Both parties are obliged to give information, but there is no penalty if they 
don't. The court can consider the parties behaviour as an indication while 
establishing the facts and appreciate a refusal as a negative aspect. 
During the preparation of the reform, it was discussed whether mandatory 
representation was necessary for the application of these instruments considering 
the danger of malpractice or injustices. However, as legal representation is 
never obligatory in Japan, the reformers hesitated to introduce mandatory 
representation only for this stage of trial. 
The expenses of this investigation period are not considered as costs of 
litigation. 
7. Procedural plan 
Every procedure has to fol low a regular schedule (§ 147a JCCP). This bears in 
mind a clear perspective as to the time-schedule of the procedure which is of 
interest to the parties and the fact that all first instance procedures should be 
ended within two years. The court must even establish a formal procedural 
time-schedule if the dispute is very complicated and contains many points at 
issue (§ 147b JCCP), l ike a multi-party-litigation, underwriting business 
litigation and litigation on the claim on the allowability of the shortening of the 
compulsory portion etc.4 Due to the complicated circumstances of the case, the 
investigation in this kind of dispute of ten takes longer than in other disputes. 
The court establishes this procedural time-schedule on its own responsibility, 
but it must negotiate with the parties. 
The procedural schedule sets a deadline for the organisation of written 
arguments, fo r the completion of the taking of evidence, i.e. testimonial 
evidence, fo r the last hearing and for the rendering of the judgment. However, 
the concrete date and time are not yet set. The presiding judge of the panel may 
set a timetable for submissions regarding the parties' methods for prosecuting 
their claims and defences regarding specified matters (§ 156a JCCP). If a party 
does not comply with the procedural time-schedule, late submissions will be 
4
 For more detailed examples see the report of the Tokyo district court, 500 days after 
the reform of the JCCP (4), Hanreijiho No. 1914. 4. 
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precluded (§ 157a JCCP). Considering the record as it stands, the conduct of 
the case by the parties and the fur ther circumstances, the court may change 
the schedule if deemed necessary [§ 147c (4) JCCP], The schedule for the 
investigation should be set depending on the concrete dispute. This might lead 
to a work overload for the lawyers, but one should not spare these efforts on 
behalf of the parties. The main ambition of the Japanese courts is to carry out a 
better investigation.5 
8. Some effects of the reform 
In the reformed parts mentioned above technical experts often have to be 
consulted especially in building disputes, disputes on medical practitioner's 
liability, disputes on intellectual property and general civil law suits/' As the 
provisions on expert evidence have been amended, expert opinions can now be 
obtained more frequently.7 The procedural schedule leaves room for improve-
ment. The cooperation of the parties is necessary when the court establishes 
the investigation schedule. The details of the cooperation between the parties 
and the court are still to be considered and elaborated with care. Regrettably 
the gathering of evidence before the lodgement of a complaint has not been 
used very often. It seems that the use of this institution is not yet common. The 
differences between this institution and the preservation of evidence are not 
sufficiently known either.8 It will take some more time to make this institution 
known and to make use of it. 
According to latest statistics, the following average duration of investigation 
could be observed/' disputes on medical practitioner's liability 27.1 months, 
building disputes (compensation) 25.6 months, disputes on intellectual property 
14.0 months. The promotion of procedure is still required for some disputes. 
9. Final remarks 
The main target of the latest reforms is the acceleration of procedure. At the 
same time, these reforms intend also to guarantee and promote just decisions. 
Especially for the intellectual property law both have been claimed by the 
Report of the Tokyo district court (4), Hanreijiho No. 1914. 9. 
6
 Report of the Tokyo district court (2), Hanreijiho No. 1911. 5. 
7
 Report of the Tokyo district court (4), Hanreijiho No. 1914. 13. 
8
 Report of the Tokyo district court (4), Hanreijiho No. 1914. 13. 
9
 Supreme Court, Report on the confirmation of the promotion of procedure, 2005. 33. 
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economy for a long time. The new provisions are also a result of the Japanese 
economic policy. Time will tell whether these new provisions are effective and 
whether other states will accept the Japanese decisions and have confidence in 
the Japanese judicial system. In the end, it is the main function of the whole 
judicial system to serve economy and society. We believe therefore that the 
Japanese court system may not only be of interest for Japanese citizens, but 
also for foreigners. 
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ISTVÁN V A R G A * 
Setting Aside Hungarian Arbitral Awards 
Without Time Limit? 
I. Introductory remarks 
The Hungarian Code on Arbitration, regulating both national and international 
arbitration, Act Nr. LXXI of 1997 (hereinafter: HAA), is in the overwhelming 
majority of its provisions in conformity with the wor ld ' s mainstream 
legislation on arbitration by implementing the Model Law on Arbitration 
created by UNICITRAL in 1985. 
There is only a small, however very important couple of rules, in which the 
Hungarian lawmaker deviated from the Model Law.1 This article deals with 
one of these rules, which happens to be of outstanding significance for the legal 
practice and in a broader sense for the Hungarian arbitration community and 
Hungary as place of arbitration: the time limit for instituting setting aside pro-
cedures set forth in sec. 55 (1) HAA. The provision in question reads as follows: 
( 1 ) The party, furthermore any person who is affected by the award, may 
file for action-within sixty days of the date of delivery of the award of the 
arbitration tribunal-at the court of law to have the award set aside if: 
a) the party having concluded the arbitration agreement was lacking legal 
capacity or competence; 
b) the arbitration agreement is not considered valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it, or in the absence of such indication, under 
Hungarian law; 
Ph.D. Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Civil Procedure at ELTE Law 
School Budapest. 
E-mail: vargai@ajk.elte.hu 
1
 For an exhaustive list of differences between HAA and Model Law see Varga, I. in: 
Liebscher, C.-Fremuth-Wolf , A. (eds.): Commercial Arbitration in Central and Eastern 
Europe. New York, 2006. 10 et seq. 
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c) the party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator 
or of the arbitration proceedings, or was unable to present his case due to other 
reasons; 
d) the award was made in a legal dispute to which the clause for sub-
mission to arbitration did not apply or that was not covered by the provisions 
of the arbitration agreement; if the award contains decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement where the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those to which the clause for 
submission to arbitration did not apply, only that part of the award which 
contains decisions not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; 
e) the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure 
did not comply with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was 
in conflict with any provision of this Act from which the parties cannot 
derogate, or failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Act. 
(2) An action for setting aside the arbitral award may also be filed alleging that: 
a) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitra-
tion under Hungarian law; or 
b) the award is in conflict with the rules of Hungarian public policy. 
(3) Failing to keep the time limit specified in Subsection (1) entails the 
forfeiture of right. In the case of a supplementary award the time limit shall be 
reckoned from the delivery thereof. 
Subsections (1) and (2) reflect therein the traditional distinction between 
the two groups of grounds for cancellation/setting aside of an award: absolute 
and relative ones. Although this distinction is not correctly reflected by the 
pertinent part of the HAA [sec. 55 ( l ) - (2) . ] This negligence of the Hungarian 
legislator can be traced back to the fact that the relevant HAA-provisions have 
been designed on the basis of an unsatisfactory Hungarian translation of Article 
V of the Uni ted Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "New 
York Convention"), specifying the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement.2 The legislator most probably used such a Hungarian translation 
2
 See the ministerial explanatory note to Sections 54-57 of Arbitration Act: 
"Az érvénytelenítésre lehetőséget adó okok megegyeznek a külföldi választottbírósági 
határozatok elismerésére és végrehajtására vonatkozó, 1958-ban megalkotott New York-i 
Egyezményben az elismerés és végrehajtás megtagadását lehetővé tevő okokkal. (Az 
Egyezménynek Magyarország is tagja.)" 
„The grounds for setting aside are in accordance with the grounds for refusal of the 
recognition and enforcement stipulated in the Convention on the Recognition and 
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of the New York Convention, which-as opposed to the original English 
version-does not correctly express the distinction between the both sets of 
grounds for refusal.3 
In theory, one of the differences between absolute (or rather objective) and 
relative (or rather subjective) grounds for cancellation of an award and for 
refusal of recognition and enforcement is whether the court the suit for cancella-
tion has been filed with and accordingly the authority (in Hungary the court) 
competent to recognize the award shall take account of it ex off icio or solely at 
the request of the plaintiff or of the judgment debtor. This distinction can be 
clearly read out of the New York Convention and also f rom various foreign 
laws regulating arbitration. Most importantly, German law, as the traditionally 
most influential foreign example for the Hungarian lawmaker, and specifically 
sec. 1059 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, herein-
after referred to as the "ZPO") leaves no doubt that the relative grounds are 
only to be examined if the party substantiates and argues them, whereas both 
absolute grounds (lack of arbitrability of the subject matter and infringement 
of ordre public) have to be considered by the court even if no such party 
application has been made. 
It is a well-known tradition in regulating commercial arbitration shared by 
all major legal systems that there is no ordinary remedy against an arbitral 
award. Once an arbitral tribunal has decided on the merits of the case brought 
to it, the award containing the meritorious decision becomes final and binding 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, in 1958. (Hungary is also a 
member of the Convention.)" 
3
 The Hungarian translation reads as follows: 
55. § (1) A fél, továbbá az, akire az ítélet rendelkezést tartalmaz, a választottbíróság 
ítéletének részére történt kézbesítésétől számított hatvan napon belül keresettel az ítélet 
érvénytelenítését kérheti a bíróságtól, ha | . . . | 
(2) A választottbírósági ítélet érvénytelenítése arra hivatkozással is kérhető, hogy | . . . | 
The same in English: 
55. § (1) The party, furthermore any person who is affected by the award, may file for 
action - within sixty days of the date of delivery of the award of the arbitration tribunal -
at the court of law to have the award overturned if [... ] 
(2) An action for overturning the arbitration award may also be filed alleging that [. . .] 
On the contrary the original version of UN Convention: 
Article V 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that [ . . . ] 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that [...]. 
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against which only an extraordinary remedy with strict and exceptional 
requirements can be brought, i.e. a setting aside claim. 
As opposed to award enforcement, setting aside claims can be instituted 
exclusively in the respective jurisdiction which served as place of arbitration. 
The respective national courts seized with setting aside claims apply naturally 
their procedural lex fori with respect to all aspects of the setting aside proceedings, 
i.e., among the others, to qualification and length of the time limit for instituting 
the procedure. Therefore, peculiarities, inconsequences or even uncertainty 
regarding the details of the regulation of the possibility and contents of setting 
aside can and, as it will be shown, do lead to serious problems, like in 
Hungarian practice. For instance, it needs no sophisticated explanation that 
once a jurisdiction seems to open the door for time-limitless setting aside 
actions, then this circumstance will certainly to a considerable extent discour-
age the actors of cross border commerce to designate that jurisdiction as place 
of arbitration. 
Oddly enough, the named example poses an actual question in contemporary 
Hungarian civil procedural and arbitration law as show a series of setting aside 
proceedings which the author of this contribution had the chance to assist as 
party representative. In these unpublished decisions Hungarian courts repeatedly 
confirmed their view that the two so-called objective setting aside grounds, i.e. 
the lack of arbitrability and the violation of ordre public (sec. 55(2) HAA), 
could be relied on as causes of action even after the lapse of the 60 days time 
limit stipulated by sec. 55(1) HAA. 
Before showing that such an interpretation of the law is not only wholly 
mistaken but also outstandingly dangerous, it seems to be of some use to 
highlight the main types, attributes and consequences of time limits existing in 
Hungarian law. 
II. Different kinds of t ime limits in Hungarian law 
There are three aspects which serve as basics for the distinction of time limits 
in Hungarian law. 
(1) A distinction is drawn between time limits of substantive nature 
(hereinafter: substantive time limits) and time limits of procedural nature 
(hereinafter: procedural time limits); 
(2) Another differentiating feature relates to the consequences of failing to 
meet a time limit. Here one can distinguish between "forfeiture time limits" 
and the "lapsing or statute of limitations-like time limits"; 
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(3) Finally a distinction can be drawn with a view to the criterion as to 
from when the time limit begins to run. In this respect a t ime limit is either an 
"objective" or a "subjective" one. 
These distinctions are not only of theoretical nature. Their practical 
significance flows from the fact that each of them has different legal ef fec ts 
and attributes regulated in Hungarian civil substantive and/or procedural law. 
Ad (1) Regarding the distinction between substantive and procedural t ime 
limits it is at the outset important to bear in mind that the difference between 
both types has nothing to do with the type of source of law that establishes 
them. A time limit established in a civil procedural law source, e.g. in the Code 
on Civil Procedure can evenly be a substantive time limit and vice versa, a 
time limit established by substantive law can be interpreted as a procedural 
time limit. In other words, the main differentiating factor is not the form, but 
the function.4 
Substantive time limits govern basically still undisturbed legal relationships, 
i.e such legal affairs which have not yet reached the phase of an institutionalized 
law enforcement procedure, while procedural time limits govern the course of 
such procedures. 
Since the institution of an action, i.e. typically the fi l ing of a complaint 
with the competent court stands on the threshold leading f rom the named first 
phase to the second and at the same time linking both, it is a crucial quest ion 
whether the time limit for starting a court action is of substantive or of 
procedural nature. 
In Hungarian civil law there is no specific time limit established for institu-
tion of an action. A general provision is that statute-barred claims cannot be 
enforced in a judicial way. Nevertheless, there are some specific fields of law 
where a t ime limit for filing a claim is specially st ipulated. One of these 
special t ime limits is the subject matter of this essay, namely the time limit for 
instituting a claim for setting aside of an arbitral award. 
The time limit for filing a claim is5 necessarily a substantive time limit, 
since the statement of claim is not inherent but an instrument for initiating a 
civil procedure in order to enforce a right. By the time the claim is filed, the 
dispute may have already arisen between the parties, the judicial procedure 
4
 Cf. the Civil Law Directive Decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court No. 3/2004 
and further for a recent very comprehensive overview Kisfal ucli, A.: Társasági jog 
[Company Law]. Budapest, 2007. 226 et seq. 
5
 The exeptions are discussed infra in connection with procedural deadlines. 
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starts, however, only with submission of the claim. From this it follows that, as 
it is explicitly stipulated in the Civil Law Directive Decision of the Hungarian 
Supreme Court No. 3/2004, the rule set forth in sec. 105(4) of the Act III of 
1952 on the Code on Civil Procedure (hereinafter: CCP) is not applicable to 
the time limit for filing a c la im, since it applies only to procedural time limits, 
which require the judicial procedure to have been instituted.6 
The fact that not the above-cited provision of CCP but the ones stipulated 
in substantive law7 are applicable to the t ime limit for f i l ing an action causes 
that the instrument for enforcing a right of substantive nature shall arrive at the 
addressee, in the case of a statement of claim at the court, on the last day of the 
time limit at the latest (in fact , prior to close of office-hours of the cour t ' s 
registrar). 
If the plaintiff fails to keep the substantive time limit for filing the claim, 
the court d ismisses the c la im according to sec. 130 (1) (h) CCP without 
deciding on the merits of the case. 
Procedural time limits on the other hand exist logically only within the 
procedure, that is, once the procedure has been initiated. A procedural time 
limit means a period of time in the framework of the proceedings, which is set 
by law or by the court and within which an act shall, or may be performed. 
Failing to meet a procedural time limit causes that the act bound to the time 
limit cannot be carried out anymore with the proper legal effect . 
The above cited eased requirement for the compliance with time limits set 
forth in sec. 105 CCP (registered mail on the last day sufficient) applies 
accordingly only for these procedural time limits. 
Notwithstanding the basic principle that the time limit for filing a claim is 
of substantive nature, there are two exceptions. 
In one of these exceptional cases, the procedural nature of the time limit for 
filing the claim can be jus t i f ied by the specific characteristic that the claim 
initiates the civil proceedure, which is, however, only the second or third phase 
of the whole legal procedure itself. This special civil procedure is the judicial 
review of an administrative decision where the judicial procedure is in fact a 
kind of extraordinary remedy. 
In the o ther exceptional case, namely in labor suits, the protection and 
preference of the employee as the weaker party of the employment relationship 
6
 "Consequences of failing to meet the time limit cannot be applied if the submission 
addressed to the court has been posted by registered mail on the last day of the time 
limit at the latest. " 
7
 Law-Decree Nr. 11 of 1960 on the Entry into Force and Implementation of Civil 
Code, sec. 3 ( l ) - ( 3 ) . 
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could be a possible reason for the deviating regulation. In these two types of 
civil procedure the exceptional procedural character of the claim time limit can 
be thus regarded as justified. 
In case of the claim for setting aside an arbitral award, it is obvious that the 
time limit for filing the claim can only be of substantive nature, since the 
judicial procedure meaning the procedure of the state court, only begins with 
the submission of the claim. The time limit is furthermore declared by the 
HAA to be a forfeiture time limit, which is also an indication for its 
substantive nature. The consequences of this classification are the following: 
the statement of claim for setting aside an arbitral award has to arrive at the 
court on the last day of the time limit (till the close of office-hours), i.e. at the 
latest on the 60 th day after the plaintiff of the setting aside suit received the 
award. 
Ad (2) The distinction between forfei ture time limits and statute of 
limitations-like time limits only has meaning in the context of substantive time 
limits. Once a forfeiture time limit has been missed, not only the claim, that is, 
the possibility of enforcement of the right in judicial way, but also the right 
itself ceases to exist. For the reason that the above legal consequence is very 
rigid, the consistent case law follows the manner of interpretation that a time 
limit is deemed to be a forfeiture time limit only if this character is explicitly 
set out by the legislator. In case a statute of limitations-like time limit has been 
missed, it does not result in losing the right itself, in fact: it does not 
necessarily mean an obstacle for the trial, that is, for the decision on the merits 
of the claim, either. The circumstance that the claim is statute-barred has to be 
as a rule explicitly referred to by the counterparty. The lapse of a statute of 
limitations-like time limit only terminates the claim, i.e. the opportunity of 
enforcement of the right in a judicial way, but does not affect the existence of 
the right itself. In addition, if a time limit is not a forfeiture time limit, it is 
allowed to verify the failure. 
Considering that the time limit for filing a setting aside claim qualifies as a 
substantive time limit, the categories in question can be applied. Sec. 55 ( 1 ) -
(3) HAA establishes a 60 days time limit for filing the action, and declares it 
explicitly to be a forfeiture time limit. Consequently, the statement of claim 
shall be filed with the court till the close of office-hours of the court 's 
registrar; otherwise the possibility to have the arbitral award set aside in a 
judicial way ceases to exist. 
Ad (3) The last aspect of classification is the question whether the time 
limit begins to run when the legally relevant event occurs or when the party 
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concerned takes notice of it. In the first case the time limit is a so-called 
"objective" time limit, while the latter type is referred to in the case law as 
"subjective" time limit. In the case of an objective time limit, the time of taking 
notice of the legally relevant event, e.g. the failure to perform a procedural act 
or an obligation stipulated by substantive law, remains out of consideration. 
The time limit for fi l ing the claim for setting aside set forth in sec. 55(1) 
HAA is an objective t ime limit, since the time limit begins to run when the 
arbitral award is in fact or presumably8 delivered to the party. The time of 
taking actual notice has no relevance. 
III. The time limit for setting aside claims 
As it has been mentioned in the introductory remarks of this essay, Hungarian 
court practice has led to some uncertainty in connection with the nature and 
duration of the time limit open for filing the complaint in setting aside actions. 
It seems that the courts tend to establish a kind of deadline dualism by 
differentiating as to whether the action is based on one of the subjective setting 
aside grounds or on one of the objective ones. 
For this reason-and for the sake of simplicity the main question of this 
contribution can be formulated as follows: Does the HAA determine only one 
uniform time limit applicable for instituting setting aside claims based on any 
of the grounds listed in sec. 55(1 )-(2), or-and this seems to be the prevailing 
interpretation-are there two different t ime limits, i.e. one explicitly set forth 
for the relative grounds (60 days), the other implicitly for the absolute grounds 
("infinite")? 
The legislator makes a distinction between the two groups of setting aside 
grounds, which, as a consequence of the codification technique used, takes 
shape in two different subsections. Unfortunately the pertinent 60 days time 
limit has been codified in the first subsection containing also the rela-
tive/subjective grounds, whereas the second separate subsection has been 
dedicated to the absolute/objective grounds. This shaping of the rule leaves 
admittedly some room for such interpretation that the 60 days time limit would 
apply only for the relative grounds with which it shares the subsection. On the 
other hand, subsection (2) can also be interpreted-at least for the purposes of 
the time limit-as a mere continuation of subsection (1). 
The right interpretation of the named provision is the latter one. Each of the 
two groups of grounds is homogenous respectively in the sense, that the 
8
 Cf. sec. 99 CCP for the delivery presumption. 
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relative grounds are destined for safeguarding the interests of the parties (and 
those who are affected by the award), especially the losing ones, who can 
plead these grounds in a short period of time in order to have the arbitral award 
set aside. Since these grounds are granted by the state in order to safeguard the 
basic interests of the parties, or at least those which are deemed to be basic by 
the legislator, their common feature is that they are exclusively open to be 
pleaded by the interested party. 
The reasoning behind the relative grounds is that through them the interests 
of the parties are intended to be protected. This momentum can be also 
interpreted as a kind of paternalism over the arbitration, by not letting the 
dispute settlement (and its procedure) completely getting out of state control. 
Af ter a certain period of time it can be deemed, that causes for pleading these 
grounds have not occurred, otherwise they would have been risen by the party, 
thus the legislator rules these to be forfeited and allows no verification as 
exoneration for running out of this time limit, nor lets these grounds possible 
to be pleaded in a later exequatur. 
As an opposition to these-and this specialty of the absolute grounds is 
usually shown by the arbitration codes-the other group of grounds are not 
intended to safeguard the interests of the parties firstly, rather to protect the 
public order and public interests in a broader sense. International practice 
clearly shows, that the challenge of an arbitral award is only possible through a 
setting aside claim, in which the claimant is to cite the ground on which he 
relies as setting aside basis. But once the claim has been filed, the court is free, 
moreover it is his legal duty, to examine criteria set out in the two objective 
grounds also, i.e. whether the public order or the objective inarbitrability are 
infringed. Nevertheless the issue that these are to be examined by the court ex 
officio, once the claim has been filed, shapes a completely different question, 
and does not mean at all that these ground i.e. the absolute grounds would be 
free to be pleaded in a setting aside claim limitlessly. 
By taking a closer look at the ministerial explanatory note to sections 5 4 -
57 of the HAA one can find an explicit reference to this time limit.9 By reading 
the note carefully it becomes obvious that the text says nothing about the 
grounds, but without slightest touch on differentiation between the groups of 
grounds it explicitly speaks about the claim: "For instituting such a claim a 
t ime limit of 60 days is open...". Thus in my opinion the explanatory note 
9
 For instituting such a claim a time limit of 60 days is open, which may be a short 
period of time, but in the frames of arbitration the disputes should be solved quickly, and 
the suspension of persistent uncertain situtations arc to be avoided. Hence the time limit is 
forfeiting. 
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clearly shows that after the 60 days elapse, there is no opportunity (since the 
legislator does not want so, instead orders forfeiture as consequence of running 
out f rom the time limit) for any setting aside claim to be filed anymore, based 
on whichever ground. This note explicitly confirms the opinion that there is no 
difference among the grounds with regard to the time limit for instituting the 
claim, citing whichever ground. 
All this means that although the grounds are different from the viewpoint 
of their main aim, the different safeguarded interests, their ability to be taken 
into account by the court ex officio or only on the basis of citation by the party, 
and the possibility of serving as a pleading in a later exequatur, there is at least 
one point where they are all to be treated equally: the time limit open for filing 
the setting aside claim enforcing them. 
IV. Comparative law aspects 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of procedural legal systems playing 
substantial role in international commercial arbitration and with a Model Law-
based legislation can be cited in favor of our above outlined view. 
The time-limit is exactly the same for relative and absolute grounds with-
out any further differentiation in Germany,1 0 which is of major importance due 
to the traditionally strong influence of German procedural law on Hungarian 
legislation and practice. In addition to the German example, an overview of a 
series of foreign legal systems having substantial weight in the international 
commercial arbitration community provide for a same solution, i.e. the time-
limit is exactly the same for the relative and for the absolute grounds. Here 
only some examples of major importance shall be listed. The jurisdictions 
listed all play a significant role in international arbitration and their regulations 
provide like the German one for a uniform time limit: the Netherlands," in 
Spain,12 in the United Kingdom,1 3 in Italy,14 in France,1 ' ' in Austria,16 in 
Sweden1 7 or in the USA. 1 8 
10
 § 1059 Zivilprozessordnung, establishing a general 3 months time limit. 
11
 Art. 1065(7) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. 
12
 Art. 41(4) of the Spanish Arbitration Act. 
13
 Sec. 70(3) of the English Arbitration Act. 
14
 Art. 828 Codice di procedura civile. 
15
 Art. 1486 Nouveau Code de procédure civile. 
16
 Art. 611(4) Österreichische Zivilprozessordnung. 
17
 Sec. 34 of the Swedish Arbitration Act. 
18
 Sec. 12 of the Federal Arbitration Act and in conformity with it the state laws. 
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All of the listed countries can be regarded like the Hungarian HAA as 
UNCITRAL-harmonized systems. This constitutes in my view additional and 
satisfactory evidence that the Hungarian courts' interpretation of the time-limit 
is clearly mistaken. The right interpretation of the-admittedly uncertain and 
misleading-wording of the HAA in sec. 55(1) must thus be that the time-limit 
for the filing of the action does not differ along with the different grounds for 
setting aside. 
There are on the other hand only a few jurisdictions where a problem 
comparable to that in Hungary seems to exist, i.e. where the legislator 
establishes different time limits for setting aside claims arising out of different 
challenges. So in Ireland, by the Arbitration (International Commercial) Act of 
199814 the Model Law has been adopted. The Act explicitly rules that time 
limit specified in Art. 34(3) of Model Law shall not be applicable to setting 
aside claim on the ground of ordre public. 
Apparently there is therefore no specific t ime limit for this kind of 
challenge in contemporary Irish law. It has to be noted that this legislation is 
harshly criticized in Ireland and furthermore it is planned to be replaced by a 
specific regulation establishing a t ime limit in the near future.2" The weak-
ness of this construction is shown by the fact that it is not reasoned in the 
explanatory memorandum of the Act at all, but the memorandum only repeats 
the texts of the act. Recently there is a new Bill drafted in which the time limit 
open for ordre public ground claim is planned to be fixed.21 
The reasoning behind the interpretation (which follows from the explanatory 
note, the wording of the HAA, the formal logic and the international practice 
also) of the subject matter this way, that every different interpretation leads 
to a legal nonsense, namely, a remedy infringing legal certainty. Duly 
examining the-in our opinion-false interpretation, it clearly follows that only 
the first interpretation of Section 55 could and can be the real motion of the 
legislator. 
As it is stated also in the supra quoted explanatory note, and also as it is 
well-known, one of the main advantages of arbitration is its quickness and the 
fact that arbitration is able to give a definite, professional answer to legal 
disputes, which is of course very important especially in case of business 
19
 See full text at site http://www. irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/pub/0014/. 
Cf. e.g. Leila Anglade-Challenge, recognition and enforcement of irish and 
international arbitral awards under the Irish 1997 Arbitration (International Commercial) 
Bill. 
21
 See http://www.justice.ie/ga/JELR/Arbitraton%20Memo.PDF/Files/Arbitration%20 
Memo.PDF 
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issues. The main reason of ruling on a relative short period open for filing a 
setting aside claim is the requirements of promptness and avoidance of 
persistent uncertainties concerning the relationship or rights and duties of the 
parties and the future enforceability of the award. 
Establishment of a timely limitless possibility for the setting aside procedure, 
which is the only way for challenging an arbitral award, would straightly mean 
a ruling opposite of this advantages of arbitration and to the aim of legislator. 
In case we would accept this interpretation, in the same time we would accept 
an interpretation that is in total divergence with the international practice. The 
consequence of such an interpretation would be that Hungarian arbitration 
would become very uncomfortable for parties who may solve their possible 
disputes through arbitration, since there would be no final deadline when the 
winning party would be safe about the final result of the award. 
Nevertheless we should bear in mind that with our interpretation the 
opportunity of safeguarding the interests (at first place the state's but in some 
way also those of the losing party) is still open, since the absolute grounds, 
namely the infringement of the ordre public and the objective inarbitrability 
are still possible to be pleaded as grounds for refusal of execution in the 
exequatur, even after the time limit for the institution of the setting aside claim 
has elapsed and no such action has been brought. 
On the contrary, a subjective ground, if not relied on in a timely instituted 
setting aside action, becomes excluded also in its capacity as ground for 
refusal of exequatur. Absolute grounds are absolute only in the meaning that 
they do not get lost as exequatur objections and thus they protect the ordre 
public of the respective enforcement jurisdictions without timely limitation. 
This protection satisfies wholly the interest of public order. Nevertheless 
this protection does not apply through the infinite challengeabilityof the award, 
but in another phase of the dispute, in the exequatur, through refusing the 
execution of any award that infringes the interests protected by the absolute 
grounds. 
V. S u m m a r y and conclusion 
According to nowadays prevailing Hungarian court practice the 60 days 
deadline for filing a setting aside claim to be counted from the service of the 
award would not apply to the absolute grounds, i.e. both inarbitrability and 
ordre public infringement regulated in sec. 55(2) HAA. 
The Hungarian regulation is certainly not entirely clear on this issue. Section 
55(2) HAA can be interpreted as a mere addition to Section 55(1) containing 
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the named time limit, meaning that the absolute grounds listed in subsection 
(2) shall be raised under the same (timely) conditions as the relative ones in 
subsection (1). 
There is, however, also another possible interpretation according to which 
subsection (2) contains a completely different group of setting aside grounds 
which shall be excepted from the scope of subsection (1), consequently also f rom 
the time limit laid down in subsection (1). 
Taking a closer look at the ministerial explanatory note to sections 5 4 - 5 7 
of the HAA one can find an explicit reference to this time limit. From this 
reference it follows beyond any doubt that-as has been shown-the lawmaker 
did not intend any differentiation, so that the time limit generally applies to 
each ground for setting aside. Hungarian doctrine is somewhat surprisingly 
uncertain on this question. The ministerial explanatory note justifies the 
relative shortness of the time limit by listing the requirements to the arbitration 
proceedings such as promptness and avoidance of persistent uncertainties 
concerning the relationship or rights and duties of the parties and the future 
enforceability of the award. Such a differentiation makes some sense in only 
one case, i.e. in the case of application for recognition and enforcement of a 
domestic award. 
An absolute ground like infringement of the ordre public can be relied on 
as a ground for refusal of exequatur even after the time limit for the institution 
of the setting aside claim has elapsed and no such action has been brought. 
On the contrary, a subjective ground, if not relied on in a timely instituted 
setting aside action, becomes excluded also in its capacity as ground for 
refusal of exequatur. Absolute grounds are absolute only in the meaning that 
they don' t get lost as exequatur objections and thus they protect the ordre 
public of the respective enforcement jurisdictions without timely limitation. 
This protection satisfies wholly the interests of public order. It certainly does 
not render the objective grounds timely limitless causes of action. It can easily 
be recognized that the opposite would lead to unbearable consequences f rom 
the viewpoint of legal certainty. 
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T A K E H I R O O H Y A * 
On the Scarcity of Civil Litigation in Japan: 
Two Different Approaches and More 
1. Preface 
Let me start with one episode. When I met Professor Honma in university 
bookshop, and asked to make a speech in Hungary on some topics related to the 
legal foundation of Japanese high economic growth (in 60 's-70 's) , my first reply 
was "Oh well.. . the shortest answer should be 'nothing'" . 
What did I mean by that? The point is that Japan is known to be a society 
with very scarce occasions in which law works, in both criminal cases and 
civil litigations. For instance in the United Nations statistics,1 the number of 
homicide per 100,000 population in Japan is only 0.5, while in the United 
States it is 4.6. A part of reason could be of the States and its violent society, 
as often be criticized. However, considering the fact that the same numbers in 
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany lays around 1.5," Japan seems to be 
very safe society even in comparison to these countries. On civil disputes, 
Wollschläger shows that there are 1.6 cases in Japan per 1,000 populations per 
a year, while the number is around 20 in France and Germany, over 50 in the 
state of Arizona, U.S. and the United Kingdom,1 From these data, we could say 
Associate Professor (Philosophy of Law), Nagoya University Graduate School of 
Law. LL.B. f r o m the University of Tokyo, 1997. 
E-mail: yhonma@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp 
1
 United Nations Off ice on Drugs and Crime. The 7th U.N. Surveys on Crime 
Trends & the Operations of Criminal Just ice Systems (1998-2000) , available at 
http:/ /www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Seventh-United-Nations-Survey-on-
Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html (visited on 18th 
Feb., 2008). 
2
 The accurate numbers are 1.6, 1.2, and 1.8 for U.K., Germany and France, 
respectively. 
Wollschläger, Ch.: Historical Trends of Civil Litigation in Japan, Arizona, Sweden, 
and Germany: Japanese Legal Culture in the Light of Judicial Statistics. In: Baum, H. 
(ed.): Japan: Economic Success and Legal System, Landsberg, 1997. 
ON T H E SCARCITY OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN JAPAN 341 
that there are very scarce legal cases in Japan, and the court has not so much 
importance in Japanese society. The problem is, why this phenomenon exists. 
Kawashima These: cultural approach 
In 1960's, the main theory on this problem found its answer in cultural factors. 
For instance Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima4 wrote in his famous book 
Japanese Sense of Law,5 that the Japanese dislike to solve disputes by litigation. 
He said that in Japanese traditional sense of law, rights and duties were 
recognized as ambiguous beings, and the people hate to make it clear or definite, 
because it probably harms the harmony in community. He wrote, "Since there 
exists friendly or 'communal ' relation, to 'make clear between black and white' 
destroys the foundation of this friendly 'communal' relation".6 So in Japan "those 
who make civil litigations are branded as 'weird' or 'aggressive' . The attitude 
to avoid litigation is deeply fixed in our hearts".7 For Kawashima, this feature 
shows the underdevelopment of Japanese society. In the developed countries, 
litigations are thought as "the struggle to rights", as Rudolf von Jhering said, 
not only just but also sacred means to protect their own rights. Because the 
Japanese still had very weak sense of rights, Kawashima thought, they did not 
want to fight by themselves. So, along with the development of Japan the 
Japanese will recognize their rights stronger, and make litigations more frequent. 
This prediction is often called "the Kawashima These". 
"Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou" 
There is one clear example often referred in this topic to show that the Japanese 
dislike disputes at all; the idea of Кепка Ryou-Seibai [put same sanction on 
both sides in dispute]. The idea is originally emerged as the Кепка Ryou-
Seibai Hou [The law of Кепка Ryou-Seibai], which originally means that the 
both party in dispute are to equally sanctioned with death penalty. The first 
clear case is thought to be in the law of a Daimyo [feudal lord] in Sengoku Jidai 
4
 Takeyoshi Kawashima (1909-1992) was professor of civil law in the University of 
Tokyo. He is famous for introducing legal sociological research into Japan. 
5
 Kawashima, T.: Nihon-jin no Hou-ishiki [Japanese sense of Law], Iwanami Shoten, 
1967. 
6
 Ibid. 140. 
7
 Ibid. 142. 
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[the age of war].8 The Imagawa Kana Mokuroku [Law of House Imagawa]9 
article no. 8 provided "the persons to make violent disputes are both to be 
sentenced to death, without discussing right or wrong". This kind of rule became 
widespread in the laws of Sengoku feudal loads, and in the age of Tokugawa 
Shogunate (1603-1867) sometimes thought to be "Tenka no Taihou" [the grand 
rule of the country]. At least in the Genroku Akoh case in 1703 (Genroku 15),'" 
in which the late subjects of House Asano of Akoh made vengeance to Kira 
Yoshinaka who was believed to committed dispute with Asano Naganori their 
late lord in the Edo Castle, they justified their revenge referring to this law. In 
the dispute only their lord Asano was sentenced to commit Seppuku [the 
forced suicide with honor] while no penalty was put on Kira. 
Haley's Argument: systematic approach 
Against Kawashima, Professor lohn О. Haley pointed out the systematic 
problem in lapanese legal sphere. He called the belief that the lapanese dislikes 
litigation was a "Myth".11 He agreed with Kawashima, that the fact the 
lapanese introduced many arbitration systems before the 2nd World War has 
ended,12 shows that there lies some hesitation to litigate. But he insists that the 
hesitation was of the governing elites, not of the ordinary lapanese. Haley wrote: 
8
 Sengoku Jidai (c. 1467-c. 1573) is the age of warfare between two Shogunate, 
Ashikaga and Tokugawa. Along with the decline of power and authority of Ashikaga 
Shogunate, many Daimyo increased their independence from the Shogunate and 
governed their power realm by their own initiative. 
9
 House Imagawa, a branch of Ashikaga Shogunate, was a powerful feudal lord 
governed Suruga and Toutoumi (around Shizuoka prefecture now). Imagawa Kana 
Mokuroku was the law issued by Imagawa Ujichika in 1526 (Daiei 6) independently 
f rom the Shogunate, to govern his realm. The law was consisted from 33 articles. 
10
 Inside the parenthesis is the name and count of the year in Japanese traditional 
calendar. Since traditional calendar was in lunar system, the year Genroku 15 had some 
difference from 1703 A.D. in its range. 
11
 Haley, J. O.: The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant. Journal of Japanese Study, 4, 
(1978)359-390 . 
12
 E.g. the Land Lease and House Lease Conciliation Act in 1922, Farm Tenancy 
Conciliation Act of 1924, the Commercial Affairs Conciliation Act of 1926, the Labor 
Disputes Conciliation Act of 1926, the Monetary Claims Conciliation Temporary Act of 
1932, the amendment of the Mining Act of 1939, The amendment of the Placer Mines 
Act of 1940, the Agricultural Land Adjustment Act of 1938, the Personal Status 
Conciliation Act of 1939, and the conciliation provisions of the Special Wartime Civil 
Affairs Act of 1942. 
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Kawashima relies heavily on the enactment of these statutes in arguing that 
the Japanese have been loath to litigate. Yet there is nothing to suggest that 
they were the product of popular demand for an alternative to litigation 
more in keeping with Japanese sensitivities. Rather it seems more accurate 
to conclude that they reflected a conservative reaction to the rising tide of 
lawsuits in the 1920s and early 1030s and a concern on the part of the 
governing elite that litigation was destructive to a hierarchical social order 
based upon personal relationships.13 
For him, the largest factor for the Japanese to hesitate to litigate was the 
scarcity of lawyers in Japan. There are about 22 thousand practicing attorneys 
in 2006, after much increase f rom 1990's, which makes the number of lawyers 
per population of Japan around 1/20 of the United States, and 1/4 even to the 
France. Haley thought that this "institutional incapacity"14 is the main reason, 
and "The failure of Japan to provide more judges and lawyers has been clearly 
a matter of governmental policy".15 So which is the more reasonable answer to 
the problem ... cultural, or systematic? 
Recent Studies on the Actual Japanese Culture 
First of all, I should point out that the Kawashima Thesis is proved to be 
almost false. The statistics of Wollschläger I have mentioned earlier is of 1990, 
i.e. after Japanese high economic growth (1955-1974) and no one would doubt 
that Japan is one of the highly developed countries in the world. There was 
much population movement f rom rural villages to urban areas in the process of 
the high economic growth, and thus mass-destruction of many customs or rules 
of agriculture-based communities. But still, the number of litigation has not 
increased. 
Recent comparative study in legal sense also shows that there is not so 
much difference in that point between Japan and the United States.16 According 
13
 Haley: op. cit. 373. 
14
 Ibid. 378. 
15
 Ibid. 385. 
16
 Hou-Ishiki Kokusai Hikaku Kenkyuu-kai (The Research Center for International 
Comparison of Legal Consciousness], "Keiyaku Ishiki no Kokusai Hikaku: 22-
kakoku/chiiki Jittai Chousa kara [International Comparison of Contractual Consciousness: 
from the Survey in 22 Countries/Areas]", Nagoya Daigaku Housei Ronshuu [Nagoya 
University Journal of Law and Politics], 2003. 196. 
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the comparison of surveys in 22 countries/areas in Asia, Europe, Americas, 
Oceania, and Africa, "the countries/areas with relatively high attitude to comply 
contracts are Hong Kong, Israel, and Sweden, while relatively low are Taiwan 
and Brazil".17 Professor Masanobu Kato, chair to the survey, concluded that in 
the attitude to comply contracts, both the United States and Japan are in very 
mediate level. "We cannot conclude that the difference in the attitude to comply 
contracts is determined by difference between the East and the West".18 
From the comparison between the United States, China, and Japan as a part 
of the survey mentioned above, Professor Daniel H. Foote concluded that in all 
these three countries, people thought in general that the alternative conflict 
resolution methods are more favorable than making litigation. He wrote: 
There is no clear result which country likes litigation and which dislikes in 
these three countries. (...) There are few people who find the litigation fun 
all around the world, except a few attorneys. In Japan, U.S., China, or 
whatever countries in the world, most people will try to solve the problem 
without making litigations.1'1 
How Japanese acted before Кепка Ryou-seibai Hou 
Another point what I should emphasize is that recent historical research puts 
new light on the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou. Dr. Katsuyuki Shimizu, a historian 
who investigates the earlier feudal Japanese society, pointed out that the 
Japanese society in 15th century was, against the common image (and also our 
self-image), very violent and aggressive. Among many cases he has introduced 
in his book The Emergence of the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou,20 the following two 
will show typical problem in that age. 
One is the incident in 1432 (Eikyo 4), in which the monks of two very 
famous temples in Kyoto, i.e. Kinkaku-ji and Kitano Tenmanguu, crushed each 
other in front of Kinkaku and according to one document three monks were 
17
 Op. cit. ("Introduction" by Kato, M.). 
18
 Ibid. 
14
 Foote, D. H.: Saiban to Shakai: Shihou no "Joushiki" Saikou (Litigation and 
Society: Rethinking the "Common Sense" in Judicialy]. Tokyo, 2006. 45. 
Shimizu, К.: Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou no Tanjou | the Emergence of the Кепка 
Ryou-Seibai Hou], Koudansha, 2006. 
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killed before the Shogun21 himself tried to mediate. Surprisingly, the tr igger to 
whole these trouble was that one monk of Kinkaku was laughed at by a boy 
accompanied by the Kitano Monks who visited Kinkaku for sightseeing.22 
Shimizu insists that the people in this period, whether he was Samurai or not, 
had very strong pride and was very sensitive to be abused. 
Another problem was that under weak government at that era people tend 
to have many connections or lineages to make certain that he could have 
enough help at the time of trouble. For instance, in an incident of 1479 
(Bunmei 11), a brewer in Kyoto killed his wife ' s paramour (the secret lover of 
his wife). It was widely admitted to kill him in that kind of affairs at that era, 
so there must not be any problem. But the trouble was, the paramour was a 
Samurai who subjected to the Samurai-Dokoro Tounin [Chief Inspector]23 
Akamatsu Masanori, and the lord tries to assault the brewer for vengeance 
under the name of the investigation of disorderly conduct. Another trouble was 
that the brewer himself had subjected to House Itakura who had subjected to 
another senior statesman of the Shogunate, Shiba Yoshikado.24 Not only the 
members of House Itakura, but of House Kakiya, Ohtagaki, and Enya, other 
families of senior statesmen who had no direct connection with the brewer but 
some kinship with House Itakura, gathered to protect the brewer from 
Akamatsu. Kyoto suddenly faced the danger of war, which could split the whole 
Shogunate into two, f rom a simple secret love affair of the brewer's wife.2 5 
Shimizu pointed out that in the feudal society in which existed various 
authorities with autonomous power, e.g. the feudal lords, old temples, or the 
group of blind persons who believed to have mysterious power, to discuss 
which parties are right or wrong could not give sufficient answer to f inish the 
conflict. Of course the Ashikaga Shogunate at that era tried to make a reasonable 
system of conflict resolution, e.g. mediation by a third-party personnel, sending 
delegation to show apology, or Honnin Seppuku Sei in which the first person 
21
 Ashikaga Yoshinori [1394 (Ouei 1)-1441 (Kakitsu 1)], the 6th Shogun of Ashikaga 
Shogunate (1336-1573), reign from 1428 to 1441. He himself was assassinated by one 
feudal load later. 
"
2
 Shimizu: op. cit. 12-15. 
23
 Samurai-dokoro was one of three important organization of Ashikaga shogunate, 
which governed the military and police affairs. The chief of Samurai-dokoro ("Tounin" 
[Head)) was in rotation of four powerful houses including Akamatsu, the feudal lord 
reigned Harima (part of Hyogo prefecture now). 
*
4
 House Shiba was a very powerful feudal lord, which reigned many provinces in 
north-western Japan. Shiba Yoshikado was Saki-no Kanrei [late Prime Minister] of the 
shogunate at that time. 
25
 Shimizu: op. cit. 60-62 . 
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who actually committed an attack was ordered to commit honorable suicide 
(Seppuku). None of them, however, could gain success until the emergence of 
the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou. 
New view: Predictability Approach 
In this stage I think we could reach another approach to the scarcity problem: 
the predictability. Professors J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato asserted 
that the Japanese are rational in avoiding litigations.26 Because of some features 
in Japanese litigation process, e.g. the adjudications are made by professional 
judge instead of unpredictable jury, the court session takes much time and it is 
easier f o r judges to suggest reconciliation between that long process, Ramseyer 
and Nakazato insists that it is very easy to predict the outcome (the adjudication) 
for both parties. Since the litigation needs some costs, i.e. t ime and money, 
both parties are to avoid it if they could get the same outcome. They wrote, 
"Analysts need not refer to cultural norms to explain how Japanese settle 
disputes over such accidents, fo r they will f ind, in fact, the Japanese bargain to 
27 
their immediate advantage ' in the shadow of the law" . 
The most important feature will be that in Japan the norms and standards 
on which the cour ts rely in deciding the judgment are open and widely known. 
Typically in the traffic accident cases, "judges use detailed, clear, and public 
formulae to calcula te comparat ive negligence percentages and the v ic t im 's 
damages ... whether for death , disability, or simple injury",2 8 and these 
formulae are published as a book and open to the public. In the survey over the 
compensations the victims' fami ly got in t raff ic accidents with death results, 
"figures suggest that they recover, on average, about 80-1 10 percent of the 
amount that would earn if they sued and won against a fully insured defendant".24 
So they concluded that in Japan avoiding the litigation is a result from the 
rational choice of each potential litigant. According to them, "Litigation is scarce 
in Japan not because the system is bankrupt. It is scarce because the system 
works".30 
26
 Ramseyer. J. M.-Nakazato, M.: The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and 
Verdict Rates in Japan. Journal of Legal Studies, 18 (1989) 263. 
27
 Ibid. 264. 
28
 Ibid. 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 . 
29
 Ibid. 280. 
30
 Ibid. 290. 
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The Desire of Whom? 
But the trouble still remains, on what purpose established such highly predictable 
system? Professor Takao Tanase pointed out the problem against Haley, and 
asserted that if it had failed to satisfy what the people expect in legal system, 
these must be another reason for it to maintain its existence.31 TANASE insists 
that if the governing elite try to oppress the number of litigation, they should 
give proper alternatives to litigation — "Clearly, the elite is not omnipotent. If 
the elite is to be effective in leading a society, it cannot depart too radically 
from the aspirations of the people".32 That is the case in Japan, he concluded. 
In the case of traffic accident, (1) there are many free consultation service 
run by police, insurance companies, local governments and bar associations, 
(2) there is clear, unified, public standard to calculate the amount of compen-
sation, and (3) there are alternative dispute resolution systems like conciliation 
of the court or the NGO like Koutsuu Jiko Hunsou Shori Sentaa [the Center for 
Conflict Resolution on Tra f f i c Accidents], established in 1974. Since such 
processes absorb most of all conflicts, Tanase wrote, it became somewhat rare 
occasion for both parties to decide to bring the conflict to court. He called his 
theory as the management model. 
If the differential weighting is so arranged as to make the disputants " f ind" 
judicial services less efficient and alternative services more satisfactory, then 
the state, without any coercion, can effectively induce the people to voluntarily 
use fewer services. ( . . . ) The people now believe that the system is created only 
to benefit them, not contrived by an ill-willed agant with a hidden agenda.33 
Still there remains a problem: who are those elites? Haley insists that the 
governing elite dislike litigation because it will break the friendly, communal 
relationship on which their power relied. It could be an explanation why the 
Japanese government is very eager to keep the quality of bills and acts, and to 
maintain the unification of the whole legal system, through the strict audit 
process of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. They tried to avoid litigations by 
making clear and highly predictable statutes. But what about judges? What are 
their incentives to avoid litigations? Wouldn ' t be the litigations their source of 
power? 
31
 Tanase, T.: The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in 
Japan. Law and Society Review, 24 (1990) 65 1 -692 . 
32
 Ibid. 656. 
33
 Ibid. 656-657. 
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The Role of Courts: to avoid them to work? 
Foote describes the curious situation concerning this matter.14 It is the judges 
themselves that established the highly predictable rules and standards about 
traffic accident compensations from which everyone could avoid litigation. He 
introduces the fact that in corresponding to the rapid increase of t raff ic 
accident, and thus increase of lawsuit filed to the court in early 1960's, the 
Supreme Court of Japan decided to establish the special division to solve them, 
i.e. the 27th civil division in the Tokyo District Court in 1962. Just after its 
establishment the judges in the division started eagerly to make new, highly 
predictable sys tem to solve the problem: they persuaded the prosecutors' o f f ice 
to offer police inspection report on the accidents, organized workshops to 
investigate the substantive and procedural law relating this topic, and made the 
standard fo rmulae for the attorneys to fi le a lawsuit and for the judges to 
adjudicate. In fact it was those judges that made the whole "detailed, clear, and 
public formulae to calculate comparative negligence percentages and the 
victim's damages",1 5 which Ramseyer and Nakazato introduces. It is also 
notable that not only judges but also public prosecutors (referred above) and 
attorneys were cooperative in the process. If they didn't agree with the judges 
to bring high predictability to the courts and thus decrease its role, it would be 
totally useless to making standard formulae of petitions. 
So there c a m e to be another problem. Not only bureaucrats, but judges , 
prosecutors, and attorneys were eager to suppress the number of litigation 
through establishing high predictability in the whole legal process. But it is 
certain that this is not totally for their profit, especially in the case of attorneys 
who could earn from making litigations. W h o wants these features in Japan? 
Yet Another N e w Approach: the interaction of culture and system 
I suppose that there is only the people themselves are left . According to 
Tanase, there must be some reason if the system, which fails to satisfy the 
peoples' expectation, continued its existence. But what about the case if a 
system successfully satisfies what the people expect for the legal system at 
least to some extent? You may notice that the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou is also 
very predictable, especially with very law resource to investigate the cases: 
both parties are to be sentenced to death without discussing right or wrong. 
34
 Foote: op. cit. 
35
 Ramseyer-Nakazato: op. cit. 269-270. 
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Shimizu pointed out that the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou had established in the 
process of Ashikaga Shogunate to lose its political power, and its validity 
under Tokugawa Shogunate was limited only to wartime,36 although the late 
subjects of House Asano insisted that the law was "the grand rule of the 
country". 
Thus, in my opinion, it could understand as a compromising rule to stop 
conflicts to escalate with limited resources, at least from the viewpoint of the 
governing elites. We could notice that the last thing left in there was the claim 
for predictability and equality, i.e. very simple rule which could be called as 
"the balance sheet of blood", which is rumored to be still used in the under-
ground world of Japanese maf ia (Yakuza) to resolute the conflict . 
They were the Japanese ordinary citizens who appraised on the vengeance 
of the late members of House Asano in the Genroku Akoh case. The case was 
later dramatized in the Kabuki "Chuushin-gura", the most famous and popular 
program in Japanese traditional play. Since the members' c la im to gain balance 
of blood between two Houses conflicted with the Shogunate 's policy to regain 
peace within the society af ter long wart ime of the Sengoku Jidai, all the 
members were sentenced to death. The only sign of concession f rom the 
Shogunate was that they were permitted to commit Seppuku instead of were 
beheaded, which usually applied to murder f rom personal f ight . Their corpses 
were buried in Sengaku-ji temple of Edo, the same place as their late lord, where 
still the incense to pray for their souls never cease. Of course those incense 
were dedicated by the ordinary man-on-the-streets through the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, the Japanese Empire after the Meiji restoration, and post-war 
liberal democracy. 
If we could find the cultural character special to Japanese, in my view it 
could be very strong concern with equality, unity, and thus predictability, 
shown in the emerging process of the Кепка Ryou-Seibai Hou. 
Conclusion 
Let me summarize the point. Against Kawashima who thought that the scarcity 
of litigation was the direct expression of Japanese weak sense of rights, Haley 
pointed out that there could be some systematic problem behind the scene. 
Ramseyer and Nakazato, jo ined to Haley, asserted that under the existence of 
more effective alternative conflict resolution systems it is rather rational fo r 
the people to depend upon them. I would like to point out in addition, that it 
36
 Shimizu: op. cit. 191. 
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should be bet ter to start our inquiry f rom why the conflicts would occur. As 
Immanuel Kant suggests, if all the person could use his practical reason 
properly, everyone will come to know what is his due portion of goods, and 
thus there should be no conflict between persons." I don ' t intend to say that 
the Japanese have such an ideal character, but it suggests also that if each of us 
know exactly what the law will provide, there would be no conflict, and there 
is rather strong law functioning in reality, than weak sense of law. Of course to 
what extent this hypothesis could explain the fact of the scarcity of litigation in 
Japan needs more detailed study, I would like to propose a little bit new 
framework to see the legal function in society, other than just a number of 
litigation brought into courts. 
Kant, I.: Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Kant's gesammelte Schriften. Berlin, 1907. 
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Á D Á M B O Ó C * 
A Brief Introduction to Hungarian Arbitration Law 
I . 
The antecedents of modern arbitration-similarly to several institutes of modern 
private law-can be found in Roman Law, where arbitration was considered as 
a way of private dispute resolution.1 As a leading source in Roman law we can 
refer to D. 4, 8, which has the following title: De receptis: qui arbitrium 
receperint ut sententiam dicant. When analyzing the features of arbitration in 
Roman Law, special attention should be paid to the term of compromissum, 
which meant the settlement of the parties to submit themselves to the juris-
diction of an arbitrator, who was called arbiter ex compromisseThe term of 
compromissum on the field of arbitration still plays a particular role in several 
jurisdictions in Latin America.3 
Concerning the appointment of the arbitrator in Roman law, the most 
important source in the Digest is perhaps the following sentence: "Arbiter ex 
compromisse sumptus cum ante diem, qui constitutus compromisso erat, 
sententiam dicere non potest."4 This regulation means that the arbiter ex 
compromisso cannot judge the case before the parties reached a consensus 
regarding the appointment of the arbitrator. This rule highlights the importance 
PhD. Research Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30 
E-mail: adambooc@gmail.com 
1
 In this regard see especially: D. Roebuck-B. De Loynes de Fumichon: Roman 
Arbitration. Oxford, 2004. 
It should be born in mind that arbiter had another meaning in Roman Law, too. It 
also meant a judge who had special knowledge on a particular field, which was necessary 
to the appropriate judging of the case. See esp.: Földi A.-Hamza G.: A római jog története 
és institúciói (History and Institutes of Roman Law). Budapest, 2 0 0 7 n . 161. 
3
 See in this regard: Boóc Á: A kereskedelmi választottbíráskodás egyes sajátosságai 
Dél-Amerikában (Some Particular Features of Commercial Arbitration in Latin-America). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 48 (2007) 289-332. 
4
 See: Alf, D. 4, 8, 50. 
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of the consensual nature of arbitration, which is undoubtedly one of the most 
fundamental principles of modern arbitration, as well. 
Regarding the early Hungarian Medieval Law we can state that the persons 
w h o acted as quasi-arbitrators can be considered more as mediators than real 
judges . We can refer to the 11. Decretum of St. Stephen, according to which ten 
gold coins should be given to the arbitrators and mediators for fulfilling their 
duty. 5 
It is not until the 13th and 14,h century in Hungary that arbitrators could be 
regarded-to some extent-as real judges who could reach an award based on the 
same proofs as the ordinary judges . Practically speaking, there are two circum-
stances which have to be highlighted: (a) concerning the procedure of the 
arbitrators and their award they had to prepare a report either to the ordinary 
j u d g e or to the administration of the county; (b) in case they failed to do so the 
report could be enforced by an order from the King. 
It is worth mentioning that this phenomenon can be detected in modern law 
as well. Namely, that there is an important connection between ordinary judges, 
judicia l system, and arbitrators. The arbitrators have to make sure that the 
award is authentic. In case they fail to fulfill their duties there is always a state 
control . 
Concerning the possible direct effect of the arbitration agreement we can 
re fer to a very interesting point of the Planum Tabulare, which is a compila-
tion of decisions of the Hungarian Superior Court (Curia) f rom the 18lh century. 
In Decision 11 we can read the following: "Si is invalidatoriam litem in foro 
tabulari contra compromittentes suscitet vel illam continuet, ac Uli qui ad 
compromission influxerunt, propter initu, compromission institution difficultent, 
tunc illud coram foro tabulari arreptum institution condescendit, quia actor 
facto suo ab ordinaria juris via recedendo judicem sibi delegit, cuius iudicio 
stare debet."6 According to th is quotation if there is a valid arbitration 
agreement and one of the parties commences an ordinary judicial procedure, 
the respondent may raise an exception based on a jurisdictional issue (genus 
actionis vulgo institution). The ordinary judge than will reject the claim, based 
on this procedural issue. As a consequence, we can state that this procedural 
s tep does not create res judicata. 
Regarding possible legal remedies against the award of the arbitral panel 
w e can mention Decretum of 1729 (de causis von appellabilibus), which states 
that no appeal can be submitted against the award of the arbitral panel. 
5
 "Decern (pensae) autem arbitris et mediatoribus condonentur." See: Fabinyi T.: A 
választott bíráskodás (The Arbitration). Budapest, 1926". 23. 
fi
 See: Fabinyi: op. cit. 23 sqq. 
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As a very interesting point in the history of the Hungarian arbitration law, 
we can refer to the Procedural Order of 1786 of Joseph the 2'"'. This order 
contained the regulation, according to which if there is an apparent cheat in the 
procedure there is a possibility to commence another-ordinary-lawsuit within 
14 days after the receipt of the award. 
It is also worthy mentioning Act No. LIV of 1868, which regulated that in 
the case one of the parties failed to appoint an arbitrator within the given time-
limit, the ordinary judge would fulfill this task based upon the application of 
the other party. 
The Provisional Civil Procedure of 16. 09. 1852 contained a modern 
feature, which is even typical of the arbitration agreements in the 20Ih century. 
The Provisional Civil Procedure stated that the parties may submit their legal 
dispute under the jurisdiction of an arbitration panel if they were allowed to 
dispose of the legal dispute in this manner, and if they were allowed to reach 
an out-of-court agreement concerning the legal dispute. 
As it is known in the early years of the 20lh century, a code on Civil 
Procedure was promulgated in Hungary. It was the Act I of 1911 on Civil 
Procedure. The Title XVII of this Code contained regulations on arbitration. 
The following questions were covered by these provisions: 
- Arbitration agreement; 
- Appointment of Arbitrators; 
- Liability of Arbitrators; 
- Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal; 
- Procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal (proofs, legal representation, etc.); 
- Award of the Arbitral Tribunal; 
- Challenge of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
Concerning the liability of the arbitrator we have to refer to a separate act, the 
Act VIII of 1871. This act ruled that if there was an official crime commited 
by the arbitrator, he would also lose the ability to become an arbitrator. 
Regarding the challenge of the award, it should be highlighted that the award 
could be challenged-based on Section 784 of the Code on Civil Procedure of 
1911 —if there was an arbitrator on the panel who had been successfully 
challenged previously? or if the would-be challenging party could not reach a 
challenge without his own fault before the award of the arbitral tribunal. 
Unlike the modern arbitration act, there is no reference to public policy in the 
challenge in this Act.7 
7
 See in that regard: Burián L.: Gondolatok a közrend szerepéről (Thoughts on the 
Role of Ordre Public). In: Kiss D.-Varga I. (ed.): Magister artis boni et aequi. Studia in 
Honorem Németh János. Budapest, 2003. 99-122. 
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The well-known political and economic changes in 1948 in Hungary had an 
impact on arbitration as well. Because of the new political era and economic 
structure, the commercial arbitration in traditional sense ceased to exist to a 
large extent, but unlike the law of the stock exchange, there was a so-called 
"survival" of commercial arbitration. 
There was a sort of compulsory arbitration among the member states of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It was regulated by the 
Moscow Convention (Convention on the Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law 
Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific and Technological Co-operation). 
This convention was promulgated in Hungary by Law-Decree No. 23 of 1973. 
The aim of this convention was that in commercial disputes among CMEA 
countries, the method of the dispute resolution was the compulsory arbitration 
based on this convention.8 
In order to integrate Hungary into the international legal framework of 
international commercial arbitration it should be taken into account that 
Hungary has ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10. June 1958. It has been promulgated into the 
Hungarian law by Law-Decree No. 25 of 1962. Hungary has promulgated the 
Geneva Convention of 1961 by Law-Decree No. 8 of 1964.9 
As it is known a new Code on Civil Procedure was promulgated in Hungary; 
this was the Act No. Ill of 1952. The original version of this Act did not 
contain any regulation on arbitration. In 1972 this Act was amended with 
Chapter 24 on Arbitration. Chapter 24 included only four sections, lacking 
many important rules due to political-economic reasons. The main problems of 
this regulation can be summed up as follows. On the one hand the scope of 
application was quite narrow: according to Section 360 (1) c) arbitration could 
be applied between economic organization, supposing there had been an 
authorization by act, law-decree or governmental-decree. On the other hand 
the possibility to challenge the award was only allowed in case of ad hoc 
arbitration. At that time there was only one arbitration institute in Hungary: 
The Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian Economic Chamber, which is 
the legal predecessor of the Hungarian Commercial and Industrial Chamber. 
8
 See: Szász I.: A KGST Általános Szállítási Feltételek. Egységes törvény a nemzetközi 
kereskedelemre (General Supplying Conditions of CMEA. Uniform Law on International 
Commerce). Budapest, 1974. 308-310. 
9
 See in detail: Faragó L.: A szocialista országok választottbíráskodásának néhány alap-
elve (Some General Principles of the Arbitration of the Socialist Countries). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 21 (1966) 214-216. 
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The awards of this Court had been regarded as legally binding and thus 
enforceable. 
Later on-approaching the economic and political changes of the '80s- there 
had been a change in the regulation which resulted in arbitration gaining a 
much broader application. As an example, we can mention Act VI of 1988 on 
economic associations. This act provided the possibility of submitting legal 
disputes, between the members of the economic associations and between the 
members and the company, to the jurisdiction of an arbitration court. 
Regarding the legal framework of arbitration the next important step might 
be considered the modification of the Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. 4 of 
1959) in 1993 with an effective date of 1st November, 1993. Af te r this 
modification the Section 7 (2) of the Civil Code gave economic organizations 
the possibility to conclude arbitration clauses for legal debates. At that t ime, in 
order to create a valid arbitration clause both of the parties had to be economic 
organizations. 
It should be kept in mind that after the promulgation of Arbitration Act this 
regulation was changed. It was, and still is today, sufficient if one of the parties 
is an economic organization and the subject matter of the legal dispute concerns 
its activity. 
In that regard we cannot avoid mentioning a very important dogmatic 
question: Should this basic regulation be incorporated into the Civil Code? In 
Hungary, the codification of the new Civil Code is under progress. According 
to the Draft of the new Civil Code it is not necessary to have any regulation on 
arbitration (alternative dispute resolution) in a private law code. (As it is currently 
known; the new draft has not been adopted, yet.)111 
The present act on arbitration in Hungary is Act No. LXXI of 1994 on Arbitra-
tion. In spring 1994, the Government accepted the draft of the arbitration act. 
There were Parliamentary elections at that year and after the elections the new 
Government made some minor changes. Still, in 1994 the Arbitration Act was 
' "See in that regard: Boóc Á.: A kereskedelmi választottbíráskodás egyes kérdései 
(Some Questions of Commercial Arbitration). In: Balogh M. (ed.): Diszciplínák határain 
innen és túl (Within and Beyond the Badeis of Disciplines). Fiatal Kutatók Fóruma 2. -
2006. Budapest, 2007. 12115. 
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presented to Parliament and they adopted the new Act on Arbitration. The Act 
was promulgated and it became effective on 13. 12. 1994." 
The new Act is based on UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, as adopted on 21 June, 1985. Unlike the Law of the 
Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration which has been in 
force since the 14th of August 1993, the Hungarian Act is not a verbatim 
translation of the Model Law.1 2 It is an adaptation of the Model Law, which 
means that there are some minor diverging points in the Hungarian text. 
The Act contains 65 sections, having the following structure: 
- General Provisions; 
- Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal; 
- Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal; 
- Procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal; 
- International Arbitral Proceedings; 
- Proceedings of the Court; 
- Miscellaneous and Closing Provisions. 
The Hungarian Arbitration Act follows the monist conception, which means that 
the Act also regulates the domestic and the international arbitration procedure.11 
Some of the important features of the Hungarian Arbitration Act can be 
summed up as follows. Section 6 of the Act contains the possibility of waiver, 
which is based on the principle of prohibition of venire contra factum 
proprium. It means that if a party knows that there is a breach of the agreement 
of the parties or the regulation of the Arbitration Act, and in spite of that this 
party still keeps on participating in the procedure, it has to be considered as if 
the party had waived to seek any legal remedies in this issue.14 
11
 For travaux préparatoires of this act see especially: Szász I.: A választottbírás-
kodásról és szabályozásáról (On Arbitration and on its Regulation). Gazdaság és Jog, 2 -
3 (1993) 8-1 1. 
'"See esp: Gellért Gy.: Új törvény a választottbíráskodásról (New Act on Arbitra-
tion). Magyar Jog, 45 (1995) 449 -460 ; Horváth E.: A választottbíráskodásról szóló tör-
vény általános rendelkezései a gyakorlat tükrében (The General Regulations of the Act 
on Arbitration with Special Emphasis on the Practice). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 50 
(1995)171-178. 
" For practical application of the Hungarian Arbitration Act, see: Horváth É.: A 
választottbíráskodásról szóló törvény gyakorlati alkalmazása (Practical Application of 
the Act on Arbitration). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 54 (1999) 335-340. 
14
 Section 6 of the Act states: "A party who knows that any provision of this Act from 
which the parties may derogate or any requirement of the arbitration agreement has not 
been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to 
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It should be highlighted that the number of the arbitrators must be odd in 
order to enable the panel to reach a decision. It is interesting to mention that 
under the Civil Procedure of 1911 the parties could appoint an even number of 
arbitrators. 
It is important to refer to section 11, first sentence: " T h e arbitrators are 
independent and impartial, they are not representatives of the parties." This 
regulation is very similar to the Model Law. It should be pointed out that the 
reference to the fact that the arbitrators are not representatives of the part ies 
can be reasoned with some Anglo-Saxon, esp. American, traditions: there is a 
dissenting role of party-appointed arbitrator in the American arbitration tradition. 
The Hungarian Act is also lacking the definition of independence and 
impartiality. In order to try to find some sort of interpretation of these te rms 
we can refer to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration (Approved on 22 May, 2004 by the Council of the International 
Bar Association), and secondly to the relevant legal literature. 15 
It should be kept in mind that if the arbitral t r ibunal dismisses the 
application for challenge of one of the parties, then this party may seek legal 
remedy in a competent county court. 
The Hungarian Act (section 24) contains the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, which means that the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its o w n 
jurisdiction.16 We have to stress that if one of the parties appoints an arbitrator 
or participates in the appointment of an arbitrator, it does not exclude the party 
from providing an exception against the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
Chapter seven of the Act deals with international arbitration procedure. It is 
important to know that in international cases the competent arbitration court is 
always the Arbitration Court, attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. The reason for this regulation is that this arbitration court is a 
legal successor of the arbitration court attached to the Hungarian Economic 
Chamber, and therefore, this court has enough experience in this matter. Th is 
part of the Act should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the 
New York Convention as well. 
such non-compliance immediately or, if a time-limit is provided therefore, within such 
period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object." 
15
 See in detail: Boóe Á.: Megjegyzések a választottbírónak az eljárásból való ki-
zárásáról (Remarks on the Cha l lenge of Arbitrator) . Állam- és Jogtudomány, 47 (2006) 
445^167. 
16
 See: Horváth É.-Kálmán Gy.: A nemzetközi eljárások joga, különös tekintettel a 
választottbíráskodásra (The Law of the International Procedures, wi th Special Emphasis 
on Arbitration). Budapest, 1999. 112-113. 
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The intervention of the state court into the arbitral process can be divided 
as follows: 
- Appointment of the arbitrator if the party fails to appoint his arbitrator; 
- Legal help to the arbi t ra l tribunal in the question of proof or inter im 
measure; 
- Challenge of the Award ; 
- Recognition and Enforcement of the Award. 
This part is a lso in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law. In Hungary, 
the time-limit for challenging the award is 60 days f rom the receipt of the 
award of the Arbitral Tribunal . It should be stressed that the challenge of the 
award is not a form of appeal . There is an award of the Hungarian Supreme 
Court, which confirms it (BH 1996.159), so the legal practice also supports 
this interpretation. 
According to par. 55 (2) b) one can a lso challenge the award if the award 
breaches public policy, ordre public. There is a leading case of the Supreme 
Court of Hungary (ВН. 1997.489), which clarifies the notion and interpretation 
of ordre public, public policy in Hungary. According to the reasoning of the 
case the breach of the ordre public should mean the breach of a fundamental 
right granted by the Constitution, and even more, the te rm of ordre public 
should also protect the ethical , political ideas of the society. The reasoning 
provides a framework how to interpret the breach of the ordre public. 
It is wonderful to see that the application of arbitration is getting more and 
more popular in Hungary.17 It is also nice to experience that Hungarian and 
foreign investors seem to realize the advantages of this way of dispute resolution. 
It does not seem to be an overstatement that there is a trend in Hungary which 
makes arbitration an important way of dispute resolution, and also that arbitra-
tion is likely to become a real alternative to civil l i t igation in commercial 
18 
issues. 
1
 This is also supported by the activity of the Hungarian arbitral institutions. In that 
regard, we would like to refer to Arbitration Cour t Attached to Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and the Arbitration Cour t Attached to the Money and Capital 
Market. Concerning Arbitration Court Attached to Hungarian C h a m b e r of Commerce and 
Industry see: www.mkik.hu, whi le regarding Arbitration Court At tached to the Money and 
Capital Market, see: www.valasztottbirosag.hu . 
18
 For actual questions of arbitration in Hungary with special emphasis on the practice 
see especially: Balog L.: A kereskedelmi választottbíráskodás aktuál is kérdései (Some 
Actual Quest ions of Commercial Arbitration). Gazdaság és Jog, 15 (2007) 39-44. 
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R É K A FRIEDERY* 
The Role of the European Ombudsman in Dispute Solving 
Abstract. The establishment of the Office of the European Ombudsman by the Maastricht 
Treaty was explicit in connection with the demonstration of the Union, as a complex of 
democratically functioning bodies. Democratically functioning is in necessary connection with 
transparency, openness and accountability. Transparency and openness are key requirement set 
as aims by the European Union in connection with the decision-making procedure of bodies 
and offices, and between the European bureaucracy and the European citizens. 
In every member state of the European Union there are non-judicial and nonlitigious 
proceedings to settle the community and administrative disputes. The career of the institution 
of the ombudsman started in the 17()()'s and at present time one of the most important phase 
was the establishment of the institution at supranational level. 
Keywords: Maastricht Treaty, transparency, bureaucratic. European citizens, right to complain, 
non-judicial, maladministration 
1. C o n c e p t u a l o r i g i n 
T h e o r i g i n of t he o m b u d s m a n c a n b e f o u n d in the O l d N o r s e , a n d t h e w o r d 
u m b u d s m a n m e a n s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . T h e f i r s t p r e s e r v e d u s e in S w e d i s h is f r o m 
1 5 5 2 . It is u s e d in o t h e r S c a n d i n a v i a n l a n g u a g e s as w e l l , e x a m p l e s a r e the 
I c e l a n d i c u m b o , t h e N o r w e g i a n o m b u d s m a n , and the D a n i s h o m b u d s m a n d . T h e 
o m b u d s m a n c a n b e a p p o i n t e d b y a g o v e r n m e n t , b y a p a r l i a m e n t , b y i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , by f i r m s b u t t h e o m b u d s m a n of a n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n w o r k s f o r its o w n m e m b e r s o r f o r t he p u b l i c in g e n e r a l , a n d d o e s 
no t c a r r y spec ia l p o w e r s or s a n c t i o n a b i l i t i e s . 
T h e e x p r e s s i o n o f o m b u d s m a n o r i g i n a t e s f r o m the S w e d i s h u s a g e , f r o m the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t he p a r l i a m e n t a r y o m b u d s m a n in 1809. T h e w o r d o m b u d s m a n 
a n d i t s s p e c i f i c m e n a i n g h a d b e e n s i n c e a d o p t e d b y o t h e r l a n g u a g e s , a n d 
o m b u d s m e n h a v e b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n 
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too. The aim of this function is to protect the citizens' rights with an institution 
which is independent from the executive branch of the government 's power. 
The ombudsman is a government official who is charged with representing 
the interests of the public by investigating the complaints reported by indi-
viduals and addressing them to the responsible authority. The ombud always 
stands against the state bureaucracy in the case of violation of law (malad-
ministration) as watching the requirements of the good administration, moreover 
he can cri t icize-either on functionalism or humanitarian base- the legally 
fai l ing administration due to the lack of aim because of system sociological 
reason.1 
The history of the inst i tut ion 's development is following. The Swedish 
Charles XII, fighting in the Great Northern War, when loosing the battle 
against the Russian Czar and his troops at Poltava in 1712, had to flee to 
Turkey and had not returned back to Sweden in over a decade." 
Because the state's administration had fallen into disarray, he wrote a letter 
to his government initiating the establishment of the office of His Majesty 's 
Supreme Ombudsman. Some argue that the Swedish king was inspired by the 
practice of the Turkish Emperor ' s court. There he had learned about the Diwan 
al-Mazalim, the Board of Grievances. The holder of this office was entitled 
and obliged to check the complaints of the individuals against authorities.3 In 
practice the Muhtasib, who was entrusted by the Sultan with a non-legal 
review protected those people who were victims of the officials ' injustice, 
discrimination and unfairness. This system worked even before the structures 
of administration were introduced.4 
In Sweden the role of the King's Ombudsman was to ensure that judges 
and public officials acted in accordance with the laws, proficiently discharged 
their tasks, and if not he could initiate legal proceedings because of dereliction of 
duty. This could be regarded as the origin of the Ombudsman institution. In 
1719, with the Instrument of Government, a new name had been given to this 
1
 Majtényi, L.: Ombudsmann: Állampolgári jogok Biztosa [Ombudsman. Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civil Rights]. Budapest. 1992. 19. 
" Sultan Ahmed III pointed out the Karolins' residence in the so-called Karlopolis, 
which was situated in Bess Arabia, on the riverside of Dnyeszter, between Vernice and 
Bender. Here had been made decisions regarding the Swedish empire, and the law 
proposals and nominations (into important offices) had been transported by a courier 
between Stockholm and Bender. 
' The Diwan al-Mazalim, or Muhtasib is still existing in some Islamic state. In 1983 
an ombudsman, a Wafaqi Mohtasib had been instituted in Pakistan. 
4
 Machacek, R.: Law and Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin, Law and Politics, 1 
(2001)571-580. 
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position, the so-called Justitiekanslern, the Chancellor of Justice. Although, he 
performed important tasks, it only acted on behalf of the royal government. In 
Sweden after the death of Char les XII, through the fol lowing decades there 
was more or less parliamentary rule, the so-called period of liberty.5 In 1766, it 
was the first time that the parliament had elected the Justitiekanslern, but the 
Instrument of Government of 1776 made the appointment again to a royal 
prerogative. 
The autocratic rule of Gus tav III, that ended the half-century long parl ia-
mentary supremacy, prompted the Riksdag of the Estates (the assembly of 
the nobility, the clergy, the bourgeoisie and the peasants) to establish an 
ombudsman who is independent from the executive power. His son Gustav 
Adolf IV was deposed with the Instrument of Government in 1809, and 
divided the power between the king and the parliament. This Instrument of the 
Government had been adopted in 6lh June in 1809 by the Riksdag of the 
Estates, which became repealed in 1974. This happened af te r the catastrophic 
outcome of the Finnish war, when Gustav Adolf had to resign and his place 
had been reserved by his uncle, Charles XIII. The one f rom 1809 had replaced 
the Instrument of Government of 1772, and could be regarded until the newest 
constitution as the second o ldes t constitution after the Amer ican one. Next to 
the King's Ombudsman, w h o had been appointed by the King, the parlia-
mentary ombudsman had been instituted, who had been appointed by the 
Parliament, and acted on behalf of it.'1 
At this point we must revert to those allegations, which say that the 
ombudsman institution has A r a b roots. As we have seen, in the Islamic legal 
tradition there is a high officeholder, who had handled the people 's complaints 
lodged to the ruler, and the Swedish king created this institution in Sweden 
during his Turkish residence, based on the experience collected there. How-
ever, as Jacob Söderman7 pointed out, this was not the establishment of the 
ombudsman's office as we know it today. In fact, in many royal courts in 
Europe, there were high off ic ia ls dealing with complaint to the king, some of 
them as the justifia mayor of Aragon clearly inspired by the Islamic example, 
5
 According to the laws passed in the Parliament in the years of 1720 and 1723, the 
cabinet-council assumed authority, which had been responsible towards the Estates, where 
the nobility was the most influential one. 
6
 The first ombudsman of the Office 's in the world was appointed in Sweden, on 1st 
March of 1810, in the person of Baron Lars Augustin Mannerheim. 
7
 Jacob Söderman was the first ombudsman to be elected in the European Union. He 
had worked two periods long, and now the second European Ombudsman is Nikiforos 
Diamandouros. 
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others clearly set up just for practical reasons. The invention of the Swedish 
ombudsman idea came into force in a constitutional r e f o r m of 1809, when 
the Swedish legislative body, the Ständerna was given the right to elect an 
ombudsman of justice, a f ter having disputed over that right with the king 
during almost the whole earlier century.8 This new office had the model of that 
of the Chancellor of Justice. Like the latter, this was to be a prosecutor whose 
task was to supervise the application of the laws by the judges and civil 
servants. As in the words of the 1809 Instrument of Government, the Parlia-
ment was to appoint a man known for his knowledge of the law and exemplary 
probity as parliamentary ombudsman. In other words his duties were to focus 
on protection of the rights of citizen, for example he encouraged the uniform 
application of the law and indicated legislative obscurities. His work included 
to take the form of inspections and inquiries into complaints. The complaints 
played quite an insignificant role at the beginning, and dur ing the first century 
of the existence of the of f ice , the total number of complaints amounted to 
around 8000. The legislators introduced into the new constitution a system that 
would allow the Parliament some control over the executive power. The 
Standing Committee on the Constitution was therefore charged with the task of 
supervising the actions of ministers and ensuring the election of the special 
parliamentary ombudsman to monitor the compliance of the public authorities 
with the law. The reason for giving the power of appointment to the Parliament 
was to ensure the independence of the ombudsman 's work from the king, the 
government and the administration." 
After this, the Parliament 's Act of 1810 contained provisions concerning 
the auditors elected by the parliament to scrutinise the doings of the civil 
service, the bank of Sweden, and the Nat ional Debt O f f i c e . The regulations 
in Chapter 12 of the Consti tut ion of 1974 later incorporated these three 
supervisory Riksdag10 agencies (the parliamentary ombudsmen, the Standing 
Committee on the Constitution and the parliamentary auditors) into the current 
system of parliamentary government. 
The Off ice of the Chancellor of Justice still exists, as the ombudsman of 
the government. The role of the parliamentary ombudsman, which was estab-
lished in 1809, as we have mentioned earlier, have been preserved with the 
instrument of government of 1974. Against the public belief , the ombudsman 
8
 Söderman, J.: Is there a classic parliamentary Ombudsman. Austrian Ombudsman 
Board. 20th Anniversary, Vienna, 4 June 1997. 
' The European Ombudsman-Report for the year 1995, Office of the European Ombuds-
man, April 22, 1996. 
'" The name of the Swedish Parliament. 
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had been instituted by the political experience and not by the Swedish 
democratic government system, and this institution-gaining a new sense-ave 
spread all over the wor ld . " 
2. The spread of the ombudsman institution 
The office started to spread to other states in the twentieth century. It started in 
1915, when an independent military ombudsman was established in Sweden. 
Next was Finland in 1919, when it made provisions in the new constitution 
for the establishment of an ombudsman. With the introduction of a military 
ombudsman in 1952 by Norway, and a general ombudsman in 1953 by Denmark, 
Scandinavia confirmed its historical contribution towards the protection of 
citizens' rights." The Scandinavian examples and experiences were continued 
with the controversial establishment of a military ombudsman in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1957. 
The recognition of the office increased in the early 1960s, as different Com-
monwealth and other but mainly European states established such office. 
Examples for this are New Zealand in 1962, the United Kingdom in 1967, most 
Canadian provinces, starting from 1967, Israel in 1967, Tanzania in 1968, 
Puerto Rico in 1977, and Australia at the federal level in 1977 and at the state 
level between 1972 and 1979. By the middle of 1983 there were only twenty-
one states with ombudsman offices at national level, and about six states at the 
provincial/state or regional level. By 2004 the number of the ombudsman 
institution had more than quintupled, including states with well-established 
democracies and states with younger democracies.13 
In most states of the European Union,14 the position of the general ombuds-
man is well known. The function of the general ombudsman was instituted in 
1967 by the United Kingdom, in 1973 by France and later in the other Member 
States. Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom as well as Spain preferred 
the role of the parliamentary ombudsman, while in Germany we see the Peti-
tion Committee, and in France the Médiateur de la République enjoys consid-
11
 Kerekes, Zs.: Az ombudsman intézménye az Európai Unióban és Magyarországon 
|The institution of the ombudsman in the EU and Hungary], Politikatudományi Szemle, 
7 (1998) 138. 
12
 Epaminondas, M.: The European Ombudsman. Eipascope, 11 (1994) 2. 
13
 See International Ombudsman Institution http://www.law.ualberta.ca. 
14
 Denmark. France, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria. Portugal, Finland. Sweden, 
Great Britain. 
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erable reputation.15 Ombudsmen function in Germany16 , in the Netherlands and 
in Portugal too, in the latter the ombudsman coexists with the Committee on 
Petitions of the Portuguese Parliament. In Belgium the situation is similar, the 
ombudsman of the Flemish Community and the ombudsman of the City of 
Antwerp functioning in parallel with the Committee on Petitions of the Parlia-
ment. In Luxembourg we can f ind the Committee on Petitions of the Chambre 
des Députés, and in Italy at regional and at local/municipal level there are 
ombudsmen too. In France and in the United Kingdom the complainant has to 
get the assent of a senator or of a Parliament's member, and in Spain an 
efficient net of regional ombudsmen was developed. In Austria, we can find an 
organ with three members who have constitutional authorization and inde-
pendent power to control the administration. 
Ombudsman-type offices can have different mandates; there can be various 
ways for their nomination or performance. The ombudsman is the institution of 
the parliament, and the parliament has the right to nominate them, except in 
Great-Britain where the monarch nominates on the recommendation of the 
Parliament. In France as the only real exception the President of the Republic 
has this right. Generally, in the European Union ombudsmen get the appoint-
ment for four-six years, and it can be renewed with the exception of France. 
Common feature of the ombudsmen position is the obligation to supervise 
the proceeding and maladministration of public servants. Therefore, in general 
their independence is guaranteed by constitution, and they have immunity 
everywhere. The states for establishing their ombudsman off ices can choose 
from different kind of models. They often refer to the Scandinavian model, but 
the Danish and the Norwegian offices are presenting a different model with 
different mandate. The Swedish and the Finnish ombudsman are established by 
constitutions and have broad mandate, which comprises not only the whole 
public administration, state and municipal, but also the supervision of the 
activities of the courts, meaning here the procedural and administrative sides 
of their work. The Swedish and Finnish so-called "classical ombudsman" has 
the power to prosecute or decide that a civil servant should or should not be 
prosecuted before a court of law, for criminal offences. The Danish one was 
established in 1953 and the judiciary does not belong to the mandate, concen-
15
 Epaminondas: ibid. 2. 
In Germany at federal level only specific ombudsmen-data security ombudsman and 
ombudsman for the protection of members of military bodies-are nominated. 
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trates especially on the maladministration in public administrative activities.17 It 
has no power of prosecution but can initiate proceedings through a prosecutor. 
The most effective power of the Danish type is the right to publicly recom-
mend the undoing of administrative malpractices and to argue for better 
solutions. However the broad investigation power and its right as well as the 
obligation to report its findings in annual or special report to the Parliament, 
makes it possible for the Members of Parliament to act on certain issues, fo r 
example by proposing law amendments. 
The main difference between the Danish and the Swedish model is that the 
Swedish can be regarded as the expansion of a parliament, while in the Danish 
the legal protection of individuals is more emphatic. The Danish one was the 
model for the establishment of the European Ombudsman, and this model was 
mostly followed in the world, f irst in New Zealand in 1962, and than in other 
Commonwealth states. 
3. The Office of the European Ombudsman 
3.1. The establishment of the Office 
In 1978, Sir Derek Walker-Smith, a British conservative Member of Parlia-
ment stated that the community law was increasingly regulating the lives of 
average European citizens. Although, he was contented with the safeguard of 
the civil and political rights by the European Convention on Human Rights, 
he recommended that appointing a Community Ombudsman could improve the 
protection of social and economical rights, would allow the investigation of 
injustice caused by maladministration, and would show the European Eco-
nomic Community less inaccessible and impersonal . However, Walker-Smith 
did not suggest that the Community Ombudsman should represent an alterna-
tive to judicial review.1 1 Taking into consideration the report of Derek Walker-
Smith, the European Parliament adopted a resolution aimed at instituting a 
Community Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in 1979.14 
17
 Söderman, J.: The ombudsman concept and types of control of maladministration 
in Greece and Europe, Speech delivered at the University of Athens, 11 November, 
1996. 2. 
18
 Report drawn up on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee on the appointment of a 
Community Ombudsman by the European Parliament, 6 April 1979 (PE 57.508/fin.). 
Rapporteur: Sir Derek Walker-Smith. 
19
 OJ 1979 С 140/53. 
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In 1990 Philippe Gonzales wrote a letter addressed to the members of the 
European Council and he explained his idea to introduce provisions in connec-
tion with the European Citizenship into the Treaty on European Union. Fol-
lowing his letter, the Spanish delegation submitted a note on citizenship on 24 
September, with the title "The Road to European Union" , within the scope of 
the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. According to the 
Spanish note, the adoption of a catalogue on special rights of the citizens of the 
European Union should be accompanied with the establishment of special 
bodies for safeguarding. The Spanish Delegation proposed that European 
citizens should get greater protection of their rights within the f ramework of 
the Union by submitting petitions or complaints to a European Ombudsman 
whose function would be to protect and to help safeguard these rights. More-
over, for the European citizens the ombudsman could act through ombudsmen 
or their equivalents of the Member States. The proposal of the Spanish 
delegation was backed by Denmark, as here the institution of the ombudsman 
worked successfully. In the Memorandum of the Danish Government, which 
was issued on 4 October 1990, they stated that in order to strengthen the 
democratic basis of Community cooperation, an ombudsman system should be 
introduced under the aegis of the European Parliament. The Danish memoran-
dum showed the changing European policy of Denmark, because the state was 
against the intergovernmental conference of the Single European Act in 1985, 
but the memorandum of 1990 was an obvious yes towards a closer economic 
and political integration. " In the autumn of 1990 the Spanish government 
submitted a new considered plea for the statement of rights, f reedoms and 
obligations of citizens in the new Community, things which were believed 
belong implicit in the Single Market project.21 
The institution itself was approved at political level by the meeting of the 
European Council in Rome. In December 1990, the Head of State and Govern-
ment of the Twelve stated that consideration should be given to the possible 
institution of a mechanism to defend c i t izens ' rights as regards communi ty 
matters. 
"Biering, P.: The Danish Proposal to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political 
Union in: The European Ombudsman and the authors: The European Ombudsman-Origins, 
Establishment, Evolution. Luxembourg, 2005. 43. 
: l
 Church, C. H.-Phinnemore, D.: The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties-From 
Rome to Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and beyond. London, 2002. 228. 
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The Spanish Delegation on 21 February 1991 submitted a new and more 
detailed proposal on European Citizenship.22 This envisaged European Citizen-
ship as one of the three pillars of the European Union and the foundation of its 
democratic legitimacy.23 The proposal had 10 Articles, where Article 1 to 8 were 
concerned with the substantive rights of European citizens, Article 9 was con-
cerned with the structure for protecting these rights. According to the proposal, in 
each Member State a Mediator was to be appointed in order to support the 
citizens in the defence of their rights before the administrative authorities of the 
Union and its Member States and to call up these rights before judicial bodies. 
This should happen on the mediator 's account or in support of the person 
concerned. Besides that, the mediators would also have the task of making 
available clear and complete information to the European citizens in relation to 
their rights and the means of enforcing them. At the same time, the Spanish 
Delegation pointed out in form of a footnote that consideration would also be 
given to two other possibilities: namely that the above mentioned function would 
be entrusted to the European Ombudsman, as an independent and responsible 
organ towards the European Parliament, and that the common action of the 
national ombudsmen and the European Ombudsman would be reinforced. 
When setting up the European Ombudsman, it had to be taken into account that 
the Committee on Petition of the European Parliament, the national ombudsmen 
and the Committees on Petition of national parliaments function in parallel. 
The Luxembourg presidency issued the draft of the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaty that established the European Ombudsman. The Treaty 
limited his jurisdiction because only the maladministration occurring during 
the activities of the Community institutions or bodies could have been examined, 
and has given the right to elect subordinated the office to the European 
Parliament.21 The Maastricht Treaty on European Union has taken into effect 
in November 1993. The provisions concerning union citizenship can be find in 
Article 17-22 in the Treaty establishing the European Community, following 
the Amsterdam Treaty 's through the new numbering. By virtue of Article 17 
"(1) Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be the citizen of the union. Citizenship of 
the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.(2) Citizens of 
22
 Annex II, The Spanish Proposal for a European Ombudsman, Spanish Delegation 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, European Citizenship (21 February 
1991). 
23
 Epaminondas: ibid. 3. 
24
 This is on of the rare possibility where the European Parliament can take an in-
dependent decision. 
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the union shall en joy the rights conferred by this treaty and shall be subject 
to the duties imposed thereby." Articles 18-21 introduce the various rights 
of European cit izens. Article 21 provides for citizens to have the right to 
complain to the ombudsman, in accordance with Article 194 and 195 of the 
Treaty. After the establishment of the European Ombudsman, a report made in 
the frame of the European Parliament 's Committee on Institutional Affairs 
said, that the ombudsman is intended to give people a mean to defend them-
selves against administrative abuses, without having to resort to costly legal 
action, or where legal action is not possible."5 In his response the European 
Parliament emphasised that the ombudsman is intended to reinforce the European 
institutions, by providing an effective complaints procedure."6 
The decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general 
conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman duties27 was adopted 
in 1994, regarding the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and in 
particular Article 195(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Article 20d(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
and Article 107d(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community. According to the Statute, the authorization of the Union's ombuds-
man is nearly the same as the national ombudsman 's . It must be mentioned, 
that the Treaty of Amsterdam resulted two changes in relation to the office. 
Firstly, a new paragraph was added to Article 21, according to which every 
citizen had the right to write to community institution on his own language and 
get a response on the same language, so this concerned the Ombudsman office 
too. Secondly, originally the mandate of the European Ombudsman was 
limited to the European institutions and bodies, and with the Amsterdam 
Treaty 's third pillar (the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) 
this was widened to other bodies. 
3.2. The procedure of the European Ombudsman 
A complaint can be referred to the Ombudsman by any citizen of a Member 
State, or by a person who is living in a Member State, directly or through a 
Member of the European Parliament. Furthermore, businesses, associations or 
other bodies with a registered off ice in the Union can also complain. There are 
25
 Report A3-0298/92. 
26
 Resolution A3-0298/92. 
27
 It was adopted by the Parliament on 9 March 1994 (OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, 15), and was 
amended by its decision of 14 March 2002 deleting Articles 12 and 16 (OJ L 92, 9.4.2002, 
13). 
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no special requirements with reference to lodge a complaint, but it is necessary 
to know the identity of the complainant and the accused. It is not necessary for 
the individual to show any specif ic interest to lodge a complaint. There is no 
express locus standi restriction in the Treaty or in the Statute of the ombuds-
man and the tradition is that the right to complain is an actio popularis 
especially in the classical ombudsman version.28 Article 195 (1) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and the Statue lists other conditions 
regarding the complaints. Pursuant to Article 195 (1), he cannot make an 
inquiry when in the complaint "the alleged fac ts are or have been the subject of 
legal proceedings". From this formulation it is evident, that in such cases the 
complainant has no discretional possibility whether to turn with the complaint 
to the court or to the ombudsman. According to Article 1 (3) "The ombudsman 
may not intervene in cases before the courts or question the soundness of the 
court 's ruling".29 
The complaint 's subject cannot be related to work relationship between a 
community institution or body and their off icials or other servants. However, 
when the person concerned has exhausted all possibilities fo r the submission 
of internal administrative reques t and complaints , and the time limits fo r 
the authorities' replies have expired, he can turn to the ombudsman. The 
complaint shall be submitted within two years of the date on which the facts on 
which it is based came to the attention of the complainant. Moreover, it 
necessary that before this the complainant has contacted the institution or body 
concerned and preceded the appropriate administrative approaches. 
The complaints can be divided into five groups. The first include the disputes 
about tenders and contracts. Th is includes all kind of procurement contracts, as 
well as contract under which the Commission provides grants or subsidies. The 
second group concerns the Commission 's role as the "Guardian of the Treaty" , 
which means enforcing the European law against a Member State that fails to 
28
 Söderman, J.: The citizen, the administration and community law. General Report, 
FIDE Congress, 1998. 33. 
29
 In cases where "When the ombudsman, because of legal proceedings in progress or 
concluded concerning the facts which have been put forward, has to declare a complaint 
inadmissible or terminate consideration of it, the outcome of any enquiries he has carried 
out up to that point shall be fi led definitively." Article 2 (7) of the Decision of the 
European Parliament on the regulation and general conditions governing the performance 
of the ombudsman's duties. Adopted by the Parliament on 9 March 1994 (OJ L 113, 
4.5.1994, 15), and amended by its decision of 14 March 2002 deleting Articles 12 and 16 
(OJ L92, 9.4.2002, 13). 
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comply with the law. " Here complaints concern the subject of confidentiality 
and the long time of procedure. The third group involves complaints about 
personnel matters, recruitment procedure and complaint from existing staff. 
The fourth category concerns lack of openness especially refusal of access to 
documents. The fifth category finally covers complaints falling within the 
generic notion of maladministration." It must be mentioned, that neither the 
Treaty, nor the Statute defines the term "maladministration". Clearly, there is 
maladministration if a community institution or body fails to act in accordance 
with the Treaties and with the Community acts that are binding upon it or if 
it fails to observe the rules and principles of law established by the Cour t of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance.32 Furthermore maladministration 
includes administrative irregularities, administrative omissions, abuse of 
power, negligence, unlawful procedures, unfairness, malfunction or incom-
petence, discrimination, avoidable delay and lack or refusal of information. 
The European Parliament in connection with the ombudsman ' s annual report 
of 1995, asked the ombudsman to precise more the term of maladministration. 
Following this the ombudsman wrote a letter to the national ombudsmen, for 
information on whether in their states' administrative law there is something 
about maladministration or about the code of good administrative behaviour. 
After this he gave the fol lowing defini t ion in his annual report of 1997: 
"Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with 
the rule or principle which is binding upon it."33 After this the European Parlia-
ment has considered, that the definition together with the further explanation 
provided in the annual report gives a clear picture." Following the proposal on 
By virtue of Article 226: "If the Commission considers that a member State has 
failed to fulfil an obligation under this treaty it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the 
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observation. If the 
State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice." 
1
 Diamandouros, N.: The Role of the European Ombudsman. British and Irish 
Ombudsman Association Conference. 2005. 2. 
" The European Ombudsman-Report for the year 1995, Strasbourg. Office of the 
European Ombudsman, April 22, 1996. So the European Ombudsman must take into 
consideration Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union. 
The European Ombudsman-Annual Report for 1997, Strasbourg, 1998. 
34
 Söderman, J.: What is a good administration? The European Ombudsman's Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour, International Seminar "The Ombudsmen and European 
Union Law", Bucharest, 21-24 April. 2001. 1. 
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behalf of the Commit tee on Petitions the Parliament adopted a resolution 
welcoming this definition.35 
The Office gets many complaints, which cannot be the subject of any inquiry, 
because they concern the function of the national, regional or local public 
service of the Member States. The Treaty and the Statute declares unequivocally, 
that the ombudsman has no authority to take steps in such cases, or in the 
procedure of international organizations.3 '1 This implies to the case when the 
authority concerned is liable for the enforcement of community law or community 
policy. The ombudsman can act strictly in relation to complaints concerning 
the work of community institutions and bodies, which institutions are listed in 
Chapter 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and the bodies 
created by the Treaties and the community legislation. Among the institutions 
two exceptions can be found: the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance, where maladministration originating from the area of their judicial 
power cannot be the subject of inquiry. Also he cannot intervene in cases before 
the courts or question the soundness of the court's rulings. When the ombuds-
man has no authority to act, he can give advice to the complainant where to turn, 
and when it is possible he hands the complaint over to the body concerned.3 7 
3.3. Possibilities of the ombudsman during the inquiries 
Similar to the national structure, the European Ombudsman has wide investi-
gative power, but cannot annul administrative decisions. The ombudsman 
informs the institution or body concerned about the received complaints, and 
notifies as soon as possible the person lodging the complaint from the steps he 
has taken. Besides the complaints received, the European Ombudsman can motu 
proprio conduct inquires, which gives him an advantage contrary to the courts. 
Therefore, he does not need any particular complaint to open an inquiry, and 
he uses this possibility when analysing different complaints it may conclude, 
35
 A4-0258/98 (OJ 1998 С 292/168). 
36
 Within the framework of the aforementioned Treaties and the conditions laid down 
therein, the Ombudsman shall help to uncover maladministration in the activities of the 
Community institutions and bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role, and make recommendations with a view 
to putting an end to it. No action by any other authority or person may be the subject of a 
complaint to the Ombudsman. Article 2 (1) of the Statute. 
37
 For example the regulation from the power of the French Médiateur has a special 
provision which gives authorize the Médiateur to take over complaints from the European 
Ombudsman. In this case the filter role of the French Parliament is not working. Numerous 
national, regional or local ombudsman can take over complaints, without any special provision. 
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that they refer to a general problem. It must be mentioned that he uses this 
possibility in cases where maladministration is to be observed, but the com-
plainant has no locus standi, because he is not a citizen of the Union, or he 
does not live in the Union. If he decides to conduct an inquiry, he carries out 
every examination, which he considers justified to clarify the suspected 
maladministration and informs the community institution or body concerned. 
That shows the great value of his discretionary power. The importance of the 
cooperation can be seen that the institution or body concerned has the possibility 
to forward any useful comment arising during the inquiry to the ombudsman. 
At community level the institutions and bodies are obliged- at the ombuds-
man 's request- to give him any requested information or documents in relation 
to the case. Cases for exception are when there are duly substantiated on grounds 
for secrecy, without prejudice to the duty of the ombudsman 's professional 
secrecy. The Member States has to make available any information at the 
demand of the ombudsman that he considers to be necessary. Exception is 
when such information is covered by rules or decrees on secrecy, or by provisions 
hindering its being communicated. Those documents, which are classed as 
secret by law, or regulation, can be accessible only with a prior agreement. 
Other documents originating from a Member State can be accessible only after 
having informed the Member States concerned. The Office (the ombudsman and 
his staff) are required not to reveal information or documents which they obtain 
in the course of inquires. The ombudsman has more tools that he can use where 
he finds that there is an instance of maladministration. But before turning to 
these tools, he must find a solution with the body to eliminate the instance of 
maladministration, and which also will satisfy the complainant. This obligation 
prevails throughout the whole course of the proceedings. 
The Office is also trying to promote that the institutions or bodies in question 
look for an agreement directly with the complainant, and as the experience demon-
strate it is quite successful. If a settlement cannot be achieved, the ombudsman 
submits a proposal to the administrat ion-where it is adequate-for a friendly 
solution. 2 The proposal is often accepted by the institution or body although 
there is less room for this, because the institutions or bodies settle many cases 
directly, which clearly demonstrates their readiness to cooperate. We can con-
clude that 70% of the complaints are lodged against the European Commission, 
which is understandable in the light of its position as the main European organ 
that has direct relations with European citizens and inhabitants. W h e n a friendly 
solution cannot be achieved, there are other means at the ombudsman's disposal. 
The ombudsman makes critical remark where is no sensible way to redress the 
This is the la médiation in the French ombudsman system. 
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situation. The idea behind this critical remark is to state an established instance 
of maladministration and seek to avoid a repetition in the future.3 4 
There are cases where the ombudsman comes to the conclusion that there 
was no apparent maladministration. However, it would be desirable that the 
administration improves its behaviour in the future, and in such cases, at the 
end of the case he submits his suggestion to the administration. 
When there is an instance of maladministration that can still be treated, 
the ombudsman informs the administrative institution or body, and makes 
proposals. The latter are called draft recommendations. The ombudsman is 
entitled to publicly submit a special report to the European Parliament, and asks 
to use its political power to undo the instance of maladministration when the 
institution or body concerned does not accept the draft recommendation within 
three months, or does not find an adequate way of undoing the maladministra-
tion. According to Article 195 (1) of the "Treaty establishing the European 
Community" and Article 3 (8) of the "Statute of the European Ombudsman", the 
ombudsman publishes annual reports in relation to his work. In the frame of 
the annual reports he has the opportunity to make more general comments, and 
can give positive guidance in connection with the good administration. 
3.4. The main areas of the ombudsman's activity 
The proceeding of the Office of the European Ombudsman, as an independent 
and impartial institution, has the following key areas: 
- safeguarding fundamental rights; 
- ensuring an open and accountable administration; 
- improving the service the institution provide; 
- guaranteeing respect for the rule of law; 
- and protecting staff rights in the institutions. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been adopted on the European Parlia-
ment summit in Nice, and later the European Parliament, the European 
Committee, and the European Council published it in a common Statement. 
According to the Charter, with the formulation of the rights in 50 Articles, the 
European Union intended to strengthen its commitments toward the human 
rights, and outlined its general human rights policy. This was a significant step 
even when the Charter is not legally binding, and gives only a guideline for the 
39
 Söderman, J.: The effectiveness of the Ombudsman in the oversight of the administra-
tive conduct of government. 7th International Ombudsman Institute Conference, South 
Africa, 30 October 3-November, 2000. 2. 
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legislation and the application. "1 The ombudsman promotes the respect of the 
Charter on the area of fundamental rights. The Charter includes the right to good 
administration41 and to determine this exactly, the ombudsman designed the 
Code of good administrative behaviour. In the Code he formulates what citizen 
can expect from the European administration, and gives a guideline to the 
public servants for their proceeding.42 Those officials, who follow the Code, 
can be certain of avoiding the case of maladministration. 
The duty of the European institutions is to protect and to p romote the 
principal of transparency. As the Treaty formulates, decisions are taken as openly 
as possible.43 One determining motive of the realization of transparency and 
openness is to ensure a broader possibility of people 's access to documents. 
The ombudsman made inquires in connection with the access to documents, 
and as a result nearly all of the European institutes and bodies adopted and 
published the rules of access to documents. 
Citizens have the right to expect an appropriate functioning of admini-
stration. The work of the ombudsman contributed in a great extent to the 
improvement of services offered, as for example by the use of language where 
citizen can write on their own language to the institutions or bodies of the 
European Union, and can expect an answer on the same language, or by the 
decisions taken by off ic ia ls citizens can ask for their justifications. Rule of 
law belongs to the principle of the Union, and during his work the ombudsman 
called the European Commiss ion ' s attention to the infringement of the 
community law, and in this way he contributed to the respect of the acquis 
communitaire. The ombudsman made inquires in cases where the community 
officials lodged complaints against their employer. The complaints encom-
passed a wide area, for example he proceeded in cases of unfair dismissal, or 
social security coverage, and he successfully solved many disputes. 
J
" Rácz, A.: Az Európai Unió alkotmányos berendezkedése |Thc constitutional system 
of the European Union], Állam- és Jogtudomány, 45 (2004) 244. 
41
 Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
4
" The idea of a Code was first proposed by Roy Perry, Member of the European 
Parliament in 1998. The European Ombudsman drafted the text, following an own-
initiative inquiry and presented it to the European Parliament as a special report. The 
Parliament' resolution on the Code is based on the Ombudsman's proposal, with some 
changes introduced by Mr. Perry as rapporteur for the Committee on Petition of the 
European Parliament. 
43
 "This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an even closer union 
among peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely 
as possible to the citizen." Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union. 
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3.5. The Committee on Petition and the Ombudsman 
The Maastricht Treaty raised the right to complain to the European Ombuds-
man at community level and parallel to this the right to petition. The latter 
competence was mentioned in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (Chapter of the Rules of Assembly), and f r o m 1981 in the 
Statute of the European Parliament. Following this it was created formally in 
the Maastricht Treaty, as a European citizen's right. A significant difference 
between the two non-judicial fo rums is that with petition that relates to a 
proceeding at community level the citizens can turn with every case to the 
European Parliament. Instead of this, the ombudsman concentrates expressly 
onto the work of Community institutions and bodies-except ion is the work 
of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the ombudsman has no possibility to supervise the authorities of the 
Member States, but the right to petition touch upon this too. Example for the 
cooperative relation between the two institutions is that the Committee on 
Petition hands over the complaints to the ombudsman when the petition con-
cerns only the maladministration of the offices of community institutions and 
bodies . The handling over of such complaints must have the assent of the 
complainant. In the case the complaints in the ombudsman's office can be 
regarded as petition, thus can be given to the European Parliament. The filing 
of complaints of the Committee of Petition concerns the application of community 
law of the Member States' o f f i ce s and in these cases the Commit tee sends 
the petition to the European Committee to get an opinion, where the latter 
registers it usually under Article 169. 
Conclus ion 
Citizens of Member States of the European Union can realize since the estab-
lishment of the European Ombudsman Office, that the Union does not intend 
to be seen as the set of bureaucratic institutions. The Union believes that it is 
important for European citizens to have the opportunity to turn to a body with 
their likely or presumed offence in connection with the European institutions' 
work. It is also important, that the citizens already have certain experience of 
the working potential of this body at national level, which strengthens the 
trust towards this kind of o f f i ce on the area of the European Union. The 
success of the national ombudsmen offices predicted the guarantee of serving as an 
effect ive mean in relation to the legal functioning of the extremely expanded 
European administrative procedures. Working together with national ombuds-
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men in an even closer way can improve the service provided by the institution. 
Regarding the future of the Union, in the Draft Constitution of the European 
Union the European Ombudsman has been ment ioned under two titles in 
Part 1: under Title II of fundamental rights and cit izenship, where the rights 
in reference to European citizenship are listed,44 and under Title VI on the 
democratic life of the Union, where it stresses that the ombudsman shall be 
elected and not chosen by the European Parliament.45 According to these, the 
ombudsman constitutes the link between the Union's commitments to human 
and fundamental rights and its democratic commitments and aspirations.4'1 
Moreover, because the establishment of the institution can be connected 
to the idea of the European citizenship, it represents a new form of unity for 
the Union. The Off ice can play a role in the demonstration of the benefi ts of 
the European citizenship towards the citizens of the Member States, in the 
intensification of the relation between Europeans and the Union, and in the 
insistence on Europeanism. Furthermore, in this relation it can be expected 
giving a realistic picture from the role of the institute in the realization of the 
idea of the "Union's citizens", as this would play a role in "holding together and 
keeping" together in the integrating Europe. The European institutes concerned 
with ci t izen 's complaint refused only in small instances the recommendation 
of the ombudsman. This shows its increasing importance, wherebythe institute 
occupies its proper place in the system of the European Union. However there 
is still where to develop, there is the task to inform an even wider circle of 
citizens, and to enhance the citizen-friendly administration. 
44
 By virtue of Article I-10 (d): "The right to petition the European Parliament, to apply 
to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the 
Union in any of the Constitution's languages and to obtain a reply in the same language." 
4
~ By virtue of Article 1-49: "The European Ombudsman elected by the European 
Parliament shall receive, examine and report on complaints about maladministration in the 
activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies, under the conditions laid 
down in the Constitution. The European Ombudsman shall be completely independent in 
the performance of his or her duties." 
4
'' Diamandouros, N.: The European Ombudsman and the European Constitution. 
Speech given on the 34lh Session of Asser Colloquium on European Law on 'The EU 
Constitution: Best way Forward?' The Hague, 15 October 2004. 5. 
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Introduction 
This paper purports to review the system of the protection of rights provided 
by the Hungarian Constitution, with the aim of taking into account historical 
and theoretical considerations, as well as the practice of the Constitutional 
Court (hereinafter: CC), with special regard to the role of Article 8 paragraph 
(1) in constitutional protection. Article 8 states: (1) The Republic of Hungary 
recognizes inviolable and inalienable fundamental human rights. The respect 
and protection of these rights is a primary obligation of the State. (2) In the 
Republic of Hungary regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and duties 
are determined by law; such law, however, may not restrict the essential 
contents of fundamental rights. (3) repealed (4) During a state of national 
crisis, state of emergency or state of danger, the exercise of fundamental rights 
may be suspended or restricted, with the exception of the fundamental rights 
specified in Articles 54-56, Article 57 paragraphs (2)-(4), Article 60, Articles 
66 -69 and Article 70/E. 
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What lends special importance to the issue is the fact that, pressed by the 
need to interpret specific constitutional decrees, theoreticians and practitioners 
of the field seldom have the opportunity to stop to meditate the all-important 
text, through which the constituents have set the framework for further decisions. 
The item-by-item analysis of the terms of this paragraph gives an overview of 
the constitutional foundations of the Hungarian system of fundamental rights 
protection. 
1. The history of the provision 
The preamble to Act I of 1946, which declared Hungary's new form of 
government, contained the first at tempt at defining human rights standards in a 
way in which Article 8 of the Constitution does.1 It stated that it is the 
Hungarian Republic that guarantees the natural and inalienable r ights of all its 
citizens. The rights themselves appeared in the fo rm of a list of examples. It 
also contained a clause of universal equality stipulating that rights apply equally 
to everyone. This provision also guaranteed that no citizen may be deprived of 
his or her rights without due legal procedure. The so-called "minor constitution" 
did not, however, take full effect. History, however, hindered his statute, also 
known as "the minor constitution," f rom taking full effect. The period between 
1946 and 1949, with the liquidation of political parties, with unfair elections that 
were forced on the population etc. obliterated the democratic initiatives. Act 
XX of 1949, the present Constitution of Hungary, did not provide for the 
protection of human rights. Constitutional orders related to human rights first 
appeared, as a declaration, in the Constitution with the constitutional reform of 
1972. This, however, did not result in any significant improvement in the field 
1
 "The republic ensures for its citizens the natural and inalienable rights of mankind, 
for the Hungarian nation the regulated cooperation and the peaceful living. 
The natural and inalienable rights of citizens: personal freedom, right to life without 
oppression, fear and deprivation, freedom of expression of thoughts and opinion, free 
exercise of religion, right to assembly, right to ownership, right to personal security, right 
to work and human standards of living, right to education and right to participation in the 
control of the life of the state and the municipalities. 
No citizen may be deprived from these rights without due procedure, and the 
Hungarian State ensures these rights to each citizens without discrimination, within the 
confines of the democratic state order, equally and uniformly." 
Cf. Sólyom, L.: Az Alkotmány emberi jogi generálklauzulájához vezető út [The road 
to the general human rights clause of the Constitution], lustum, aequum, salutare 1 (2005) 
28-49, especially 28. 
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of fundamental rights protection, since the party-state did not attend to human 
rights any more than in the preceding years. Noteworthy change only arrived 
with the democratic revolution of 1989. It was then that the legal system for 
the protection of fundamental rights was established, and not merely as a 
declaration, but as an actual safeguard, with institutional foundations, guaranteed 
by the state, for every individual to exercise his or her rights, as regulated by 
the provisions of the Constitution.2 
On 26. April 1972 the following rule was incorporated into the text of the 
Constitution: 
Article 54 (1) The Peoples Republic of Hungary respects human rights. (2) 
In the Peoples Republic of Hungary citizens' rights shall be exercised in 
accordance with the interests of the socialist society; the exercise of rights is 
inseparable from the fulfilment of ci t izens ' duties. (3) In the Peoples Republic 
of Hungary regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and duties of citizens 
are determined by laws. 
The amendment restates the same rights that were once described as the 
rights of the workers1 as the rights of all citizens.4 It also states, generally, that 
the People 's Republic of Hungary respects human rights. This version, in many 
respects, already conforms to the standards of the protection of rights in 
democratic countries, but the lack of will to implement, and the shortage of 
institutional background made it impossible for these regulations to take full 
effect. Moreover, the declarations themselves were part and parcel of the 
socialist system of the Kádár-era: exercising rights was inseparable f rom the 
fulfi lment of obligations, and rights could only be exercised in harmony with 
the interests of the "socialist society." Which means that rights were condi-
tional: they were rights exclusively for those who complied with their duties. 
In the original, 1949 text of the Constitution, the general rules can be 
found, importantly, under the heading of "rights and obligations of the citi-
zens," whereas the 1972 amendment of the constitution already talks about the 
fundamental rights and obligations of the citizens. It even uses the phrase 
'human rights' . The change in terminology did not, however, imply a veritable 
2
 On the history of human and citizens' rights in Hungary see: Sári, J.: Alapjogok. 
Alkotmánytan II. [Fundamental Rights, Constitutional Law II.]. Budapest, 2006. 25-27. 
1
 Some claim that "workers" here implies a broader category than that of "citizens." 
Cf. Sólyom: Az Alkotmány emberi jogi generálklauzulájához vezető út. op. cit. 40. 
4
 According to the official explanation, the original distinction lost its function, since 
with the hegemony of socialist methods of production, the annihilation of oppressive social 
classes was complete. 
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attempt, on the part of the leaders of the country, at enforcing human rights.5 
The Constitution remained one of those declarations that were never seriously 
meant to be implemented. The claim that rights can only be exercised as long 
as they are in harmony with the interests of socialist society amounted to a 
general restriction of rights. 
Through the democratic transformation of 1989, when the need to respect 
and protect human rights was accentuated, the legislator created the legal 
foundations for the protection of human rights in Hungary. The paragraph of 
Act XXXI of 1989, which provided for the fundamental rights in general, was 
placed at the beginning of the normative text. 
Article 8 ( 1 ) The Republic of Hungary recognizes inviolable and inalienable 
fundamental human rights. The respect and protection of these rights is a 
primary obligation of the State. (2) Regulations pertaining to fundamental rights 
and duties are determined by acts of constitutional force. (3) The exercise of 
fundamental rights may only be restricted by acts of constitutional force, if 
such restriction is necessary for the security of the state, public policy, public 
security, public health, public order or the protection of the fundamental rights 
or liberties of others . (4) During a state of national crisis, state of emergency or 
state of danger, the exercise of fundamental rights may be suspended or 
restricted, with the exception of the fundamental rights specified in Articles 5 4 -
56, Article 57 paragraphs (2)-(4), Article 60, Art icles 66-69 and Article 70/E. 
According to the ministerial explanation to the law, it emerged, while the 
amendment was in preparation, as a possibility that the acceptance of human 
rights as fundamental values might be expressed through structural changes to 
the Constitution (following the German example, the first part of the Constitu-
tion might have been devoted to the fundamental rights), but finally they 
decided that the urge of democrat ic transformation does not leave time for 
the restructuring.6 The problem that stems f rom the provisory nature of the 
Cf. Takács, I.: Az emberi jogok garanciái [The guarantees of human rights]. In: 
Katonáné Soltész, M. (ed.): Emberi jogok Hazánkban [Human rights in Hungary], Buda-
pest, 1988. 51. 
6
 Cf. Bozóki, A. (et. al.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve alkotmányos forradalom 
[The script of tbc democratic transformation. Constitutional revolution]. Budapest, 2000. 
vol. 7: Farkas, Ci.: A magyar köztársaság alkotmányi szintű alapjogi és alapjogvédelmi 
rendszerének születése [The birth of the Hungarian system of fundamental rights and their 
protection in the Republic of Hungary], Pécs, 2006; Kulcsár, К.: Koncepció az Alkotmány 
felülvizsgálatáról | Proposal for the supervision of the Constitution]. Budapest, 1991; 
Kilényi G. (ed.): Egy alkotmányelőkészítés dokumentumai. Kísérlet Magyarország új 
alkotmányának megalkotására (The preparatory documents of the Constitution. An attempt 
at creating the new Constitution of Hungary]. Budapest, 1991; Sükösd, F.: Az emberi és 
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Constitution is that Article 8 is not regulated together with other fundamental 
rights, which are regulated in chapter XII. The constituent declared, among the 
general provisions, that the Republic of Hungary recognises the inviolable and 
inalienable human rights; it is a primary duty of the state to respect and protect 
them. The role of the regulation in the protection of fundamental rights is, never-
theless, clear: the CC has provided the bases for its interpretation by defining 
the way in which the regulation should affect the protection of fundamental 
rights. 
An important constitutional safeguard of the fundamental r ights and 
obligations is that the relevant rules could only be modif ied by the unanimous 
vote of the two-third of the MPs; in so-called acts of constitutional force.7 The 
legislator purposed, in harmony with international treaties, to ensure that the 
fundamental rights be limited according to a very strict protocol. The amend-
ment to the constitution specified the fundamental rights that could not be 
limited even under extraordinary circumstances. 
The rule, however, which stipulated that fundamental rights be regulated 
only through laws of constitutional force, made governing difficult, since the 
Antall administration (the first democratically elected government af ter the 
transformation), did not possess a two- th i rd majority in parliament. This state 
of affairs stemmed basically from decision 4/1990 (III. 4) of the CC, which 
made it a constitutional expectation that all rules related to fundamental rights 
and obligations be only defined by laws of constitutional force. When political 
consensus did arise, the further criteria of limitation could easily be satisfied, 
since the introduction of notions such as "public morals ," "public o rde r" etc. 
left, in principle, ample opportunities for the limitation of fundamental rights. 
The task of the CC under such conditions would largely have been restricted to 
examining whether qualified two-thirds majority is necessary for the given 
decision. Some early decisions of the CC indeed show such a tendency. The 
CC did not undertake the interpretation of the notions listed in the Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, it did state, for instance, that the modification of fami ly law 
has-on the basis of the articles of the Constitution pertaining to marriage and 
the protection of the fami ly- to take the form of a law of constitutional force 
[CC decision 4/1990. (III. 4), CCD 1990. 28.]. The first "interest-tax" law 
decision had to be regulated through a law of constitutional force due to the 
general and proportionate sharing of taxation [CC decision 5/1990 (IV. 9), 
állampolgári jogok, valamint az alapvető kötelességek [Human and citizens' rights, and the 
fundamental duties]. In: Kilényi, G. (ed.): Alkotmányjogi füzetek 2. Budapest, 1989. 
7
 Article 10 paragraph (3) of Act XXXI of 1989, on the amendment to the Constitution. 
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C C D 1990. 32, 35].8 The political difficulties resulted in an amendment to the 
Constitution which annulled the category of a law of constitutional force; the 
Constitution, thenceforth, only prescribes that the two-third majority of the 
M P s present (not all of them, that is) have to pronounce a uniform opinion, and 
even that only in cases, which are seen as politically sensitive." 
After the first democratic elections, the need to modify the text of the 
Constitution that came into p o w e r with Act XXXI of 1989 was swift to 
emerge.1" Article 8 of the Constitution was also affected by the introduction-in 
accordance with German pract ice-of the concept of "the essential content of 
fundamental r ights" ( Wesensgehalt) to replace earlier rules of limitation. This 
meant that the limitation of fundamental rights, which the law made possible, 
should not affect the essential content of the given fundamental right. This step 
did not, however, invalidate the earlier rule, s ince the list of reasons of the 
limitation of r ights does not speci fy the extent to which the limitation is 
constitutional. Unlike the ear l ier version, the new normative text does not 
indicate when it is possible to limit fundamental rights; it only specifies the 
maximum of the limitation. This is probably the reason why it was so difficult 
to get the notion of "the essential content of fundamental r ights" accepted in 
Parliament." 
Article 8 of the Constitution was put into e f fec t by Act X L of 1990 on the 
amendment of the Constitution. There are, thus, vital differences between the 
current normative text and its 1989 precedent. The relaxation of the formal 
criteria related to the regulation of fundamental rights undeniably makes 
governing more effective. It is important to accentuate, nonetheless, that the 
change in the content of constitutionality was more significant than that,12 and 
the most important element of that change is the incorporation of the idea of 
s
 Balogh. Zs. et al.: Az Alkotmány magyarázata [The explanation of the Constitution], 
Budapest. 2003. 
' For the details see: Sólyom: Az Alkotmány emberi jogi generálklauzulájához vezető 
út. op. cit. 48. Even with regard to the limitation of fundamental rights, it was agreed that 
they would return to the concept of limitation defined by the Roundtable discussions, 
which was significantly different f rom the one later accepted by the Parliament. 
10
 Concerning the amendments to and the new concept of the Constitution, see: 
Kukorelli, I.: Alkotmánytan I. [Constitutional law I.]. Budapest, 2007. 70-73 . 
11
 See the official minutes of the 18. June 1990 session of the Parliament, and Balogh 
et al.: op. cit. 206-210; also Halmai, G.-Tóth, G. A.: Emberi jogok [Human rights], Buda-
pest, 2003. 125. 
12
 Tóth, G. A.: Az eljárási alkotmányosság tartalma [The content of procedural consti-
tutionality], Fundamentum 3 (2004) 5 - 3 3 . 
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"essential content" into Article 8 paragraph (2), and the annulment of the list 
of reasons for limitation.13 
2. Institutional protection of fundamental rights 
Article 8 paragraph (1) is the foundation of the protection of fundamental 
rights. The most essential element of the paragraph is that the Republic of 
Hungary recognises the fundamental human rights: the Constitution declares, 
thus, that these rights exist independent of the Constitution. More than merely 
recognising these rights, the State respects them, and places them under its 
active protection, qualitatively transforming them thereby, through guarantees 
of the State. This legal concept is in harmony with international and European 
human rights standards.14 Right hereby means that the State is specifically 
obliged to justify any departure from guaranteeing these entitlements. '7 
Fundamental rights can, therefore, be defined as that group of rights, which 
the national constitutions and international treaties recognise as such, and which 
thus form part of statutory law."' The safeguarding of fundamental rights consists, 
in the case of written constitutions, of two phases: the fundamental rights have 
to be incorporated into the text of the Constitution, and an effective institu-
tional f ramework has to be provided for. Modern constitutions, therefore, do 
not merely declare the fundamental rights, but ensure the means of their 
protection.'7 The Hungarian Constitution includes fundamental rights, more 
specifically basic rights and constitutional rights, obligations, constitutional 
values and objectives. Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution contains the 
general rules related to fundamental rights and obligations. This provision is 
the underpinning of the protection of fundamental rights in Hungary, since all 
further legal definitions have to be seen in unity with the contents of this 
paragraph. This rule led to the interpretation of the Constitution by the CC, 
which is basic-right-centred and protective of fundamental rights in outlook. 
13
 Sólyom: Az Alkotmány emberi jogi generálklauzulájához vezető út. op. cit. 44. 
14
 Klein, E.: Az alapjogok meghatározása az alkotmányban [The definition of funda-
mental rights in the Constitution], In: Ádám A. (ed.): Alkotmányfejlődés és jogállami gya-
korlat [The development of the Constitution and constitutional practice], Budapest, 1994. 67. 
18
 Dworkin, R.: Taking Rights Seriously. London, 1984. 191. Quoted by András Sajó. 
Sajó, A.: Az „emberi jogok" jogi haszontalanságairől és lehetetlenségeiről [Of the legal 
uselessness and impossibility of "human rights"]. Világosság 31 (1990) 578. 
16
 Cf. Halmai-Tóth: Emberi jogok. op. cit. 28-29. 
17
 Pikler, К: A burzsoá alkotmánybíráskodás [Bourgeois constitutional practice]. Buda-
pest, 1965. 212-213. 
384 FRUZSINA GÁRDOS-OROSZ 
Fundamental rights are enforceable, and although originally one could only 
demand enforcement vis-à-vis the State, by now there is an increasing demand 
to render fundamental rights enforceable in certain horizontal legal relationships 
pertaining to private law.18 Fundamental rights do not usually mean boundless 
rights, or liberties. The majori ty of rights can be limited, with the criteria of 
limitation f ixed by the text of the constitution or/and the principles that have 
been propounded in the legal practice of the constitutional court. The content 
of human rights, protected by the State, can only be understood by examining 
fundamental rights, as codified in the constitution, together with the possibilities 
for their limitation. 
One of the cardinal points as well as novelty of the system of human rights 
protection that arose in the years following World War II, and which Hungary 
adopted in the course of the democratic transformation, was that rights became 
gradually enforceable. Let us look at the origins of this development. Already 
in 1803 the Constitutional Court of the United States declared that regular 
courts do not have to apply unconstitutional laws.'" In Europe, however, in 
accordance with the Kelsen-model, constitutional courts, as distinct from regular 
courts, only emerged in 1920, and in most countries, only after 1945.20  
Specifically and primarily human rights protection, enforceable by the court, 
and jointly European, only came into being in 1950, with the establishment of 
the European Court and Committee of Human Rights. In Hungary the first body 
to protect the constitution was set up on 2. January 1990. Although from 1984 
there had been a Committee on Constitutionality surveying the constitutionality 
of legal regulations and legal directives, which was elected by the Parliament, 
and had the power to suspend the execution of unconstitutional provisions; it 
did not, however, amount to a real constitutional control over legal regulations, 
since the political aims of the party-state had paramount influence. The right to 
suspend execution did not extend to legal regulations codified by the 
Parliament or the Presidential Council of the Peoples' Republic; neither did it 
affect the principles of the Supreme Court or its theoretical decisions. The 
body made decisions in a limited number of cases, and its decisions were not 
legally binding.21 
1K
 See Sajó, A-Uitz. R.: The constitution in private relations. Maastricht, 2006. 
19
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. 
20
 The first famous constitutional court was established in Austria, the operation of 
which was suspended between 1934-1945. 
Bihari, M.: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás [Constitutional transformation]. Minden-
tudás Egyeteme, VI. szemeszter, 13. előadás |University of Omniscience VI. lecture 13.], 
2005. április 25. http://origo.hu/attached/20050430bihari0.rtf 
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The interpretation of Article 8 of the Constitution was elaborated in the first 
years of the CC,22 and has remained essentially unchanged since then.2 ' This is 
largely due to the model of western democracies and international treaties that 
the body could build on in its defence of the constitution. With the end of the 
socialist era the new democracies could take advantage of the legitimate practice 
of constitutional courts in other countries, as well as of the interpretative 
traditions of specific regulations in the courts of Western-Europe and the United 
States. The CC relied primarily on the accumulated experience of the German 
BVer fGE, because it found the arguments of this court the most satisfactory 
in interpreting the text of the Constitution. Although there are a number of 
unexpected parallels between the decisions of the German and the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, and their respective justifications, there is no reason to 
impute this to direct copying of the foreign practice. The CC usually tried to 
adapt the lessons it learned from other courts to the Hungarian situation and to 
the traditions of the history of constitutionality in Hungary. Its intention was to 
create a coherent system, which, by clarifying the content of the normative 
text, creates a firm background for the protection of fundamental rights. 
The CC relied on international traditions of human rights jurisdiction in 
establishing the national framework for the protection of fundamental rights. 
Human rights norms worldwide and in the EU, together with the precedents in 
the practice of the courts define the minimal standards that every member has 
to comply with in the field of the national protection of human rights. The 
work of the Hungarian CC is most heavily effected, besides the German (and 
in some cases American) example, by the ECHR; this tendency can be seen in 
the chapters of this commentary covering the fundamental rights.24 
22
 There were a number of sceptics among the experts, who did not give much credit to 
the C C ' s development of fundamental rights. Béla Pokol believed, for instance, that 
fundamental rights are dynamites that are bound to cause harm eventually. "Activism, 
therefore, is harmful-not only to the legal system and to parliamentary democracy-but to 
the institution of constitutional jurisdiction itself." Pokol, В.: Pénz és politika [Money and 
politics], Budapest, 1993. 115. 
23
 László Sólyom claimed already in 1997 that the CC has established the framework 
of interpretation, and has made the fundamental decisions. Sólyom Lászlóval Tóth Gábor 
Attila beszélget [Discussion between László Sólyom and Gábor Attila Tóth). In: Halmai, G. 
(ed.): A Megtalált Alkotmány? A magyar alapjogi bíráskodás első kilenc éve [Constitution 
found? The first nine years of constitutional jurisdiction in Hungary]. Budapest, 2000. 390. 
~
4
 The situation is similar in most countries that are experiencing or have recently 
experienced the democratic transformation. Cf. The protection of fundamental rights by the 
constitutional court. Strasbourg, 1996. 
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The CC consequently defines itself and its responsibilities regarding the 
protection of fundamental rights: 
„The Constitutional Court shall continue to state in its decisions the origins 
of the Constitution and the rights contained therein. These decisions shall form 
a coherent system, which-as an "invisible consti tut ion"-serves as the standard 
of constitutionality, in a regime where the constitution is often amended due to 
daily political interests. 
This could help to prevent contradiction with the probable new constitution 
or future constitutions. The Constitutional Court is free in this as long as it 
remains within the boundaries of constitutionality." [23/1990 (X. 31) 99.25] 
2.1 "Fundamental Human Rights" 
The beginnings of modern constitutionality are marked by British acts and 
declarations regarding fundamental rights-the Petition of Rights (1628), the 
Habeas Corpus Act (1679) and the Bill of Rights (1689)-, together with the 
Declaration of Rights issued by the Philadelphián Congress in 1774, and the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776).26 These declarations reformulated 
basic principles as human rights, without, however, endowing them with the 
enforceability which characterises legal norms; these were, nevertheless, to 
fo rm the bases of modern catalogues of fundamental rights, and the very 
concept of fundamenta l rights.27 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
Some experts warn that the CC. in enforcing the invisible constitution, often 
transgresses its constitutionally prescribed domain, and endows certain fundamental 
rights with content that can hardy be justified on the basis of the text of the Constitution. 
Sajó , A.: A „láthatatlan alkotmány" apróbctüi: A magyar Alkotmánybíróság első ezerkét-
száz napja [Deciphering the "invisible constitution:" the first 1200 days of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court]. Állam- és Jogtudomány 35 (1993) 51. Béla Pokol also saw the CC as 
diverging from the text of the Constitution. According to him the breach set in with 
decision 8/1990, where the CC founded its case on the general practice of modern consti-
tutional jurisdiction, even though the German example was followed by none of the 
traditional democracies. Pokol. В.: A törvényhozás alkotmányossága [The constitutionality 
of legislation). Világosság 34 (1993) 42^43. 
Ádám. A.: Az alapjogokra vonatkozó alkotmányi rendelkezések továbbfejlesztésé-
nek lehetőségei [Possible directions in the further development of the constitutional 
provisions on fundamnetal rights]. In: Ádám: Alkotmányfejlődés és jogállami gyakorlat, 
op. cit. 9; and Péteri, Z.: Az emberi jogok a történelemben [The history of human rights]. 
In: Katonáné Soltész: Emberi jogok hazánkban, op. cit. 21. 
~
7
 "Wc hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are insti-
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the Citizen a p p r o v e d on 28. A u g u s t 1789 by the Na t iona l A s s e m b l y of F rance , 
t r ea ted in its 17 ar t ic les of " t h e na tu ra l , una l i enab l e , and sac red r i gh t s of m a n . " 
T h i s d o c u m e n t w a s i ssued " in o r d e r that the g r i e v a n c e s of t h e c i t i zens , b a s e d 
hereaf te r u p o n s imple and incontes tab le pr inciples , shall tend to the m a i n t e n a n c e 
of the cons t i t u t i on and r e d o u n d to the h a p p i n e s s of al l ."2 8 B y t h e 20 th cen tu ry 
al l cons t i t u t i ona l d e m o c r a c i e s p r o v i d e fo r the p ro t ec t i on of f u n d a m e n t a l r ights . 
Ar t ic le 8 of the Cons t i t u t i on r e c o g n i s e s the f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n r ights . It 
c l a i m s , t hus , t ha t there a re c e r t a i n f u n d a m e n t a l r ights 2 4 tha t e v e r y h u m a n 
b e i n g , f r o m the m o m e n t it is b o r n , m e r e l y by v i r tue of be ing h u m a n is en t i t led 
to.3" A c c o r d i n g to the c lass ica l f o r m u l a t i o n : " H u m a n d ign i t y? T h i s e x p r e s s i o n 
is m e a n i n g l e s s if it does not r e f l e c t that b a s e d on natural l aw all m e n has t h e 
r ight to be r e spec t ed , to be the s u b j e c t of r igh ts , to have r igh ts . T h e s e are the 
r igh t s that m e n are ent i t led to b e c a u s e they a re m e n . " 3 1 
tuted among Men" United States Declaration of Independence. The legal positivists 
believe, on the contrary, that "right is the child of law", and is not derived from natural 
laws. Bentham, J.: Anarchical Fallacies. Edinburgh. 501. Quoted in Sajó, A.: Az önkor-
látozó hatalom [The self-limitation of power], Budapest, 1995. 325. 
28
 Ádám: Alkotmányfejlődés és jogállami gyakorlat, op. cit. 10. 
29
 The Constitution thus aligns itself with the theory of Ronald Dworkin. Ele argues that 
the moral rights transformed in a constitution into fundamental rights, which flow from the 
idea of human dignity and equality, are superior. Consequently, no government can refuse 
them to anyone. Dworkin, R.: Taking rights seriously. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977. xi; 
See also: Halmai-Tóth: Emberi jogok. op. cit. 51. This right is furter strengthened by the 
fact that the Constitution makes the protection of the fundamnetal rights into a primary 
obligation of the state. 
311
 Of the origins and development of human rights in the twentieth century, see e.g.: 
Takács, P: Emberi jogok [Human rights]. In: Szabó, M. (ed.): Jogbölcseleti előadások 
[Lectures on the philosophy of right]. Miskolc, 1998. 
31
 Maritain, J.: The rights of man. London, 1944. 37. quoted in Sajó: Az önkorlátozó 
hatalom, op. cit. 324. This is sharply opposed by the positivist concept of rights, according 
to which it is the state which gives rights to people, and in certain cases, to citizens. András 
Bagyova proposed that both theories are well-founded, and can even be harmonised. It is 
exactly this harmony that ensures the proper functioning of the state in the sphere of the 
fundamental rights. Human rights, consequently, can truly be seen as existing a priori, and 
due to human beings by the sheer virtue of being human. It is up to the state to decide the 
methods of enforcing the individual human rights. The Hungarian state undertook to 
respect and protect fundamental human rights. The category of fundamental rights is, 
however a legal category, the content of which it is the task of the state to determine. 
Bragyova, A.: Az. új alkotmány egy koncepciója [A concept of the new constitution]. 
Budapest, 2005. 58. 
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B o t h theoret ical c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' " a n d in t e rna t iona l legal p rac t i ce j u s t i f y 
such an in te rpre ta t ion o f f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s . " J u d g e L á s z l ó S ó l y o m , the f i rs t 
P re s iden t o f the H u n g a r i a n CC, f o r m e d at the end o f t he 20 , h c en tu ry , be l i eves 
that, l i m i t e d in its a c t i v i t y by the t e x t of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , the C C did not 
s u b s c r i b e to any m a j o r theore t ica l t r e n d in e s t a b l i s h i n g its p rac t i ce of the 
pro tec t ion of f u n d a m e n t a l r ights, itself desc r ibed as v a l u e - c e n t r e d and e labora ted 
in c o n n e c t i o n with the ind iv idua l r i gh t s . T h e C C a v o i d e d bas ing the a r g u m e n t 
pure ly o n natural a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , or to o b j e c t i v e va lues . 3 4 A r t i c l e 7 
p a r a g r a p h ( 1 ) of the C o n s t i t u t i o n d e c l a r e s that H u n g a r i a n law c o n f o r m s to the 
c o u n t r y ' s obl igat ions r e su l t ing f rom internat ional t reat ies ; this does not, h o w e v e r , 
imply tha t it is i n t e r n a t i o n a l law tha t m a k e s the p r o t e c t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l 
r ights l e g i t i m a t e a c c o r d i n g to H u n g a r i a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
32
 Sólyom argues that the CC, instead of the system of values represented by the 
constitution, has elaborated legal concepts. Instead of ideologies or natural rights 
principles, it has adopted a limited form of constitutional positivism. "Legal security 
matters more than justice, which is always partial and subjective." [CC decision 11/1992. 
(II. 5), CCD 1992. 77, 82]. In a given historical context-in Sólyom's appraisal-"a neutral 
and objective standard has the power to create stability." Sólyom, L.: Az emberi jogok az 
Alkotmánybíróság újabb gyakorlatában [Human rights in the recent practice of the 
Constitutional Court], Világosság 34 (1993) 16. 
33
 Bragyova, A.: Alapozhatók-e az emberi jogok a nemzetközi jogra? Avagy pótol-
hatja-e a nemzetközi jog a természetjogot? [Is international law the proper foundation of 
human rights? Can international law replace natural law?] Állam- és Jogtudomány 32 
(1990) 94. 
14
 "The prime objective of the CC was to develop the Constitution into a coherent 
system, which requires a basic principle that ensures the coherence. It can be debated 
whether this is a moral principle. The CC has never stated that the supreme law presupposes 
a system of moral values. W e wanted to avoid the German example, which-especially up 
until the mid-60s-usually referred to the system of values embodied by the constitution and 
its foundations in natural rights. There was no way to justify this on the basis of the 
Constitution, either in its history or in its present state. We have continually emphasised 
that the Constitution, especially since the 1990 modification, which extirpated all 
ideological references, is a neutral legal text. It is perfectly clear, nonetheless, that human 
rights are the legal equivalents of moral categories. The CC has elaborated the 'moral 
content' and 'moral reading' (in Dworkin's words) of the fundamental rights individually, 
according to the nature of the given fundamental right. There was no need, therefore, to 
refer to such abstractions as a 'constitutional system of values'. Moreover, this amounted 
to an instrumentálisadon of moral ideas." Sólyom Lászlóval Tóth Gábor Attila beszélget. 
op. cit. 383. See further: Sólyom, L.: Alkotmányértelmezés az új alkotmánybíróságok gya-
korlatában |The i nterpretation of the constitution in the practice of the new constitutional 
courts]. Fundamentum 2 (2002) 25. 
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Usually, regulations related to fundamental rights in the Constitution can 
be described as general, as far as the wording of the contents and limitations of 
individual rights are concerned, and more specific, whenever the text of 
international treaties is adopted. The treatment of, civil, political, economic, 
cultural and social rights is homogeneous. Certain fundamental rights are 
placed as principles and national objectives among the general provisions of 
the Constitution. It is the concept of human rights, not that of the rights of the 
citizens that is accepted as a basic principle. The legal regulation of a number 
of basic rights is dependent on two-thirds majority; and it is also declared that 
no essential contents can be limited. The Constitution creates a wide range of 
institutions for the safeguarding of human rights.35 
Terminological distinctions of fundamental rights are problematic, since 
both the texts of the CC rulings and the relevant legal literature present a number 
of diverse definitions and distinctions: there is simply no consensus or generally 
accepted practice in this respect.3'' For the purposes of this commentary, based 
on the text of the Constitution, the following terminology has been applied. 
Chapter XII of the Constitution, entitled "Fundamental Rights and Obligations" 
provides for the fundamental rights and obligations, but there are other parts of 
the Constitution that also discuss fundamental rights (e.g. the right to private 
property).37 The CC applies the following categories: basic rights (e.g. the right 
to human dignity) and other constitutional rights (e.g. the freedom of contract), 
obligations (e.g. contribution to rates and taxes). The category of fundamental 
rights includes constitutional objectives (e.g. public peace and order) and values 
33
 Kardos, G.: Az új alkotmány emberi jogi fejezete [The human rights chapter of the 
new constitution), in: Ádám. A. (ed.): Alapjogok és alkotmányozás (Fundamental rights 
and the making of the constitution]. Budapest, 1996. 20. 
36
 An influential university textbook describes "fundamental rights" and "basic rights" 
as synonyms, and "constitutional rights" often turn up as further synonyms, but this usage is 
mistaken, since "every right, including civil rights, can be described as constitutional, which 
is based on the constitution, hence, those as well, which are not the constitutional versions 
of human rights (e.g. the rights of MPs)." Halmai-Tóth: Emberi jogok. op. cit. 29. 
37
 The Hungarian Constitution uses the expression "fundamental rights," where the 
European Convention on Human Rights speaks about human rights and liberties. This does 
not mean that the catalogues of rights coincide, this only underlines that certain rights set 
out in treaties have been included in the Hungarian Constitution as fundamental rights. 
Bárd, К.-Bán, T.: Az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezménye és a magyar jog [The European 
convention on human rights and Hungarian law]. Acta Humana 6 - 7 (1992) 9. 
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( e . g . the p r o t e c t i o n of the c o u n t r y , the c r e a t i o n of p r o p o r t i o n a t e tax ing) . 1 8 
A r t i c l e 8 of t he Cons t i t u t i on is t h e founda t ion o f all these " r i g h t s " . 1 9 
T h e CC, t h u s , d i f f e r en t i a t e s b e t w e e n the c a t e g o r i e s of cons t i t u t i ona l i t y , a n d 
e s t ab l i shed d i s t i n c t status, f u n c t i o n and level of p ro tec t ion f o r each of t he 
" f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s " e n u m e r a t e d in the C o n s t i t u t i o n . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights a r e 
l e s s protected a n d can more e a s i l y be l imi ted . It is the r i g h t s dec lared bas i c 
r i g h t s by the C C that en joy s t r o n g e r p ro tec t ion vis-à-vis s t a t e power . 4 0 T h e s e 
r i g h t s include t h e bas ic l iber t ies a s well . The l i be r t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l are a l s o 
l e g a l in nature , s i n c e the d e m a n d can arise that t h e state p r o t e c t t he right of t he 
3S
 Géza Kilényi uses a more detailed system including: principles, fundamental values, 
declarations, rules related to power, fundamental rights, guarantees of fundamental rights, 
other normatives included in the constitution. Kilényi, G.: Az Alkotmány egyes (alapelvi, 
alapjogi) rendelkezéseinek jogi je l lege [The legal qualities of certain provisions of the 
Constitution, in the filed of principles and fundamental rights|. Társadalmi Szemle 11 
( 1995) 40. Concerning the other legal sources of fundamental rights see: Rácz, A.: Alapvető 
jogok és jogforrások [Fundamnetal rights and legislations]. In: Petrétei. J. (ed.): Emlékkönyv 
Adóm Antal egyetemi tanár születésének 70. évfordulójára [Studies presented to professor 
Antal Ádám on his 70th birthday]. Budapest-Pécs, 2000. 181. Nóra Chronowski claims 
that the CC uses three categories: „there are fundamental rights, constitutional fundamental 
rights and constitutional rights. Fundamental civil rights usually demand no conditions to 
be fulfilled, the law pertains widely, it guarantees all possibilities for action, can be 
asserted in courts, can only be limited in accordance with Article 8 paragraph (2), and is to 
be tried by the general test (the right to free speech, freedom of conscience, personal 
liberty, the right to chose profession). Fundamental constitutional rights permit action only 
if a number of objective criteria are satisfied, they cannot be directly asserted in courts, but 
civil rights do flow from them. They are usually limited in accordance with Article 8 
paragraph (2), but extra-legal issues may be taken into consideration as well (e.g. state 
economy), the test of public interest can be used (work, profession, the right to services, 
the right to rest etc.). Constitutional rights are recognised and protected by the Constitution, 
but they are neither fundamental, nor civil rights. They are merely related to fundamental 
rights; often the two presuppose each-other. They can be limited through the use of the 
accessory test (e.g. the right to enter contracts)." Chronowski, N.: Integrálódó alkot-
mányjog [The integration of constitutional law], Budapest-Pécs, 2005. 209. 
14
 Cf. Halmai-Tóth: Emberi jogok. op. cit. 28-29. 
411
 It was in German constitutional legislation that the concept of fundamental rights 
first emerged to denote the most important human and citizens rights. The constitution of 
the German Empire (Paulskirchen-Verfassung) was the first to provide for fundamental 
rights. The constitution of 11. August 1919, the so-called Weimar Constitution examined, 
in its second part, "the fundamental rights and obligations of the Germans." The first 
chapter of the constitution declared on 23. May 1949, which was intended to be provisory, 
is entitled "Fundamental rights." Ádám, A.: Alkotmányi értékek és alkotmánybíráskodás 
[Constitutional values, constitutional jurisdiction], Budapest, 1998. 45-46 . 
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individual to enjoy this freedom, according to constitutional standards. Liberty, 
then, appears as an enforceable right. A liberty becoming a basic right turns it 
into much more than a liberty, or a nationally accepted freedom to act: in the 
case of a basic right, the state is obliged to actively create the possibility for 
exercising that liberty.41 
Constitutional objectives and values are used almost synonymously in CC 
parlance, and at times even the notion of constitutional principle emerges with 
a similar meaning attached to it.42 Objectives usually appear as abstract consti-
tutional values. Such divergent qualities are placed here as legal security, 
public peace or the principle of the separation of powers fCC decision 58/1994 
(XI. 01), CC decision 30/1992 (V. 26)].43 Constitutional objectives influence 
the limitation of fundamental rights and the constitutional surveillance of 
limitations. If the CC finds that the objective of the regulation indicated by the 
legislator can be seen as a constitutional objective, then the necessary and 
proportionate limitation can take place, in order to attain the objective. There is 
no such catalogue of the constitutional objectives as that of the rights. This is 
why it takes special precaution to establish the method apt for the assessment 
of the objectives. 
Constitutional values appear in comparison as a more specifically defined 
category in CC practice. The CC, in treating the constitutional values as 
distinct from the constitutional objectives, associates the notion of value with 
the objective side of basic rights and obligations. The defence of the nation or 
the proportionate sharing of taxation, for instance, appear on the institutional 
side as a constitutional value in CC rulings. CC ruling 47/2007, which inter-
preted the right of the President of the Republic to award decorations, declares 
that the Constitution is a system of values in itself, and it is the responsibility 
of the State to safeguard its enforcement. Fundamental rights are, in this sense, 
values as well, which have to be protected.44 All this means that fundamental 
41
 Sajó: Az önkorlátozó hatalom, op. cit. 348. 
42
 Géza Kilényi finds that in specific cases the nature of the norms is unclear. The term 
"constitutional principle" carries different meanings in different contexts. The distinction 
between principles and values is ad hoc as well [CC decision 11/1992 (III. 5.)]. Kilényi: Az 
Alkotmány egyes (alapelvi, alapjogi) rendelkezéseinek... op. cit. 41. 
43
 In the case of each second and third generational right, fundamental rights should be 
distinguished from constitutional objectives, the definitions of the purposes of the state. 
Halmai, G.: Az alkotmány mint norma [The constitution as norm]. In: Erdei, Á. (ed.): 
Második magyar jogászgyűlés [The second lawyers' convention], Budapest, 1994. 168. 
44
 Antal Ádám, for instance, is of the opinion that "fundamental rights guarantee the 
basic intellectual, moral, political interests of humans, citizens and societies, together with 
the protection of their life and health, their social services and material possibilities, and 
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rights qua values can serve as reasons for the limitation of fundamental rights 
according to the test regarding the limitation of fundamental rights introduced 
by the CC. 
CC decision 47/2007 (VII. 3) orders that „Some values, which serve as a 
basis for honours are values l isted in the Constitution or values derived from 
them. The major standard for the worthiness is the constitutional value order of 
the Republic of Hungary. The constitutional value order consists of the values 
listed in or derived from the Constitution." 
It is important to mention, nonetheless, that the system of values discussed 
in this decision is not a fiction that precedes the decisions, but a constantly 
evolving system that finds its origins in the individual rulings of the CC, in 
which the position of the given values is a function of the way in which 
constitutional cr ises are resolved. The temporary condition of the system of 
values can be reconstructed on ly after the decisions; it is not an a priori 
existent. This ruling, moreover, also suggests that the CC does not necessarily 
distinguish between the values encoded in the Constitution, and the abstract 
objectives that are merely derived from it. 
The fundamental rights encoded in the Constitution are summarily called the 
fundamental r ights catalogue. T h e fundamental rights catalogue is necessary in 
order that the legislator may not make an arbitrary decision according to its 
temporary needs concerning the range and content of fundamental rights 
regulations.4" In the Hungarian Constitution, however, it is very difficult to 
def ine the fundamental rights catalogue, since the abstract nature4 6 of Article 8 
paragraph (2) of the constitution and certain fundamental rights regulations led 
to the CC introducing new rights on the basis of already existing constitutional 
rules.47 
thus, unquestionably are among the fundamental values." Ádám. A.: Az alkotmányi érté-
kek fejlődési irányairól [The development of constitutional values]. Jura 1 (2002) 11. 
45
 Sajó: Az önkorlátozó hatalom, op. cit. 336; 319-362. 
4ft
 The text of the Constitution is nevertheless more detailed than that of certain civil 
and political rights, since it relies on the UN treaty on civil and political rights. Third 
generational rights turn up mostly as values, in the case of which it is unclear who the legal 
entity is and who the obligee, what the right is and what the obligation connected to it. 
4
 The CC does not regard the fundamental rights catalogue as a closed system. So 
much so. that through its jurisdiction it has established new constitutional rights. The 
process is partially directed at the enrichment of certain rights. An example of this was the 
C C ' s pronouncing that from general personal rights the right to the f ree development of 
personality and the personal integrity can be deduced [CC decision 74/1992 (XII. 28), CC 
decision 4/1993 (II. 12)]. The CC has also created independent fundamental rights, e.g. 
in deducing the right to a private sphere from general personality rights [CC decision 
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Everyday parlance regarding right is multifarious, the concept of funda-
mental rights, however, has a very special meaning in the Constitution.48 "Rights 
in the sense of civil, subjective rights due to every individual are basic 
categories of human intercourse and social thinking, since our rights define or 
may define our social liberties, our possibilities for action; which, in turn are 
guaranteed ultimately by the legal system-and thus the state-, which has the 
power to create and defend these possibilities."44 The separation of the clusters 
of the fundamental rights catalogue, the interpretation of their legal character, 
as regards both their original content and their limitation, is a challenge that 
faces legal practice. This is due to the fact that in the case of fundamental 
rights regulations, in defining their content and the possibilities of their limita-
tion, legal considerations are inseparable from moral , political and other 
concerns.50 
In socialist state-law there was barely an example of even mentioning funda-
mental rights without fundamental obligations.71 Rights could be exercised as 
long as obligations were fulfilled.52 This, however, changed with the 1989 
amendment to the Constitution: rights have become independent of obligations. 
20/1990 (X. 4)]. The CC has also decided that even if the right to a healthy environment 
were not present in the Constitution, it could be deduced from the right to live [CC 
decision 28/1994 (V. 20)]. The right to work, moreover, follows from the right to human 
dignity [CC decision 21/1994. (IV. 16)]. Géza Kilényi is of the opinion that with this the 
CC has transgressed its jurisdiction, since, by this logic, it would suffice to name just a 
handful of rights in the Constitution and let the CC deduce the rest from those. Kilényi: Az 
Alkotmány egyes (alapelvi, alapjogi) rendelkezéseinek... op. cit. 44—45. 
48
 Pokol, В.: Az alapjogok és az „alapjogi" bíráskodás [Fundamental rights and funda-
mental rights jurisdiction]. Társadalmi Szemle 5 (1991) 56. 
44
 Bragyova: Alapozhatók-e az emberi jogok a nemzetközi jogra? op. cit. 94. 
50
 "In the fundamental rights cluster of the Constitution [ . . . ] the interpretation of the 
text is impossible without first answering the question: what is the best political interpre-
tation of this political morality." Kis, J.: A semlegesség megközelítései [Approaches to 
neutrality]. Politikatudományi Szemle 1 (1994) 158. 
51
 Sári, J.: Jogok és kötelességek |Rights and obligations]. In: Katonáné Soltész: Em-
beri jogok hazánkban, op. cit. 378-385. For a general overview of socialist rights and 
obligations see: Halász, J.-Kovács, I.-Szabó I. (eds.): Az állampolgárok alapjogai és köte-
lességei [The fundamental rights and obligations of the citizens]. Budapest, 1965. 
52
 Conjoining rights and obligations is alien to British, American or German law, 
although there are examples of it in the French constitution. The ultimate source, however, 
was Marx's dictum: "no rights without duties, no duties without rights." Quoted in Sári: 
Jogok és kötelességek, op. cit. 383. 
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The dogmatic revolution is unchanged by the fact that rights and obligations 
are still treated side by side in the Constitution.5 ' 
As human beings and as cit izens we all have several obligations that we 
have to fulfil in the interests of social coexistence.54 Only few of these, how-
ever , are among those fundamental obligations that are listed in Article 8 of the 
Constitution.55 The Constitution establishes four basic obligations: the obliga-
tion to defend the country (Article 70/H.), the obligation to contribute to public 
revenues on the basis of income and wealth (Article 70/1.), the obligation to 
ensure the education of young children (Article 70/J.), and the obligation to abide 
by the laws [Article 77 paragraph (2)]. Out of these, the obligation to defend 
the country is defined as an obligation of the citizen, while abiding by the other 
rules are human obligations. 
Article 8 paragraph (2) of the Constitution guarantees that rules regarding 
fundamental obligations are codif ied as laws. The Constitution further declares 
that it is possible to place members of the society under constitutional obliga-
t ions through laws. There are certain constitutional rights, values and objectives, 
fo r the attainment of which the legislator is endowed with the right to declare 
new obligations, and to use the state's powers to enforce these obligations. 
Since the fulfi lment of one's constitutional duties always coincides with the 
limitation of one or other of the fundamental rights, criteria of limitation refer 
to the regulation of obligations as well. 
2.1.1 The subject of fundamental rights, or the interpretation of the word 
"human " 
Article 8 of the Constitution uses the word "human" in defining the holder of 
fundamental rights. The subject of fundamental rights, historically and primarily, 
is truly humankind. This implies an abstract level of entitlement, since there are 
certain fundamental rights that are restricted to citizens or other specific groups.56 
'There is no such expression in the German constitution, which in many ways is 
markedly similar to this part of the Hungarian constitution. 
4
 The European Convention on Human Rights states that "the individual has obliga-
tions with respect to the society, which is the only possible milieu for the full and free 
development of a personality" (article 29). 
55
 Petrétei J. (szerk.): Magyar alkotmányjog III. [Hungarian constitutional law III.] 
Budapest-Pécs, 2006. 608. 
56
 Antal Ádám argues that constitutional values oblige everyone: every citizen, the 
organs of legislation and execution, all natural and legal persons, and all human communities 
must comply with them. Ádám. A.: A jogrendszer alkotmányosodása és erköicsösödése 
[Rendering the legal system constitutional and moral]. Jogtudományi Közlöny 10 (1998) 
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In a number of cases the Constitution claims that "everyone" has the right 
to something [e.g. Article 55 paragraph (1)1, or that no one can be denied their 
rights [e.g. Article 54 paragraph (2)].57 There are certain provisions that 
concern citizens [e.g. Article 69 paragraph (2); Article 70/F], There are also 
rights that refer to those who live within the Hungarian Republic (Article 
70/D). There are further some rights to which everyone who works in the 
country is entitled [Article 70/B paragraph (2)-(3)]. Others are for everyone 
within the borders of the Republic of Hungary.3 8 
The original version of the 1949 Constitution held that rights are granted by 
the State, therefore it is the State who decides about who it confers them on.59 
Already before the political transformation, however, there have been voices 
arguing that the State merely recognises already existing rights, and thus it is 
the individual who enjoys priority, and not the state. Following this logic, 
though, every human being should be entitled to these rights, and the rights 
should refer exclusively to human beings. 
The CC has extended human rights to legal entities as well. The different 
arguments led to different fundamental rights with different contents in the 
case of legal entities, which have no inviolable essences, by virtue of which 
they would be entitled to rights independent of state recognition. This is what 
distinguishes between them and human beings as far as human rights are 
concerned. László Sólyom argued, at an early date, in his parallel statement on 
CC decision 23/1990 (X. 31.), which annulled capital punishment in Hungary, 
that „the right to human dignity embodies two functions. On the one hand it 
expresses that there is an absolute boundary and the power of the state or other 
352. The CC, however, as we have seen, does not grant such a broad range of meanings to 
the concept of value. 
37
 The concepts of "legal entity" and "legal capacity" have to be sharply distinguished. 
According to Article 56 of the constitution every human being has legal capacity. See: 
Sári, J.: Jogképesség az alkotmányjogban, az alapjogi jogképesség [Legal capacity in 
constitutional law, fundamental right legal capacity!. In: Bragyova, A. (ed.): Ünnepi tanul-
mányok Holló András 60. születésnapjára [Studies presented to András Holló on his 60th 
birthday], Miskolc, 2003. 378. 
ss
 There are certain rights, then, which the constitution defines as human rights, but can 
only be exercised when they become laws (the right to work or the right to found a party). 
In others, it is described as a civil right, but foreigners may exercise it as well (the right to 
social security, the right to culture), and there are citizens' rights that not every citizen has 
a right to exercise (the right to vote, the protection of diplomats), since these rights are 
limited already by the text of the constitution. See: Petrétei: Magyar alkotmányjog III. op. 
cit. 24. 
59
 The origins of this idea can be found e.g. in: Hobbes's Leviathan, Locke's Treatise 
on Government and Rousseau's Social Contract. 
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people may not go beyond this. This is the core of autonomy or self-deterrence. 
This is reflected by the concept also followed by the CC, stating that the right 
to human dignity is the origin of other liberties which constantly guarantees 
autonomy against (state) regulation. This concept of the right to human dignity 
differentiates men from legal persons, which can be fully regulated and has no 
untouchable essence" (CCD 1990. 88, 103). 
The CC afterwards reaffirmed in its decis ion number 34/1994 (VI. 24) 
[summarising the conclusions of CC decision 21/1990 (X. 4), (CCD 1990, 77), 
C C decision 7 /1991 (II. 28) ( C C D 1991, 25) and CC decision 28/1991 (VI. 3) 
(CCD 1991, 1 14)1 that fundamental rights-for different reasons-usually refer to 
legal entities as well. '" What makes the status of legal entities special is that 
they are created in order to serve the interests of natural persons.61 Even 
though modern law recognises the concept of even the criminal responsibility 
of legal entities, they are still qualitatively different from human beings (in 
civil law terminology: natural persons) as fa r as the applicability of funda-
mental rights go . The practice of the CC fo l lows the German GG, where it 
has even been written into the normative text [GG Article 19 paragraph (3)1. 
According to this idea, it is the State, which safeguards the recognition and 
protection of those fundamental rights that legal entities are entitled to. This 
does not, however , imply that legal entities should have original rights; it 
simply means that the State constitutes a law. 
The CC distinguishes between two types of legal entities: that are legal 
entities according to public and according to private law.62 The existence of 
public law legal entities is heavily problematic.63 It means, in effect, a legal 
entity with even more limited fundamental r ights than the private law legal 
entity."' The C C declared that State organs have no fundamental rights vis-à-
vis the State [50/1998. (CC decision XI. 27), C C D 1998, 387. 402]. German 
constitutional dogmatics has elaborated and recognised the ability of legal 
entities forming part of the State or exercising powers endowed by the State to 
The Constitutional Court examined in this decision how far the provisions on the 
protection of data about natural persons can be applied to data about legal entities [34/1994 
(VI. 24) Constitutional Court Decision 1994, 177, 183]. 
The example already describes public bodies and institutions as public law persons. 
This is elaborated in the part meaning of the "Republic of Hungary." Cf. Stern. K.: Das 
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München, 1988 vol. III/ l . 1112. Quoted in 
Petrétei et al.: Magyar alkotmányjog III. op. cit. 27. 
"" A legal entity is public law legal entity, according to the classic, functional definition, 
if with its ceasing to be, it would be the duty of the state to take over its function. 
63
 Martin Pagenkopf in: Sachs, M. (Hrsg.): Grundgesetz. München, 4. Aufl. 2007, 104. 
"
4
 Sári, J.: Alapjogok. Alkotmánytan II. op. cit. 378. 
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be entitled to procedural rights;65 in their relationships pertaining to private law 
other fundamental rights may also be due to them.66 The fundamental rights of 
public law legal entities have been elaborated to the greatest detail in the case 
of the rights of local governments, which, however, form a special group, since 
they have rights, but they are also obliged to respect and serve basic rights. 
This is due to the fact that the government-according to the Constitution and 
the laws-has duties, which it fulfi ls as part of the state. CC practice regarding 
legal capacity is not coherent, though [CC decision 4/1993 (II. 12), CCD 1993, 
48, 69; CC decision 37/1994 (VI. 24), CCD 1994, 238, 244; CC decision 
56/1996 (XII. 12), CCD 1996, 204, 207]. What is clear, though, is that local 
governments can be the subjects of fundamental rights. In the case of govern-
mental fundamental rights, we have the right of self-government to which all 
voters are entitled (by the general test of fundamental rights protection) and the 
rights of the governments, which are best seen as jurisdictional authorities [CC 
decision 4/1993 (II. 19), CCD 1993. 48, 69]. In the latter case the CC does not 
apply the general test of necessity and proportionality; rather it examines 
whether the regulation that was the object of the complaint would effectively 
hinder the work of the government.67 
The Constitution places public bodies into a similar position to the local 
governments. Economic, labour and professional unions are historically 
connected to the right of congregation,68 but today, in certain cases, they are 
endowed with executive power.64 They are entitled to the fundamental rights of 
legal entities, but they also exercise executive power in cases when they, like 
the State, are responsible for the respect for fundamental rights. 
2.1.2 The inviolability and inalienability of basic rights 
This phrase (inviolability and inalienability) is a remnant of Act I of 1946, and 
a term also from international treaties. Those who negotiated at the Round 
65
 In certain cases, even to the content of rights, e.g. in the case of the radio or TV, the 
liberty of the media; or, with the universities, the freedom of science. Klein 73, and also 67 
on the German context. 
66
 Stern, K.: Das Staatsrecht cler Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band III/1. Allgemeine 
Lehren der Grundrechte. München, 1988. 1061-1066. quoted in Petrétei et all.: Magyar 
alkotmányjog III. op. cit. 27. 
67
 Sári: Alapjogok. Alkotmánytan II. op. cit. 389. 
68
 Ibid. 53. 
69
 Public bodies have tasks related to their members or the activities of their members. 
E.g. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, economic or professional chambers. Cf. Ibid. 390. 
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Table on the eve on the democratic transformation returned to this document in 
order to make up for the shortages in respecting human rights.70 
In the great declaration of the French Revolution (Déclaration cle droit de 
l'homme et du citoyen) the inalienability of rights simply meant that human 
beings cannot renounce their rights.71 Historically and politically both concepts 
have had mostly declarative values, they nevertheless have a basic significance 
as far as positive law is concerned. The notions of inalienability and inviolability 
have their roots in the philosophy of human rights; their positive meaning in 
constitutional law indicates the type of force human rights have. These notions 
imply that neither the constituent nor the legislator have power over the 
fundamental rights. The two concepts are not synonymous. Inalienability does 
not imply inviolability: inalienability is a lesser form of protection, as regards 
grievances, than inviolability. The latter meaning that the right can not only 
not be withdrawn, but it cannot be violated either. 
The two adjectives, however, appear as one in the hermeneutic practice of 
the CC; they are applied without distinctions, and they add nothing to the 
criteria of limiting rights set out in Article 8 paragraph (2), they are seen rather 
as their explanation and their foundation. One way of interpreting their role is 
by seeing the provision regarding essential content in Article 8 paragraph (2) 
as flowing from the provision for inviolability and inalienability in Article 8 
paragraph (l).72 Fundamental rights, in this interpretation, are limitable, as 
long as the limitation does not withdraw their essential content; rights, thus, 
are inalienable, and cannot be withdrawn altogether. 
The other way of reading the adjectives in Article 8 paragraph (1) suggests 
that the human rights defined in this paragraph do not refer, immediately, to 
the limited right, but to the human right recognized by the Constitution (as 
inviolable and inalienable) in its originality and ful lness. Article 8 paragraph 
(2) of the Constitution, then narrows the content of Article 8 paragraph (1). 
The disparity between Article 8 paragraph (1) and (2) can be resolved by 
separating the recognition of the full (inviolable and inalienable) human rights 
" Sólyom: Az Alkotmány emberi jogi generálklauzulájához vezető út. op. cit. 43. He 
believes that this wording is reminiscent of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(inherent rights) as well, and clearly points to the roots in natural rights. Article 8 coincides 
with the wording of the GG as well, although there is no proof that it would have been a 
direct influence. 
71
 Sajó: Az önkorlátozó hatalom, op. cit. 338. fn. 
- Bragyova, A.: Vannak-e megváltoztathatatlan normák az alkotmányban? |Are there 
unchangeable norms in the Constitution?] I n: Bragyova (ed.); Ünnepi Tcinnlnicinyok Hollo 
András... op. cit. 82-84. 
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from the thesis according to which human rights are usually limited, when they 
become full rights, codified by the State. 
The seeming disparity between Article 8 paragraphs (1) and (2) of the 
Constitution (the problem that human rights are, on the one hand, inviolable 
and inalienable, and on the other subject to limitations, with the exception of 
the essential content) can be resolved. Whichever above interpretation is 
accepted, the criteria of the inviolability and inalienability of human rights has, 
apart f rom its declarative value, positive legal content. 
Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution contains the expressions "The 
Republic of Hungary," and "the State," both of which are used in a loose sense 
in CC practice. All bodies endowed with executive power are parts of the 
State, and are consequently obliged by constitutional law to recognise and 
protect the fundamental rights. 
German legal literature suggests that executive bodies can only interfere 
with interests protected by basic rights, if they are legal authorised to do so. 
This applies both to (governmental) decisions following legal regulations, and 
norm-creation by public authorities. The Constitution's orders that protect 
basic rights can only have direct implications for the work of the executive 
bodies, if the formal-legal authorisation leaves space for action, in which they 
have to comply independently with the requirements related to the limitation of 
fundamental rights.73 
The commentary to the German constitution suggests that the same norms 
apply at the courts and in the executive. In limiting fundamental rights they 
have to respect-as part of the general requirements-the guarantee of essential 
contents. The legal principles elaborated in the process of law-development, 
irrespective of the treatment of the fundamental-rights-limiting "judge's right," 
are restricted in the same way as procedural rights-creation is, thus, the guar-
antee of essential contents applies in the same way too.74 The utmost limits of 
fundamental rights limitation accordingly refer indirectly to judicature as well, 
since all laws infringing on essential content are classified as unconstitutional. 
Disregarding the effects of the breach of the constitution on the judicature, the 
really significant possibility is that through the interpretation of the constitu-
tion the court should avoid altering the essential contents of a fundamental 
right. The same applies to the obligation of the protection of institutions 
through the constitution.75 
73
 Pagenkopf 733. 
74
 Ibid, para 37. 733-734. 
75
 Ibid, para 38. 734. 
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All considered, the CC has unambiguously declared that it is not merely the 
State, abstractly considered, that is obliged to respect the basic rights, but all 
its organs, and every member of the executive have to comply with the constitu-
tional obligations regarding basic rights.71' The CC claims that it is through 
these organs that the State fulf i ls its constitutional duties. 
„The democratic functioning of the state includes through the activities of 
the state and its organs that it fulf i ls its constitutional obligation to respect and 
protect fundamental rights. Besides the protection of rights, the obligation of 
the state is to establish and maintain the functioning of the certain institutions 
so that they can guarantee fundamental rights irrespective of the claim of the 
individuals. The breach of the fundamental rights, therefore, cannot be separated 
f r o m the functioning of the institution." [36/1992 (VI. 10) CC decision, CCD 
1992. 210, 215, 216.] 
Primarily it is the task of the legislature, naturally, to actively safeguard the 
fundamental rights, as the basic rules regarding fundamental rights have to be 
f ixed as laws. Respecting and actively protecting these laws is the part of all 
organs of the executive. 
The strictest liberal concept of the state claims that the state has no other 
obligation regarding fundamental rights as that of abstaining; what matters is 
that the organs of the state should in no way infringe upon fundamental rights. 
More recent constitutional thinking holds, on the contrary, that the state has to 
actively protect fundamental rights. The institutional concept of fundamental 
rights, a third opt ion, insists that the protection of fundamental rights has to 
be present in all areas of the legal system.77 This last theory sees an all-
encompassing institutional f ramework as the guarantee of the protection of 
individual fundamental rights. Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Hungarian Consti-
tution declares the obligation to respect and safeguard fundamental rights. CC 
practice shows, moreover, that the state is objectively obliged, on the basis of 
6
 Article 8 paragraph (2) of the Constitution states, unlike its German counterpart, that 
the requirement of preserving the essential content only refers to fundamental rights 
regulations set out as laws. Grammatically considered, this suggests, in opposition to the 
complex interpretation above, that the Constitution restricts, ab ovo, the protection of 
fundamental rights to the activity of the legislative. Béla Pokol believes that the wording of 
the Constitution is ambiguous here: there is no guideline to what the limitation of funda-
mental rights refers to, which causes legal uncertainties. Pokol: Pénz és politika, op. cit. 
115-117. 
In almost 90% of the cases the CC decides on the basis of fundamental rights 
regulations, and only in approximately 10% of the cases does it decide about questions 
related to tlie structure of the state. Ádám: Alkotmányfejlődés és jogállami gyakorlat, op. 
cit. 5. 
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the same paragraph, to protect the institutions, which realises the protection, 
not subjective, but institutional, of these rights. 
The most important fact about Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution is 
that the state recognises the fundamental human rights. This is where the 
normative text establishes that these laws exist independently of the state, but 
are hereby also confirmed by the state. CC practice-analysed above-has not 
decided whether this recognition is merely a declaration, or whether any 
specific conclusions flow f rom it, as regards the obligations of the state. The 
recognition does refer, nonetheless, to the origins of the fundamental rights, 
and does thus provide for the possibilities of their limitation by the state. The 
fact that the state recognises the fundamental rights implies that the system of 
fundamental rights can in no way be annulled by the state. (See the explication 
of the expression "inviolable and inalienable" above.) 
Not even through a constitutional procedure can the bases of the system of 
fundamental rights be withdrawn. Although the procedures of the amendment 
of the constitution are provided for in the Constitution itself [Article 24 
paragraph (2)1, the 1990s saw major debates regarding the nature of constitutional 
amendments (summarised as CC decision 1260/B/1997, CCD 1998, 816, 8 1 9 -
826). The majority of the CC claim that the law regarding amendments to the 
Constitution is special insofar as the CC has no right to examine its content; 
it can only declare about its (un)constitutionality. The CC decided that the 
Constitution contains no provision that would make any other provision 
unchangeable or incapable of losing its effect. (CC decision 39/1996 (IX. 25), 
CCD 1996, 134, 138).78 This ruling of the CC notwithstanding, the interpreta-
tion-that appeared as a dissenting opinion then- , which sees the first clause of 
Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution as unchangeable in content is still 
more convincing.7 ' Recognition by the state means that in the relationship 
between the state and the individual it is always the latter that has priority. The 
inviolable and inalienable fundamental human rights have to be recognised 
under whatever circumstances; the amendment that would leave an individual 
defenceless f rom the state is unconstitutional. 
The essence of these debates can be summarised as fo l lows. Article 77 
paragraph (3) of the German GG, which was used as an example in the wording 
of the Constitution, and which regulates amendments to the constitution, states 
that in the field of fundamental rights GG Article 1, related to human dignity 
and the protection of human rights cannot be altered, even through an amend-
78
 Of this debate, see: Bragyova: Vannak-e megváltoztathatatlan normák az alkot-
mányban? op. cit. 65-67. 
79
 Cf.: Ibid. 77. 
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ment to the constitution. The German Constitution, in other words, declares that 
the human right to dignity, an essential element in human rights protection, can 
under no circumstances be violated. The Hungarian Constitution does not contain 
this safeguarding passage, and therefore, technically, one could conjecture that 
every provision can be altered, limited or annulled through an amendment to 
the Constitution. Even without any explicit constitutional provision, however, 
what fol lows from CC practice and its stance regarding essential contents is 
that the right to life and human dignity cannot be withdrawn; not even through 
an amendment to the constitution. The recognition of human rights, therefore, 
results in rendering the essential content of fundamental rights (itself deducible 
from Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution) in their totality unalterable 
even to constitutional power . 
3. From classic restraint to active protection 
The second point made in Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution regarding 
obligations is that the state respects fundamental human rights. Originally and 
historically, in the constitutional concepts of fundamental rights, this signifies 
that content, which was the first to appear, namely that the state and the 
executive organs (placed under obligation by the fundamental rights) must not, 
either actively or through their passive behaviour, limit fundamental rights. One 
of the reasons why constitutions and the organs for the protection of funda-
mental r ights came into being was that it needed to be ensured that the 
Parliament and the other organs endowed with the power of the state do not 
abuse their prerogatives.80 
Respect, guaranteed by the state, also means non-interference. Non-inter-
ference, in this case implies that the state does not, for its own interests, 
influence interpersonal relationships, and does not regulate individual behaviour. 
This does not mean that the state should protect the individual from being 
limited in his or her rights by another individual: this only means that the state 
does not limit anyone's rights through interfering with relationships between 
private persons or legal entities. 
811
 In the early phase of modern constitutionality it was held that human rights do not 
create concrete right for the citizens, it is only a mere promise that these aspects will be 
taken into account when the laws relating to citizens are enacted. Waldron, J.: Rights and 
Majorities: Rousseau Revisited in Majorities and Minorities. New York, 1990. 52. Quoted 
in Sajó: Az. önkorlátozó hatalom, op. cit. 334. 
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3.1 Active "protection " of fundamental rights: subjective protection of rights 
and the state's obligation to protect institutions 
CC has deduced from Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution that apart 
f rom the classic constitutional content, the obligation of restraint, the state has 
active obligations as well in the fields of fundamental rights protection.81 This 
obligation to protect has two parts: (1) to actively guarantee the prevalence of 
civil rights, and (2) to establish and protect the fundamental right as a legal 
institution that manifests the prevalence of constitutional values. This second 
obligation has two parts as well: (1) the creation of the institutional f ramework 
for the rights, and (2) making the prevalence of fundamental rights systematic 
and harmonious. 
An important difference between the two aspects of fundamental rights is 
that the subjective side-whether it demands restraint or action-entails that the 
individual has a legal claim on the state, whereas the object ive side, which 
ensures the prevalence of values, does not mean that the individual could, in 
specific cases, demand that the state fulfil its obligation of institutional protection. 
State activity is necessary in order that the fundamental rights prevail. This 
means that civil rights are realised only if the state creates and maintains an 
institutional framework: first, in terms of the creation of normative provisions 
on equal position in life, and second, the system of organs, which these 
provisions bring into being.82 
In German dogmatics, regarded as exemplary by the CC, basic rights create 
not merely civil rights, but (using terminology introduced by Carl Schmitt) the 
objective protection of-as institution-protection (Institutionsgarantie)—private 
81
 "The question about the roots of the obligation of the state to protect institutions 
finds its answer in the constitutional concept of the state, and also in the extent to which 
the functioning of the society and presupposes the services of the state. In the early XlXth 
century, the formation of the market-economy demanded the restriction of the state with its 
powers to confer or withhold monopolies. Constitutions that were born in these times 
clearly object to the state's and especially the executive's, recently overcome, interference 
with economic and private affairs. The Supreme Court of the US originally held that the 
state has no duty of active protection; though it has altered this view since then. DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-196 (1989) ( . . . ) 
Easter-European countries no longer wanted to eliminate the central role of the state; there 
would have been nothing, on the short term, to replace state services, anyway. The protective 
'services' of the state usually survived in the form of constitutional expectations." Sajó: Az 
önkorlátozó hatalom, op. cit. 349-350. 
82
 Cf. Farkas, Z.: Az intézmény fogalma, fedezete és formalitása [The concept, the 
background and the formality of the institution]. Miskolci Jogi Szemle 2 (2007) 33. 
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law and-as institutional protection (institutionelle Garantie)—pubUc law institu-
tions, hence removing these from under the free, unl imited provision of the 
legislator. The constitutional protection of marriage, fami ly , property and 
inheritance are good examples . It has to be decided case-by-case whether 
certain provisions related to fundamental rights provide objective institutional 
protection.83 According to Carl Schmitt the state protects certain institutions 
(both in public and in private law) through constitutional regulation. The aim 
of the regulation is to make it impossible for these institutions to be annulled 
by simple laws. Schmitt underlined that institutional protection is not the same 
as the basic civil rights. These guarantees are structured differently. Basic rights 
presuppose an individual, whose sphere of liberties is, in principle, unbounded. 
There is no such presupposition in the case of institutions.8 ' 
A good example for the C C ' s understanding of the act ive obligation of the 
state can be found in CC decision 64/1991 (XII. 17), which provided for the 
constitutionality of abortions. This was the first occasion on which the CC 
stated that the state's obligation to respect and protect fundamental rights 
means, apart from refraining to violate them, that it is obl iged to provide for 
the conditions in which they can prevail. This implies a complex obligation, 
manifested above all by duties of legislation. 
Institutional protection often appears in the decisions on its own. The CC 
stated in the ruling on abortion as well that if the embryo is not seen as a 
human being, then objective, institutional right to live is contrasted with the 
autonomy of the mother. In the case of the right to a healthy environment, the 
CC pronounced, likewise, that the fundamental right's institution protecting 
side is guaranteed, but is not a basis for subjective basic rights. If, in a given 
case, it is only the state's duty to protect rights that is weighed, then a unique 
standard is applied, which is given in the text of the specific basic rights. More 
often, however, what is emphasised is the state's duty to create minimal 
protection for the legal institution, so that the existence of the institution is 
never imperilled.83 
"The constitutional requisite (standard) of institutional protection is not 
necessity and proportionality, but it serves the constitutional tasks of the 
institution." [52/1997 (X. 14) CC Decision. C C D 1997, 333, 344.] 
83
 Pieroth, B-Bernhard, Sch.: Staatsrecht II. Grundrechte, 19. Aufl., Heideberg, 
2003. 19. 
84
 Schmitt, С.: Verfassungslehre, 9. Aufl. Berlin, 2003. 170-174. 
83
 Sólyom, L: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon [The beginnings of 
constitutional jurisdiction in Hungary!. Budapest, 2001. 422. 
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The CC believes, in accordance with the German concept of institutional 
guarantee,8 ' ' that just because a private civil right is not imperilled, that does 
not mean that fundamental right as an institution is not in danger.8 7 The 
following decisions demonstrate the developing sophistication of this thought. 
The objective obligation of the state to protect the institutions is usually 
elaborated without specific reference to Article 8 of the Constitution; it is 
described, rather, as the content of the given fundamental right. The obligation 
flows, however, from Article 8 paragraph (1) in the case of all basic rights. In 
the early decisions of the CC, reference is often made to Article 8 (the source 
of fundamental rights and the protection of institutions), [CC decision 33/1992 
(V. 28), CCD 1992. 188, 190], later on, however, it has increasingly disappeared, 
and the CC decisions have lived a life of their own. 
An early version of the concept of the protection of institutions can be 
found in CC decision 15/1991 (IV. 13), which states that it follows from the 
obligation of the state to protect fundamental rights that the risk to personal 
rights has to be kept to the minimum [CCD 1991. 40, 52]. The obligation of 
the state to protect the institutions flows, hence, f rom its obligation to protect 
fundamental rights. This does not only mean that the state has to refrain from 
infringing on those rights, but it has to provide for the conditions in which they 
can prevail. The state has to create the institutional (objective) guarantee of the 
subjective rights. According to the CC, the guarantee of the prevalence of 
subjective fundamental rights is the objective obligation to protect the 
institutions. The CC first declared that in its decision 64/1991 (XII. 10), (CCD 
1991. 297, 302-303), and then reaffirmed it in the explanation to the second 
decision on abortion 48/1998 (XI. 23), (CCD 1998. 333, 340).88 
86
 "The existence of institutional guarantees is a relatively recent phenomenon only 
with regard to constitutional rights-the constitution itself, in its totality, is an institutional 
guarantee with respect to the state-, but there it has a very significant role to play, since 
many constitutional rights are essentially institutional guarantees (among other things), 
such as the right to property or the constitutional protection of the family or marriage. It is 
indifferent, here, whether or not the constitution explicitly calls them so." Bragyova: Van-
nak-e megváltoztathatatlan normák az alkotmányban? op. cit. 69. Emphasis in the original. 
8
 In the case of expropriation, for instance, even if the specific decisions fulfil the 
criteria set out in the constitution, and violate no fundamental right, such decisions may 
reach a point where they begin to endanger a legal institution, in this case, the right to 
property. Holló, A.: Az alkotmányvédelem kialakulása Magyarországon [The development 
of the protection of the constitution in Hungary]. Miskolc, 1997. 167. 
88
 Balogh. Zs-Holló, A.: Az értelmezett Alkotmány [Constitution interpreted], Buda-
pest, 2005. 207. 
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It was in connection with the freedom of speech that the CC further 
elaborated its s tance on the objec t ive protection of institutions. The argu-
ment is special, but the general concept clearly shines through. The CC stated 
that 
"In addition to the right of the individual to the freedom of expression. 
Article 61 of the Constitution imposes the duty on the State to secure the 
conditions for the creation and maintenance of a democratic public opinion. 
The objective, institutional aspect of the right to the freedom of expression 
relates not only to the freedom of the press, f reedom of education and so on, 
but also to that aspect of the system of institutions which places the freedom of 
expression, as a general value, among the other protected values. For this reason, 
the constitutional boundary of the freedom of expression must be drawn in 
such a way that in addition to the person's subjective right to the freedom of 
expression, the formation of publ ic opinion, and its free development-being 
indispensable values for a democracy-are also considered." [30/1992 (V. 26) 
C C Decision, C C D 1992. 167, 171-172.1 
The state is obliged, therefore, to harmonise subjective, personal rights, and 
to protect situations in life in their own complexity. The state is obliged to 
uphold and manage the whole constitutional order. Only the state can so arrange 
the laws regulating individual behaviour, that all the legal and institutional 
conditions of the safeguarding of basic rights are fulfilled, while, at the same 
t ime the regulations are in harmony with all the fundamental rights, without 
the state losing its ability to accomplish all its constitutional tasks. In doing so, 
the state has to resolve confl icts of interest and harmonise various legal 
practices. The subjective, personal side of certain fundamental rights is not 
necessarily correlated with its object ive content. The objective protection may 
extend beyond the subjective right that every citizen enjoys. [CC decision 
64/1991 (XII. 17) C C D 1991. 296, 302.] 
It is a peculiar phenomenon in Hungarian CC practice that the state's 
obligation to protect the institutions is conjoined with the protection of values. 
Nevertheless, as was seen in the explication of the concept of value, there is no 
such pre-defined system of values as in the German BVerfGE: the objective 
side of the fundamental rights that connected with the protection of institutions 
is often identified by the CC with the concept of constitutional value, which 
the state is obliged to implement. The objective side of specific fundamental 
r ights is, in short, the constitutional value, which cannot be enforced as a 
subjective (claim) right, but which it is the task of the state to guarantee. There 
are no constitutional values as separate from the Constitution itself: the 
objective and subjective sides of the fundamental rights logether-as separate 
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rights and as a unified system-can be called constitutional value, or, alternatively 
a dynamic system of values.89 
German constitutional law made a great impact on CC practice in this 
respect. The BVerfGE strictly separates the subjective and objective elements 
of fundamental rights. BVerfGE practice shows that the definite, objective 
system of values, which is manifested by the fundamental rights, and which 
must prevail in the complete legal system, results in an obligation on the part 
of the state not only to recognise fundamental human rights in individual cases, 
but to guarantee their prevalence in general as well. Every single measure of 
the state-be it legislative or executive-has to respect human rights. The 
objective side of fundamental rights is not only connected to private rights, it 
also protects the institutions of constitutionality. The state, for instance, is not 
only obliged to respect the right to marriage, it also has to protect the institu-
tion of marriage. Institution-protection extends, among other things, to property, 
to the press, to scientific institutions, and to the churches as well. According to 
the German concept, then, fundamental rights have a double role to play. 1) T o 
protect, as private fundamental rights, certain exceptionally imperilled areas of 
human liberty. 2) To oblige, as objective principles, the state to generally and 
institutionally ensure that the conditions of the prevalence of these rights are 
fulfilled, even in the absence of individual legal grievances.9" This under-
standing had a formative influence on Hungarian CC practice as well. 
Summary 
Article 8 paragraph (1) makes the protection of fundamental rights a primary 
obligation. This is not merely a declaration: this rule is the regulative principle 
of constitutional democracy. This obligation is manifested, for instance, in the 
CC ' s elaboration of the specific rules for the limitation of fundamental r ights -
the coherent system of the protection of fundamental r ights- , and in the 
Constitution's providing, in Article 8 paragraph (4), the standards of declaring 
a state of emergency. In both cases the respecting and protection of funda-
mental rights is the dominant factor. The primacy of the obligation means that 
all other considerations-public interests related to the organisation of the s ta te -
are only valid if they do not hinder the state in fulfill ing its primary obligation. 
The protection of fundamental rights being a primary obligation of the state 
s
'Constitutional Court decision 47/2007 (VII. 3), Constitutional Court Decision July 
2007. 
90
 Halmai-Tóth: op. cit. 103-104. 
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means, therefore, that fundamental r ights are seen as the basic values of the 
legal system, while constitutional considerations concerning the ef f icacy of the 
organs of the state are only secondary. " 
The C C constantly reaffirms that the state has to establish the conditions 
suitable for the protection of fundamental rights in such a way as to comply 
with Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Constitution. This is what makes the 
adaptation to international standards possible, as well as the creat ion and 
preservation of the constitutional s tate, set out in Article 2 paragraph (1). 
The CC deduced from the provision on constitutionality that the state has to 
create the most suitable conditions for the prevalence of the fundamental rights 
[CC decision 34/1992 (VI. 1), CCD 1992, 192, 201]. This being the primary 
obligation of the state, the CC's criteria for the limitation of fundamental rights 
have to conform to the constitutional norms. Further restriction of the 
limitation of fundamental rights, based on the interpretation of the text of the 
Constitution, has become necessary, in order that the primacy of fundamental 
rights remain unaltered. It was in the light of Article 8 paragraph (1) that 
paragraph (2) had to be interpreted, which excluded seeing the possibility of 
limiting fundamental rights (until their essential content remains unharmed) as 
legitimating their unbounded limitation; that would be in conflict with the 
primary obligation of the state to protect fundamental rights. This is why the 
CC interpreted the regulation on the limiting of fundamental rights in such a 
way as to enable the state to limit fundamental rights, only on condit ion that 
there is no other way to protect or enforce other fundamental rights, liberties, 
or constitutional values. 
"' Pokol, В.: Az alapjogok és az „alapjogi" bíráskodás [Fundamental rights and funda-
mental rights jurisdiction]. Társadalmi Szemle 5 (1991) 56-57. 
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"But it does suggest that current fashionable suggestions 
that Slate sovereignty is a thing of the past 
are to be understood with some cautions and perhaps some qualification" 
Sir Robert Jennings 
I. Jurisdiction and extraterritoriality-A general introduction 
1. Jurisdiction, from theoretical perspectives 
Law, since it is a human product, is necessary dependent upon t ime and 
circumstances. Its spatial, temporal and material boundaries are designated by 
the legislator itself and the practice of the community of states in the form of 
international customary law. The legislator can define the material, territorial, 
personal and temporal scope of a given legal rule, while international customary 
law regulates the collision of different s tates ' legal spheres. Thus, the limits of 
a state's competences stem from both its own decision and the practice of the 
international community of states. 
1.1. The concept of jurisdiction 
The birth of the doctrine of jurisdiction is a necessary corollary of both the 
formation of the modern international political system and the emergence of 
modern s tate . ' The premise of states' sovereign equality, as a basic principle 
of the Westphal ian system of international relations rendered necessary the 
elaboration of such rules of international law which are able to regulate the 
relationship among the colliding competences of states. If no state can subor-
dinate other states to its will, since they are equal in a legal sense, international 
law regulating interstate relations needs such rules which can solve the conflicts 
in case of collision of legal rules of different states. Therefore, the emergence 
of the doctrine of jurisdiction was inevitable during the first centuries of legal 
modernity. 
In the v iew of F. A. Mann, who elaborated a comprehensive theory of 
international jurisdiction, the concept of jurisdiction in international law 
consists of f ive constitutive elements. First of all, it is related to activities of a 
state, however it has nothing to do with the internal competences of state 
1
 Cf. Weber, M.: Államszociológiai töredék [A Fragment of the Sociology of the 
State], In: Takács P. (ed.): Államelmélet [State Theory], Budapest, 2003. 48-70. 
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organs based on municipal law.2 Secondly, jurisdiction is about a state 's right 
to exercise certain of its powers.3 Thirdly, a state's right to exercise jurisdiction 
is exclusively determined by public international law. 4 So, states cannot 
unilaterally determine the scope of their jurisdiction, it is delimited by public 
international law. Fourthly, jurisdiction is focused on states' right of regulation.5 
Lastly, jurisdiction in international law has only relevance in those cases which 
are about matters not exclusively of domestic concern.6 He concludes that 
jurisdiction "is concerned with what has been described as one of the funda-
mental functions of public international law, viz. the funct ion of regulating and 
delimiting respective competences of States."7 
It is common ground in doctrine that jurisdiction comprised of the afore-
mentioned five constituting components has three di f ferent aspects. One can 
use the expression of jurisdiction to elaborate on the opportunities of states 
how to perform acts in the territory of other states (executive jurisdiction), to 
explain the competences of courts to deal with cases in which a foreign factor 
is present (judicial jurisdiction), and to analyze the p o w e r of states to make 
binding laws to cases involving foreign elements (legislative jurisdiction).5 
1.2. The origins of the doctrine of jurisdiction, territoriality 
As a consequence of the predominance of the concept of sovereignty in the 
structure of modern international law a territorial approach of jurisdiction 
emerged during modernity. This territorial approach was in perfect conformity 
with the needs of modern international law which regarded the world as a 
community of sovereign states. All these sovereign states formed complete 
units of legal systems regulating legal relationships over their territory, as 
Bodin described it in his fundamental work. ' 
2
 Mann, F. A.: The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law. Recueil des Cours, 
1964,1. 9. 
3
 Ibid. 9. 
4
 Ibid. 10. 
5
 Ibid. 13. 
6
 Ibid. 15. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Shaw, M. N.: International Law. Cambridge, 2003. 576-578. ; Akehurst, M.: Juris-
diction in International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 43 (1972-73) 177; 
Lowe, V.; Jurisdiction. In: Evans, M. (ed.): International Law. Oxford. 2003. 329. 
4
 Cf. Bodin, J.: Les six livres de la république. Paris, 1526. 
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U. Huber in his work publ ished in 16841" laid down the foundations of 
the territorial theory of jurisdiction. In his axioms he announced that laws of 
sovereign authorities have only force within the boundaries of its state, and the 
exercise of sovereign authority should not prejudice that kind of power of 
other states." These axioms gradually became the guiding principles of the 
territorial conception of jurisdiction. Joseph Story only reformulated them in a 
more modern wording when he affirmed that "every nation possesses an 
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own terri tory" and "no State 
can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its o w n territory or bind 
persons not residents there" except so far as regards its own ci t izens." Story 's 
general maxims were universally accepted in the community of international 
lawyers prior to World War I. Therefore, they dominated the doctori communis 
opinio about the scope of jur isdic t ion." 
However, the transformation of the structure of world economy, precisely 
both the strengthening of economic interdependence and the growing role of 
multinational enterprises, has been starting to progressively challenge this 
approach fol lowing the end of World War II. Due to the far-reaching conse-
quences of the alteration of the world economic context the leading states of 
the world economy made severe attempts to regulate more-and-more that 
economic conduct which took place outside of their territories, but neverthe-
less affected their domestic market . 
1.3. Beyond the territorial principle and legislative jurisdiction 
This profoundly, or dramatically, altered economic environment induced the 
rethinking of the whole concept of jurisdiction which was born in a considerably 
different socio-economic context. Territoriality did not seem to be able to of fer 
adequate answers for the novel problems of the post World W a r II era anymore. 
It became clear for the scholars' community that this traditional concept should 
be exceeded. It was also obvious that the whole paradigm needed rethinking, 
not only some parts of the territorial approach. 
"' The title of this work: De conflictu légiim diversarum in diversis imperiis. 
11
 Mann: op. cit. 26. 
12
 Mann: op. cit. 28. 
13
 However, in the Lotus-case, in 1927, the PCIJ argued that territoriality is not an 
absolute principle of international law and it does not coincide with territorial sovereignty. 
I PCIJ. Lotus case. No. 9. (France/Turkey), judgment of 7 September 1927, Permanent 
Court International Justice Report. Series A. Nr. 10, 20.] With this, the case-law opened 
the theoretical possibility to accept other approaches than strict territoriality. 
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Mann suggested that international law concerning legislative jurisdiction 
should liberate itself from the chains of the traditional territorial approach and 
the time came for the elaboration of a qualitatively new approach.14 Therefore, 
he proposed a change of point of view at the beginning of the 60 ' s . He suggested 
that international lawyers should not ask anymore whether certain facts can be 
subject to the legislation of a state, but whether the relevant facts of a case 
belong to a given jurisdiction.15 Therefore, in his view, problems of jurisdiction 
should be approached from the direction of the legislation, so f rom the aspect of 
a given state, rather than from the direction of the nature of the facts. 
According to this approach, when deciding on jurisdiction, it must firstly 
be decided whether a given jurisdiction has a 'close connection' with the 
relevant facts of the case. The assessment of these facts f r o m the aspect of 
territorial maxims may be of marginal importance. Hence, to claim jurisdiction 
over a given 'behavior ' a close connection with the facts of the case is needed, 
not a territorial one. This close connection must demonstrate a genuine link, in 
other words a sufficiently strong interest in the case at hand.1 6 If a state s 
relation to a certain constellation of facts is " s o close, so substantial, so direct , 
so weighty"17 then a state can legitimately, that is, in harmony with international 
law, claim the right of legislation in that respect. 
In sum, Mann argues that mere political, social, economic or commercial 
interests cannot in themselves establish this close enough connection, s ince 
any declaration of jurisdiction should be in harmony with basic principles, 
such as non-interference, reciprocity, of international law. One may say that 
Mann proposed to reformulate the theory of jurisdiction on the basis of interest 
instead of the traditional territorial approach which looked to be quite o ld-
fashioned within the conditions of an emerging global economy. 
1.4. The 'primary effects' approach 
As a further step in the inner development of the doctrine of jurisdiction 
Michael Akehurst suggested some additional refinement with regard to the 
effects doctrine forged out by the case law. In his view it implies certain 
obscurity from a theoretical point of view. As a main problem, Akehurst pointed 
out that the broad interpretation of this approach can easily refer to absolutely 
coincidental facts, remote and slight effects. And, asserting jurisdiction on this 
14
 Mann: op. cit. 43. 
15
 ibid. 44-45. 
16
 Ibid. 46. 
17
 Ibid. 49. 
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basis would have an unfavorable effect on trade relations. It is easy to accept 
that almost all transnational economic activities can have a certain e f fec t on 
markets around the globe. 
He proposed that the best way to avoid the implications related to a too 
broad interpretation, such as for instance too many states claiming jurisdiction 
in a given case, is to limit jurisdiction to that state where the primary effects 
of the bus iness conduct occurred. In the determination of the p r imary or 
secondary nature of the 'effects ' two fac tors should be taken into account.1 8 
Firstly, are the effects more direct in a state than in other states? Secondly, are 
the effects occurring in a given state more substantial than in other s tates? On 
the basis of this 'primary effects test' it will be possible to differentiate among 
primary ef fec ts which may call for state intervention via its legislation and 
judiciary, and other effects which are too slight and remote to trigger the same 
mechanisms. In conclusion, as argued by Akehurst, this approach makes the 
exercise of jurisdiction possible by those states which have a legitimate interest 
in the given case.1" So, by this development, Mann's 'close connection' require-
ment is realized since this theory links the 'effects doctrine' with the legitimate 
interest of states. This approach helps to sufficiently sharpen the focus of the 
'effects theory ' , so that it creates a reasonable framework for asserting juris-
diction over business practices occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state. 
2. Globalized world economy and competition law 
The main goal of competition or antitrust law is to help the neutralization of 
those effects which can likely arise f rom an imperfect competition. Distortion 
of competition can have such outcomes which are unfavorable from the point 
of view of society. Monopolies cause welfare losses by maintaining prices 
above the optimal and blocking market entry for new innovative actors. Unfair 
or restrictive commercial practices also disturb the functioning of the market 
by depriving the consumer of information necessary to make optimal and well-
founded choices , that is, they cause informational asymmetries. There fore 
market p o w e r and market actors are to be necessarily regulated in o rde r to 
improve the work of the market. A smooth run of the market can increase the 
aggregated social welfare as followers of Adam Smith believe and teach it.20 
18
 Akehurst : op. cit. 198. 
19
 Ibid. 201. 
J l
 Cf. Van Cayseele. P. and Van den Bergh, R.: Antitrust Law. In: Bouckaert, E.-
Geest, G.: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5300book.pdf 
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The birth of competition law at the end of 19lh century was thus an answer 
to regulate those circumstances which dis turb the real functioning of the 
market.21 Of course, these early acts mainly intended to regulate the national 
market, that is, the domestic market of a g iven country. The structural fea tures 
of the world economy prior to World War I and in the interwar period did not 
render it necessary to take into account foreign acts and facts to that degree as 
it is unavoidable today. 
However, today's world economy is characterized by new features wh ich 
separate it from the earlier stages. According to a historical approach, fol lowing 
the age of mainly land and agriculture based pre-industrial capitalism and the 
industrial, machine and finance based second phase of capitalism-in which the 
Sherman Act was born in 1890-a qualitatively new economic phenomenon has 
come forth in the last decades of the 20,h century. 
This new form of capitalism is now mainly knowledge-based and has a 
global dimension in contrast to the limited spatial d i f fus ion of the ear l ier 
stages. The distinctiveness of this new economic world order is based on f ive 
qualitatively new features. Firstly, cross-border transactions are deeper and 
more interconnected than they have ever been. Secondly, resources, goods and 
services are spatially more mobile than they have ever been. Thirdly, multi-
national enterprises play a more significant role in the creation and distribution 
of wealth than they have ever done before. Fourthly, the financial and real 
volatility has increased in a considerable degree due to the dramatically 
increased interdependence. And lastly, the advent of digital environment and 
electronic commerce has completely changed the character of cross-border 
transactions by making them much faster and easier.2" 
Therefore interdependence,21 which has transactional, spatial and informa-
tional dimensions in economic sense,24 is a keyword to understand that 
21
 The first anti-trust acts were the following: the Sherman Act of 1890 (US), the Law 
against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) of 1909 (Germany), 
the Clayton Act of 1914 (US), and the Combines Investigation Act of 1923 (Canada). 
22
 Dunning. J. H.: Global Capitalism at Bay. London, 2001. 13. 
23
 A guiding indicator of economic globalization in the sense of interdependence is 
the trade-to-GDP ratio (in other terms the "trade openness ratio"). Between 1992 and 2005 
this indicator increased by 13 percentage points fo r the whole OECD. For the details see 
http://titania.sourceoecd.Org/pdf//fact2007pdf//03-01-01.pdf. And Cf. Woods, N.: The 
Political Economy of Globalization. In: Woods, N. (ed.): The Political Economy of 
Globalization. London, 2000. 1-3 . 
24
 For a detailed and broader discussion of interdependence in international law see: 
Wouters, J.: Perspectives for International Law in the Twenty-First Century: Chaos or 
World Legal Order. Ethical Perspectives 7 (2000) 17-23. 
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economic context in which the problems of extraterritoriality in antitrust cases 
have arisen in the last decades. 
3. Extraterritoriality in antitrust cases; general introduction 
The very f i rs t problems of extraterritoriality in antitrust cases have a l ready 
appeared in the first decade of the 20lh century and they continuously crystallized 
during the who le century. So, anti-trust extraterritoriality has a history of more 
than ninety years. The experiences of this period may help to formulate some 
general premises supporting the particular research of the new trends in the 
second part. 
3.1. The genesis of the U.S. practice 
Thus, in accordance with the classical doctr ine of public international law, 
legislative jurisdiction regarding restrictive business practices is subject to 
those limitations which stem from territoriality."7 However, within the conditions 
of a highly interrelated world economy characterized by several dimensions of 
interdependence it is more-and-more difficult to localize such business practices 
which extend beyond a certain scale.26 General ly , business transactions beyond 
and over nat ional boundaries can be realized in a form of complicated pat terns 
of conduct implying a longer time period and a transnational, even global 
spatial area.27 So, these practices necessary have a transnational character due 
to the very nature of their economic context , and this transnational nature 
encodes some problems of extraterritoriality f rom the point of view of legislator. 
3.1.1. The prior- Alcoa period, the first antecedents 
U.S. antitrust law is fundamentally based on two legislative acts; on the 
Sherman Act of 1894 and Clayton Act of 1914. While the Sherman Act in its 
first paragraph declared that all anticompetitive business illegal,28 so to say it 
3
 For an analysis of alternative legal bases fo r the application of antitrust law see: 
Basedow, J.: International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization. 
Louisiana Law Review 61 (1999-2000) 1039-1042. 
7
 On the question of localization see Mann: op. cit. 36-37. 
27
 Ibid. 
"
s
 Sherman Act 1§ "every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce a m o n g the several States, or with foreign 
nation, is declared to be illegal." Stranger, A.: Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over 
foreign parties af ter Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Ltd. Brighcim Young University 
Law Review, 2003 . 1456. 
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indicated the general U.S. antitrust attitude, the Clayton Act established a 
detailed procedural framework for antitrust affairs.24 Additionally, the legislator 
announced that their provisions equally apply for domestic and fore ign 
business practices by explicitly addressing activities among foreign nations.3 0 
Nevertheless, from the birth of the Sherman Act to the first decade of the 
20"' century, U.S. courts did not think of applying the Sherman Act for 
business practices occurring outside U.S. territory." Justice Oliver Wendel l 
Holmes, as a judge of the U.S. Supreme Court , in his opinion in the American 
Banana v. United Fruit Co.3' pointed out that the lawfulness of an act causing 
damage in the U.S. "must be determined wholly by the law of the country 
where the act is done".33 
However, this practice based on a restrictive interpretation of the Sherman 
Act radically changed by the judgment in the case of United States v. Am. 
Tobacco Co.34 in 1911. The court held that an agreement between a U .S . and 
a British tobacco syndicate is under the scope of U.S. antitrust law notwi th-
standing that the agreement was concluded under British ju r i sd ic t ion . " 
Moreover, Chief Justice White argued that a specific "rule of reason" imposes 
U.S. antitrust law to foreign cartels if they significantly threaten U.S. commerce.3 6 
With this judgment the case-law37 confirmed the legislator's intent concerning 
the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act . 
29
 The Clayton Act concerning the enforcement of antitrust law provided that the U.S. 
government can bring both civil and criminal suits in case of an illegal, anti-competitive 
conduct. Moreover, it mandated private parties to bring suits, and provided treble damages 
for successful complaints. Ibid. 1457. 
30
 Ibid. 1458. 
31
 The U.S. Supreme clearly declared in Rose v. Himely [8 U.S. (Cranch) 241 (1806)] 
that, on the basis of conflict-of-laws rules, U.S. legislation is basically territorial, and 
beyond its borders it can only affect its subjects and citizens. Moreover, in 1812, it forged 
out a presumption that federal law applies only within the U.S. Norton, J. J.: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Security Laws. The International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 28 (1979) 577. 
32
 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
33
 Mehra, S. K.: Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International 
Consensus. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 1999. 204,; Falencki, C. 
A.: Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against Extraterritorialty. The George 
Washington International Law Review 35 (2004) 1219. 
34
 221 U.S. 106(1911). 
35
 Stranger: op. cit. 1458, footnote 24. 
36
 Ibid. Footnote 25. 
37
 Other cases disregarding the principle of territoriality in antitrust matters: Strassheim 
v. Daily [221 U.S. 280 (1911)], U.S. v. Pacific & Arctic Co. [228 U.S. 87 (1913)], and U.S. 
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3.1.2. The "effects doctrine" and the Alcoa judgment 
As we have seen in the prior World War II period, the U.S. courts, fol lowing 
some hesitation, consequently applied U.S. antitrust law to anticompetitive 
foreign business practices affect ing the domest ic market. However, it should 
also be recognized that they did so on the basis of occasional considerations, 
so they did not forge out a coherent doct r ine for the justification of their 
practice. 
The so-called "effects doctr ine" was born in the famous Alcoa decision of 
the Second Circuit . Since it was able to o f fe r a solid conceptual framework for 
antitrust lit igation having extraterritorial dimensions, it could swiftly replace 
the earlier fragmented practice. In 1945 in the US v. Aluminium Company of 
America and others38 (the Alcoa case) the court had to decide on such economic 
effects which resulted from business pract ices of foreigners outside of the 
USA. In the given case an agreement a m o n g foreign a luminium producing 
companies a f fec ted aluminium imports to the United States.3 9 The Cour t 
argued that "I t is a settled law [. . .] that any State may impose liabilities [ . . . ] 
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders."411 
Furthermore, the Court also asserted that the intention to produce effects on the 
territory of Uni ted States is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the US. 
And, if this intention is proved, the burden of proof will automatically shift to 
the defendant to prove that his acts have no such effects.41 
The details of the effects doctrine were elaborated by Judge Learned 
Hand's opinion in this case. According to h im four conditions must be fulf i l led 
to assert US laws over those conducts which occurred outside the territory of 
US. First of all, a close connection between the conduct and its effect is 
necessary. Secondly, this ef fec t must be substantial, so it cannot have marginal 
relevance concerning the given market segment . Thirdly, the effects must be 
"direct and foreseeable"; a mere coincidence of facts is not enough to assert 
jurisdiction. Fourthly, the application of this doctrine should be "consistent 
with generally recognized principles of just ice".4 2 
v. Sisal (274 U.S. 268 (1927)]. Common in these cases that the Court chose quite diverse 
legal bases for the justification of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, for example: producing 
detrimental effects , the realization of the conspiracy happened partially in the U.S., or the 
intention of the parties. Norton: op. cit. 577-579. 
38
 148 F. 2d 416 (2ndCir. 1945). 
39
 Akehurst: op. cit. 193. 
41
 Quoted by Akehurst, ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 194. 
42
 De Kieffer, D. E.: Effects on US Trade. In: Lacey, J. R. (ed.): Act of State and 
Extraterritorial Reach: Problems of Law and Policy. New Orleans, 1982. 63. 
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3.1.3. Post-Alcoa developments: the Timberlane decision and the FTA1A 
Following the A/coo-judgment the ' e f fec ts theory' was applied in many US 
antitrust cases.43 In 1976 the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America44 substantially improved this approach by amending the traditional 
effects test with the element of comity.4 5 In the view of the Ninth Circuit the 
"effects test" simply failed to take into account other states' legitimate interests. 
A so-called "jurisdictional rule of reason"4 6 should be applied in addition to the 
effects analysis in order to decide whether a U.S. Court has jurisdiction over a 
certain business activity. This "jurisdictional rule of reason" is composed of 
several factors which should be assessed to assert jurisdiction. Chief amongst 
these factors are: (i) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, (ii) the 
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to comply, (iii) the 
extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect American 
commerce, and (iv) the relative importance of the given conduct within the 
U.S. as compared with conduct abroad.47 So, by adding the element of comity 
to the "effects test" the Ninth Circuit considerably blunted its edge and there-
fore it contributed to the consolidation of the quite upheaval international 
atmosphere.48 
The Free Trade and Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA) could 
also be regarded as a qualitatively new development in the story of "effects 
test". This procedural statute amending the Sherman Act attempted to unify 
those divergent "effects tests" which were elaborated in the judgments of 
different courts.44 The FTAIA requires the Sherman Act to apply to all conduct 
related to imports, and it can also be applied in those cases where there is a 
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce or U.S. 
exports and this effect "gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act".5 0 
43
 The US courts referred to this doctrine in US v. Timken Roller Bearing Co. [83 F. 
Supp. 284 (1951)], US v. General Electric Co. [82 F. Supp. 753 (1953)], US. v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Centre [Trade Cases 77, 414. (1963)] and Hazeltine 
Research. Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp. [239 F. Supp 51, 78 (1969)]. Cf. Akehurst: op. cit. 194. 
44
 549 F. 2d 597 (9lh Cir. 1976) 
45
 About the concept of comity and its role in antitrust litigation see Mehra: op. cit. 
203-211. 
46
 Ibid. 205. 
47
 Quoted by Mehra, ibid. 
48
 For critics of this approach on the basis that assessing the interests of states is not 
part of the judicial function see: Durack, P.: Australia: Conflicts and Comity. In: Act of 
State and Extraterritorial Reach... op. cit. 48 -49 . 
49
 Cf. Stranger: op. cit. 1459-1460. 
50
 Ibid. 1461. 
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However, the FTAIA was not as successful as initially hoped by the legislator. 
Because of the ambiguous expression of "gives rise to a c la im" divergent 
interpretations began to develop around the question who precisely can have 
standing before a U.S. court in an antitrust case. In case if the plaintiff is a U.S. 
company no problems arise since it can raise the claim without difficulties.51 
Conversely, if the given case is about damages occurring outside the U.S. 
market, which may affect the U.S. market, as a result of non-U.S. companies' 
act, the interpretation of the "gives rise to a c la im" clause is more problematic. 
U.S. courts tried to solve this question in three different and divergent ways. 
The Fifth Circuit held in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap Ai v. HerreMac Vof2  
ease that this clause only allows for plaintiffs who are injured in connection 
with the effect, so it interpreted it very narrowly.5 ' The Second Circuit in 
Kruman v. Christie's International54 chose a different approach by declaring 
that on the basis of this clause it is possible to grant jurisdiction if the plaintiff 
can show evidence of a hypothetical claim under U.S. laws.55 Finally, the D.C. 
Circuit also created its own interpretation. As it was elaborated in Empagran 
S.A. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd56 foreign plaintiffs can have standing if they bring 
a suit alongside those U.S. plaintiffs who had suffered damages in the U.S.57 
3.2. The European approach 
The European Union and the EU member states, on a political and a legislative 
level, produced quite a hostile reaction regarding the extraterritorial reach of 
U.S. antitrust law. The United Kingdom, as for instance, adopted the U.K. 
Protection Trading Interests Act in 1980 in order to outweigh the negative con-
sequences flowing from the U.S. practice. Moreover, in the 90 ' s the EU in 
many press releases questioned the legality of the extraterritorial application of 
the Helms-Burton38 and D'Amato5 9 acts and other laws60 which established 
51
 Ibid. 1464. 
52
 241 F. 3d 420 (5 ,h Cir. 2001). 
53
 For details see: Stranger: op. cit. 1465-1466. 
54
 284 F. 3d 384 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
33
 For details see: Stranger: op. cit. 1466-1468. 
56
 3 1 5 F. 3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
37
 Stranger: op. cit. 1470. 
33
 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.; for a detailed discussion of 
the act from the point of view of the entertprises see: Wallace. C. D.: The Multinational 
Enterprise and Legal Control. The Hague-London-New York, 2002. 613-625. 
34
 Iran and Lybia Sanctions Act of 1996. 
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unilateral sanctions against the so-called "rouge" states between 1993 and 1996. 
Obviously these acts considerably affected other nations' trade and commerce 
by unilaterally blocking commerce and business participation in the sanctioned 
countries. The result of long-lasting negotiations was a Transatlantic Cooperation 
Agreement in 1998. Thereby the U.S. government provided a waiver under 
these acts for the European Union in exchange for suspending the WTO 
proceedings against these acts initiated by the European Communities.61 
From the earlier it may seem that the EU and its member states have been 
quite reluctant towards the extraterritorial application of laws, and they have 
approached this problem from the direction of solid territoriality. However, the 
analysis of some ECJ and Commission decisions may suggest a slightly shaded 
conclusion. During the 60 ' s and 70 ' s the Commission and the Court of Justice 
have already applied the effects doctrine to claim jurisdiction over certain 
business conducts. In cases related to distributorship agreements, Martens and 
Streat v. Bendix (1964) and Bégnél in Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export 
(1971)62 or market-access agreements, Grossfillex v. Fillistorff (1964), the 
European Commission or the ECJ partially applied "effects doctrine".63 
It is also very intriguing that the Advocate Generals in Imperial Chem. 
Indus, v. Commission,4 and Ahlström v. Commission67 explicitly referred to the 
"effects test" by using the same criteria-substantial, direct and foreseeable-as 
used in the U.S.66 But, the ECJ by applying different legal constructions avoided 
the explicit application of the "e f fec t test" in order to establish its juris-
diction. Finally, in 1999 in Gencor v. Commission17 the ECJ declared that it 
has jurisdiction if the conduct, in this case a merger, can have an immediate 
and substantial effect on the EC market . In this case the ECJ acknowledged 
that the application of the "effects test" is not contrary to international law.68 
Thus, while on a political level the countries of the EU and the EU in itself has 
60
 Between 1993 and 1996 61 laws and other administrative actions were adopted, which 
authorized unilateral economic sanctions against 35 countries. For a detailed list see: Layton, 
A.-Parry, A. M.: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: European Responses. Huston Journal of 
International Law, 30 (2004) 315; footnote 22. 
61
 For a detailed discussion of the whole process see ibid. 315-318. 
62
 Case C-22/71 Béguelin Import v G.L. Import Export (Ree. 1971, 949). 
63
 Akehurst: op. cit. 197. 
64
 Case C-48/69 Imperial Chem. Indus, v Commission [1972) European Court Reports, 
619. 
65
 Case C-89/85 Ahlström v Commission [1988] European Court Reports, 5193. 
66
 Layton-Parry: op. cit. 318-320. 
67
 Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd. v Commission [1999] European Court Reports, 11-753. 
68
 Layton-Parry: op. cit. 322. 
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a quite conservative standpoint concerning the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. laws, the practice of the ECJ seems to be quite similar to the U.S. 
practice. 
II. Recent developments on the field of corporate governance law 
I. Changing scope: from behavior of market actors to their governance 
techniques 
Following the earlier brief theoretical-historical overview the paper wishes to 
turn to recent tendencies. As a starting point of this analysis it might be 
worthwhile recognizing a qualitatively new trend underlying the development 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction issues. As we have seen in the first part, from the 
50 ' s to the 80's the problems of extraterritoriality mostly flowed from such 
conducts of economic actors which may affect the domestic market. However, 
following the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 20036 9 the focus of questions 
concerning extraterritoriality suddenly shifted to the area of corporate 
governance. So, while in the first four decades of the history of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction problems were mainly arising from the conduct of economic actors, 
their restrictive practices which may affect the domest ic market, nowadays the 
main problem of legislation having extraterritorial reach is how these economic 
operators direct their businesses. So, the whole problem of extraterritoriality 
got a relatively new layer in the last years besides the 'traditional' issue of 
transnational restrictive economic practices.7" 
' ' For the full text of the act see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
11
 Although commentators agree that U.S. securities laws, in principle, cannot be 
extraterritorially applied there are some very limited exceptions under this rule. In. 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook (403 f. 2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967) and in Leasee Data Processing 
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell (468 F. 2d 1326 (2nd Cir. 1972) the Second Circuit found that 
sec. 10 (b) (an anti-fraud provision) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be 
extraterritorially applied. And. the court developed a specific conflict-of-laws rule for the 
extraterritorial application of this section of the act in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone (549 
F. 2d 614 (9lh Cir. 1976). For details see Norton, J. J.: op. cit. 584-587 and 590-591. 
Additionally, the judgment in Consolidated Goldfields pic. V. Minorco S.A. (871 F. 2d 252 
(1989) also raised the certain questions about the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities laws. 
Cf. F. A. Mann: The Extremism of American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990) 410-412. Furthermore, this development has 
also some antecedents in certain provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
This act covered conduct of (i) U.S. companies' subsidiaries abroad as well as (ii) foreign 
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2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its extraterritorial implications 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted on July 30, 2002 has opened a new chapter in 
the history of extraterritoriality. According to U.S. commentators it should be 
regarded as the most comprehensive corporate reform legislation since the 
reforms that had been introduced under the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.71 Both the Securities Act of 1932 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 mainly intended to give concrete answers to the financial crisis of 
1929 from the aspect of corporate and securities affairs. Commentators also 
agree that the decisive impetus behind the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act were the corporate scandals between 2001 and 2002 coined by such 
companies' names as Enron, World Com Inc., Adelphia Communications Co. 
and so on.72 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must be regarded as a clear govern-
mental answer to certain failures and shortcomings of the U.S. corporate system 
and one of its major aims is to restore and preserve investors' confidence in the 
securities market.73 
It is more than a commonplace that the U.S. securities market is one of the 
world 's most important marketplaces.74 Foreign companies are traditionally 
actors on these capital markets, therefore extraterritorial problems were implied 
from the very first moment of the birth of the act. 
companies registered under the Exchange Act. De Kieffer: op. cit. 61-62. But corporate 
governance issues from the aspect of extraterritoriality were impressively and 
comprehensively raised by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
71
 Lunt, M. G.: The Extraterritorial Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Journal of 
Business Law, 2006. 250. President Bush regarded it as "the most far-reaching reforms of 
American business practices" Thompson, J.: The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as it Relates to the Practitioner Representing a Multinational Corporation. 
Journal of Transnational Law ancl Policy 16 (2006) 266. 
72
 Lunt: op. cit. 249.; On the background and the legislative history of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act see Falencki: op. cit. 1212-1214. 
73
 In the words of William Donaldson, former president of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Quoted by Stoltenberg, C.-Lacey, K. A.-George, B. C.-Cuthbert, 
M.: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance Develop-
ments in the U.S. and European Union. The American Journal of Comparative Law 53 
(2005) 462.; Or, in the words of Congress, as it was formulated in the ac t ' s preamble, 
the aim of the act is "To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." 
74
 Most of the major transnational companies are registered companies on the U.S. 
securities exchanges. Cf.: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary 
2006.pdf 
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2.1. Nexus to extraterritoriality 
Concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its definition 
of "issuer" lias a predominant importance. In its 2 § (a) (1) the act defines 
"issuer" as 
"an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 
the securities of which are registered under section 12 of that Act, or that is 
required to file reports under section 15 (d), or that files or has filed a 
registration statement that has not yet become effect ive under the Securities 
Act of 1933, and that is has not withdrawn."7 5 
Thus, the decisive factor from the personal scope of the act is either the fact 
that a company ' s securities are registered according to the Securities Exchange 
Act or the company is required to send reports to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Therefore, all non-U.S. companies registered on the US. 
securities exchanges and reporting with the SEC are under the scope of the 
act.7'1 So, all companies whose securities are traded in the U.S. must comply 
with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, it is clear that the 
act has an extraterritorial scope from the point of view of those multinational 
enterprises that are registered on U.S. securities exchanges. 
2.2. The major provisions of the act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced numerous new provisions concerning the 
traditional corporate governance structure of U.S. companies. These provisions 
specifically aimed to strengthen the transparency of the companies' affairs so 
they are answers to a specific problem of the U.S. corporate governance 
model. However, they may be in confl ict with foreign corporate governance 
laws due to the explicit extraterritorial nature of the act arising f rom its 
definition of "issuer". Thus it is inevitable to get to know them better, in order 
to understand the vehement foreign, mostly European, reactions. 
The act introduced reform in the following areas of corporate governance.77 
Firstly, it instituted certain reforms regarding the pre-Enron corporate struc-
75
 Quoted by Falencki: op. cit. 1222. 
' On December 31, 2006 1145 foreign companies were registered. Cf.: http://www. 
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary2006.pdf 
On the basis of M. D. Vancea's categorization, however by restructuring it and 
amending it with new elements Cf. Vancea, M. D.: Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance 
Standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation. Duke Law 
Journal 53 (2003) 838-839. 
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t u r e s of U .S . c o m p a n i e s by (i) e s t a b l i s h i n g the s o - c a l l e d audit c o m m i t t e e , as a 
c o m p u l s o r y r e q u i r e m e n t for all c o m p a n i e s under its scope;7 8 ( i i) e x p a n d i n g 
cer ta in d i sc losure r e q u i r e m e n t s for p r i nc ipa l execu t ive off icers ; 7 4 ( i i i ) in t roduc-
ing n e w ce r t i f i ca t ion r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r C E O s and C F O s ; 8 0 ( iv) p r o h i b i t i n g loans 
to e x e c u t i v e s of a c o m p a n y 8 1 and ( v ) e s t ab l i sh ing a n e f f i c i en t " w h i s t l e b l o w e r 
p r o t e c t i o n " s y s t e m f o r e m p l o y e e s p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e f inancial 
s i tua t ion of a c o m p a n y . 8 2 Second ly , it m a d e se r ious e f fo r t s in o r d e r to (vi) 
c o n s i d e r a b l y e n h a n c e the i n d e p e n d e n c e of audi tors by d rama t i ca l ly d e c r e a s i n g 
the po ten t i a l pe r sona l and bus iness r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n audit f i r m s a n d their 
aud i t c l i en ts . 8 3 T h i r d l y , f r o m the a s p e c t of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n it (vii) 
78
 Section 301 of the act obliges all publicly registered companies to establish an audit 
committee which is directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight 
of the work of the auditor, a public accounting firm registered by the new regulatory entity 
(PCAOB), employed by the issuer. This committee is composed of independent members 
and members of the board of directors. The other main part of this committee's work is to 
treat any complaints on accounting, internal controls and auditing matters. Lunt: op. cit. 252. 
'Section 409 obliges each issuer to disclose to the public any relevant information 
regarding the financial situation of the company as rapidly as possible. Furthermore, according 
to section 401 every report containing financial statements, mainly the periodic reports, 
should reflect all "material correcting adjustments to [...] financial statements" which have 
been identified by an external audit firm. Lunt: op. cit. 254-255. 
8,1
 Section 302 requires that both the principal executive and financial officer must 
certify in the quarterly and annual reports that they give a fair presentation of the financial 
situation, so to say the statements contained in the report are accurate and complete. 
Additionally, as required by section 906, these periodic reports submitted to the SEC have 
to include a certification prepared by the CEOs and CFOs that the given report fully 
complies with the relevant sections of the Securities Exchange Act. Lunt: op. cit. 251. 
81
 Section 402 prohibits any credits in the form of personal loans to executive officers. 
Lunt: op. cit. 251. 
82
 Section 806 forbids to discharge, suspend, threaten, harass or even discriminate 
against an employee because of the fact that this employee lawfully provided information 
or assisted in an investigation. If the employee can reasonably believe that a conduct 
constitutes a violation of any securities law he cannot be sanctioned due to her/his assistance 
to the public authorities. Lunt: op. cit. 255-256. 
83
 Section 206 forbids audit firms to perform for a company any audit service if any of 
the companies' principal executive officers has been employed by the given audit firm and 
participated in any capacity in the audit of that company in the one year period preceding 
the actual audit process. Additionally, Section 201 explicitly prohibits auditors to provide 
eight specified non-audit services for the audit clients. Furthermore, section 203 requires 
that audit partners should rotate every five years. O'Neill, T.-Cardi. B.-Chabit, S.: Conflicts 
between French Law and Practice of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. International 
Business Lawyer, April 2003, 62-63. 
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s t r e n g t h e n e d the s a n c t i o n s , both c iv i l and c r i m i n a l , f o r v io la t ions of secur i t ies 
l aw 8 4 and (viii) s i g n i f i c a n t l y b r o a d e n e d the p r e s c r i p t i v e c o m p e t e n c e s of the 
S E C o v e r c o m p a n i e s by d e l e g a t i n g a general i m p l e m e n t i n g p o w e r to it85 and 
( ix) es tab l i shed a n e w admin i s t r a t ive body, the P u b l i c C o m p a n y Accoun t ing 
O v e r s i g h t Board ( P C A O B ) to r e g i s t e r audit c o m p a n i e s and set f o r th c o m p u l s o r y 
s t a n d a r d s for the a u d i t p ro fe s s ion . 8 6 
2.3. Arguments for justification and critics 
O b v i o u s l y , the S a r b a n e s - O x l e y A c t has b e e n a cen t ra l t o p i c of po l i t i ca l , 
b u s i n e s s and s c h o l a r l y d isputes s i n c e C o n g r e s s p a s s e d it. In t h e s e deba tes o n e 
can d i s t ingu ish a n a r m a d a of a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g the v a l u e s and the 
d i s a d v a n t a g e s of t h e ac t . In the n e x t par t this p a p e r shall try to s u m m a r i z e the 
m o s t impor tan t l i n e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n in o r d e r t o indicate t h e w o r l d w i d e 
r e c e p t i o n of the ac t . 
84
 If the principal officers falsely certify a report, or any report contains false state-
ments, they have to face serious fines and/or prison sentences. In case of a "knowingly" 
false certification the penalty may be a fine up to $1 million and/or prison sentence of up to 
10 years. If it was committed "willfully" the penalties imposed are much more serious, a 
fine up to $5 million and/or prison sentence of up to 20 years. Moreover, the act creates a 
new crime for the destruction, alteration or falsification of records in federal investigations 
and the destruction of corporate audit records in its section 802. Ibid.: Vancea: op. cit. 839. 
Footnote 32. 
83
 The act by its section 3 (a) gives a general mandate to the SEC to "promulgate such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, and in furtherance of this Act ." Until July 30, 2003 the SEC 
adopted 13 sets of rules in various areas, such as for example improving the independence 
of outsider auditors, requiring companies to disclose whether they have a code of ethics for 
the principal officers, or governing standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before the 
SEC. Section 1103 permits SEC to temporally freeze certain payments made to those who 
violated securities law, and due to section 1105 the SEC has an authority to prohibit 
persons from serving as principal officers or directors. For the details see http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.litm 
86
 In order to enhance the transparency of the work of audit companies Section 101 
created a new administrative body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. One 
of the main areas of the work of this body is to register audit firms, because after the 
adoption of the act only publicly registered audit firms can provide audit services. Besides 
this authorization function it has the competence to adopt standards, as for instance auditing, 
quality control and ethics which should be respected by all registered companies. More-
over, this organ has a certain supervisory function because it can conduct inspections as 
well as investigations and disciplinary proceedings regarding public accounting firms, and 
it can even impose appropriate sanctions. Lunt: op. cit. 254. 
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2.3.1. Arguments of justification 
The main justification behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the intention to 
defend the American capital markets and, in a broader sense, to protect the 
whole American free enterprise system. On the one hand President George W. 
Bush argued that this act provides "new too ls" for the U.S . administration.8 7 
And, these "new tools" make the American authorities ab le to defend the 
American free enterprise system against corruption and cr ime, even in an 
"aggressive" way.88 On the other hand, Senator Paul Sarbanes emphasized that 
the act is an essential piece of legislation in order to protect the investors' 
confidence in the U.S. corporate structures. Senator Sarbanes pointed out that 
the trust "in corporate executives and their financial repor ts" as well as the 
independence of accountants should be regarded as the main aims of the act.84 
Consequently, the act is just if ied in the eye of the U.S. government by the aim 
of protecting the American system of capitalism through the defense of trust 
and confidence in the U.S. corporate structures. This governmental intent to 
restore the confidence can effectively contribute to the smooth functioning of 
U.S. capital markets, which can also be considered to be of vital importance to 
U.S. style capitalism. 
Another argument for the justification of the act, on a scholarly level, is 
that it can potentially establish "global best practices",40 so to say it can foster 
the existing convergence of corporate models.41 Many exper ts state that the 
convergence of corporate governance models can lead to a substantial decrease 
of transaction costs of issuers and to an increased comparability of companies. 
Furthermore, it can also facilitate the opportunities of global firms to enter 
foreign public markets, and trade there with their shares.42 In conclusion, the 
convergence of corporate governance models based on worldwide recognized 
"global best practices" can reduce the transaction costs of the functioning of 
enterprises. And this reduction of transaction costs can increase the efficiency 
of world economy which may lead to a better performance of world markets. 
87
 President George W. Bush's speech at the time of signing Sarbanes-Oxley, July 30, 
2002. Quoted by Thompson: op. cit. 266. 
88
 Ibid. 
84
 Faleneki: op. cit. 1214. 
90
 Cohen, A.-Winter, M.: The Debate Sarbanes-Oxley. Accountancy Age, Sept 4, 2002. 
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/comment/2038648/debate-sarbanes-oxley 
91
 Vancea: op. cit. 867-870. 
92
 Cf. Ibid. 868. Footnote 169. At this point the author quotes the researches of John C. 
Coffee. 
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2.3.2. "Insicler" and foreign criticisms 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been ander very severe criticism since its enactment 
in July 2002. Regarding these critics, one interesting, probably unusual point is 
that the act was criticized by U.S. issuers as well as foreign actors. 
Smaller U.S. firms were quite vocal concerning the negative effects of the 
act on their businesses. Several advisory organizations came up with such 
conclusions that the burden created by the provisions of the act is quite 
significant for small companies being publicly listed. T h e y also anticipated 
that for these small companies it is even advantageous to go private, that is to 
de-list f rom the stock exchanges, because they can avoid a considerable 
increase of their costs in this way. As for instance, a survey realized in 2004 
found that fo r smaller companies , that is f i rms with annual revenues less than 
SI billion, the price to remain listed increased by 130 percent compared to the 
costs of the last pre-Sarbanes-Oxley year.93 
Besides this increasing of compliance costs small f i rms can be threatened 
by a silent change in the atti tude of audit f i rms invoked by the act. Due to the 
severity of the new rules regarding the auditors, audit companies, mostly the 
Big Four, may drop their cl ients considered to be too risky to work with them. 
Because of the fact that a Big Four audit is regarded by the business community 
as symbol of prosperity, losing this relation can send a bad message to possible 
investors. Furthermore, the increase in audit fees due to the act ' s audit provisions 
may also imply disadvantageous consequences for the smal ler companies.94 
The universal foreign criticism has basically been focused on the charge of 
illegitimate extraterritoriality of the act.95 Generally, the international com-
munity complained that the U.S. intended to act as a global regulator on the 
field of corporate governance practices, thus it did not respect, or even infringed 
the sovereignty of other countries to rule these activities.4'1 Consequently, the act 
appeared to conflict with classical principles of public international law on 
jurisdiction. Additionally, international business community raised a very clear-
cut point regarding the ac t ' s disadvantageous implications. In the view of 
foreign f i rms it has a very strong anti-competitive aspect vis-à-vis foreign 
companies.97 They argued that the cost of compliance for foreign companies is 
41
 Stoltenberg-Lacey-George-Cuthbert: op. cit. 469. Footnote 72: first and second 
sections. 
14
 Ibid. Footnote: 72 third section. 
43
 Cf. Vagts, D. F.: Extraterritoriality and Corporate Governance Law. The American 
Journal of International Law 97 (2003) 293. 
96
 Falencki: op. cit. 1218. 
97
 Ibid. 
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much higher,98 errors, and therefore criminal penalties are much more likely, 
and some exceptions of the act favor U.S. companies." Additionally, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Japan asserted that Congress failed to respect the 
principles of comity, which obliges the U.S. to adjust to those foreign regulations 
which are equivalent to the provisions of the act."10 
The European Commission, either as a body or through its high officials, 
also indicated quite serious concerns about the act. In a communication of 
2003 the EU Commission raised the problem of "outreach effects" on European 
companies as well as auditors and asserted that these can cause "a series of 
problems".101 Moreover, Alexander Schaub, Director General of DG Internal 
Market in his speech in the framework of an ECB Symposium criticized the 
act owing to the lack of consultation and the rather fast and hasty process in 
which it was enacted."12 
Moreover, certain European companies explicitly declared that they have 
very serious doubts whether it is worthwhile to maintain their listing in New 
York. The increased costs of compliance to the new requirements may 
outweigh the benefits of being listed on the New York Stock Exchange.1"3 
Moreover, almost two thirds of European CEOs said during a survey in 2003 
that they are more reluctant concerning the access to U.S. capital markets then 
they have been prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These European CEOs argued 
that the over-regulation created by the act could be the biggest threat to the 
business."14 As an illustration of this wide-spread att i tude among European 
98
 Lunt: op. cit. 264. About compliance costs in details see: Thompson: op. cit. 265. 
Footnote 1. Concerning S&P 500 companies the average costs of auditing fees in 2001 (the 
last prior-Sarbanes-Oxley year) was $2.934.000, following the adoption of the act in 2002 
it increased to an average of $4.048.000. 
99
 Section 402 generally prohibits all loans to executives, but it provides certain 
exceptions for U.S. banks, on the basis that they are insured by a federal entity, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Falencki: op. cit. 1218. 
100
 Ibid. 1211; for a detailed analysis of conflicting rules see Falencki: op. cit. 1225-
1229. 
101
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the E U - A Plan to 
Move Forward, COM (2003) 284, 2004 OJ (C 80) 12-16, quoted by Stoltenberg-Lacey-
George-Cuthbert: op. cit. 468. 
102
 Speech by Alexander Schaub, Director General of DG Internal Markets to the ECB 
Symposium, Money v. Ethics, Nov 29, 2002, quoted ibid. 
103
 Ibid. 470. 
104
 Schlesinger, L.: Sarbanes-Oxley scares off European CEOs . Accountancy Age, 24 
Jan, 2003. http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2031960/sarbanes-
oxley-scares-european-ceos 
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CEOs, Wendelin Wiedeking, Porches ' s CEO argued, when his company with-
drew its plans fo r listing on the NYSE, that the certification requirement for 
C E O s and CFOs makes no sense , because German company law establishes a 
collective responsibility for the management board."15 
2.3.3. Scholarly problems 
T h e other part of criticism was raised by scholars and experts. A major part of 
this wave of criticism focused on the issue that the act is, in reality, an 
unambiguous exportation of U .S . corporate governance models. Some scholars 
even asserted that since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted without any 
foreign consultation, in a unilateral way.""1 it can be a kind of American economic 
imperialism.11,7 Thus, from the aspect of international business environment 
including multinational companies as well as major powers of world trade, 
the act may indicate the intent of the U.S. to export its corporate governance 
model without taking into account other interests and divergent models. 
From a more detailed perspective it can also be argued that the Sarbanes-
Oxley is not in conformity with those requirements which can justify its 
extraterritorial scope. According to an academic position neither the subject-
matter test nor the effects test can justify the extraterritoriality of the act.'"8 
Due to the fact that that the act does not use any geographical terms and that 
the act's legislative history suggests that the act is mainly concerned with 
domest ic problems, the Congre s s ' intent to regulate extraterritorial affairs 
cannot be presumed."14 Additionally, since the act also tries to regulate that 
kind of conduct which cannot have substantial harmful effects on U.S. 
investors, because these conducts have already been effectively regulated by 
foreign legal systems, the act goes beyond those considerations which may 
jus t i fy extraterritoriality under the effects test."11 Additionally, it should also be 
taken into account that from the perspective of a comity analysis, even in the 
narrow sense of cases of true conflicts between U.S. and foreign laws, as 
accepted in the Hartford Fire'" judgment, the legitimate extraterritoriality of 
the act is highly questionable.112 
105
 Lunt: op. cit. 264. 
Stoltenberg-Lacey-George-Cutlibert: op. cit. 457; Vancea; op. cit. 874; Lunt: op. 
cit. 266. 
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 Falencki: op. cit. 1224. 
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 Vancea: op. cit. 849-860. 
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Case-studies based on the post-Sarbanes-Oxley experiences revealed the 
fact that certain provisions of the act conflict with some structural elements of 
U.S. or foreign legal systems. Section 307, for instance, requires an attorney 
representing an issuer to report any evidence of a material violation of securities 
law to the chief legal officer or to higher forums, as the Audit Committee or 
the Board of Directors. This provision obviously conflicts with the American 
Bar Association's model rules of professional conduct which require the 
attorney not to disclose any information without her/his client's permission. 
The narrow exceptions provided by these model rules, preventing the client 
f rom committing a criminal act which likely result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm, can obviously not be applied to this case ." 3 
Some whistleblower protection provisions can also be in conflict with 
national legal systems. In order to get all relevant information related to the 
work of the whole company; companies should establish anonymous tip-lines 
through which an employee can inform the management of the company 
without giving any personal information.114 However , these tip-lines are not 
in conformity with the data-protection rules applied in the EU. In France in 
the case of McDonalds the French Data Protection Authority found that 
McDonalds by introducing an anonymous tip line failed to comply with the 
French Data Protection provision, hence it did not authorize this tip-line 
sys tem." 1 A German Court also established that a similar tip-line created by 
the Wal-Mart Group is contrary to the provisions of the German Works 
Constitution Act.116 
2.4. General Assessment 
The most general and most important effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the 
significantly stronger U.S. governmental position in the supervision of financial 
markets and their operat ions ." 7 The act established a new administrative 
body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and broadened the 
competences of SEC by mandating it with the implementation of the act. So, 
one can easily recognize a shift in the attitude of the U.S. legislator. By this act 
the legislator abandoned the former regulation model based on the self-
113
 Thompson: op. cit. 268. 
114
 Ibid. 269-270. 
115
 Ibid. 271-274. 
116
 Ibid. 274-277. 
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 Ehrat, F. R.: Sarbanes-Oxley-a View from Outside. International Business Lawyer, 
April 2003. 77. 
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regulation mechanisms established and managed by market-participants, and 
proceeded to a novel model in which state supervision has the preeminent 
ro l e . " 8 It may also indicate that the U.S. legislator recognized the relevance of 
the enhanced governmental regulation of financial markets in order to tame 
those turbulences which might be caused by the market actors' conduct. 
Taking into account the importance of U.S. capital markets on the world 
scene it seems to be quite likely that the act shall have a certain benchmark 
e f fec t . "" Foreign legislators may regard the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a reference 
point or a model having certain provisions which might be worthwhile to take 
into consideration during the draft ing of new corporate governance standards. 
For instance, during the discussion of 8th Company Law Directive on statutory 
audit Commissioner McCreevy suggested very similar points on the further 
development of EC law in this area.120 Inter alia he emphasized that the 
directive should clarify the duties of auditors, their independence and their ethics. 
Moreover he argued for a "robust public oversight of the audit profession".121 
The recent version of this directive being in force obliges public-interest 
entities to establish an audit committee which should primarily monitor the 
financial reporting process and the effectiveness of the company internal audit 
and risk management system.122 It is not too difficult to identify the same 
underlying philosophy behind the above-cited article of the EC directive and 
the relevant paragraphs of Sarbanes Oxley Act on audit committees. Both the 
U.S. and the EC legislator attempts to strengthen the independence of audit 
mechanisms by establishing a new committee within the traditional corporate 
structures in order to minimize the risks arising from the possible interlocking 
of companies and audit firms. 
In conclusion, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not only profoundly changed 
the regulative framework of U.S. financial markets by setting forth new 
standards for publicly listed companies, but revealed a new tendency of U.S. 
legislation which proceeds to an increased governmental intervention in former 
self-regulatory areas. Additionally, the act can also illustrate another change 
in the U.S. legislator's approach concerning extraterritoriality; instead of the 
118
 Ibid. 
7 m d -
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 Naturally, the effects of Parmalat collapse in 2003 should also taken into account as 
a significant motivation to adopt an ammended version of the former directives on audit 
controls. Cf. Stoltenberg-Lacey-George-Cuthberg: op. cit. 478-481. 
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former international practice focusing on the search for cooperative solutions 
to extraterritorial problems, the U.S. legislator privileges the unilateral solution 
nowadays. 
III. Sovereignty in the mirror of the recent extraterritorial developments 
1. Introductory remarks 
Sovereignty is one of the most important basic antinomies in the understanding 
of modern international law. Its precise meaning, boundaries and relevance has 
been broadly debated in our age, however these very intense scholarly disputes 
indicate its inestimable importance within the structure of international law.123 
Extensive debates on sovereignty, from the most different perspectives, are 
quite frequent, but a theory of international law without sovereignty, at least 
as an antithesis, is nearly unimaginable. Hence, it is a rational solution to 
compare the earlier f indings with certain dimensions of sovereignty, since it 
may facilitate to bet ter understand both our f ind ings and sovereignty in 
itself.124 
In the next part the paper will reflect the earlier f indings to the concept of 
sovereignty by using three different prisms. Each prism-Legislatio, Legitimatio 
and Subordinatio-will highlight a peculiar feature of sovereignty to compare 
this feature to recent extraterritorial developments. This method may make 
possible to better comprehend the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the general 
concept of sovereignty and formulate some conclusions. 
2. Legislat io-sovereignty as legislation 
Those international lawyers who rely on the heritage of Jean Bodin agree that 
legislation is the most crucial aspects of sovereignty.123 By the ' invention' of 
sovereignty Bodin created the modern state's most relevant conceptual basis. 
123
 Cf. Jennings, Sir R.: Sovereignty and International Law. In: Kreijen, G. (ed.): State, 
Sovereignty and International Governance. Oxford, 2002. 27. 
124
 Due to the differences in the interpretation of this concept, this paper does not 
endeavor to work out a comprehensive definition. In the following analysis it will only 
apply certain dimensions of sovereignty, which should be a part of it, however they should 
not be every part. 
125
 Cf. Jennings: op. cit. 30-31. Sir Jennings here argues that these years ' tragic 
situations related to 'failed states' in Asia and Africa are obvious symptoms of the decline 
of state sovereignty. 
434 BALÁZS FEKETE 
If the modern state is sovereign all governmental functions, so to say the 
corollaries of statehood like legislation, execution and judic iary , are easily 
explainable coherently from the point of view of public law. Since every state 
competence emanates from a f inal axiom, f rom the suprema potestas. And 
one particularly relevant dimensions of sovereignty is legislation, as Bodin 
formulated it: an essential manifestation of sovereignty is the power to make 
the law.126 Or, in a more modern wording: a state's sovereign right to regulate " 
those conducts which are under its jurisdiction, if certain requirements regarding 
the basis for it are met. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a sovereign legislative act in an age when most 
scholars talk about the disappearance or the erosion of traditional sovereignty 
presuming a governmental center of decision-making.'28 They argue mostly 
following these three patterns. First , in our world classical state sovereignty is 
diminishing since the interlocked nature of world economy and its economic 
self-regulation regimes make it meaningless.124 Hence state sovereignty is a 
possible source of binding norms, but neither the only one, nor a privileged 
one. Secondly, besides the classic governmental level alternative, that is from 
sub-national units to supra-national or global processes, decision-making centers 
have been emerging since the end of Cold War. ' 3 0 Therefore, more and more 
parts of decisions are made on a level, or in a process which is not the traditional 
governmental one. And thirdly, due to the considerable improvement of 
regulatory elements in international law, such as for instance human rights 
enforcement mechanisms, international law erodes governments ' sovereignty 
"Primum ac praecipium caput majestatis [...] legem universis ac singulis civibus 
dare posse" quoted by Ibid. 27. 
U7
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Solution. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 34 (1985) 744-746. 
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to comprehensively regulate domestic affairs.1 ,1 That being said, governments 
should incorporate norms having an international or supranational law origin 
into their legal systems without possessing any discretion for their implemen-
tation. 
Notwithstanding this, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests a slightly differ-
entiated conclusion about the imaginable future of sovereignty. Through 
classical lenses this act is the best example of a traditional sovereign legislative 
act. When Congress passed the act, it made a serious effort to change the 
whole framework of such a regulatory area-law of securities and corporate 
governance-which has a strategic importance f rom the perspective of the 
whole U.S. economy in the age of globalization. Thus, this 'draconian' change 
in the law of securities is in the very national interest of the U.S. In doing so, 
the legislator was quite reluctant to take into account the legitimate interests of 
other states or those of the international community, in one word comity 
concerns. So, the act had been passed in a unilateral way, which was shocking 
as a new state practice regarding the cooperative solution of extraterritorial 
issues seemed to be gradually emerging at the end of the 90's.132 But, the U.S. 
legislator simply disregarded this former practice and enacted the act without 
any serious doubts in its legality concerning all international law aspects. 
Furthermore, the SEC, being responsible for its implementation, has also 
been very reluctant to consider foreign complaints, al though it provided some 
extension of compliance deadlines, it did not permit any exemptions f rom the 
scope of the act for foreign companies.133 
In conclusion, the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act unambiguously shows 
that notwithstanding all those considerations and achievements which may 
suggest the rethinking of the classic theories of public international law largely 
131
 Cf. Weiler. J. H. H.: The Geology of International Law-Governance, Democracy 
and Legitimacy. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 64 ( 2004) 
559. 
1
 ~ AH examples of this emerging practice in antitrust cases-Agreement relating to 
Mutual Co-operation regarding Restrictive Business Practices of 1976 (USA-Germany), 
Agreement relating to Co-operation on Antitrust Matters of 1982 (USA-Australia), the 
final outcome of the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger, and the Transatlantic 
Partnership on Political Cooperation and Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for 
Strengthening of Investment Protection in 1998 about the effects of the Helms-Burton and 
D'Amato Acts between the United States and the European Union-showed that the parties 
concerned can find cooperative solutions. 
133
 This is contrary to the former SEC practice, which exempted foreign companies 
from certain obligations flowing from the securities acts. For a more detailed discussion 
see Faleneki: op. cit. 1229-1231. and Lunt: op. cit. 250. 
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based on sovereignty, sovereignty as a right to legislation is still in force and 
can be a powerful tool in the hands of governments. And, governments by using 
this tool can seriously disturb the recent structure of international law by 
creating such a situation which is obviously contrary to the universally 
recognized principles of international law. However, this atti tude is such a 
reality which renders the adjustment of both international and national policies 
necessary. 
3. Legitimatio—sovereignty as a value-basis in the construction of 
international law 
From the second half of the 19,h century to the first decade of the 20th century, 
transactional ism was the dominant assumption in the theory of international 
law. This approach was mostly based on such interlinking concepts as sovereign 
equali ty, consent and pacta sunt servanda.134 It also meant that the basic 
legitimating source of the whole international order based on an international 
law mostly comprised of bilateral treaties was the sovereign will of actors. So, 
behind the whole system of international law stood the states' sovereign will as 
a fundamental cornerstone of the entire world order. Therefore , from this 
perspective, Sovereignty, that is to say sovereign equality, could be regarded 
as the preeminent legitimating source of international law. 
However, following the end of World War I and owing to the hard lessons 
stemming from it the value structure of the international system has begun to 
gradually change. First of all. Stability as a value has appeared. It primarily 
meant that the maintenance of the stability of the international system with the 
help of a multilateral framework should be considered as a value of humankind. 
This conviction was reflected among the objectives of the League of Nations 
in an embryonic form,1'35 and considerably elaborated in the UN Charter.13'1 
Then, Human Rights have also become a legitimating factor of international 
law as they were concretized in the UN human rights system, f rom a solemn 
declaration through covenants to implementing and follow-up mechanisms.137 
Moreover, international Rule-of-Law, meaning the slow formation of increasingly 
134
 Cf. Weiler: op. cit. 555. 
135
 Preamble, Art 8 first para. Art 10, Art 11. The Covenant of the League of Nations. 
136
 Art 1. UN Charter. 
1,7
 de Wet, E.: The International Constitutional Order. International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 55 (2006) 58. 
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refined and complex international dispute settlements systems,138 also got quite 
an important place within the values of the international community. 
Thus, the value-basis of international law is much richer and broader today 
than it was at the turn of the 20lh century, when Sovereignty had a predominant 
place in this construction. Therefore, legitimization of international law emanates 
from these values which can even permit the restriction of Sovereignty in order 
to favor other values. 
The legislative attitude behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is exclusively based 
on the sovereignty of Congress. Within certain constitutional limits139 Congress 
can regulate anything, even conducts occurring outside the territory of the U.S., 
and it is only legitimated by Sovereignty. It is not too difficult to recognize that 
this approach has clearly originated f rom that century when Sovereignty, and 
the national interest implied within it, was the predominant legitimating factor 
in international law. So, as the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shows it, 
this classic attitude did not at all disappear under the influence of the new 
values, it can again-and-again appear if a certain constellation of facts invokes it. 
What could be the major factors being able to trigger this attitude? On the 
basis of lessons arising f rom the Sarbanes-Oxley Act one of them is clearly 
identifiable. If basic or vital interests of a state are at stake, it is quite likely 
that the given government will answer by bringing out the mask of Sovereignty. 
And, if this state has enough power,140 in military, economic and diplomatic 
sense, to disregard or neglect the reactions of the international community, 
such an answer will be even more likely. 
4. S u bоrd i n a t i o-so vereign ty with the eyes of subjects 
138
 For a comprehensive overview of the web of international, regional and speeialized 
tribunals as well as international administrative tribunals and international arbitral tribunals 
see: Burgenthal, T.: Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad. 
Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001) 267-271. 
139
 Concerning extraterritoriality the Congress is limited by the so-called "subject-
matter" test which comprised of two mutually interlinked assumptions. The first one is the 
"Charming Betsy presumption" implying that legislative acts cannot to be enacted in 
violation of international law. The second one, the Foley Bros, presumption, asserts that an 
act of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, can be applied within U.S. territorial 
jurisdiction. The intent of Congress, if it is not an explicit one, can be revealed from the 
given act 's legislative history and the related administrative decisions. This doctrine was 
revitalized by the Aramco judgment in 1991. Cf. Vaneea: op. cit. 849-852. 
14(1
 Cf. Rynagaert, С.: The Limits of Substantive International Economic Law: In 
Support of Reasonable Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. KULeuven Institute for International 
Law Working Papers, No. 99, Aug. 2006. at http://law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/ 
WP99e.pdf, 2. 4,h para, and 5. 3rd para. 
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From a different angle, sovereignty necessarily implies the fact of subordina-
tion to the suprema potestas. All subjects under the scope of the sovereign must 
obey to its acts so long as the conditions for a legitimate practice of sovereign 
powers are satisfied. In modern international law this convict ion is reflected 
in the very ref ined doctrine of jurisdiction as well as in the detailed rules of 
confl icts-of- laws. Thus, doctr ine of jurisdiction and confl ict-of- laws rules 
orientate that fundamental preparatory process in international law whereby a 
person is subjected to a given legal system which emanates f rom the will of a 
sovereign. Therefore, these areas of law, which may have a marginal significance 
compared to the weight of substantive provisions, have a vital importance 
regarding the element of subordinatio in international law. So, state practice 
concerning the extraterritorial reach of a sovereign act can have fundamental 
importance from the point of view of potential subjects. 
In accordance with the provisions of the act every issuer is under the scope 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act if its securities are registered on the U.S. financial 
markets or it has to report regularly to the SEC. In order to get a slightly more 
precise picture on the relevance of this section it is worthwhile comparing the 
list of top 200 transnational companies with the list of registered companies on 
the U.S. securities exchanges.141 In 1999, so during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
period, from the top 30 transnational companies 21 companies were foreign 
in accordance with their place of incorporation and the remaining 9 were 
incorporated in the USA. From the foreign multinational companies only 7 
companies were not registered under the SEC (4 Japanese and 3 German multi-
nationals). This fact means that the most powerful players of world economy 
attach a substantial importance, due to a number of reasons as for instance 
access to nearly unlimited sources of capital or indicating the prosperity by 
being registered on such prestigious marketplaces, to the fact of being registered 
on U.S. capital markets. So, a considerable majori ty of top global multinational 
companies'4" is an actor on the U.S. securities markets, that is to say they have 
to act under the scope of U.S. securities law even if they are de facto foreign 
companies. Nevertheless, until the birth of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the SEC 
141
 Cf. S. Anderson and J. Cavanagh: Top 200-The Rise of Corporate Global Power, 
at http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/Top_200.pdf 10. Table 3. Top 200 (1999); and 
International Registered and Report ing Companies, Alphabethical Listing (2000) at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/alpha2000.htm 
!4
~ About multinational or transnational companies in general see: Wallace: op. cit. 9— 
13 and 60-70. 
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provided them some exception from those obligations which must be completely 
fulfilled by domestic companies. 
With the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Congress in fact tried to fully 
subject all registered companies to its jurisdiction notwithstanding their place 
of origin or registration. So, the U.S. Sovereign sent a clear message to the 
major actors of the global economy: if they want to have access to the U.S. 
capital market they have to fully comply with the requirements of the act, even 
if this extraterritorial reach is contrary to international law and the former 
international practice, or the compliance costs are too high. Foreign multi-
nationals can only stay on the domestic capital markets if they accept these 
new rules emanating from the will of sovereign. In any other case, due to 
whatever legitimate reason of non-compliance, transnational companies must 
leave the U.S. securities exchanges because exemption from the scope of the 
act is impossible. 
In conclusion, if transnational companies would like to participate in the 
exploitation of U.S. capital sources, they have to subject their full corporate 
governance system to the new rules created by the Sovereign. So, Congress 
offered them a stay or leave solution via neglecting the classical mechanisms 
to deal with the problem of subordinatio developed by scholars and state 
practice in the last century. This attitude revealed again, in a very bluntly way, 
the element of subordinatio in sovereignty which was successfully disguised 
and tamed by the doctrine of jurisdiction and international private law. 
5. Final comments 
The comparison of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to these three profoundly interlocked 
dimensions of sovereignty-Legislatio, Legitimatio and Subordinatio-can lead 
us toward a slightly non-conventional conclusion. First of all, it should be 
recognized that the whole concept of sovereignty is under transformation. The 
concept of sovereignty is changing since states are more-and-more willing to 
give up or confer certain competences to international organizations. More-
over, the international, perhaps it is better-to-say global context of international 
law has also considerably changed, and this transformation also eroded some 
original aspects of sovereignty mostly in an economic sense. 
However, as the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act unambiguously shows, 
this does not at all mean that sovereignty is completely disappearing, rather 
that its function has been transforming to a certain degree. Nowadays, in 
accordance with the emblematic example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, legislative 
sovereignty-legitimated by the sovereign interest and the goal of subjecting 
certain actors to the sovereign regulative competences in order to protect vital 
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national interests-might be conceived of as an ultima ratio, a last legal basis 
which can be very eff icient ly invoked. 
In conclusion, it is quite p laus ib le to say that the classical 19 th century 
approach of sovereignty is outda ted , but sovereignty is still in p lay if the 
question is the protection of fundamenta l national interests. One may formulate 
this conclus ion f rom a different ang le , too: under the layers of g lobal inter-
dependence, multilateralism, regionalism and international regulatory processes-
that is to say under the surface of those factors of which our age ' s international 
environment is compr i sed-we can get to see Sovereignty if a certain constella-
tion of facts invoke its re-appearance. And, it has exactly happened in the case 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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I. Introduction 
The paper aims to determine how consumers are protected in Hungary when 
concluding, the basic and most f requent transaction in their everyday life, 
the sales transaction. In other words it explores what rights consumers have 
according to the law in force, and which procedures and remedies are available 
when their rights are infringed. In exploring consumer 's rights and remedies a 
complex approach is taken, and the protection of consumers is analyzed from 
both civil and criminal law point of views. 
The paper deals with consumer sales transactions. However, as sales contract 
in the Hungarian Civil Code is def ined as a contract for the sale of goods, the 
features of the sale of goods contract will be considered, together with 
mentioning some special ways of sale like distance contracts and doorstep 
selling, but some contracts that otherwise could be considered as sales contracts 
and some selling arrangements like time-share agreements and package holidays 
will stay outside the scope of this paper. 
The paper aims to give a comprehensive overview of consumer protection 
issues arising out of the sales contract in Hungary, f rom the advertising activity, 
via the contract itself, and until the enforcement of consumer's rights. Attention 
will be given even to consumer education and information, as important tools 
for making smart purchase choices. However, since a wide range of issues will 
be covered, there is no place for an indebt analysis. Therefore, the paper aims 
to give a structured summary of consumer ' s rights, remedies, institutions, 
enforcing mechanisms, procedures, educational and information tools and 
methods, pointing onto some compelling problems but leaving room for further 
research and discussion. 
Since the research (that this paper is based on) has been conducted in 
Szeged, the capital of Csongrád County, the city with county rights (megyei 
jogú város)1 and its own university, the paper will, when dealing with the 
application of the law in practice, present unique, location specific data related 
to consumer protection in Szeged. 
After the introduction the paper will give a short overview of the crucial 
definitions (consumer, sales contract) and present the legislation in force (civil 
and criminal law). Thereafter it turns to the enforcement of the law, to its 
mechanisms and procedures, also briefly showing the institutional framework of 
consumer protection in Hungary. The last part spreads some light on consumer 
education and information. The paper is concluded with a short assessment of 
1
 The local authorities have extended powers but are not independent territorial units. 
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the main research findings and some remarks on the future of consumer protec-
tion in Hungary. 
II. Definitions 
Before turning to the legislation in force and its enforcement, it is necessary to 
determine how the crucial terms, the consumer and the sales contract are 
defined according to the Hungarian law. 
1. Who is a consumer? 
Interestingly, the Hungarian law knows a couple of definitions, they are given 
by the CLV Act of 1997 on Consumer Protection2 (hereinafter: CPA), the Act 
IV. of 1959 on the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary3 (hereinafter: CC), 
the Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair 
Competition (hereinafter: PUTPUC) and the Act LVIII of 1997 on Business 
Advertising Activity (hereinafter: B A A ) . 4 
The most detailed definition of a consumer is given by § 2 (a) CPA, according 
to which a consumer is "a person who purchases, buys, orders, receives, or uses 
goods for non-business or non-professional purposes, or for whom a service is 
rendered, furthermore who is the addressee of information or an offer related 
to goods or services ". 
The CPA talks about consumers as persons, which leads to a conclusion 
that both natural persons and business organizations (with or without legal 
personality) can be considered as consumers,5 whereby the main criteria for 
delimiting consumers from non-consumers is the aim of the purchase. A 
consumer is a person, who buys, orders or receives goods for a non-business, 
non -professional pu rposes. 
The CPA addresses consumers as persons who buys, orders, receives or 
uses goods. Therefore, the notion of a consumer is wider than the buyer, and 
tenants, lessees, even receivers of a gift and family members of a purchaser 
Comments and analysis of the definition of consumers can be found in Fazekas, J.: 
Fogyasztóvédelmi jog [Consumer Protection Law], Miskolc, 2003. 62-67. 
3
 The definition of a consumer has been implemented into the CC with 1997 amend-
ments. 
4
 Act LVIII of 1997 on Business Advertising Activity. 
5
 See also court decisions Bírósági Határozatok (BH) 2000, 554 and BH 2006, 343. 
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can be considered consumers/ ' It also extended the notion of a consumer from 
realized transactions to those situations when there is not contract yet, but the 
rights of a consumer had been infringed due to some information or offer to 
conclude a contract (e.g. in the advertisement).7 
The CC defines a consumer as "any person who is a party to a contract 
concluded for reasons other than economic or professional activities". This, 
definition, though much more simple than in the CPA, encompasses (explicitly 
or implicitly) almost all elements than the CPA, but limits consumers to persons 
who are party to a contract, and consumer transactions to realized transactions. 
The PUTPUC in § 8 (1) determines consumers as customers, buyers and 
users that thereby define consumers in a much wider manner. A consumer can 
be anyone who is a customer, a buyer or a user, a natural person or a business 
organization even when buying goods in the course of its business or 
professional activities. 
§ 2 (g) of the BAA defines consumers as "all private individuals, legal 
entities and economic associations without legal entity towards whom or to 
which advertising is directed". Therefore, a consumer is anyone to whom the 
advertisement is directed, regardless of a purpose (professional or non-
professional) in connection which the advertisement is received. Moreover, it 
is not necessary to actually receive the information but is sufficient if the 
advertisement is published and a person, a consumer falls within the critical 
category of a group of persons towards whom the information is directed. 
In addition to these definitions, Ministerial Decrees, that implement EU 
directives into the Hungarian legal system, often overtook the definit ions given 
by the directives. Taking into account that directives mostly delimit consumers 
to natural persons, the confusion is even greater. 
Having more definitions and different definitions within one legal system is 
not the best solution. Problems arose when in an instant case the legislation 
itself does not give any guidance as to who is a consumer. In like situations, 
the best solution is to determine under which legal branch the problem falls and 
apply the corresponding definition, and in case of a doubt use the definition of 
the CPA.8 
f
' Fazekas: Fogyasztóvédelmi jog (2003). op. cit. 63. 
7
 Ibid. 66. 
8
 Ibid. 67-68. 
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2. What is a sales contract? 
The essence of sales contact is determined by the CC. However, it does not 
give a definition as to what constitutes a sales contract, but rather determines 
the mutual obligations of buyer and seller. Namely , the seller is obliged to 
hand over the goods and to pass the title on goods onto the buyer, while the 
buyer is obliged to take the goods and to pay their purchase price [§ 365 (1) 
СС]. Further on, the CC also defines the consumer contract. A consumer contract 
is any contract concluded by a consumer and a person acting within the scope 
of its economic or professional activities [§ 685 (e) CCI. 
It can be concluded, that in a consumer sales contact the business 
organization, a person acting within the scope of its trade or business is 
obliged to hand over the goods and to pass title on them, while the consumer 
(natural person or business organization) is obliged to take possession of the 
goods and to pay for their price. 
III. Civil and Criminal Law Protection of Consumers in Hungary 
The civil and criminal law protection of consumers is considered from a 
practical point of view, starting from a pre-contractual phase (advertising), 
f rom the initial "contact" of the consumer with the goods, throughout the 
content of the contract and the rights and remedies of a consumer in case of 
non-confirming performance by the seller. The liability of the seller will also 
be considered for injuries caused by a defective product, and for crimes and 
offences. However, the civil and criminal law protection of consumers in 
Hungary will be presented as a brief overview of consumer protection 
regulations pointing onto the main features of the Hungarian law and legal 
system without detailed analysis and scientific elaborations. 
I. The pre-contractual phase: Advertising and labeling 
Advertising is the major activity of the companies that influences (and induces) 
consumer in making their purchase choices. Basic rules on advertising can be 
found in the BAA, whereas additional provisions are laid down in the PUTPUC 
and sanctions in the Criminal Code. 
Business advertising is any "communication facilitating the sale or use 
in any other way of products, services....; the popularization of the name, 
designation or activity of an enterprise; or the familiarization of goods or 
identification of goods" [§ 2 (h) BAA], 
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The most important notions regarding advertising are that, of course, the 
advertisement should contain true information, the advertised goods and the 
advertiser should be clearly identified, and ultimately the sales contract should 
be performed according to the advertisement or label. Covert and misleading 
advertising (§ 6 & 7 BAA) is expressly forbidden, comparative advertising is 
allowed under certain conditions (§ 7A BAA ). 
In case of a breach of law, a business organization is liable for an offence 
or a crime. The Act LXIX. of 1999 on (minor) offences (hereinafter: MOA) 
incorporates only one offence involving advertising relating to pornographic 
advertisements and the advertising of sexual services [§ 145 (1) М О А ] . 
Misleading consumers is a crime, called: Deception of Consumers. "Any 
person who, in respect of any essential feature of a product, publicly states 
false facts, or true facts in a deceptive way, or provides deceptive information 
on any essential feature of the product for the purpose of rendering it more 
desirable, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to 
two years, community service work, or a fine" (§ 296/A CRC). 
Therefore, the information has to be stated to the general public, it has to 
be deceptive (false information or a true information that becomes deceptive in 
the context) and the advertiser has to be aware of the true features of the 
advertised goods and of the fact that the information published is potentially 
deceptive. However, in order to have a crime, the publication of the informa-
tion is sufficient, and practically none consumer has to be decided.4 
Besides advertising, another important factor that influences purchase 
choices and often contains crucial information are labels. Even though labeling 
requirements strongly relate to information of consumers, due to its c lose links 
with advertising and the structure of the paper itself, the rules on labeling will 
be discussed at this point. The CPA deals considerably with rules relating to 
labeling, whereby the most important provisions are those on the exact content 
of labels and the language requirements, or that labels should be only or also in 
Hungarian language (§ 9 & 10 CPA). If goods are accompanied with the Users 
or Instructions Manuals, it should be also written in Hungarian language (§ 11 
CPA). Besides general rules contained in the CPA, there are other legislative 
acts that regulate a more narrow market of goods10 or only certain aspects of 
4
 For a more detailed analysis see Tóth M.: Gazdasági bűnözés és bűncselekmények 
[Economic Criminal and Crimes], Budapest, 2000. 178-184. This is the only crime in the 
CRC that has no monetary limits, or in other words, the same circumstances cannot lead to 
an offence in case the harm done to consumers was not substantial. See 186 above. 
10
 Like the Ministerial Decree on shoe labeling 4/1998 (I. 16). 
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labeling." Regarding price indications, prices of goods should be indicated 
twofold. They should contain the sale price and the unit price (§ 14 CPA). In 
case any doubt occurs regarding the content of the labels, the CPA declares: 
the burden of proof is on the distributor (seller) (§ 16 CPA ). 
A business organization that violates rules on labeling harms competition 
and is liable for a crime: False Marketing of Goods. "Any person who produces 
a product with distinctive appearance, packaging, labeling or name, from which 
a competitor or his product having distinctive features can be recognized, and 
who does so without the consent of such competitor, or who acquires such 
product for the purpose of placing it on the market, is guilty of a felony pun-
ishable by imprisonment for up to three years " (§ 296 CRC). 
If a sufficient amount of production material (e.g. raw material, labels) has 
been acquired for marketing purposes, but the actual marketing did not take 
place, the person will be liable for preparatory actions of the crime.12 If until 
the discovery only an unsubstantial amount of goods has been placed on the 
market, a business organization will not be liable for a c r ime but rather for an 
offence.13 An offence will be committed also when a person publicly states a 
false statement (on the label) to the general public, but the amount of goods 
placed on the market (carrying false statement) is not substantial.14 
False Marketing of Goods is a crime, because it is designed to safeguard the 
interests of both consumers and competitors. Therefore, if a business organiza-
tion labels its products with a confusingly similar label with its competitor, it 
will be liable for the above criminal act even if the goods are otherwise of a 
perfect quality.13 
2. The content of the sales contract 
Regarding the content of the consumer sales contract the most important 
provisions are those related to unfair contract terms. Consumers often have no 
choice but to sign a pre-printed form contract that contain a number of pre-
formulated terms by the business organization. Consumers thereby have no 
11
 Like the Government Decree on providing uniform codes for the goods 145/1991 
(XI. 22). 
12
 Horváth, T. at all: A magyar büntetőjog különös része [The Special Part of the 
Hungarian Criminal Law). Budapest, 1999. 632. 
13
 Court decision: BH 1996. 404; In case of an offence the fine of up to HUF 100.000 is 
playable, according to § 71 of the Government Decree on some offences 218/1999 (XII. 28). 
14
 Court decision: ВН. 1999. 103. 
15
 Court decision: ВН. 1998. 552. 
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choice but to take or leave the contract, and are not in a position to negotiate 
its terms (contracts of adhesion). General provisions regarding unfair contract 
terms can be found in the C C . 
The CC firstly defines standard contract terms,16 emphasizing their non-
negotiated character;17 regardless whether they are integrated into a written 
contract or provided in a separate document [§ 209/A (3) СС] . It also contains 
a set of rules on the incorporation of standard contract te rms into the contract; 
however these rules relate to all contracts (consumer and business) and are of 
less relevance to consumer contracts.18 Rules of the C C that are consumer 
focused relate to contract interpretation and unfair contract terms. 
Regarding contract interpretation, the CC incorporates the contra proferentem 
rule according to which if the term is not clear it will be interpreted in favor of 
the consumer [§ 207 (2) CCI . 
A standard contract term that has not been individually negotiated is regarded 
unfair in consumer contracts if, contrary to the requirements of good faith 
and honesty it causes a significant and unjustified imbalance in the part ies ' 
rights and obligations arising under the contract [§ 209 (1) CCI. The unfairness 
of a contractual term is assessed, taking into account the nature of the contract 
and all the circumstances that existed at the time of contract conclusion [§ 209 
(2) СС]. The CC also states which terms will not be regarded as unfair, these 
are: terms relating to the definit ion of the subject matter of the contract, the 
price of the goods and terms defined by legal regulations [§ 209 (4 & 5) СС]. 
Unfair contract terms will be declared null and void. Nullity can be invoked 
by the injured party, provided the injured party is a consumer [§ 209/A CC] or 
by an organization that represents consumer interests [§ 209/B CC].14 
16
 Calling them "standard contractual conditions". See § 205/A (1) CC. 
If doubt arises whether the term has been individually negotiated, the burden of 
proof is on the party who claims it was negotiated. See § 205/A (2) CC. 
18
 For example it provides that contract terms which have not been individually 
negotiated will become part of a contract only if they have been previously made available 
and if the other party accepted the terms explicitly or via conduct that implies acceptance 
[§ 20 5/B (1) СС]. Moreover, the party that indents to use its standard clauses has an 
obligation to explicitly inform the other party of any standard term that differs substantially 
from usual contractual conditions [§ 20 5/B (2) СС]. 
'"The organization that represents consumer interests (like the NACPH) can ask the 
court to grant an injunction against an unfair term in standard contracts (or general 
conditions of business that is part of the standard contract) of a business organization, 
provided it is unfair, regardless whether the term has been actually used. Following such 
judgment the user of the unfair term or condition shall satisfy any claim the consumers 
may have against him. 
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Provisions of the CC are further specified with the 18/1999 (II.5) Govern-
ment Decree on unfair terms in consumer contracts2U that relates to both 
standard terms in consumer contracts and to unfair terms in individual contracts 
conclude by consumers.21 The Decree lists contract terms that will be regarded 
as unfair (§ 1 of the Decree) differentiating between those that will be regarded 
unfair in any event, and those that will be regarded unfair until the opposite is 
proven (§ 2 of the Decree). 
3. Performance of the contract 
The seller is obliged to deliver (or hand over) goods that are of a quality and 
quantity specified in the sales contract. Regarding characteristics of goods, 
according to the CC, goods should be as goods of the same type under like 
circumstances, or goods that a consumer can reasonably expect taking into 
account any public statement on the specific characteristic of goods made in 
advertising or on labeling. Accordingly, goods should fit fo r any particular 
purpose which the consumer made known to the seller at the time of contract 
conclusion (§ 277 CC) . 
If the delivered goods does not confirm to the contract the seller is liable 
for lack of conformity (implied warranty) [§ 315 (1 & 3) CC]. 2 2 Conformity is 
estimated at the time of delivery of goods, however, any lack of conformity 
that becomes apparent within six months after delivery is presumed to have 
existed at the time of delivery unless this presumption is incompatible with the 
nature of the goods or the nature of the lack of conformity [§ 305/A (2) СС] . 
But the seller will not be liable for the lack of conformity, if the consumer was 
or could reasonably have been aware of the defect at the time of contract 
conclusion [§ 305/A (1) СС]. 
In the case of non-conformity firstly, the consumer can choose between 
repair and replacement, or if repair and replacement is not possible it can ask 
for a price reduction or rescind the contract. However, rescission in possible 
only if the lack of conformity is substantial (§ 306 CC). 
20
 18/1999 (II. 5) Government Decree on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
21
 Kertész, Á.-Wallacher. L.: The Ministerial Decree 18/1999 (II. 5) on Unfair Contract 
Clauses in Consumer Contracts and Related Rules in the Civil Code. In: Szerződési jog-
fogyasztóvédelem [Contract Law-Consumer Protection]. Budapest, 2000. 77. 
" It has to be noted that all provisions regarding consumer rights arising out of non-
conforming goods in the CC are of a mandatory character. Therefore, any agreement to the 
contrary will be regarded as null and void. 
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Any repair or replacement should be completed within a reasonable time 
and without any significant inconvenience to the consumer. If the seller is 
unable or unwilling to comply with the above requirements, the consumer is 
entitled to repair the goods itself and reimburse the expenses incurred f rom the 
seller (§ 306 CC). 
The consumer has to no t i fy the seller on the lack of conformity within the 
shortest possible time, or within two months after it has noticed the lack of 
conformity. The consumer is liable for any damages resulting f rom late 
notification (§ 307 CC). 
According to the general rule, the consumer is entitled to invoke its warranty 
rights in the limitation period of six months upon delivery of the goods (unless 
a different period is prescribed by a special regulation) or within two-years 
after delivery. This period, however may be shorter (but not less than one year) 
in case of second-hand goods , if the parties reach an agreement to that effect. 
The limitation period is suspended for the period when the goods are being 
repaired and the consumer cannot use them (§ 308 CC).23 
However, even though the limitation period for consumer contracts is 
extended ( f rom six months to two years), the burden of proof shifts. Namely, 
within six months of warranty, the burden of proof is on the seller, and after 
six months it shifts to the consumer, when the consumer has to prove the goods 
have been defective at the t ime of delivery. This is of course very difficult in 
practice, taking into account that not many consumers are in hold of the 
necessary technical or other relevant information. 
Besides warranty rights, consumers are entitled to damages resulting from 
the lack of conformity (§ 310 CC). Costs incurred in bringing goods into 
conformity with the warranty, particularly the costs of postage, labor and material 
are on the seller. When the goods are replaced or the contract is rescinded, the 
consumer will not be liable to compensate for the loss in value resulting from 
proper use of the goods (§ 309 CC). 
The other particularity of the defective performance is guarantee rights. 
The CC states that where a guarantee is provided under the contract or the law, 
the guarantor will be released from liability during the guarantee period if he is 
able to prove that the cause of the defect occurred a f te r performance. The 
liability of the seller is determined in accordance with the conditions laid down 
in the guarantee statement of the contract, the applicable regulation, or the 
relevant advertising [§ 248 ( 1 & 2) CC ]. 
21
 The limitation period is suspended until the consumer wai ts for the expert report, 
having been discovered the de fec t on the goods (court decision: Bírósági Döntések Tára, 
2004. 1057). 
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Therefore, the difference between the guarantee and warranty is that the 
guarantee can also be contractual. However, the particularity of the Hungarian 
legal system is that a mandatory guarantee can be provided by the law. This is 
done by the Government Decree on obligatory guarantee for certain durable 
consumer products?4 Namely, the seller is obliged to undertake a guarantee, 
meaning that within a minimum of one year starting from the delivery of goods 
it will repair or replace the defective products. The rules therein relate only to 
durable consumer goods, like household appliances, transportation means. The 
guarantee claim is enforceable by the presentation of the warranty certificate, 
provided by the seller at delivery. Unlike warranty, in case of a guarantee, the 
burden of poof is on the seller. 
Consumer rights are the same in both warranty and guarantee claims. 
However, the procedure of their enforcement is regulated in separate acts,25 
and if at the initiation of claim six months passed after delivery the burden of 
poof is different in case for warranty and guarantee claims. As in many cases 
both the rules on mandatory warrantee and mandatory guarantee are applicable 
there is a legal uncertainty as to which rules are applicable in the instant case.2,1 
In case of non-confirming delivery, the consumer will invoke its warranty 
or guarantee rights and ask the seller to remedy the fault. However , the seller is 
also criminally liable for Marketing of Poor Quality Products, False Display of 
Quality, and Defrauding Consumers. 
a ) Marketing of Poor Quality Products'7 
A person who sells or places on the market poor quality products as if they 
were good quality is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 
three years. However, if a person acts out of negligence, it will be liable for a 
misdemeanor with imprisonment of up to one year, community service or fine. 
The same punishment goes to a person who only engages in preparations for 
the sale or placement on the market of poor quality products . On the other 
hand, a person who violates the rules applicable for determining the quality28 
and the qualification of a product, and thereby makes possible for such product 
"
4
 151/2003 Government Decree on obligatory guarantee for certain durable consumer 
products. 
23
 49/2003 Ministerial Decree on handling guarantee and warranty claims within 
consumer contracts. 
26
 Fazekas, J.: Fogyasztóvédelmi jog (Consumer Protection Law). Budapest, 2007. 133. 
27
 See § 292-294 CRC. 
Rules that make possible quality estimation are laid down e.g. in 2/1981 (I. 23). 
Ministerial Decree on Certain Aspects of Quality Protection. 
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to be sold, or to a bad quality product to be placed at the market, is guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for up to three years. 
The product that is subject to mandatory national standards is considered to 
be of poor quality if it fails to meet the lowest quality requirements defined in 
the standard.24 When the product is not subject to a standard a product is of a 
poor quality when it cannot be used for its designated purpose, or its use has 
been diminished considerably. 
The 218/1999 Gov. Decree on offences establishes the offence variation of 
the above crime, which will occur when the value of goods that have been sold 
or placed on the market are not exceeding the amount of H U F 50,000 (§ 75 of 
the Decree). In this case a person will be punished with a fine and the goods 
will be confiscated. When the product in question is foodstuff the Decree does 
not sets any limit as to the value of the goods, hence in any case a person will 
be liable for an offence (§ 84 of the Decree). 
h) False Display of Quality 
According to § 295 of the C R C , any person, who certifies false data related to 
substantial amount or monetary value of goods, regarding their quality in a 
document attesting quality, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for up to three years. A person who only acted in negligence will be punished 
for a misdemeanor by imprisonment for up to one year, community service or 
fine. 
This crime therefore relates to forgery of documents that testify the quality 
of goods.30 The most important element in this crime is the substantial amount 
or monetary value of goods regarding which the false data is presented. This 
condition is satisfied provided the value is more than two million but less than 
fifty million H U F [§ 318/A (c) CRC], 
A person who fails to present the qual i ty of the g o o d s or fails to give 
necessary information to consumers is responsible for an offence.3 1 
c) Defrauding Consumers 
According to the crime Defrauding Consumers (§ 328 C R C ) any person who, 
in the process of supply of goods directly to consumers, engages in an activity 
for defrauding consumers by false measurement or calculation or by degrading 
'' National standards of products can be found in the Act XXVIII . of 1995 on national 
standardization. 
10
 It can be considered a special way of a document forgery. Tóth: Gazdasági bűnözés 
és bűncselekmények, op. cit. 161. 
31
 § 74 of the Decree on offences. 
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the quality of goods is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for up to one year, community service or f ine provided such act did not result 
in a criminal act of a greater gravity. If a person engages in defrauding the 
consumers in a form of business activity is guilty of a fe lony punishable by 
imprisonment for up to three years. 
In order to have a crime a person has to be engaged in defrauding consumers 
as a continuing activity. The number of activities and consumers that are 
defrauded is not relevant, a consumer has only have to be defrauded on more 
than one occasion.32 In case of only one intentional act, the act will be qualif ied 
as an offence.3 3 
4. Product liability issues 
Product liability is regulated with the Act X of 1993 on Product Liability 
(hereinafter: PLA).34 Regarding damages, material or non-material damages 
due to death, injury or any impairment of health [§ 4 (a) PLA] caused by a 
defective product [§ 2 (1) PLA],35 the PLA determines the liability of the 
manufacturer. The distributor (seller) of the defective product is liable for 
damages only in case the manufacturer cannot be identified, or until the 
distributor does not reveal to the name of the manufacturer (§ 4 PLA). In case 
products are imported the liability lies on the importer. However , the importer 
can later reclaim the amount paid for compensation from the manufacturer [§ 3 
(2) PLA], This exemption is understandable, as in case of an imported product 
the manufacturer is a foreign business organization, and cross border law suits 
are extremely expensive and troublesome for consumers. 
Since the liability of a seller and the importer is basically an exception 
from the main rule, and between the manufacturer and the buyer of a final 
product there is no contract concluded, the deeper elaboration on product 
liability issues will stay outside the scope of the paper, s ince it primarily deals 
with contractual liability and is not invited to settle issues of tortuous liability. 
32
 Horváth at al.: A magyar büntetőjog különös része. op. cit. 754. 
33
 § 78 of the Decree on offences. 
34
 Act X of 1993 on Product Liability. 
35
 A product is defective if it fails to provide a level of safety generally expected, 
with special regard to the purpose of the product and the way in which it can be rea-
sonably expected to be used, the information provided in connection with the product, 
the date of the sale of the product, and the current state of scientific and technological 
achievements. 
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5. Some contemporary ways of sale 
As a consequence of a modern commerce apart from the traditional sales 
contract some special ways of sale developed, from which distance contracts 
and door-to-door sales will be mentioned at this point. 
a) Distance sales contacts 
Distance contracts in Hungary are regulated by Government Decree on distance 
contracts'6 that practically regulates all kinds of distant sales contracts concluded 
between absents via TV, telephone, catalogues, e-mail, etc. It guarantees the 
"classical" r ights of consumers in respect of distance contracts , namely the 
right for suff ic ient information (orally and in writing) and the right of 
withdrawal f rom the contract without any reasons. Withdrawal can be done 
within eight working days37 f r o m the time of the contract conclusion. 
b) Door-to-door sales 
Doorstep selling is regulated in Hungary with Government Decree on contracts 
concluded away from business premises and on certain conditions of doing 
business away from business premises У 
When contracts are concluded during a visit by a trader to the consumer's 
home or its place of work, provided the visit did not take place at the express 
request of the consumer, the consumer can withdraw f r o m such contract 
without giving any explanation within eight working days from the time of 
contract conclusion or delivery of goods.34 The seller (trader) is obliged to 
inform, at the time of contract conclusion, the consumer on how and to whom 
he should communicate the withdrawal. In case of withdrawal the consumer 
has no obligation to reimburse the seller for the decrease in the value of goods 
that occurred due to their regular usege. 
16
 17/1999 (II. 5) This Decree implemented (except Art. 8) the Directive 97/7/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in 
respect of distance contracts. 
1
 According to the principle of minimum harmonization, the Government Decree 
givers one day longer time to consumers to change their minds in respect of the concluded 
sales contract than the EC Directive. 
18
 370/2004 (XII. 26) Government Decree on contracts concluded away from business 
premises and on certain conditions of doing business away from business premises that 
implemented the Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the 
consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away f rom business premises. 
" Here, the deadline for withdrawal is even more extended than stated in the directive 
that requires a cancellation period of 7 days, whereas the Decree stipulates 8 working days. 
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IV. The Institutional Framework of Consumer Protection in Hungary 
Before turning to the mechanisms of enforcement of consumer rights, it is 
necessary to give a brief overview of the institutional f ramework of consumer 
protection in Hungary as these institutions are empowered to enforce or to 
assist in enforcing consumer's rights. 
1. Central government: the Ministries 
On the level of the central government the issue of consumer protection is in 
the hands of ministries. The main responsible ministry is the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labor (Szociális és Munkaügyi Minisztérium) that has a separate 
Consumer Protection Department. The operation of the Advisory Committee 
for Consumer Protection (Fogyasztóvédelmi Tanácsadó Testület)4 0 stands also 
within the competence of the Ministry. The Ministry of Economy and Transport 
(Gazdasági és Közlekedési Minisztérium' is responsible for EU and national 
legislation in the field of product specific directives, business advertising activity 
and commercial regulation. The Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement 
(Igazságügyi és Rendészeti Minisztérium) bears the overall responsibility for 
the coordination of the transposition of the EU legislation and its integration 
into the national legal system. It is responsible for the regulation of consumers ' 
economic interests in the field of contract law, competition law or procedural 
law. 
2. Public Agencies 
Among the public agencies the National Consumer Protection Authority p lays 
a crucial role in defending consumer 's interests and shaping the consumer 
protection policy, whereas the Hungárián Competition Authority has some 
importance in the filed of consumer protection, especially regarding business 
advertising activity. 
4
"The council is taking part in shaping the consumer policy, it advises the Ministry, 
follows the enforcement of consumer protection legislation, etc. See more at 
http://www.szmm.gov.hu/main.php?folderID=l 139&articleID=32444&ctag=articlelist& 
i id=l . 
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a) National Consumer Protection Authority 
The National Consumer Protection Authority (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Ha-
tóság) has been established in 20074' (hereinafter: N C P A ) by the transforma-
tion of its legal predecessors the General Inspectorate for Consumer Protection 
(Fogyasztóvédelmi Főfelügyelőség). It is a central administration body with 
independent scope of dut ies and authority under the managerial and financial 
control of the government responsible for consumer pol icy. The NCPA has its 
central administration and seven regional establishments as well as their 
representations throughout Hungary. For the paper the Dél-alföldi Regional 
Authority of the NCPA ( N F H Dél-alföldi regionális felügyelősége) seated in 
Szeged with representations in Kecskemét and Békéscsaba are important. 
The competence of central and regional bodies is split so that the regional 
authorities act/decide in the first instance and the central bodes in the second. 
The NCPA is responsible for monitoring the enforcement of the consumer 
protection legislation, and takes part in shaping consumer policy in Hungary. 
It is a principle body for market surveillance and quali ty control, and often 
represents the first instance in deciding of fences against consumer interests.4" 
b) Hungarian Competition Authority 
The Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal) is responsible 
for the implementation of Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by Direct ive 
97/55/EC (misleading and comparative advertisement). 
c) The Local Government 
Though the CPA delegates certain competences to local governments (§ 44 
CPA), however their role in Szeged is still marginal. 
(I) National Consumer Organizations 
A great number of N G O ' s deals with protection of consumers in Hungary, 
from which the most power fu l is the National Association for Consumer 
Protection (hereinafter: N A C P H ) (Országos Fogyasztóvédelmi Egyesület).4 3 
41
 In Accordance with the Action Plan for Consumer Protection Policy in the period of 
2007-2013, the institutional system of consumer protection in Hungary has been renewed 
with the NCPA. It was established with the Government Decree on National Consumer 
Protection Authority 225/2007 (VIII. 31) and the Government Decree on the amendments 
of some government decrees in compliance with the establishment of the National 
Consumer Protection Authority 226/2007 (VIII. 31). 
42
 www.nfh.hu 
43
 www.ofe.hu 
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being the only N G O defending consumer ' s interests that covers the entire 
country and all consumer issues. The paper focuses on the activities of the 
NACPH in Szeged (hereinafter: NACPH Szeged). The NACPH Szeged has a 
separate legal personality and as consumer protection in Hungary is organized 
on regional bases, it is further a member of a wider regional association with 
NACPH' s in Békéscsaba and Kecskemét.44 
Besides the NACPH there are other consumer associations that tend to 
protect a wide range of consumer interest, but are much less significant for the 
shaping of consumer protection policy in Hungary.43 
Individual consumer organizations are gathered in further, wider associations, 
from which the most significant is the National Federation of Associations for 
Consumer Protection in Hungary (Fogyasztóvédelmi Egyesületek Országos 
Szövetsége).46 
V. The Enforcement of Consumer Rights 
Consumers can enforce their rights guaranteed by the law in courts or rather by 
taking advantage of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.47 
/ . Courts 
In Hungary there is no special court procedure for the resolution of consumer-
disputes. Although a simplified procedure, order to pay procedure (fizetési 
meghagyásos eljárás) exists that allows the settlement of simple complaints in 
a faster way, it has no special consumer oriented features. In accordance with 
the Civil Procedure Act (hereinafter: CPRA)48 this procedure can be applied 
when the amount of claim is for the payment of a sum of money and will be 
applied in any event when this amount does not exceeds HUF 200,000 (§ 313 
CPRA). However, the order to pay procedure was rarely if ever applied for 
44
 Regional Consumer Protection Association of Délalföld. 
43
 E.g. the Hungarian Association of Consumer Protectors and Association of Conscious 
Consumers. 
46
 www.feosz.hu 
47
 See for more on out-of-court and in-court mechanisms of settling consumer disputes 
in the National Report of Hungary within the project titled: An analysis and evaluation 
of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through ordinary judicial 
proceedings, prepared by The Study Centre for Consumer Law-Centre for European 
Economic Law Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. 
48
 Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure. 
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consumer redress in Szeged, and not because of the monetary limit of the claim 
but due to particularities of consumer disputes. Most disputes arising out of 
the consumer-business sales contract relate to defect ive goods, whereby a 
consumer is in first instance entitled (and in the same time obliged) to ask for 
repair or replacement of goods, and only if these remedies are not available the 
consumer can ask for the reduction in purchase price or rescission of the 
contract. Since, the order to pay procedure is applied for payment of a sum of 
money or handing over a movable property [§ 313 (1) CPRA] the order to pay 
procedure in consumer disputes is applicable only in case of rescission of the 
contract, when the consumer is entitled to claim back the paid purchase price. 
However, since rescission of the contract is only a subsidiary remedy of a 
consumer (after repair or replacement) the application of this special procedure 
comes rarely in consumer disputes. Therefore, the main problem is not in 
monetary limit of H U F 200,000 but rather in the fact that the order to pay 
procedure is applicable only for monetary payments, whereas the same remedy 
is only subsidiary for consumers.49 
Besides the order to pay procedure there is another simplified procedure 
that is perhaps more suitable for consumer disputes called: preliminary proof 
or preliminary proving procedure (előzetes bizonyítás). Before submitting the 
claim or during the civil procedure when warranty issues are disputed [§ 207 
(c) CPRA], the interested party may ask the court to grant an expert witness 
hearing, during which both parties are entitled to ask questions f rom the 
judicial expert. Appeal is possible only against the cour t ' s negative (rejecting) 
decision on granting the procedure [§ 209 (2) CPRA] . This procedure is 
sensible when goods of a substantial value have been purchased, and also 
when the burden of proof is on the consumer, since the costs of the procedure 
itself have to be covered initially by the consumer, as this procedure helps the 
consumer to proof the goods have been defective at the time of delivery. After 
the expert report is ready, the procedure ends, and the consumer can decide, 
whether it will based on the expert report, commence a regular civil procedure 
and sue the seller, or provided the report is favorable for the consumer, to 
settle the dispute with the seller out of court.50 
Despite the fact that even the regular court procedure usually lasts (if there 
are no complications) approximately one year, not many consumer cases 
appear in courts of Szeged. Consumers, most probably, unwilling to accept the 
44
 Dudás, E.: pers. conv., 6 Dec. 2007. 
50
 Ibid. 
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expenses and inconveniences coming with the process itself, sue the seller only 
if the value of goods is substantial (e.g. a purchase of a car).51 
Collective action for damages or collective redress (közérdekű kereset) is 
foreign to the Hungarian legal system, similarly to other Continental- European 
legal systems. However, according to the CPA the consumer protection 
authority, organizations representing consumer interests or the public prosecutor 
may file a claim against any party causing substantial harm to a wide range 
of consumers by illegal activities. The claim can be filed even if the identity 
of injured consumers cannot be established (§ 39 CPA). Th is possibility was , 
however, not yet exercised in Szeged.52 
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
In Hungarian legal system there is only one out-of-court procedure, which has 
specifically been designed for the resolution of consumer-business disputes. 
There are other out-of court procedures that have a more general scope of 
application (arbitration, mediation), however, these procedures are less suitable 
for the resolution of consumer disputes that usually involve small claims and a 
wide range of types of disputes. 
a) Arbitration 
The Act LXXl of 1994 on arbitration53 (hereinafter: A A) regulates the 
arbitration procedure (választott bíróság). Parties may settle their dispute in an 
arbitration procedure if at least one of the parties engages professionally in 
economic activities and the dispute is connected to that professional activity, 
moreover the parties are in command of the subject matter of the lawsuit and 
they have agreed on arbitration (§ 3 AA). Therefore, arbitration can be used for 
solving consumer disputes. However, consumer disputes involve generally 
small claims and contracts are concluded in most cases orally while the 
arbitration agreement has to be in writing [§ 5 (3) АА]. 
b) Mediation 
Mediation in Hungary is regulated by Act LV of 2002 on Mediation,5' (herein-
after: MA). Mediation (közvetítés), as a special alternative dispute settlement 
method can be used by natural or legal persons to settle their disputes in 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Varga, J.: pcrs. conv., Nov. 20. 2007. 
53
 Act LXXI of 1994 on arbitration. 
54
 Act LV of 2002 on Mediation. 
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connection with personal and property rights, provided the parties are not 
bound by statutory provision [ § 1 ( 1 ) M A j . Therefore, in principle, consumer 
disputes can be resolved by mediation. However, mediat ion has a number of 
disadvantages for consumers. The process results only in an agreement (settle-
ment) that is basically a new contract and can be subject of further procedures. 
Additionally, until the very end the parties can withdraw (change their minds) 
from mediation (§ 35 MA) . Further, part ies ' choice in choosing a mediator is 
limited to the Register of Mediators which is maintained by the Hungarian 
Ministry of Justice.55 Lastly, the mediator is entitled for remuneration, and the 
reimbursement of expenses (§ 27 MA). Therefore, while mediation could be a 
fast and simple way to resolve consumer disputes, it neither offers lasting and 
optimal outcomes nor is it a cheap solution for consumers.56 
It has to be noted, that neither mediation nor arbitration is applied as a 
dispute resolution method of consumer disputes in Szeged.1 7 
с) Consumer Arbitration Boards 
Dispute resolution by the Consumer Arbitration Boards (Békéltető testület) 
(hereinafter: CAB) is the only ADR method in the Hungarian legal system that 
is specifically designed for solving consumer disputes. The CAB has been 
introduced and is regulated by the CPA."' 
The C A B are independent bodies that operate at the regional chambers of 
commerce. There are a total of 20 arbitration boards in Hungary, of which one 
is in the capital and each one of the remaining 19 is in different County. One 
CAB is situated at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Csongrád County 
in Szeged. The CAB's are comprised of the representatives of consumer 
associations (in Szeged only the NACPH has designated members) and the 
representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Csongrád County, 
thereby the interests of both consumers and businesses are represented.14 
Instant cases are decided in tripartite panels (hereinafter: Panel) whereby two 
arbitrators are from the N A C P H and one f rom the Commercial Chamber. The 
competence of the CAB extends to all kinds of consumer disputes.60 
55
 § 5 - 1 2 of the MA. 
56
 National Report of Hungary . . . op. cit. 47. fn . 
57
 Varga, J.: pers. conv., Nov. 20. 
58
 See § 18-39 of the CPA. 
' 'According to § 18 (5) C P A the local government can also has its representatives in 
the CAB, however, this right is not exercised in Szeged. 
6,1
 Especially regarding disputes the quality and safety of goods and services, the 
application of product liability regulations and the conclusion and performance of contracts 
(§ 19 CPA). 
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The CAB is established for the purpose of attempting to reach an agree-
ment (settle a dispute) between a consumer and a business organization in a 
quick, efficient, simple [§ 18(1) CPA] and free of charge ways.61 
A prerequisite for commencing a proceeding is that the consumer has 
attempted to settle the case directly with the business organization (§ 27 CPA). 
The consumer has to record its complaint in the Consumer Complaint Book 
(jegyzőkönyv) in writing, at premises of the business organization. One copy 
stays with the business organization and one with the consumer. If the business 
organization is unwilling to remedy the consumer's complaint the consumer 
can commence the CAB procedure, by a written petition to the chairman of the 
CAB.62 The Chairman shall review the complaint within three working days, 
and provided the CAB has jurisdiction, it will schedule the hearing date within 
thirty days of the commencement of the proceedings [§ 29 (2 & 3) CPA], The 
Chairman shall notify the parties regarding the date of the hearing deliver them 
a copy of the petition and the list of CAB members, requesting the parties to 
make their choice of a panelist. If the parties flail to appoint a member the 
Chairman will do so ex officio [§ 29 (4) CPA], In the notice, the business 
organization affected by the complaint shall be ordered to file a written statement 
(response) within 5 days with regard to the legitimacy of the complaint, the 
circumstances of the case, and acceptance of the decision of the Panel as 
obligatory (submission). The business organization will be warned that, should 
it fail to file a statement regarding the merits of the case, the Panel will pass its 
resolution based on the information at its disposal [§ 29 (5) CPA], 
The procedure at hand is lead by the Chairman, during which the Chairman 
attempt to negotiate an agreement between the part ies [§ 30 (1) CPA], 
Proceedings are public; however either party may request the exclusion of the 
public [§ 30 (3) CPA], If one of the parties fails to appear at the hearing in 
spite of having been properly notified or fails to present its evidence, the Panel 
shall continue the proceedings and shall pass its resolution on the basis of the 
information in its possession [§ 31 (2) CPA], Unless the Panel terminates the 
proceeding [§ 31 (4) CPA] it will conclude the procedure within 60 days of its 
commencement [§ 31 (6) CPA] and bring a decision (a resolution) with simple 
majority votes [§ 31 (5) CPA], 
6
 The procedure is free of charge from 2004. Before, consumers needed to pay HUF 
1000 at the initiation of the procedure. See Fekete, О.: A fogyasztóvédelem aktuális kérdé-
sei [Contemporary Questions of Consumer Protection], Magyar Közigazgatás, 55 (2005) 
608. 
62
 On the exact content of the petition, see § 28 (3) CPA. 
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The resolution can be a recommendation (the business organization stated 
upon commencement of the proceeding that it will not avail itself to the 
decision of the Panel), or obligatory (the business organization declared it will 
accept the decision of the Panel as obligatory, upon commencement of the 
proceeding (submission) or upon announcement of the resolution (§ 32 CPA). 
Obligations f rom the resolution have to be fulfilled within 15 days from the 
day of its announcement (adoption) [§ 33 (3) CPA], The resolution of the 
council is not subject to an appeal [§ 34 (2) CPA] and it is passed without 
prejudice to the consumers r ight to have his claim enforced in a regular court 
proceeding [§ 34 (1) CPA], 
Within 15 days from receiving the resolution, any party may have the 
resolution annulled by the competent court,63 however, only on grounds laid 
down by the C P A [§ 34 (3) CPA] , 
In case the business organization (the seller) does not comply with an 
obligatory resolution, the consumer protection authority or the commercial 
chambers in question will be entitled to publish the decision | § 36 (2) CPA] or 
the Panel, the consumer or the organization initiating the proceedings may 
request the court to have a writ of execution attached to the C A B resolution [§ 
36 (3) CPA], 
The CAB can make its o w n rules of procedure within the available legal 
framework (§ 37 CPA ). However , in Szeged this step has not yet been done. 
In practice, when a consumer is not satisfied with the goods purchased and 
cannot settle the dispute with the seller, it will firstly turn to the Complaint 
Office. The Complaint Office in Szeged is operated by the NACPH. Complains 
can be submitted in person, via telephone or online. Most of the times, the 
consumers are advised how and where to complain, but the complaint off ices 
do not participate in settling the complaint in any way. The Complaint Off ice 
receives approximately 18-20 complaints/day or 1600/1800 per year.64 They 
relate (in percentages): to foodstuff (9%); clothing (32% f r o m this shoes 29%); 
guarantee, warranty (37%); public utility services (19%) and other (3%).65 
Most of the complaints are settled, after getting the advice f r o m the complaint 
office, between the consumer and the seller. 
All complaints arrive to the Complaint Office, and the activists thereby 
decide which cases will fall under the competence of the N C P A . The NCPA is 
63
 The annulment procedure of the resolution is not an administrative procedure (court 
decisions: EBH 2005. 1284; RH 2005. 411; Közigazgatási-gazdasági döntvénytár, 2006. 
67). 
64
 Varga, J.: pers. conv., Nov. 20, 2007. 
65
 Ibid. 
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competent to take actions when besides infringing the rights of an individual 
consumer the business organization also committed and offence. Approxi-
mately 10% of all complaints are forwarded in the lack of competence to the 
NCPA and around the same (10%) passes to the next level, to the CAB.66 
After receiving the complaint the NACPH activist will check whether all 
the conditions are fulfilled, and direct the consumer to file a petition for the 
commencement of an CAB proceeding. At the hearing parties, due to the small 
amount of claims, participate by themselves (without lawyers). Since disputes 
usually involve bad or insufficient quality products, parties are asked to 
provide proof regarding the quality by showing an expert report.6 Both parties 
can submit their own reports, but since the aim of the proceeding is to reach an 
agreement between the parties, none of the parties is legally bound to accept 
the expert report. 
In practice business organizations many times would not come to the 
hearing, and though a resolution can be brought in their absence, they are not 
obliged to act by it. Only in about 25-30% business organizations accepts the 
decision (resolution) of the CAB as an obligatory.68 Therefore, the success of 
the CAB depends mainly on the good will of a business organization, whether 
in course of protection of its reputation it will be willing to co-operate and 
settle the dispute with the consumer. 
The other deficiency of the CAB procedure is the fact that the free of charge 
character of the procedure looses its weight, as consumers usually incur non-
refundable expenses in order to take part in the proceeding.64 
VI. Education and Information of Consumers 
A right for information and education are amongst the basic rights of consumers. 
In the era of new information technologies and increasingly sophisticated 
strategies for promoting products and services the need for consumer education 
is indispensable. This need become even more significant after Hungary 
became an EU Member State and part of the European single market. The aim 
of consumer education it to raise the awareness or to help individual 
66
 Ibid. 
97
 Quality checks are done by independent organizations. 
68
 Varga, J.: pers. conv., Oct. 16, 2007. 
69
 The most expensive is the expert report on quality of the product, which expense in 
most cases is not refunded to the consumer, and which is sometimes a more substantial 
amount than the value of the goods (dispute) in question. 
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consumers to understand and apply their rights and thereby take full advantage 
of market opportunities.7" Nowadays education of consumers is more important 
than legal over-regulation, as it teaches consumers how to use effectively their 
rights and the available information when making purchase choices.71 
Section 17 of the CLV Act is devoted to Consumer Education, according to 
which the education of consumers should be primarily done in schools [§ 17 
(1) CPA] during primary and secondary education. As education is primarily a 
State responsibility [§ 17 (2) CPA] consumer protection education is included 
into the National Basic Curriculum (Nemzeti Alaptanterv).72 However, in 
practice in the fulfillment of its task the State cooperation with the NCPA and 
consumer organizations [§ 17 (5) CPA], Accordingly, organizing consumer 
protection education is one of the tasks consumer organizations should strive at 
[§ 45 (1) (h) CPA], 
In Szeged, the NACPH has a significant role in providing education for 
young consumers. It visits 15-20 primary and high schools, 2 -3 times a year. 
Their campaign is named: "Gaining necessary knowledge for becoming aware 
consumers".71 
Besides, the NACPH also organizes an accredited 30 hour specialization 
course in consumer protection for school teachers and professors. 
The NACPH is involved in other interesting activities in the filed of con-
sumer education. It organizes a consumer protection competition for pupils and 
announced a drawing competition for children between 8 and 13, with the 
topic: "Shopping in hypermarkets".74 Since consumer education became one of 
the explicit goals of education in Hungary only in 2007,7 5 the NACPH in the 
future expects an increase in its activities in providing education for con-
sumers.76 
"See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_info/index_en.htm (Last visited: October 15, 
2008). 
71
 Fazekas: Fogyasztóvédelmi jog (2007). op. cit. 71. 
72
 243/2003 (XII. 17). Gov. Decree on the issuance, introduction and application of the 
National Basic Curriculum as amended in 2007. 
73
 Varga, J.: pers. conv., Oct. 16, 2007. 
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 OFE Hírlevél (NACPH Newsletter), 2007. No. 53. 8. www.ofe.hu 
75
 Consumer education became one of the goals of Hungarian education only in 2007, 
with the amendments of 243/2003 (XII. 17) Gov. Decree. In the section on pupils 
economic education the National Basic Curriculum states: "The school education system 
plays a principle role in developing aware consumers from the pupils, whereby they will be 
able to asses the risks, benefits and costs of their choices". 
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 OFE Hírlevél, op. cit. 
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Informing consumers is just as important as their education. However, it 
suppose consumers are already aware of their rights and thereby need to be 
equipped with sufficient information to make smart purchase choices. Consumer 
information should fulfill two criteria. It should be complex or complete, 
include the pros and cons of a product or service, and it should be plural or 
multilevel, namely provided not just one sided from the other contracting party 
(seller) in the course of contract conclusion but gained from governmental and 
non-governmental organs and agencies.77 
The CPA is considerably devoted to Consumer Information; primarily 
focusing on labeling requirements. On the other hand, the CPA establishes a 
duty of consumer organizations to operate consulting offices for providing 
information to consumers and aiding in the enforcement of consumer rights 
[§ 45 (1) (g) CPA] and to inform the consumers by the making public their 
experiences [§ 45 (1) (i) CPA], 
The NACPH Szeged is operates a consulting office, or a Consumer 
Complaint Office where the activists are available to consumers for all kinds of 
advices and questions of the consumers. However, the majority of cases relates 
to consumer claims, whereby the consumers are advised on how to enforce 
their rights. 
The NACPH Szeged is active in informing the consumers in their County 
and in Szeged. Approximately once a month its activists are guests in Telin TV 
in a program called: "Szótér". They are also appear regularly in radio programs 
at Rádió 7, Rádió 88 and Rádió M R 6 Szeged. 
Regarding printed media, a couple of is devoted exclusively to consumer, 
namely the "Kosár Magazin",78 the "Fogyasztóvédelem" magazine74 and the 
"Kontroll" newspaper.8" However, even though these media cover a wide range 
of topics, they are not well known, or not solicited among consumers, which 
fact diminishes their practical importance. However, the "Délmagyar", the 
regions most wide spread daily newspaper regularly publishes news related to 
consumer protection. 
A significant step has been taken by NACPH, when in October 2007 it 
launched a one year EU funded consumer information project, called: "In the 
77
 Fazekas: Fogyasztóvédelmi jog (2003). op. cit. 72. 
78
 The magazine of the NACPH and is published monthly. See www.kosarmagazin.hu 
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 Published four times a year by the NCPA. See http://www.ntti.hu/portal/hasznos/ 
szaklap 
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EU consumers have rights. Get to know yours" that already showed its positive 
results.81 
Though consumer education is viewed as educating pupils in primary and 
high schools, today the internet become just as an important education tool. 
Besides providing information on consumers' rights and remedies, ways to 
enforce there rights, a great deal of useful information can be found therein for 
everyday purchase choices.82 
VII. Conclusion 
Hungary underwent a great deal of legislative changes from the time of regime 
change and signing the Europe Agreement in 1991. The harmonization process 
with acquis communaitaire has been mainly finished by April 2004 that 
required a total of almost 50 peaces of new or amended legislation!83 However, 
changes are still ongoing, towards more solid consumer rights and their more 
effective protection. In this light the institutional framework has been reformed 
just recently, and the former General Inspectorate for Consumer Protection was 
transformed into the National Consumer Protection Authority in September 2007. 
Since the paper aimed to offer location specific data, focusing primarily at 
consumer protection in Szeged, it presented unique data related to the city and 
to Csongrád County. However, the same fact also made limits to the paper, as 
some possibilities that are given by the law, more accurately by the CPA have 
not yet been taken advantage in Szeged, thereby some issues practically stayed 
outside the scope of the paper. This relates for example to the possibility that 
organizations providing representation of consumer interests (like the NACPH) 
may file a claim against any party causing substantial harm to a wide range of 
consumers by illegal activities, and to the role of local government is in the 
filed of consumer protection that is still marginal in Szeged. Since the paper 
31
 For example: for some time there is already a possibility to file an online con-
sumer complaint, but till the beginning of a campaign none arrived to the NACPH 
Szeged. After the initiation of the campaign within 1 or 2 weeks around 10 claims have 
been filed online! 
3
~ Information and education of consumers via the internet is very impressive in 
Hungary. Web pages deal ing with consumer issues vary f rom official presentations of 
the ministries, throughout web sites of different consumer organizations until consumer 
forums. 
Fazekas, J . -Sós , G.: A fogyasztóvédelmi jogharmonizáció 10 éve - II. Rész (10 
Years of Consumer Law Harmonization - Part II). Külgazdaság, 48 (2004) 77. 
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focused on Szeged, it did not explore further whether these possibilities have 
been used in other parts of Hungary, perhaps in the capital, Budapest. 
Due to being an EU Member State consumer protection is influenced by 
EU legislation. However, having more and different definitions of a consumer 
is not a sensible solution and causes confusion and legal uncertainty in practice. 
Moreover, according to all definitions of Hungarian legislative acts, consumers 
can be both natural persons and business organizations, which is not in 
compliance with EU directives that delimit consumers to natural persons. 
Even though the protection of consumers, without a doubt, is on a high level, 
there are still some lacks in the legal system that is waiting to be remedied. 
Regarding substantial provisions, the confusion related to guarantee and war-
ranty rights of consumers should be abolished. Regarding procedural rights, it 
would be sensible to introduce class actions, collective redress for consumers. 
Consumers, usually due to small claims and no prior legal knowledge, are 
deterred from enforcing their rights in regular court proceedings. Class actions 
would free consumers from all inconveniences of the court procedure and their 
rights would still be effectively protected. Today, Hungarian consumers mostly 
turn to the CAB seeking justice. However, as it was shown, in practice even 
favorable decisions of the CAB do not guarantee protection, as they are not 
obligatory for business organization. That leads to a conclusion, that the 
enforcement of the consumer's right depend on the will of the seller. In most 
Western European countries, business organizations are aware that nothing can 
harm them more than a bad reputation, however, it seems Hungarian business 
people seldom visited their neighbors, as in practice only a small percentage of 
resolutions is complied with. 
In the filed of criminal law, though certain behaviors of business organiza-
tions are recognized as criminal acts, it still cannot be said that there is a 
Consumer Protection Criminal Law in Hungary. There is a need to look for a 
substantial connection between consumer protection and criminal law84 that 
has not yet been done, neither in theory nor in practice. 
The education of consumers should be continued, and perhaps intensified, 
as until now much less attention has been devoted to education and information 
of consumers from making legislative changes in the light of harmonization 
process. Major improvements are expected in the future, as consumer education 
become part of the National Basic Curriculum only in 2007. The information 
84
 Karsai, К.: Gondolatok a büntetőjogi fogyasztóvédelemről [Thoughts on Criminal 
Law Protection of Consumers). Acta Juridica et Politico, Szeged, Tomus LXIX. 2007. 
1-48. 
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of consumers is also expected to improve in the future after the EU financed 
information project. 
The future of consumer protection in Hungary is the future of consumer 
protection in EU that is defined by the EU Commiss ion 's document: "EU 
Consumer Policy Strategy in the period of 2007-2013".S l The aim is to empower 
EU consumers, which will have real choices, accurate information, market 
transparency, effect ive protection and solid rights. It remains to be seen how 
Hungary will live up to these challenges. 
85
 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/132054.htm 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2008 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
49. No 4. pp. 469-482 (2008) 
DOI: 10.1556/A J и r. 49.2008.4.5 
C S A B A V A R G A * 
Judicial Black-box and the Rule of Law 
in the Context of European Unification and Globalisation 
I. Basic Issues in the Understanding of Law 
1. For an ontological reconstruction, the significance of juristische Weltan-
schauung as one of the original components of the law's very existence (besides 
objectified embodiments) is definitely shown by the fact that institutionalised 
social existence, whatever it be, cannot but withstand those kinds of simplifi-
cation inspired by the Newtonian outlook of the universe (reducing reality to 
casual intertwinement of causal series originated by things and powers directed 
at them), in terms of which we may and have to differentiate the 'construction' 
itself (as given f rom the outset) from its 'being made to func t ion ' as a 
complementation exteriorly and posteriorly added to the former by an individual 
purposeful or random act; albeit when we are considering social dynamics with 
social institutions at work, we are tempted to take simplifyingly the two above 
components as some bifactoral mechanics that has been organised into one 
single functional system. As opposed to the physical world, however, in the 
specifically social world exclusively kinds of phenomena (features and aspects) 
suitable to be reconstrued f rom their actual movement as their genuine 
subsistence can be thought as prevailing as having the specif ic quality of 
'social existence'.1 
Consequently, the ontological status of the way the jurist approaches to law 
in a manner sanctioned by the approved canon of the profession-describing the 
kinds of intellectual operations he/she usually performs by referencing to the 
law and the actual ways in which real life situations are judged by justices in 
law (as if all it were a simple deduction from the law valid at the time)-is 
hardly more or else than what is called professional deontology. And this is 
Scientific Adviser, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
H-1250 Budapest, P.O. Box 25; Professor, Director of the Institute for Legal Philosophy of 
the Catholic University of Hungary, H-1428 Budapest 8, P.O. Box 6. 
E-mail: varga@jog.mta.hu 
1
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1996. 
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just not simply a case of false ideology (as usually treated by Marxisms) but a 
specific procedure of (virtual? real? in any case: actual) reality construction, 
controlled by the required mental referencing as a mediator wedged in-between.2 
As if the same background idea asserted in the professional conceptualisation 
of norms would also be repeated here as applied to the overall functioning of 
the normative world. For in the same way as neither the norm is descriptive-
therefore necessarily t rue/false-a ' ref lect ion ' (the fact notwithstanding that 
its lingual expression suggests as if it were exact ly some description of 
ontological relations),3 nor this reality construction is effectuated-„caused", or 
made to have no alternatives at all in practical decision making-by the norm 
(the fact notwithstanding that the normative understanding of norms pictures 
and officially justifies it as such).4 
2. The duality of Taw in books' and Taw in ac t ion ' (which Roscoe Pound 
formulated originally as a pioneering category of legal sociology after he had 
realised that positivation itself cannot automatically be equated to textual 
effects referenced to in implementation) has turned into a genuine paradox 
when it has also been revealed that differing normative orders, heterogeneous 
to one another to an extent to be almost incommensurable by their textures 
compared, can nevertheless exert quite a commensurable impact as measured 
by the social effect to which, however, they may lead in societies at by and 
large comparable civilisational levels.5 
Accordingly, one may raise the issue whether or not there may be a hidden 
(and hitherto unrecognised) "magic" (perhaps exer t ing influence on/through 
Cf. Varga. Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1981. It is to 
be noted that 'mediation' [Vermittlung] itself is a key term of Georg Lukács' posthumous 
Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. For a background, see Varga, Cs.: Marxian 
Leged Theory. Aldershot. Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1993. 
3
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: A magatartási szabály és az objektív igazság kérdése [Rule of 
behaviour and the issue of objective truth] [1964], in his Útkeresés Kísérletek - kéziratban 
[Searching for a path Unpublished essays], Budapest, 2001, 4 -18 . 
4
 Cf., in summation of a decade's research previously published in huge a many parts. 
Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts [1992], Budapest, 
1995. Later on, a similar conclusion was reached from the phenomenologisation of Critical 
Legal Studies by Conklin. W. A.: The Phenomenology of Modern Leged Discourse The 
Judicial Production and the Disclosure of Suffering. Aldershot, 1998, preceded, as a case 
study, by his Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey of Semiotics and Phenome-
nology. Ottawa Law Review 27 (1995-1996) 129-173. 
5
 Zweigert, К.: Solutions identiques par des voies différentes (Quelques observations 
en matières de droit comparé). Revue internationale de Droit comparé 18 (1966) 5-18. 
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other-cultural?-paths) similarity (or some mechanism of effects resulting in 
comparable ends) among such linguistically differently expressed and culturally 
differently contextualised rules aiming at behavioural regulation and control, 
or the norm(s) posited by them can only qualify as a decisive factor of 
decision-making by their mere appearance and backing normative ideology 
solely, while in fact other (further) circumstances do play the role of 
determination in (parts or the over-weighty part of) the actual process.6 
3. The answer is to be searched for in the actual functioning of the 'judicial 
mind' taken as a 'black-box' (symbol for a self-regulating cybernetic entity), in 
case of which, its internal laws remaining unknown, we can only try at re-
constructing the regularities at work in it through the analysis of its actual data 
processing, by comparing what are their in-puts to what are their respective 
out-puts. 
First of all, the judicial mind aims at resolving (by settling) the confl icts of 
prevailing interests (involving the axiological conflicts behind them) brought 
before court fora, through asserting that alternative of resolution (settlement) 
which it considers the most defendable of (while balancing amongst) all the 
feasible (or presented) variations-by fulfi l l ing, inasmuch as avai lable at an 
optimum level, the 'system of fulf i lment ' [Verfi i l lungssystem] canonised in the 
given legal regime-, all this being operated by the l aw ' s particular technicality 
which, in each and every case in principle, makes it possible with equal logical 
chance (that is, in a way not any longer limitable or controllable by logic) to 
select those procedures from the stock of available (by the way, even logically 
mutually counter running) techniques,7 with the help of which one may argue 
for the given norm either covering or non-covering (and therefore ei ther to be 
applied or disapplied to) the case at hand, and respectively, by the help of 
which-in the name of our common respect for the law-either strict or equitable 
judicial adjudication can be reached almost at please, when also the strictness 
of the wording of the law is loosened in cases when a programme "to make the 
law liveable" is appealed for. 
6
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Theory and Practice in Law: On the Magical Role of Legal Technique. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 351-372 and <http://www.akaderniai.com/content/ 
j4k2u58xk7rj6541/full text.pdf>. 
7
 For the foundational outlines, cf. Varga, Cs.-Szájer, J.: Legal Technique. In: Mock, 
E.-Varga, Cs. (eds.): Rechtskultur - Denkkultur. Ergebnisse des ungarisch-österreichischcn 
Symposiums der Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 1987. 
Stuttgart, 1989, 136-147. 
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Accordingly, behind the stage appearance and ideology of mere norm 
application there is always a human being at standing work, with own valuation 
and further full human(e)ly personal facultases mobilised when the determina-
tion is taken to (and how to) decide. For the hermeneutic definition of the very 
understanding of norms as a kind of cultural predisposition [Vorverständnis] 
will from the beginning have a selective effect on the judicial ascertainment of 
both those facts that shall constitute the given case (Tatbestand, taken as the 
legally exclusively relevant set of facts to be judged) and the norm to be 
applied thereto (including its actual meaning reflected to, by validated in, the 
given case). On the one hand and always posteriorly, the logic of justification 
cannot do but infer the decision f rom the given normative set by positing that 
there is an available cluster of norms from which the case-specific and case-
conform selection has been made and, on its turn, the selected norm will have 
already defined what fact(s) can be taken as relevant for the actual norm 
application. On the other hand, however, from the point of view of the logic of 
problem-solving (that is, the genuine logic at work in the actual process), any 
consideration of ei ther facts or norms can at all be marshalled in simultaneous 
mutuality of both sides as complementarily reflected upon and through (as 
tested by) one another . 
This is why for an ontological reconstruction of the judicial process, the 
judicial operation with both legal provisions and so called facts can only be 
termed as manipulation. On its behalf and as the temporary end product of 
judicial reality construction, this manipulation will produce so-called case-
law, on the one hand, and law-case, on the other. The former represents law as 
actualised to a concrete life situation, while the latter stands for the legal 
reconstruction of real life facts that will then be adjudicated in law. It is to be 
seen that the exclusive reason and the genuine roots of both sides lies in their 
having been mutual ly reflected-the fact notwithstanding that the official court 
statement is to bui ld on the hypothesis (taken as an ideological claim) of their 
being independently posited and then related to one another. 
4. In sum, the law can not simply be reduced to rule components alone.8 What 
is more, similarities and dissimilarities amongst legal arrangements can not even 
be reduced to rule contextures termed as mentalités juridiques either (using a 
notion applied until now exclusively to the self-conflicting contemporary 
8
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Is Law A System of Enactments? In: Peczenik, A.-Lindahl, L . -
Roermund. В.: Theory of Legal Science. Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, 176. 
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European legal set-up, composed of Civil Law and Common Law regimes').1 0 
The realisation of differing legal mentalities lurking behind in the background 
is part of a larger problem indeed that can only be revealed, I believe, by future 
inquiries into what I propose to call 'Comparative Judicial Mind' within the 
larger domain of future analyses on the field what I do mean by 'Comparative 
Legal Cultures'.11 
Unfolding what is inherently working within the judicial 'black-box' promises 
an answer to the query raised in the former paragraphs, namely, whether or not 
the law as the total sum of enactments is either one of the (probably determi-
native) relatively autonomous components of the complex legal network aiming 
at the regulation and effective control of behaviours or, simply, one of the 
(probably determinative) signals of cultural expectations formulated in many 
ways in the complex social patterning network taken in the largest sense, a 
total sum that can neither stand for nor substitute to the total complex of social 
patterning (which is to enclose into one framework both cultural determination 
and the entire process of getting determined in interaction). 
Concludingly, the comparative analysis of the judicial 'black-box' is faced 
with a double task: on the one hand-as motivated by pure theoretical interest-
it recourses to historical "legal mapping", that is, to draw the available 
taxonomy of all the variety of past and present legal experiences of theatrum 
legale mundi in representation of the whole arena of our historical and cultural 
diversity,12 and on the other hand-for the sake of assuring mutual cognition on 
behalf of all concerned and out of purely practical interest-, it is to promote 
interaction amongst differing civilisational superstructures, with approaches, 
conceptual sets and institutions, human sensitivities and professional skills 
included, for widening their horizons in a continued learning process. 
For the expression, and its unfolding as a key term, cf. Legrand, P.: Le droit 
comparé. Paris, 1999, 127. and his Fragments on Law-as-Culture. Deventer, 1999. 
10
 For their internal variety and richness with a partly heterogeneous historico-cultural 
potential, cf. Gessner, V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs. (eds.): European Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot-Brookfield USA-Singapore-Sydney, 1996. 
" Cf. Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine 
Discipline. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 95-113 and <http://akademiai.om.hu/ 
content/gk485p7w8q5652x3/fulltext.pdf>. 
' "Cf . Varga, Cs.: Introduction to Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot-Hong Kong-Singapore-Sydney-New York, 1992, and, more developed, his 
Theatrum legale mundi avagy a jogrendszerek osztályozása [On the Classification of Legal 
Systems]. In: Szilágyi, H. I.-Paksy, M. (eds.): lus unum, lex multiplex. Liber Amicorum: 
Studia Z. Péteri dedicata (Studies in Comparative Law, Theory of State and Legal 
Philosophy). Budapest, 2005, 219-242 and 243-244. 
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5. Up to the point reached here, our developments have been grounded on the 
widely held assumption of classical legal positivism as the approach to law 
traditionalised in the western civilisation." However, our inquiry must diversify 
into further paths of research and extended cores of problematisation, taking 
also into account the materialisation of the l aw ' s own (so called) post modern 
conditions under which the new juristische Weltanschauung itself will declare 
(or simply tolerate the hard empirical facts o f ) the re/dis-solution of legal 
positivism (taken narrow-mindedly as rule-positivism) in a legal regime that 
asserts itself as thoroughly (a) constitutionalised while also (ß) multiculturally 
(y) poly-centered under conditions when (8) even its eventual codification 
cannot aim at more than just foreseeing patterns to be considered (8/1) at the 
level of principles (8/2) as the suggestion of the temporarily best solutions 
(that may be changed the next t ime), which (8/3) openly calls for continuous 
judicial unfolding and further development (refinement and adaptation); or, 
summarily expressed, (e) the final re/dis-solution of classical legal positivism 
in what adepts now call "legal socio-positivism' [socio-positivisme juridique].14  
Well, the ERC advanced research proposed has also to involve the foresight in 
what way and h o w such a new setting (with further ongoing moves also 
considered) will have a detouring accumulated impact on the tasks judicial 
law-actualisation is going to face in actual court processes. 
A further complementary issue and topic of problematisation is set by the 
renewing international arena as well. This is dedicated partly to those forms 
that the above re/dis-solution may have on the field of international law 
proper1 3 and partly to forms that the structural arrangement and internal 
13
 As mirrored by the development of the idea of law-codification and the adventure of 
its variegated uses and attempts at implementation, cf. Varga, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-
historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991. 
14
 Cf. Varga, Cs. : What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates 
Revolving around the Topic of "The Judicial Establishment of Facts". In: Atienza, M . -
Pattaro, E.-Schulte, M.-Topornin. B.-Wyduckel, D. (eds.): Theorie des Rechts und der 
Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657-676 
as well as his Meeting Points between the Traditions of English-American Common Law 
and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments and Experience of Postmodernity in 
Canada), Acta Juridica Hungarica 44 (2003) 21 -44 and <http://www.akademiai.com/ 
content/x39m7w4371341671/fulltext ,pdf>. 
15
 According to Koskenniemi, M.: The Politics of International Law. European Journal 
of International Law 1 (1990) 4-32, „Social theorists have documented a recent modern 
turn in national societies away from the Rechtsstaat into a society in which social conflict 
is increasingly met with flexible, contextually determined standards and compromises. The 
turn away from general principles and formal rules into contextually determined equity 
may reflect a similar turn in the development of international legal thought and practice. 
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o r g a n i s a t i o n of international humanitarian law will p r o b a b l y es tab l i sh w h e n it 
is a b o u t to reach its r e l a t i ve c o m p l e t i o n . F o r , as k n o w n , its novel s t r u c t u r a t i o n 
is b a s e d g r o w i n g l y on the call fo r a m o d e of th ink ing asser t ing d e f i n i t e (wel l -
c i r c u m s c r i b e d ) v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e s in mi l i t a ry /c iv i l s t ra teg ic / tac t ic p l a n n i n g and 
e x e c u t i o n , r a the r t h a n on t radi t ional s c h e m e s of m e r e issuing r u l e s of 
b e h a v i o u r , a r egu l a to ry m o d e l h i s to r i ca l ly p rac t iced h i t h e r t o in law. W e l l , the 
q u e r y f o c u s e s he re on w h a t r e p e r c u s s i o n s this new m e t h o d of p a t t e r n i n g may 
and p r o b a b l y will h a v e as regards to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of domes t i c l a w s a n d the 
d ive r s i f i c a t i on of the l a t t e r ' s i n s t r u m e n t s . 
6. It c an be t aken f o r g r a n t e d that so l o n g a s it is not c l e a r e d a d e q u a t e l y a n d to 
the su f f i c i en t depth w h a t law in social ex i s t ence t ru ly is (that is, w h a t indeed 
makes it sui table to exer t normat ive e f f e c t s in the rea lms of both the O u g h t /Sollen 
and the Is /Sein as we l l ) , 1 6 cer ta in ly w e sha l l not be in a posi t ion to c o n t r o l its 
c o n s c i o u s p l a n n i n g and shap ing , that is, i ts overal l d e s t i n y . Until it w e canno t 
he lp e n t e r t a i n i n g o u r s e l v e s in re of l aw if no t in a m e r e l y symbol ica l s e n s e and 
wi th a shee r ly m e t a p h o r i c a l force , i .e . , in the e x c l u s i v e m a n n e r of s i g n a l l i n g 
s o m e t h i n g as r e f e r r i n g to it at the m o s t . 1 7 W h e n in e v e r y d a y p r o f e s s i o n a l 
There is every reason to take this turn seriously-though this may mean that lawyers have to 
re-think their professional self-image. For issues of contextual justice cannot be solved by 
the application of ready-made rules or principles. Their solution requires venturing into 
fields such as politics, social and economic casuistry which were formally delimited 
beyond the point at which legal argument was supposed to stop in order to remain »legal«. 
To be sure, we shall remain uncertain. Resolutions based on political acceptability cannot 
be made with the kind of certainty post-Enlightenment lawyers once hoped to attain. And 
yet, it is only by their remaining so which will prevent their use as apologies for tyranny." 
In the context of Georg Lukács Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins 
(Prolegomena, MS in Lukács Archives M/153, p. 253), it is of a criterial importance that 
"social being" as such can only emerge once the phenomenon in question starts actually 
exerting specific effects |e.g., „Das Sein besteht aus unendlichen Wechselbeziehungen 
prozessierender Komplexe" |. 
17
 As already demonstrated by the author-Lccíí/rei on the Paradigms... op. cit.. 
passim-, in addition to the ways in which the law shall be treated and applied (as something 
ready-made), also-as a prior issue-the ways by which the law can be produced (e.g., 
which procedure can result in a law made, fed from what and attaining what degree of 
completion) are getting conventionalised by the ideology of the legal profession. For we could 
take it as previously given from our inquiries into the methodology of the formation of legal 
notions-Varga, Cs.: Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des concepts en 
sciences juridiques in Archives de Philosophie du Droit 16 (1973) 205-241-and into the 
law's anthropological foundations-Varga, Cs.: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold 
Pospisil and the Comparative Study of Legal Cultures in Law in East and West. Tokyo, 
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routine we act as jurists, usually we identify what we mean by the law through 
its eventually objectified phenomenal forms, that is, through the latter 's 
procedurally due formal enactment, its textual wording, as carrier of what we 
qualify by legal validity;18 although when we act as jurisprudents we are aware 
of the underlying fact that this is but a simplifyingly abbreviated expression, 
and no criteria set by actually canonised states of an ideology (upheld 
temporarily by the legal profession) is entit led to substitute to scientific 
description and definition. This is why the subject and main vocation of our 
present interest in the recent research topic is to circumscribe, as exactly as 
possible, those necessarily fragmentarily objectified items (composing parts) of 
the law (necessarily withstanding, of course, definitions pointing beyond the 
limitingly relativising terms of "in this or that sense" and "more or less", 
because the law stuff, lingually expressed, is the same for law enacted, law 
enforced, law doctrinally treated in so called Rechtsdogmatik, as well as for law 
as the scientific object of study), together with those entire social, institutional, 
and intellectually represented environments of law that, on the final analysis 
and at any given time, will in their totality create and make up as well as form 
and shape the law. 
7. In want of a deepened answer to the above, it is by far not unambiguous 
what we exactly desire for when, for instance, we announce our strive for the 
harmonisation of laws within the European Union (unifying them by common 
codification, among others),19 or when, responding to the challenges made 
1988, 265-285 and his 'Law', or 'More or Less Legal?' Acta Juridica Hungarica 34 (1992) 
139— 146—that independently of the self-definition and self-provision of the law, there is a 
constant battle for both its everyday uses and tendential definition ongoing among at least 
three of its feasible components in mutual rivalry: positing as law / enforcing as law / 
popular practicing as law. Accordingly, instead of ' l aw ' in general, we can only speak 
about law with further specification implied, that is, as circumscribing it in and against a 
multifactoral continuous move. Or, on final analysis, the question of 'what the law is' is 
changed by the sole issue in which sense the law is properly and actually meant; whether 
anything meant is meant so either more or less; and if it is meant so at all, then in which 
phase of either developing to become, or ceasing to have been, a law. 
18
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Validity. Acta Juridica Hungarica 41 (2000) 155-166 and 
<http://springer.om.hu/content/mk0r8mu315574066/fulltext.pdf>. 
14
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: La Codification à l'aube du troisième millénaire in: Cohen-Jonathan, 
G.-Gaudemet, Y.-Hertzog, R.-Wachsmann. P.-Waline, J. (eds.): Mélanges Paul Amselek. 
Bruxelles. 2004, 7 7 9 - 8 0 0 and his Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 89-117 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
cv56191505t7k36q/fulltext.pdf>, as well as Az Európai Unió közös joga: Jogharmonizálás és 
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explicit by the globalisation process ongoing in our days, we declare our longing 
for a substantiated respect for 'the rule of law' and 'legality', both in the further 
shaping of international law and especially within the decision making processes 
of international organisations (such as the United Nations).20 For nowadays 
more than dreams are at stake on this global terrain. Firm determination is 
almost reached for that upon the model offered domestically by constitutional 
courts, some legal/juristic filtering agent should and shall indeed be built in 
at/around the peaks of such big international organisations (amongst which 
mostly the United Nations Organisation Security Council is specified by the 
literature), with a clear intent to control and possibly also efficaciously sanction 
the conformity of the course they are actually taking with the ideal of what is 
now called 'the international rule of law', even if it is by far not thoroughly 
and reassuringly clarified what is meant exactly thereby and how it can be 
measured within a multi-partnership complex network operated by various 
sides and under ever-changing conditions. 
II. Questions to be Raised by Legal Arrangements Individually 
8. All these developments precondition to clarify the (simultaneously condi-
tioning and conditional) basic issue in what law does indeed subsist. 
The overall query for identifying what on final analysis law consists of and 
what it is building constantly from can only be detected from its actual 
operation, that is, from the moves by which it is operated and made to funct ion, 
otherwise speaking, f rom its practical working (including the ways by which it 
recurrently reconventionalises its standing or innovative routine), or, in sum, 
from the analysis of intellectual/mental operations actually effected on/by (while 
appeals and/or references are getting made to) the law. For reaching adequate 
jogkodifikáció |The common law of the European Union: Harmonisation and codification]. 
lustum Aequum Salutare 4 (2008) 131-150 and 283. 
Cf., e.g., Bryde, B.-O.: Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationa-
lisierung des Verfassungsrechts. Der Staat 42 (2003) 1. 61 et seq. and, for the background, 
Goldstein. J. et al. (ed.): Legalization and World Politics. Cambridge, Ma., 2001, and 
Pildes. R. H.: Conflicts between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of 
Legalism. Virginia Journal of International Law 44 (2002), 145 et seq. For an overview, 
see also by the author 'Jogi kultúránk - európai és globális távlatban' [Our legal culture 
from a European and global perspective] in: Paksy, M. (ed.): Európai jog és jogfilozófia. 
Tanulmányok az európai integráció ötvenedik évfordulójának ünnepére [European law and 
philosophy of law: Papers dedicated to the half-of-the-century of European integration], 
Budapest, 2008, 13-42, particularly para. 5: "The rule of law", 25 et seq. 
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knowledge, we have to reconstruct exactly what it is that on final account gets 
referred to as the law, and indeed, what is the relationship reconstruable 
through such analyses between its aspect (property, feature, etc.) referred to as 
' the law' and the practical conclusion inferred (stated, motivated, and just if ied 
mostly by jus t ices) as 'the conclusion of the l aw ' . 
9. Triple sorts of questions can be formulated here as queries to be addressed 
to all legal tradit ions and arrangements that can at all be included in such an 
inquiry: whether or not (1) their law is exhaustively embodied by their given 
textual corpuses, or those texts, destined only to offer from what to learn the 
law, are mere signals as exemplifications f r o m the law, or references to realise 
how rich the potential hidden in the entire stuff of the law is, or not more 
ambitious then serving as memo-props or didactic help on desirable or mostly 
followed practices in the name of the law; whether or not (2) in the medium 
carrying or l ingually manifesting it, the law is also conceptualised, that is, its 
words used are at the same t ime defined as systemic and taxonomic locuses 
of a notional network built at varying (adequate) levels of generality with the 
claim of exhaust ive completeness, or all these are, in want of bet ter , 
linguistically exhibited for the exclusive sake of making communication 
possible at all on law, with kinds of mere naming that only characterise, instead 
of any classification performed within some relatively closed and internally 
arranged taxonomy; and lastly, whether or not (3) in the intellectual opera-
tional series targeting that the mutual reflection of the law and the facts 
constituting the case of it will be achieved in the case at hand, the claim is 
formulated and enforced for the legal decision being derived f rom the law as a 
logical conclusion of it (parallel to the requirement for its categorically formal 
and exhaustive posterior justif ication excluding any alternative to the 
decision reached), or logic can only and will in fact remain in the background 
all through, playing, if at all, some merely controlling function at the most.21 
For some basic hints, cf. Varga, Cs.: Jogdogmatika, avagy jus, jurisprudentia és 
társai - tudományelméleti nézőpontból [Rechtsdogmatik, or jus and jurisprudentia in the 
perspective of the theory of science] and 'Jog', ' jogtudomány', ' tudomány' - lét- és ismeret-
elméleti nézőpontból (Viszontválasz) [Law, science of law, and science, in an ontological 
and epistemologieal perspective] and A dogmatika természetét illető kutatások lehetséges 
hozadéka (Hozzászólás) [The possible fruits of inquiries into the nature of dogmatics]. 
In: Szabó, M. (ed.): Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet. A Miskolci Egyetem és a Miskolci 
Akadémiai Bizottság által 2006. november 10-én és 11-én rendezett konferencia anyaga 
[Legal dogmatics and legal theory: Conference proceedings], Miskolc, 2007, 11-26, 6 8 - 8 0 
and 245-251, as well as his Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics). Acta 
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10. This inquiry can be assured by investigating applied legal techniques in 
quadruple directions that may have developed in each and every legal system 
to a locally sufficient degree, that is, techniques which, on the one hand, (a) 
have to guarantee the need of any given law and order to remain stable and 
preserved in its identity through the continued flow of challenges it is faced to 
answer in the meantime all along, (b-c) have to produce instrumentalities 
available as suitable for that change, adaptation, or mere refinement as needed 
at any time can be effectuated, and which, on the other hand, (d) can close 
down the mutual reflection of rules and facts by/upon one another in a way 
excluding any doubt-mostly by the mere fact (or authority) of the decision 
taken or the self-comforting cover of its alleged logical certainty. 
In accordance with the above, (a) the first of the directions relating to applied 
legal technicalities moves (by oscillating) between the (frequently simultaneous) 
opposites of conservatio/novatio, with the recourse to which partial renewal 
may of course be achieved by interpretation but in most of the cases only 
fragmentarily at a given time, as emphatically counterbalanced by the simulta-
neous conservation of all the other terrains and domains of regulation for a 
while; (b) the second of the directions (sometimes in parallel to the former) 
moves (by oscillating) between what is considered ins striction /ius aequum in 
the given moment of the ever-developing overall regulatory arrangement, 
which move (somewhat modelling the former) may venture either to loosen the 
original (or derivative) strictness of the regulation in question (mostly in its 
practical legal consequence) or, vice versa, to fix the original (or derivative) 
equity available in the actual regulation, in each case preserving the prevailing 
state of strictness/equity of all the other fields; (c) a two-way option almost 
depending on free choice as an evergreen instrumental trouvaille of legal 
technicality can also be realised by the continuing tension between moves 
targeting generalisatio/exceptio, in case of which conservation/novation and/or 
strictness/loosening are/is either generalised or made to become an exception 
(whilst we have to be aware of the fact that, logically from the outset, any 
change as compared to the original state makes it an exception). Finally, (d) for 
that the law's abstract normative expectations can be related-projected, then 
ascr ibed- to actual facts by performing a formal synthesis22 unifying the 
Juridica Hungarica 49 (2008) 253-274 and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/g352w44h 
21258427/fulltext.pdf>. 
22
 This is what a Hungarian classic of legal sociology once termed as synopsis for his 
processual theorising. Cf. Varga, Cs. (ed.): Horváth, В.: The Bases of Law / A jog alapjai 
[1948]. Budapest, 2006. Cf. also Jakab, A.: Neukantianismus in der ungarischen Rechts-
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heterogeneities of Ought and Is in the court 's dictum normatively judging upon 
sheer facts, an artificially formalised gesture is also required (reminding of the 
otherwise a-natural effects of, say, mancipatio in Roman law, activated-as an 
institutional act with normative effects-by an easily memorisable formal human 
gesture as the sine qua non complementation eventually performing it in law), 
by means of which in order to officially ascertain equalisibility (reflectability and 
ascribibility, or correspondence or similarity) between the two sides, depending 
on the logical transcription of their connection established, either logified sub-
sumption [subsumptio] or discretionally decided subordination [subordinatio] 
will finally be declared by mobilising all the available and freely disposable 
legal techniques for its demonstration [justificatio / motivatio]. 
(It is to be noted that the classical stock of legal technicalities have to be 
expanded so as to include, for instance,"' techniques of argumentation by basic 
principles and of the constitutionalisation of issues, as well as the recourse to 
fil l ing gaps in the law or the case-specific determination of the meaning of so-
called flexible or uncertain terms in law.) 
III. The Circle of Legal Arrangements to be Included in the Investigation 
11. The investigation revolving around the judicial 'black-box' is to concentrate 
(1) on Civil Law and Common Law arrangements, decisive for foreseeing the 
prospects of their future dis/con-vergence what is at stake when we aim at the 
eventual unification of laws within the European Union, by surveying also, on 
the one hand, (1/a) their antecedents, involving the kinds of legal reasoning 
characteristic of the ancient Greeks and Romans (differentiated amongst them-
selves according to relevant per iods) and, on the other, (1/b) their historical 
formation within/into own so cal led families or groups-separately in the 
(1/b/a) Latin and Germanic, as well as the (1/b/ß) Nordic s tuf fs - , enlarged up 
to include (1/c) their mixed/mixing branching(s) off in the world (exemplified 
primarily by Scotland, Québec, Louisiana, and the State of Israel) as well. This 
has to be complemented by the other part of the diversity of world civilisations, 
namely, by (2) what can be learned about the resolution/settlement of legal 
conflicts in autochthonous societies, as probably our common civilisational 
root culture (with the data of contemporary legal anthropological researches 
and tribal materials included), as well as, nearing the specifically European 
théorie in der ersten Hälfte des XX. Jahrhunderts. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
94 (2008) 264-272. 
23
 Cf. with para. 5 above. 
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roots, (3) the classical Jewish and Arabic traditions, contrasted-for signalling 
the availably practiced variety of patterns-with at least (4) the Asian tradition 
exemplified by the Korean, Chinese and Japanese procedures and lastly, as 
annexed by-in function of the availability of data and monographic treatments-
for instance, (5) the Persian, Indian, or other tradition(s). 
IV. Purpose and Impact of Investigations 
12. The research hypothesis itself is addressing important challenges at the 
frontiers of the field addressed by its being grounded on assumptions going 
substantially beyond the current mainstream state of the art. Its underlying 
approach to law through the reinterpreted duality of "law in books" and "law 
in action" between which the judicial 'black-box' (calling for unfolding in the 
present project) can only erect a bridge by opening up quite new horizons, 
once it is also recognised that the very fact of (alongside the manner in which) 
exerting social influence constitutes-serving as the basis for-the ontological 
existence of law. Thereby features of law in practice perceived mostly as either 
contingently added moments or mere accidents of false consciousness (and 
therefore treated, if at all, epistemologically) are elevated into the unified 
domain of the law's very ontology. In parallel with the distinction of the logic 
of problem solving f rom the one of formal justification, the very notion of 
legal technique and its usual assessment as mere accompaniment in instrumental 
complementation is changed to an unconventionally novel one, with a creative 
or arbitrative potential able to marshal the process up to its outcome.24 By 
launching a research to be carried on 'the comparative judicial mind ' , the 
concept of "legal mentalities" itself (quite à la mode now and excellently useful 
in prophesising on the con-/dis-verging prospects of Civil Law and Common 
Law in the European Union) is transubstantiated into a transdisciplinary notion 
that can only be described by a long series of multidisciplinary investigations. 
Such features of law as its exhaustive embodiment in textures, conceptualisa-
tion perfected, or thorough logification, have never been systematically surveyed 
through historico-comparative inquiries. Moreover, neither themselves indeed 
nor their varieties in various legal-cultural settings have been notionalised as 
"
4
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 
1995 and his What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around 
the Topic of "The Judicial Establishment of Facts". In: Atienza, M.-Pattaro, E.-Schulte, 
M.-Topomin, B.-Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift 
für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657-676. 
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yet. What 1 call post modern challenges of and by the law25 is well cultivated in 
literature but without having been generalised as parts (or the over-weighty 
superior part) in any overall Juristische Methodenlehre (or juristic meth-
odology). And almost the same holds for international law, for neither 
humanitarian methodology nor post positivism's challenge to international 
regulation has ever been subjected to legal philosophical reflection, generali-
sation and application up to now. 
European endeavours at unifying/codifying/harmonising member states' 
laws are mostly politically expressed and sectorally advanced in travaux fore-
préparatoires rather than envisaged in all their possible actual implementa-
tions, including their feasible legal-philosophical dimensions. As a matter of due 
course, 'Rule of Law ' and ' international rule of law' have only simply been 
mostly used as key words without whatever theoretical-methodological 
scrutiny done to the depth, what the present paper proposes to achieve. 
Accordingly, the conceptualisation itself it is bound to conclude by has to be 
unconventionally novel. 
Or, the impact will be (1) a more differentiatedly complex notion of law in 
which both the classical positivist and the post positivist stands are transcended 
by a concept based upon something operated rather than merely positivated; 
(2) a theatrum legale mundi with a thorough historico-comparative overview 
of the kinds of judicial mind actively working in all its representative varieties, 
past and present; and (3) a legal-philosophical substantiation of (3a) what can 
at all be meant (3aa) by the "rule of law" and "international rule of law" and 
also (3aß) by unification, codification and harmonisation of laws, especially in a 
European Union context; as well as (3b) what impact so called post modern 
conditions of law expressed by the constitutionalisation of issues and the 
argumentation by principles may have on the future of judicial adjudication in 
view of the self-strengthening re-/dis-solution of classical rule-positivism; 
(3ca) what impact the specific methodology of international humanitarian law 
may have on other fields of law, including the issue of (3cß) what impact post 
modern novelties and humanitarian specificities may have on the 
understanding and individual identifiability of what is meant exactly by the 
"rule of law" and "international rule of law".26 
25
 Para. 5 above. 
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The Timesharing Contract in Hungary and in Europe 
1. Regulation of timesharing contracts 
The European Parliament and Council adopted Direct ive 94/47/EC (on the 
protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to 
the purchase of right-to-use immovable properties on a timeshare basis) on 26 
October 1994 for the following reasons: 
- From the aspect of timesharing contracts, the differences between the 
national legal systems may restrain the management of the internal 
market and deform competition; 
- Consumers shall be protected at a high level (the right to information, 
providing for the right for rescission, requirement of written informa-
tion, prohibition of paying deposit/advance); 
- Minimum obligations shall be prescribed for marketers, and the 
performance thereof shall be provided; 
- The minimum elements of timesharing contracts shall be determined 
(see: appendix of directive); 
- Common provisions referring to the language of timesharing contracts 
are needed. 
The directive's aim is not to provide for complete regulation regarding 
timesharing contracts. Its scope extends to the legal harmonization of the 
following aspects: 
- information being the fundamental element of the contract, 
- communication of information (time, mode), 
- the consumer's due rescission.' 
In the member states of the European Union, during the codification of the 
timesharing contract, either consumer protection became conspicuous (see: 
Scandinavian countries, Benelux states, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria), 
Associate professor, University of Szeged, Faculty of Law, H-6721 Szeged. Rákóczi 
tér 1. 
E-mail: papptekla@juris.u-szeged.hu 
' Papp, T.: Atypical contracts. Szeged, 2007. 77. 
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or market commerce and the aspects of the law of taxatation were taken into 
consideration (see: Greece, Portugal , Spain, France).2 A common feature of the 
member states' regulations is that the realization of the objectives of Directive 
94/47/EC was the primary task thereof. The member states adopted the 
conceptual determinations almost in the same way (see: Point 2.). The member 
states' implementations are identical to the directive in connection with the 
minimum content element (consumer data, criterion of right-to-use, payment 
liability of the consumer), fo rmal requirements (simple documents) of time-
sharing contracts, and the determination of the written information that shall be 
given to the consumer [in connection with the marketer, the right-to-use, real 
estate, consideration to be paid by the consumer, information of the consumer's 
due rescission and the final c lause (the written information shall be regarded as 
the part of the contract)]. Sharper differences appear in the subject matter of 
qualifying of t imesharing contrac ts and in the time-period of the socalled 
'cooling off per iod ' (the consumer ' s 'calming down period': after contracting 
the right for rescission, with strict legal title, is due to the consumer). With 
regards to the letter: 
- 10 day rescission (counting from the date of the contract and giving a 
copy to the consumer) is determined by Dutch, Finnish, Irish, Greek, 
Italian, Portuguese, French, Danish, Swedish and Spanish law, 
- Austrian, German and English regulations give 14 days to the consumer 
to exercise the right of rescission, 
- the Belgian and Hungarian codes give 15 days to the consumer to exercise 
the right of rescission.3 
The Hungarian Government decree (20/1999 (II. 9) Government decree on 
contracts for purchasing the right-of-use of real estate on a timeshare basis) and 
the Directive harmonize with regard to the aspect of subject-determination, 
formal requirements of concluding, content elements (referring to the information 
being inherent to the contract), the consumer's right to rescission, prohibition 
of advance/deposit, applicable law. Considering the definition of timesharing 
contracts, the Hungarian implement ing law is more detai led: it is extended 
to recreational use as well, and it does not determine min imum time for a 
repeated, definite period (the Directive does not allow establishing a right-to-
use lasting less than a week).4 
http://www.timesharingproblems.org/Timesharing_GB/index.html 
3
 http://europa.eu.int/youreurope/nav/hu/citizens/factsheets/at/consumerprotection/times 
hares/de.html 
4
 Papp: op. cit. 77. 
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The up-to-dateness of this theme is indicated by the modification of the 
Directive 94/47/EC. The Commission had drafted a proposal (COM (2007) 303; 
about the consumer protection of the timeshare and long expiration holi-
dayproduct regarding their specific aspects, as their resale and barter) as a 
reform of the Timeshare Directive leading to increased consumer protection on 
7lh June 2007. This proposal is a reaction of the Commission for development 
of timeshare-market, so it contains the following new elements: 
- the extension of the effects of the directive to the movable timeshare, 
for example boathouse, cruiser and mobile house; 
- the changing of the periods: 
- the minimum period of the timeshare won't be 1 week, it can also be 
shorter, 
- the shortest period of the timesharing contract will be 1 year, 
- the cooling-off period will be at least 14 days; 
- the effect of the directive will be extended to the timeshare-broker, who 
gives advice and acts in connection with the resale and acquisition of 
the timeshare; 
- the consumer may join the timeshare-barterpool; 
- the obligation of the information chunks; 
- the prohibition of the paying during the cooling-off period will also be 
applied for the third person; 
- the contracts subordinated to the timesharing contract (for example 
contract for the club-membership) become void by the termination of 
the timesharing contract. 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference and the Consumer Acquis Princi-
ples are targeted the full harmonisation of the consumer protection law. but 
there is a danger of inconsistencies with the reference to the changing of the 
Timeshare Directive. The concepts of the proposal ( for example consumer, 
businessman, resale, contract for barter) are not suff iciently linked to the 
current review of the Consumer Acquis.3 
2. Conceptual analysis of timesharing contracts 
Agreement for purchasing the right-of-use of real estate on a timeshare basis is 
a contract under which the consumer directly or indirectly acquires the right 
3
 Busch, С.: Der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Reform der Timeshare-Richt-
linie - ein richtiger Sehritt auf dem Weg zur Überarbeitung der Verbraucheracquis? Zeitschrift 
fiir Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht/European Community Private Law Review, 1/2008. 13—17. 
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f o r a repeated, definite period fo r the use of recreation or housing of one or 
more properties for at least a three-years period from the marketer, in return 
f o r consideration. Within the f r a m e of the contract, the consumer acquires the 
r ight to use someth ing of a de f in i t e purpose (recreation and housing) for a 3-
year period. (This period may be longer, but it must be definite.) This includes 
o n e or more buildings (e.g. hotel) and rooms, and supplementary accessories 
(e.g. swimming pool, sauna, tennis or golf court). The term is a predetermined 
period of the year (e.g. for a week or 10 days), of an annually recurrent nature 
(on the same days , the same mon th in each year). The right-to-use is received 
f r o m the owner of the real estate (this could be the marketer as well), directly 
or indirectly f r o m the marketer (if he/she is not identical to the owner of the 
real estate), or f r o m a resaler agency (having OTE-membership-Organisation 
f o r Timeshare in Europe-, the company dealing with secondary sale).6 
From a subjective aspect, the characteristic of the timeshare-construction is 
that the contracting parties usually found some kind of organization, or join one, 
in order to enforce their interests more effectively (see: Point 4): consumers 
usually found an association, c lub, or co-operative, while the marketers form 
exchange companies (RCI-Resor t Condominiums International, II-Interval 
International).7 
According to the Hungarian regulation, the direct subject matter of time-
sharing contracts is the t ransfer of the right-to-use by the marketer to the 
consumer.2 Under German, Dutch and Austrian law the marketer obliges himself 
to transmit the right-to-use (Nutzungsrecht überlassen). The general clause 
'Acquiring the right-to-use' is used in the Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Finn 
and Swedish provisions. Under Irish and Greek law the direct subject matter of 
the timesharing contract is the transfer of ownership referring to real estate, 
and other rights. Under Belgian law the consumer may acquire the right of 
jo in t ownership.'' 
According to the Hungarian Government decree, the indirect subject matter 
of the agreement is the right-to-use, under which the consumer may possess, 
use , possibly ut i l ize (change) and alienate the given real es ta te (or part of the 
6
 Papp: op. cit. 63. 
Drábik L . -Fáb ián A.: Travel organizing and timesharing activity in the EU and 
in Hungary. Budapest, 2004. 81. hltp://www.tug2.net/advice/TimeShare-101.htm#mKey 
TimeshareConcepts; http://www.ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2=18&nyelvid=l&kl=3 
2
 Papp: op. cit. 66. 
" http://curopa.cu.int/youreurope/nav/hu/citizens/factsheets/at/consumerprotection/ 
timeshares/de.html 
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real estate) for an annual definite period."1 The Hungarian legal solution 
specifies at least a three-year long period and recurring acquisition of the right-
to-use. The member states of the European Union regulate-according to the 
Directive-a minimum of 3years and periodically recurring (usually annually) 
use." The law's term of wide comprehension referring to the periodicity of 
timeshare was filled with 'more chiselled' content: not only by giving the 
possibility of annual rotation, but e.g. 
- the right-to-use of a predetermined week is enforceable biennually and 
may be taken either in odd years (odd year usage) or in even years 
(even year usage)', 
- or the so-called accelerated use, when the right-to-use is exercised in a 
shorter period as acquired (if the consumer acquires holiday ownership 
use for 10 years, annually 1 week, then in this usage mode-depending 
on the free capacity of the vacationer-yearly 2 weeks vacation through 
5 years, or yearly 5 weeks vacation through 2 years ); 
- or the annual right-to-use may be exercised at the same time, at the 
same resort (fixed unit)?2 
In respect of the period of annual exercise of recurring right-to-use, the 
member states of the Union generally adopted the determination of the mini-
mum 1-week interval of the Directive, the exception being e.g. the Hungarian, 
Danish, Austrian, German, English and the Spanish regulations.13 
The time-share practice may be: 
a) one week long, annually exercisable right-to-use, which 
- fits with the calendar week number (interval), 
- is for a fixed time (fixed week), 
- has a floating-week schedule, when only the holiday season is pre-
determined (high, early, late season and off season), but the number is 
not, 
- has a flexible schedule: either the consumer may choose, according 
to the predetermined rules, the annually utilizable time, or the right-
to-use, acquired by the consumer, may be expressed in points so the 
111
 Government decree No. 20/1999 (II. 9), Article 7, Section (1), point с and k. Papp: 
op. cit. 66. 
" http://europa.eu.int/youreurope/nav/hu/citizens/factsheets/at/consumerprotection/ 
timeshares/de.html 
12
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2=18&nyelvid=l&kl=3 
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t ime and period of the legal practice (usually its place as well) may 
be altered as demanded, 
- is taken in accrued weeks, because the consumer has not exercised 
his/her right-to-use for many years (and in exchange the company 
'banked ' the weeks) and he/she would like to utilize the accumu-
lated weeks all at once; 
b) bonus time, when in the term exceeding the period of recreation -
depending on the f ree capacity of the vacationer - the consumer may 
exercise his/her right-to-use after an already utilized one week term (i.e. 
as an additional right); 
c) quarterly, as a 3 month long right-to-use (quartershare), that may be be 
utilized on a rotation basis: in alternate months, each year ." 
Common features of the European regulation of the timesharing are that 
the right-to-use, as the subject matter of the contract, is negotiable, that it may 
be purchased for a valuable consideration, and that it may serve housing and 
recreational purposes as well (the latest is the service most generally received, 
which is why timeshare is of ten identified with holiday ownership, and termed 
as: "holiday ownership").15 
In connection with the special right-to-use acquired by the timesharing 
contract, new tendencies m a y be realized: 
a) on the one hand, t imeshare is regarded as the part of the sphere of in-
creased tourist services (See: verdict of the European Court of Justice, 
in the case of Travel Vac);16 
b) on the other hand the legal practice may not only focus on real estate, 
but on movables as well: on the basis of an American case, in the 
United Kingdom, shared, temporary fractional owning of luxury cars 
( 7 own a Ferrari/Bentley/Hummer/Rolls-Royce'), luxury yachts and 
aeroplanes is possible within the framework of a Timesharing Contract, 
or using them in luxury hotels, connected with the holiday owner-
ship.17 
14
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2= 18&nyelvid= 1 &k 1 =3 
15
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2= 18&nyelvid= 1 &k 1=3 
16
 C-423/97, Travel Vac S. L. v M. J. A. Sanchis. 
1
 Luxury cars in part-ownership. Common dream. Heti Világgazdaság, 25 December 
2004, 52-53. Nagy G.: Holiday clubs for rich. Part-time luxury. Heti Világgazdaság, 11 
June, 2005, 34-37. Common private aeroplane is spreading, <http://www.deluxe.hu/ 
cikk.php?article=59l&pat=14, 15 June 2005>. 
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3. The system of timeshare 
In Hungary, the most widespread form of timeshare-construction is (a) coopera-
tive society for building and maintenance of holiday apartments, (b) company 
of shareholders, (c) indirect formation. 
(a) The cooperative society for building and maintenance of holiday 
apartments became general at the end of the 1970s (e.g. Hegyvidéki SCH 
Szövetkezeti Üdölőszálloda-lánc). In the cooperative society for building and 
maintenance of holiday apartments, with respect to recreational buildings 
owned by the cooperative, members have legal right-to-use the recreational 
unit temporarily. Such use shall be annual for the period determined in the 
articles of association. This holiday ownership is hereditable, donatable and 
sellable.18 The mentioned Hegyvidék Üdíilöépítö és Fenntartó Szövekezet, 
and Szövetkezeti Üdülőszálloda-lánc sell two types of recreational use, in 
scheduled mode: domestic, i.e. at least a 7 night long perpetual holiday owner-
ship, and extended perpetual holiday ownership (associated with RCI club 
membership).14 
(b) Utilization of company of shareholders ( 'on the basis of timeshare-
shares', e.g. Abbázia Pic., Petneházy Pic.) covers a more complicated system: 
ba) The owner of the real estate is the Pic., and the lessee is an Ltd. 
thereof. The Ltd., as lessee, has the right to sell the right-to-use-within the 
lease-in a scheduled way. Within the framework of a contract for rec-
reational use, the consumer can acquire a right-to-use by purchasing shares: 
the consideration for the recreational right is payed by purchasing dividend 
preference shares. The shareholder, i.e. the consumer, shall not influence 
the adoption and alteration of the lease: this question is not assigned to the 
sphere of the member's meeting, but the Board of Directors of the Pic. 
shall decide thereon.2" From a legal aspect, the construction is uncertainty: if 
the dividend after the share due to the consumer-as shareholder-is the 
timeshare itself, than embodying real right entitlement (in a given case, the 
use of a recreational unit), but it isn't embodying a real membership right.21 
A more lawful variation is if the fund of the manager (or owner) of the real 
estate is produced (or completed) by a share purchase, and, besides this, 
simultaneously they conclude a contract for recreational use (which 
condition is the purchase of the share) with the consumer. The utilization of 
18
 Papp: op. cit. 74. ActCXV of 2004. Article 13. 
" 154/1999. VJ (Decision of the Economic Competition Bureau). 
20
 59/2001. VJ. 
21
 Act CXLIV of 1997. Article 179. 
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timeshare takes place within the framework of the contract for recreational 
use, generally according to the Government decree. Legally it is problematic 
that the shareholders (entitled persons of the timeshare) of the Pic. have no 
influence on the management of the Pic. and on the adoption and alteration 
of the condition of the timeshare, because they can exercise only limited 
membership rights, because the shares are acquired 'with combination sale, 
under duress' (otherwise they could not become entitled to recreational use). 
bb) A more simple form of the above mentioned legal solution is when 
the owner, maintainer and manager of the real estate (resort) is the same 
legal entity (company of shareholders), which directly (not inserting the 
' lessee ') concludes a preference lease contract (for 99 years) with those 
consumers, who take up shares of a definite number and value, or purchase 
at the end of the subscription period."" 
be) From the consumer ' s aspect, maybe the most suitable way of 
purchasing timeshare is when a partnership purchases Vi of the incorporeal 
property quota of the real estate (resort village) and the Pic., to be funded 
by it, purchases the other Vi of the incorporeal property quota from the 
stocks originating f rom the quotation of shares for the purchase price, 
suiting the planned subscribed capital. From a legal-technical aspect, it is a 
share-purchase draft contract, which takes place in connection with the 
contract for the use of real estate. After the completion of the deal, the Pic. 
terminates, and the fund is divided between the shareholders at the rate 
of the nominal value of their shares. Simultaneously with the division, 
focusing thereon, they establish common property with an agreement 
among themselves and they have the suite-quote registered into the register 
of title deeds. The partnership undertakes the profit-oriented, hotel-kind 
management and maintenance of the resort-property. To provide this, they 
establish mortgage on the property quota of the partnership in favor of the 
timeshare-entitled persons.23 
(c) Within the f ramework of indirect formation, the agencies, agents-not 
owning the given real estate-sell ing timeshare, get into connection with the 
consumers.24 For selling timeshare, we find the contract for sole commerce 
agent more suitable than the agent, or commision legal relationship between 
the real estate owner and the agent. 
In 1994 the dominant Hungarian timeshare companies founded the Hungarian 
Timeshare Association (with I I members), which in 2001 transformed into a 
22
 45/1998. VJ. 
23
 247/1995. VJ 
"
4
 Papp: op. cit. 75. 
THE TIMESHARING C O N T R A C T IN HUNGARY AND IN EUROPE 491 
union, managing for information and orientation purposes.25 Within the f rame-
work of the Organisation for Timeshare in Europe, OTE, the Hungarian 
department started its work in autumn of 2003.26 
The system of t imeshare is suitable mainly for satisfying holiday demands: 
generally a right for a one week interval recreation may be purchased, which 
can be used with maximum flexibility of time and space within the exchange 
systems. Before entering the exchange system-in the interest of better 'con-
vertibility' of exchange value-it is worth to consider: where, how big and on 
which service providing real estate, on what season, annually how of ten and 
how long and for how much can holiday ownership be acquired. By the 21st 
century already 90 countries ' 5400 vacationers participated in the exchange-
system. The two largest exchange companies, the Resort Condominiums 
International (RCI) and the Interval International (II); at these, the consumer 
automatically becomes a 'club member' of the exchange company by purchas-
ing timeshare.27 The R C I ' s residence is in London and it has 4 other regional 
centers in Europe. Hungary- together with Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Scandinavian countries, Finnland, Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia 
and Croatia-belongs to the representation of RCI Consulting in Munich.28 
The consumers' demands for bigger diversity resulted in the formation of 
first, an exchange-system, then the points system.24 So in the timeshare-system 
the acquired holiday ownership could be utilized in two ways: 
- by exchange (the club members exchange their holiday ownership to 
another resort and/or another time, sorting f rom the exchange-base of 
the given company); 
- or with the points system (which is the 'currency' expressing the value of 
holiday ownership), where, by using the available points, the consumer 
may reserve a resort (part of the resort) in the resort and time suitable 
for him. Utilization of the holiday ownership has costs as well: besides 
the single entering fee, an annual membership fee and organizational 
fee shall be payed.3 0 
The timeshare-sector - in which 4000 companies are working worldwide -
went through a profile-exchange: 
25
 Drábik-Fábián: op. cit. 79-80. 
26
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2= 18&nyelvid= I &k 1 =3 
"
7
 Papp: op. cit. 76. 
28
 Drábik-Fábián: op. cit. 81. 
29
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30
 Papp: op. cit. 76. 
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- on the o n e hand, among the 40 most significant t imeshare companies, 
6 leading public catering companies appeared (e.g. Four Seasons, Hilton, 
Ramada, Hyatt),31 
- on the o ther hand, exchange companies often provide preferential travel 
service (insurance, air-ticket, car hire etc.) for their club members,32 
- thirdly, timeshares connected to holiday-parks and bathhouses became 
conspicuous. 
The expanding timeshare-system became one of the dominant means of 
tourism, it concret ized the opportunity, uti l ized more of ten by consumers, 
because of the flexibility and accordance to the legal regulations. 
4. Qualification of the timesharing contract 
Directive 94/47/EC does not have the purpose of regulating the legal basis of 
contracts of timesharing and it concludes that the legal nature of the rights, 
regarded as the subject matter of the contract, are very different in each member 
state. The Directive does not classify timesharing-agreements as lease contracts, 
mainly because of the transfer of right-to-use and the ways of payment.33 
The international professional terminology gives three kinds of variation: 
(a) ownership, (b) lease right, (c) special right-to-use. (The timeshare is some-
where between ownership and lease.*4) 
(a) The point of timesharing is distinguished by the conception, identified 
with ownership: 
aa) deeded property covers the negotiable (this can be inherited, sold, 
donated, or rented), registered in the authentic records in the country of 
location of the real estate, 
ab) fee simple is a holiday ownership for the entitled person, under 
which he has negotiable ownership in respect of a pre-determined resort for 
a certain t ime period (it is an incorporeal property quota, which is based on 
common ownership not only in the sense of resort or a section of a resort, 
but in the sense of time as well i.e. a periodically recurrent interval); 
(b) if it is impossible to originate and register timeshare as ownership, then 
the use of real estate is provided either by lease, leasehold; 
31
 Drábik-Fábián: op. cit. 14. 
32
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2=18&nyelvid=l&kl=3 
33
 Papp: op. cit. 64. Preamble of Directive 94/47/EC, Point 3, 4, 5. 
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 http://www.timesharingproblems.org/Timesharing_GB/index.html 
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(c) or by special right-to-use (RTU)\ these two latter rights are also nego-
tiable, and may be founded for a longer, but always definite time (usually 2 0 -
99 years).35 
In the United Kingdom, timeshare shall not rest on ownership, even though 
the entirety of the group of consumers is designated deceptively from the 
aspect of legal judgement: Vacation Ownership, Fractional Ownership, Home-
owners Association. Those having timeshare may form Vacation, Members' or 
Proprietary Clubs, and authorize a trust to manage and maintain the real estate.36 
In Spain, the so-called escritura system was formed (Owners Community/Club), 
which is based on holiday ownership (multiple ownership), however, in the 
agreement the word 'proprieclad ' shall not be used.37 In Belgium the timeshare-
entitled persons are regarded as common owners:'* German and Austrian law 
categorizes timeshare as Teilzeitwohnreclit/Teilzeitnutzungsrecht (timeshared 
holiday ownership/timeshared right-to-use). In both countries, this special right-
to-use may appear as property law, association membership and as a company 
interest, as well. In the Netherlands, timeshare can be property law (ownership, 
or right-to-use) and personal right as well: association membership or company 
interest. The Irish and Greek legal definitions mention ownership and other 
rights (this latter category is not determined). In Portugal the real legal nature, 
timeshared right-to-use ( D R H P , direito real de habitaçâo periodica) and 
holiday ownership (DRT, direito de habitaçâo turística) are distinguished. In 
France, the company of shareholders-construction is spread: the timeshare-
entitled persons are preference shareholders in the company. For timesharing, 
the French often, but not appropriately, use the phrase 'Multipropriété ' (because 
those having timeshare are not the owners). In Sweden, Finnland and in Italy, 
timeshare is regarded as a special right-to-use.39 
The Hungarian Government decree, on contract for purchasing right-to-use 
of real estate on a timeshare basis, leaves the question of the nature of the right 
acquirable by contract unsettled: it may be right-to-use40 or ownership.41 
The Conception of the new Civil Code characterizes the contract for timeshar-
ing as a specific obligation to use, which includes real and civil law company 
35
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2= 18&nyelvid= 1 &kl =3 
36
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2=18&nyelvid=l&kl=3; http://www.tug2.net/advice/ 
TimeShare-101 .htm#KeyTimeshareConcepts 
37
 http://ote.hu/index.nof?o=0&k2= 18&nyelvid= 1 &k 1 =3 
38
 http://www.timesharingproblems.org/Timesharing_GB/index.html 
31
 http://europa.eu.int/youreurope/nav/hu/citizens/factsheets/at/consumerprotection/ 
timeshares/de.html 
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 Government decree No. 20/1995 (II. 9). Article 2. Point a). 
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elements, besides the obligatory nature. According to this, the legislator f inds 
it ei ther among the rules of the law of obligations, or a m o n g special rules of 
property law.42 
From other fields of law, f inancial law and compet i t ion law a f f ec t the 
construct ion of timeshare: 
- f inancial law qual i f ies the right-to-use, acquired by contract for time-
share, as a valuable right and interest, without explaining its nature;4 3 
- competi t ion law tries to fit the t imeshare in the civil law category: use 
of real estate property is divided on a timeshared basis among the joint 
proprietors so fract ional usage is regarded as limited usage.44 
In the Hungarian practice, a contract for timesharing may commence common 
property, usufruct , lease, company interest and coopera t ive , or associat ion 
membership . In tourism advert isements t imeshare is of ten called ' t imeshared 
lease' , ' legal-continuous lease contract ' , or as ' long-term lease right ' .4 5 
In economic special literature, we found a classification, which regarded 
t imeshare as real r ight- to-use, a rguing that it p romotes the sat isfact ion of 
necessities, so it is connected to the res (object), and it is not a value-right, as 
with ownersh ip and mortgage.4 6 
W e agree with the opinion of Vékás Lajos, who focuses on the contractual 
side (according to the Directive and the Government decree): the legal relation-
ship, cove red by the cont rac t for t imeshar ing , is a speci f ic obligation to use, 
including property law and civil law company elements. 47 
Our opinion: 
- if the special r ight-to-use is based on common property or usage, then 
the real nature of t imeshare is stronger, 
- if it is based on organizational membership, then the civil law company 
nature is dominant , so that the contractual relat ionship of the parties 
will be more stressful .4 8 
4
" Papp: op. cit. 64. 
43
 87/2001. Accounting question. 
44
 247/1995. VJ.; 142/2001. VJ. 
43
 Papp: op. cit. 64. 
4h
 Drábik-Fábián: op. cit. 66. 
47
 Papp: op. cit., 64. http://www.ajk.elte.hu/TudomanyosProfil/hallgatoktevekenysege/ 
tdk/pjerkonyv2001/VekasLajos.html 
4X
 Papp: op. cit. 64. 
MAGYAR  
fWÖIWÁNYQS AKADÉMIA 
KÖNYVTARA 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A , V o l . 49 
C O N T E N T S 
STUDIES 
BOND, Jonathan C.: Judicial Independence in Transition: Revisit ing 
the Determinants of Judicial Activism in the Constitutional Courts 
of Post-Communist States 25 
DEÁK, Daniel: Neutrality and Legal Certainty in Tax Law and the Effective 
Protection of Taxpayers' Rights 177 
FEKETE, Balázs: Recent Trends in Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its Implications on Sovereignty 409 
FEJŐS, Andrea: Consumer Protection in Sales Transactions in Hungary 441 
FRIEDERY, Réka: The Role of the European Ombudsman in Dispute 
Solving 359 
GÁRDOS-OROSZ, Fruzsina: Constitutional Rights : Horizontal Effect 
and Anti-discrimination Law in Hungary 111 
GÁRDOS-OROSZ, Fruzsina: The Underpinning of the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights Provided by the Hungarian Constitution: 
Article 8 Paragraph (1) 377 
HORVÁTHY, Balázs: After the First Lessons and Experiences -
Cases Concerning Hungary before ECJ (2004-2007) 89 
KECSKÉS, Gábor: The Concepts of State Responsibility and Liability 
in Nuclear Law 221 
KÖRINEK, László: Global and Hungarian Tendencies in Law Enforcement 1 
NÓTÁRI, Tamás: Verba Carminis - On a Cardinal Point of Archaic 
Roman Law 2 0 3 
SÁRKÖZY, Tamás: Post-Socialist "Primitive Accumulation of Capi ta l" 
and the L a w 143 
VARGA, Csaba: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics) 253 
VÉGH, Károly: A Legislative Power of the U N Security Council? 275 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
BOÓC, Adám: A Brief Introduction to Hungarian Arbitration Law 351 
KENGYEL, Miklós: Recent Developments in Hungarian Civil Procedure 304 
LAMM, Vanda: Japanese-Hungar ian Seminar on "Comparative Aspects 
of Civil Li t igat ion" 297 
MASANORI, Kawano: Arbitration as a Transnational Business 
Dispute Resolution 299 
ORTON, Frank: Some Special Features of Swedish Civil Procedure 311 
PAPP, Tekla: The Timesharing Contract in Hungary and in Europe 483 
TAKEHIRO, Ohya: On the Scarcity of Civil Litigation in Japan: 
Two Different Approaches and More 340 
VARGA, Csaba: Judicial Black-box and the Rule of Law in the Context 
of European Unification and Globalisation 469 
VARGA, István: Setting Aside Hungarian Arbitral Awards without 
Time Limit? 327 
YASUNORI, Honma: The Tendency of the Recent Reforms of the Japanese 
Code of Civil Procedure 318 
BOOK REVIEW 
NOTARI, Tamás'. Studia Iuridico-philologica I. Studies in Classical 
and Medieval Philology and Legal History 
(Tamás Fedeles) 137 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS 
Acta Juridica Hungarica publishes original research papers, review articles, book 
reviews and announcements in the field of legal sciences. Papers are accepted on the 
understanding that they have not been published or submitted for publication elsewhere 
in English, French, German or Spanish. The Editors will consider for publication 
manuscripts by contributors f rom any state. All articles will be subjected to a review 
procedure. A copy of the Publishing Agreement will be sent to authors of papers 
accepted for publication. Manuscripts will be proceeded only af ter receiving the s igned 
copy of the agreement. 
Authors are requested to submit manuscripts to the Editor as an attachment by e-mai l 
in MS Word file to lamm@jog.mta.hu. A printout must also be sent to Prof. Vanda 
Lamm. Editorial Off ice of Acta Juridica Hungarica, Országház u. 30, P.O. Box 25, H -
1250 Budapest, Hungary. 
Manuscripts should normally range from 4.000 to 10.000 words. A 200-word abstract 
and 5 - 6 keywords should be supplied. A submission of less than 4 ,000 words may be 
considered for the Kaleidoscope section. 
Manuscripts should be written in clear, concise, and grammatically correct English. 
The printout should be typed double-spaced on one side of the paper, with wide 
margins. The order should be as follows: author, title, abstract, keywords. Authors 
should submit their current affi l iation(s) and the mailing address, e-mail address and 
fax number must also be given in a footnote. 
Authors are responsible for the accuracy of their citations. 
Footnotes should be consecutively numbered and should appear at the bottom of the page. 
References to books should include the facts of publication (city and date). References 
to articles appearing in journals should include the volume number of the journal, the 
year of publication (in parentheses), and the page numbers of the article; the names of 
journals should be italicized and spelled out in ful l . Subsequent references to books , 
articles may be shortened, as illustrated below (Ibid.; Smith: op. cit. 18-23; or Smith: 
Civil Law. . . op. cit. 34^12). When citing a non-English source, p lease cite the original 
title (or a transcribed version, if the language does not use the Roman alphabet) and a 
translation in brackets. 
Tables should have a title and should be self-explanatory. They should be mentioned 
in the text, numbered consecutively with Arabic numerals . 

New subject collections available 
Beginning wi th 2008 Akadémiai Kiadó is offering new, minor and more 
adaptable collections in Arts & Antiques, Health Sciences, Hungary & 
Beyond, LEAF (Life, Ecology, Agriculture & Food Science), Linguistics & 
Literature, and Social Studies wi th significant pricing discounts. As a new 
feature subscribers of any collection can pick an addit ional title f rom the 
Picks collection for free; its fee is included in the price of the subscribed 
pack. 
Akadémiai Journals Collection • Social Studies 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
Acta Oeconomica 
European Journal of Menthal Health 
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 
Learning & Perception 
Review of Sociology 
Society and Economy 
Akadémiai Journals Collection • Picks 
Acta Geodaetica et Geophysica Hungarica 
Central European Geology 
Nanopages 
Pollack Periodica 
Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica 
Additional details about the prices and conditions can be found at 
www.akademiaikiado.hu/collections 
AKADÉMIAI KIADO 
VANDA LAMM, editor 
Professor of International Law, 
Széchenyi István University 
(Győr) 
Director, Institute for Legal 
Studies, HAS 
Member of the European 
Academy of Arts, Sciences 
and Humanities 
Associate Member of the Institut 
de Droit International 
Research fields: 
public international law, 
nuclear law 
Our online journals are available at our MetaPress-hosted website: www.akademiai.com. 
As an added benef i t t o subscribers, you can now access the electronic version of every 
pr inted article a long wi th exciting enhancements that include: 
• Subscription 
• Free trials to many publications 
• Pay-per-view purchasing of individual articles 
• Enhanced search capabilities such as full-text and abstract searching 
• ActiveSearch (resubmits specified searches and delivers notifications 
when relevant articles are found) 
• E-mail alerting of new issues by t i t le or subject 
• Custom links to your favourite t i t les 
constitutional law • administrative law • human rights • legal philosophy •  
European law • civil law • penal law, public and private international law • labour law 
